c84f951a5c2f51279277a506754b2bd94de28249
12 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Jakob Wennberg
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398c734b93 |
feat(whatsapp-inbox): intake extension with webhook, phone linking and receipt ack (#1338)
Webhook lifecycle: GET hub.challenge handshake (constant-time verify-token compare); POST verifies X-Hub-Signature-256 over the RAW body before any parse, Zod-parses the envelope, persists inbound rows (partial-unique wamid = dedupe against Meta's up-to-7-day redelivery), acks 200 fast and defers media processing via the after() idiom. Rejected and rate-limited content always acks 200 and lands as skipped/error rows, never a retryable status. Linking: the settings panel (Installningar -> WhatsApp) mints AC- one-time codes (sha256 stored, 10 min TTL, single use, ambiguity-free alphabet); the webhook consumes the code, binds phone to user (HMAC-peppered hash + AES-256- GCM at rest) and confirms with M3. Keyword commands stopp/start/hjalp; unknown senders get one throttled M1 greeting (1/h, 3/day) behind the sender-quota RPC, with no media download and no content persistence. Intake worker: atomic claim on the message row (the durable job record), company resolution (default -> sole membership -> M6 fallback, no item), per-company inbox quota (ack-and-drop, M17 once per 10 min per sender), MIME allowlist, 10 MB stream-checked media download, exact sha256 duplicate check, then the shared uploadAndExtract funnel (source 'whatsapp', channel_context caption, whatsapp_message_id) and the M4 ack with extracted merchant/total/date. Failures wrap to 'error' + error_message + one M18. uploadAndExtract widened: source 'whatsapp', optional channelMeta + actorId; email/upload paths behaviorally unchanged. Deferred to PR4: burst debounce + combined ack (M5), in-chat company choice (M6 buttons + 8h pin), clarifying questions M7-M10, interpret-answer LLM call, sweep cron, retention cron. Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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af9db54405 |
docs(self-hosting): AI runs on AWS Bedrock, not ANTHROPIC/OPENAI keys (#1407)
* docs(self-hosting): AI runs on AWS Bedrock, not ANTHROPIC/OPENAI keys A self-hoster followed SELF-HOSTING.md, set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY, and found document interpretation dead (with a 30s extraction-poll hang per upload). Neither key has been read since the ai-chat / receipt-ocr / ai-categorization extensions were removed in PR #157: all AI (document extraction and the assistant) goes through Claude on AWS Bedrock via AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY. - SELF-HOSTING.md, DOCKER.md, .env.example: document the Bedrock credentials and model overrides; point plain-key support at #1406 - SELF-HOSTING.md: drop the receipts-bucket setup for the removed receipt-ocr extension - EXTENSIONS.md: replace removed extensions with live ones in trees and examples; drop the AI-consent system claims (lib/extensions/ ai-consent.ts no longer exists); services-pattern example now uses the real stripe/skatteverket services - lib/init.ts: startup env warning now checks the AWS keys instead of the two dead vars, so a misconfigured self-host logs the truth Direct Anthropic API key support and pluggable providers: #1406. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: address review, dedupe tree entry and match provider-chain claim to code extractInvoiceFields bails without both static AWS keys, so only the assistant client actually falls back to the credential provider chain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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2296c0cd59 |
fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled (#1404)
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register, where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this instance", surfaced only as a generic toast. New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in .env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST /api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage instead of a silently-successful invite. /auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password (the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the password is saved. getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed" (account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP not configured) so the 502 above is actionable. Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is gated on it. Fixes #1335 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod (verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page routes even existing-account invitees toward /register. - New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC, anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied. - New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence, case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants. - .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently falls back to SITE_URL. - Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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1c9d378df8 |
feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts (#1387)
