Jakob Wennberg
398c734b93
Webhook lifecycle: GET hub.challenge handshake (constant-time verify-token compare); POST verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 over the RAW body before any parse, Zod-parses the envelope, persists inbound rows (partial-unique wamid = dedupe against Meta's up-to-7-day redelivery), acks 200 fast and defers media processing via the after() idiom. Rejected and rate-limited content always acks 200 and lands as skipped/error rows, never a retryable status. Linking: the settings panel (Installningar -> WhatsApp) mints AC- one-time codes (sha256 stored, 10 min TTL, single use, ambiguity-free alphabet); the webhook consumes the code, binds phone to user (HMAC-peppered hash + AES-256- GCM at rest) and confirms with M3. Keyword commands stopp/start/hjalp; unknown senders get one throttled M1 greeting (1/h, 3/day) behind the sender-quota RPC, with no media download and no content persistence. Intake worker: atomic claim on the message row (the durable job record), company resolution (default -> sole membership -> M6 fallback, no item), per-company inbox quota (ack-and-drop, M17 once per 10 min per sender), MIME allowlist, 10 MB stream-checked media download, exact sha256 duplicate check, then the shared uploadAndExtract funnel (source 'whatsapp', channel_context caption, whatsapp_message_id) and the M4 ack with extracted merchant/total/date. Failures wrap to 'error' + error_message + one M18. uploadAndExtract widened: source 'whatsapp', optional channelMeta + actorId; email/upload paths behaviorally unchanged. Deferred to PR4: burst debounce + combined ack (M5), in-chat company choice (M6 buttons + 8h pin), clarifying questions M7-M10, interpret-answer LLM call, sweep cron, retention cron. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
7.4 KiB
Bash
142 lines
7.4 KiB
Bash
# Local development environment variables.
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# Copy to .env and fill in the values: cp .env.example .env
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# ── Required ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Supabase project credentials (Dashboard -> Settings -> API)
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=https://your-project.supabase.co
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NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=your-anon-or-publishable-key
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SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=your-service-role-or-secret-key
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# App base URL (local dev)
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NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=http://localhost:3000
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# Secret for authenticating cron/scheduled requests.
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# Any non-empty random string for local dev: openssl rand -hex 16
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CRON_SECRET=generate-a-random-secret
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# Hosted session security defaults: 30 minutes idle, 12 hours absolute,
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# with a warning 2 minutes before expiry. Set a timeout to 0 to disable that
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# limit. Self-hosted deployments default both limits to 0 unless overridden.
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# The signing key falls back to SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY; set a dedicated
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# random secret if session signing should rotate independently.
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=1800000
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS=43200000
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS=120000
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# SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET=
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# Self-hosted only: set to true when public signup is turned off in your
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# GoTrue/Supabase auth config (GOTRUE_DISABLE_SIGNUP / "Allow new users to
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# sign up" off). GoTrue offers no clean server-side read of that setting, so
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# this flag mirrors it. When true, inviting a teammate who has no account
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# provisions the account server-side via the auth admin invite API (GoTrue
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# must have SMTP configured to deliver that mail) instead of relying on
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# public /register, which GoTrue would reject with "Signups not allowed".
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# The GoTrue redirect URI allow-list (URI Allow List / GOTRUE_URI_ALLOW_LIST)
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# must include /invite/* or the invite email's redirect silently falls back
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# to SITE_URL.
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# Hosted keeps this unset: public signup stays open there.
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# AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED=false
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# ── Optional: extension features (core runs without these) ─
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# AI features: Claude via AWS Bedrock (document extraction + AI assistant).
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# Needs an AWS account with Bedrock model access to Claude. Plain
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# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is NOT supported yet, see issue #1406.
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# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
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# AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
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# AWS_REGION=eu-north-1
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# BEDROCK_MODEL_ID=
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# Bank connections (Enable Banking)
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# ENABLE_BANKING_APP_ID=
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# ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY=
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# Accounting integrations
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# FORTNOX_CLIENT_ID=
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# FORTNOX_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# FORTNOX_REDIRECT_URI=
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# Björn Lundén app credentials (OAuth2 client credentials; per-company
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# User-Key is entered by the user in the migration wizard)
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# BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_ID=
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# BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# WhatsApp receipt intake (whatsapp-inbox extension, Meta Cloud API).
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# ACCESS_TOKEN: system-user permanent token with whatsapp_business_messaging
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# scope only. PHONE_NUMBER_ID: the Graph object id of the sending number.
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# APP_SECRET verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 on the webhook; VERIFY_TOKEN is the
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# GET-handshake shared secret you also enter in the Meta app dashboard.
