# Local development environment variables.
# Copy to .env and fill in the values: cp .env.example .env

# ── Required ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Supabase project credentials (Dashboard -> Settings -> API)
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=https://your-project.supabase.co
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=your-anon-or-publishable-key
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=your-service-role-or-secret-key

# App base URL (local dev)
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=http://localhost:3000

# Secret for authenticating cron/scheduled requests.
# Any non-empty random string for local dev: openssl rand -hex 16
CRON_SECRET=generate-a-random-secret

# Hosted session security defaults: 30 minutes idle, 12 hours absolute,
# with a warning 2 minutes before expiry. Set a timeout to 0 to disable that
# limit. Self-hosted deployments default both limits to 0 unless overridden.
# The signing key falls back to SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY; set a dedicated
# random secret if session signing should rotate independently.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=1800000
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS=43200000
# NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS=120000
# SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET=

# Self-hosted only: set to true when public signup is turned off in your
# GoTrue/Supabase auth config (GOTRUE_DISABLE_SIGNUP / "Allow new users to
# sign up" off). GoTrue offers no clean server-side read of that setting, so
# this flag mirrors it. When true, inviting a teammate who has no account
# provisions the account server-side via the auth admin invite API (GoTrue
# must have SMTP configured to deliver that mail) instead of relying on
# public /register, which GoTrue would reject with "Signups not allowed".
# The GoTrue redirect URI allow-list (URI Allow List / GOTRUE_URI_ALLOW_LIST)
# must include /invite/* or the invite email's redirect silently falls back
# to SITE_URL.
# Hosted keeps this unset: public signup stays open there.
# AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED=false

# ── Optional: extension features (core runs without these) ─
# AI features: Claude via AWS Bedrock (document extraction + AI assistant).
# Needs an AWS account with Bedrock model access to Claude. Plain
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is NOT supported yet, see issue #1406.
# AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
# AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
# AWS_REGION=eu-north-1
# BEDROCK_MODEL_ID=
# Bank connections (Enable Banking)
# ENABLE_BANKING_APP_ID=
# ENABLE_BANKING_PRIVATE_KEY=
# Accounting integrations
# FORTNOX_CLIENT_ID=
# FORTNOX_CLIENT_SECRET=
# FORTNOX_REDIRECT_URI=
# Björn Lundén app credentials (OAuth2 client credentials; per-company
# User-Key is entered by the user in the migration wizard)
# BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_ID=
# BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_SECRET=
# WhatsApp receipt intake (whatsapp-inbox extension, Meta Cloud API).
# ACCESS_TOKEN: system-user permanent token with whatsapp_business_messaging
# scope only. PHONE_NUMBER_ID: the Graph object id of the sending number.
# APP_SECRET verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 on the webhook; VERIFY_TOKEN is the
# GET-handshake shared secret you also enter in the Meta app dashboard.
# PHONE_HASH_KEY: random pepper for phone lookup hashes (openssl rand -hex 32).
# PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: 32-byte hex AES-256-GCM key (openssl rand -hex 32).
# WHATSAPP_ACCESS_TOKEN=
# WHATSAPP_PHONE_NUMBER_ID=
# WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET=
# WHATSAPP_VERIFY_TOKEN=
# WHATSAPP_PHONE_HASH_KEY=
# WHATSAPP_PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
# Optional: the public number as E.164 digits (e.g. 46766867041) for the
# wa.me deep link in settings. Unset = resolved from the Graph API instead.
# WHATSAPP_PUBLIC_NUMBER=
# Bolagsverket: digital inlämning av årsredovisning (bolagsverket extension).
# BOLAGSVERKET_ENV is test | accept | prod (default test) and also caps which
# environment a company may select in settings (test < accept < prod).
# Certificate material is read from env ONLY (PEM or base64-wrapped PEM):
# never from extension settings or the database.
#
# SECRET CUSTODY (prod): never keep the real mTLS private key in a plaintext
# .env file. Inject these at runtime from a secrets manager (Vercel encrypted
# env vars, AWS Secrets Manager, Vault, Doppler, …), restrict read access to
# the deploy pipeline, and rotate the client certificate/key on the cadence
# agreed with Bolagsverket (and immediately on suspected exposure). Outbound
# hosts are pinned per environment in extensions/general/bolagsverket/lib/
# client.ts (HOSTS): the endpoint is not configurable via env.
# BOLAGSVERKET_ENV=
# BOLAGSVERKET_CLIENT_CERT=
# BOLAGSVERKET_CLIENT_KEY=
# BOLAGSVERKET_CA=
# Safety gate: enable only after agreement, certificate, test-bank fixtures,
# acceptance testing, and production runbook approval are complete.
# BOLAGSVERKET_FILING_ENABLED=false
# NEXT_PUBLIC_BOLAGSVERKET_FILING_ENABLED=false
# BOLAGSVERKET_ARELLE_VALIDATOR_URL=
# BOLAGSVERKET_ARELLE_VALIDATOR_TOKEN=

# ── Optional: product analytics + error tracking (PostHog) ─
# Hosted only. Self-hosted deployments never load PostHog: isAnalyticsEnabled()
# (lib/analytics/enabled.ts) short-circuits on NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=true, and
# no __NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_*__ sentinel is baked into the Docker image, so an
# operator cannot accidentally ship their users' behaviour to our project.
#
# The token is the PUBLIC project token (phc_...). It is embedded in the client
# bundle by design and is not a secret. Leave unset to run with analytics off.
# Browser traffic goes through the same-origin /rl rewrite in next.config.ts;
# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST is only used by the server-side SDK.
# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN=
# NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST=https://eu.i.posthog.com
#
# PostHog Support identity verification. A REAL SECRET (it also authenticates
# external API requests), so no NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix: it must never reach the
# client bundle. Only the derived per-user HMAC crosses to the browser
# (lib/analytics/identity-hash.ts). Unset means support tickets are scoped to
# one browser session and users recover them by email link, which is the
# normal state for local dev, CI and self-hosted.
# POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY=

# ── Optional: error tracking / observability ──────────────
# The app routes every error-level log line, and anything flagged
# `alert: true`, to a provider-agnostic sink (lib/observability). When the
# PostHog token above is set, lib/init.ts registers the PostHog adapter
# (lib/analytics/posthog-observability.ts) as that sink; otherwise the sink
# stays a NO-OP, the PostHog client is never constructed and nothing is ever
# sent. (The SDK is still bundled in those builds, since the imports are
# static; it simply never initialises.) The variables below are for a
# DIFFERENT vendor adapter and still change nothing on their own.
#
# Names are generic placeholders. When a provider is picked, either keep these
# and read them in the adapter, or replace them with the vendor's own names.
# OBSERVABILITY_DSN=            # server-side ingest endpoint / key
# NEXT_PUBLIC_OBSERVABILITY_DSN=  # browser ingest endpoint / key, if used
# Any adapter reading these MUST forward only post-redaction payloads
# (lib/observability/redact.ts): see docs/security/logging-and-observability.md
# Optional overrides. Both have sensible defaults: the environment falls back
# to VERCEL_ENV then NODE_ENV, and the release falls back to
# NEXT_PUBLIC_BUILD_ID (the commit sha next.config.ts inlines at build time)
# then VERCEL_GIT_COMMIT_SHA. Set them only when tagging must differ.
# OBSERVABILITY_ENVIRONMENT=
# OBSERVABILITY_RELEASE=