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# PHONE_HASH_KEY: random pepper for phone lookup hashes (openssl rand -hex 32).
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# PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: 32-byte hex AES-256-GCM key (openssl rand -hex 32).
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# WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=
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# WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=
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# WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET=
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# WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN=
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# WHATSAPP_PHONE_HASH_KEY=
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# WHATSAPP_PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
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# Optional: the public number as E.164 digits (e.g. 46766867041) for the
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# wa.me deep link in settings. Unset = resolved from the Graph API instead.
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# WHATSAPP_PUBLIC_NUMBER=
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# Bolagsverket: digital inlämning av årsredovisning (bolagsverket extension).
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# BOLAGSVERKET_ENV is test | accept | prod (default test) and also caps which
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# environment a company may select in settings (test < accept < prod).
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# Certificate material is read from env ONLY (PEM or base64-wrapped PEM):
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# never from extension settings or the database.
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#
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# SECRET CUSTODY (prod): never keep the real mTLS private key in a plaintext
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# .env file. Inject these at runtime from a secrets manager (Vercel encrypted
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# env vars, AWS Secrets Manager, Vault, Doppler, …), restrict read access to
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# the deploy pipeline, and rotate the client certificate/key on the cadence
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# agreed with Bolagsverket (and immediately on suspected exposure). Outbound
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# hosts are pinned per environment in extensions/general/bolagsverket/lib/
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# client.ts (HOSTS): the endpoint is not configurable via env.
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# BOLAGSVERKET_ENV=
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# BOLAGSVERKET_CLIENT_CERT=
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# BOLAGSVERKET_CLIENT_KEY=
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# BOLAGSVERKET_CA=
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# Safety gate: enable only after agreement, certificate, test-bank fixtures,
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# acceptance testing, and production runbook approval are complete.
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# BOLAGSVERKET_FILING_ENABLED=false
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_BOLAGSVERKET_FILING_ENABLED=false
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# BOLAGSVERKET_ARELLE_VALIDATOR_URL=
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# BOLAGSVERKET_ARELLE_VALIDATOR_TOKEN=
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# ── Optional: product analytics + error tracking (PostHog) ─
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# Hosted only. Self-hosted deployments never load PostHog: isAnalyticsEnabled()
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# (lib/analytics/enabled.ts) short-circuits on NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=true, and
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# no __NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_*__ sentinel is baked into the Docker image, so an
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# operator cannot accidentally ship their users' behaviour to our project.
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#
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# The token is the PUBLIC project token (phc_...). It is embedded in the client
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# bundle by design and is not a secret. Leave unset to run with analytics off.
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# Browser traffic goes through the same-origin /rl rewrite in next.config.ts;
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST is only used by the server-side SDK.
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN=
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST=https://eu.i.posthog.com
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#
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# PostHog Support identity verification. A REAL SECRET (it also authenticates
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# external API requests), so no NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix: it must never reach the
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# client bundle. Only the derived per-user HMAC crosses to the browser
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# (lib/analytics/identity-hash.ts). Unset means support tickets are scoped to
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# one browser session and users recover them by email link, which is the
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# normal state for local dev, CI and self-hosted.
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# POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY=
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# ── Optional: error tracking / observability ──────────────
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# The app routes every error-level log line, and anything flagged
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# `alert: true`, to a provider-agnostic sink (lib/observability). When the
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# PostHog token above is set, lib/init.ts registers the PostHog adapter
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# (lib/analytics/posthog-observability.ts) as that sink; otherwise the sink
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# stays a NO-OP, the PostHog client is never constructed and nothing is ever
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# sent. (The SDK is still bundled in those builds, since the imports are
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# static; it simply never initialises.) The variables below are for a
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# DIFFERENT vendor adapter and still change nothing on their own.
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#
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# Names are generic placeholders. When a provider is picked, either keep these
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# and read them in the adapter, or replace them with the vendor's own names.
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# OBSERVABILITY_DSN= # server-side ingest endpoint / key
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_OBSERVABILITY_DSN= # browser ingest endpoint / key, if used
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# Any adapter reading these MUST forward only post-redaction payloads
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# (lib/observability/redact.ts): see docs/security/logging-and-observability.md
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# Optional overrides. Both have sensible defaults: the environment falls back
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# to VERCEL_ENV then NODE_ENV, and the release falls back to
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# NEXT_PUBLIC_BUILD_ID (the commit sha next.config.ts inlines at build time)
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# then VERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_SHA. Set them only when tagging must differ.
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# OBSERVABILITY_ENVIRONMENT=
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# OBSERVABILITY_RELEASE=
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