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit (reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt; self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars. Fixes #362 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review finding on PR #1387. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings - signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null - heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization - sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is never accepted on the userId fallback alone - drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen readers are not interrupted every second Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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52ec3ce497 |
feat(support): open PostHog tickets from the existing support dialog (#1239)
Enables PostHog Support through the Direct API (posthog.conversations), restoring the second channel Recapt used to provide, but as a real ticket linked to the person and their session replay instead of a black hole. The in-app WIDGET stays off on purpose. It is a third-party floating chat bubble, which is exactly what Recapt was: it would sit next to the Assistenten FAB (which already has a hide_assistant_fab preference because users wanted it gone), cannot follow the locked design system, and its copy is not ours to keep Swedish. The conversations API gives the same tickets from components/ui/support-link.tsx, which is already on-design, Swedish and reachable from 8 surfaces. A ticket is explicitly NOT treated as delivery. submitFeedback returns ok only when the Resend email actually went out, even if the ticket opened. Recapt's precise failure mode was reporting success on its own channel while /api/support/contact was dead, and nobody is watching PostHog at 02:00. Tests pin that: ticket-only is ok:false. Identity verification uses posthog.setIdentity(distinctId, hash) at runtime rather than the identity_distinct_id/identity_hash init options PostHog's settings page documents. init runs from instrumentation-client.ts app-wide, before the user is known and including logged-out pages, and PostHog fixes init values for the session. setIdentity is a real method on the SDK (verified typed in posthog-js 1.407.3), so the hash applies from AnalyticsIdentify once the dashboard layout knows who the user is. Without the key it is skipped and tickets fall back to browser-scoped with email recovery, which is the normal state off hosted. POSTHOG_SECRET_API_KEY is server-only, no NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix: it signs identity hashes AND authenticates external API requests, so unlike the phc_ project token it is a real credential. Only the derived per-user HMAC crosses to the browser. Compliance: support free text is declared as its own data category (user.content.support) in .compliance/ropa.yaml and named on the privacy page. Analytics events still carry no message body (the breadcrumb sends only the subject); a ticket carries what the user wrote, because that is the point. Keeping the purposes separate is what stops the privacy page drifting the way the Recapt row did. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jakob Wennberg
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d4f82cafc4 |
feat(analytics): add PostHog (EU) behind a same-origin proxy (#1237)
Recapt shuts down in four days, taking product analytics and session replay with it. This adds PostHog Cloud EU alongside it; the Recapt removal follows separately so events can be confirmed landing first. Wiring choices that are not the tutorial defaults: - Same-origin reverse proxy (/rl -> eu.i.posthog.com) instead of adding PostHog hosts to the CSP. connect-src 'self' and script-src 'self' already cover it, tracking blockers have no third-party host to match, and the Recapt allowlist entries in next.config.ts get replaced by nothing at all when they go. Needs skipTrailingSlashRedirect, since PostHog sends trailing-slash API requests; verified that trailing-slash URLs on normal routes still resolve 200 rather than 404. - /rl is excluded from the proxy.ts matcher. Middleware runs BEFORE next.config rewrites, so without this updateSession() treats an ingestion POST as an unknown protected path and 307s it to /login. Verified with a control: /zz/flags/ -> 307 /login, /rl/flags/ -> 200 from PostHog. This fails silently otherwise, because asset loads keep working through the rewrite while no events arrive. - persistence: 'memory' so nothing is written to the device and no cookie-consent banner is required. Everything post-login is unaffected: AnalyticsIdentify re-identifies on each dashboard load. - session_recording.maskTextSelector: '*'. PostHog masks inputs but not text by default, and this app renders org numbers (which for an enskild firma ARE the owner's personnummer), customer names and balances as ordinary text. Replays show where a user gets stuck, never what their books say. buildGroupProperties() also refuses to send org_number at all, with a test pinning it. - Error tracking registers through the existing lib/observability sink rather than bypassing it, so every error-level createLogger() line is captured already redacted. instrumentation.ts onRequestError covers what escapes uncaught. Analytics is hosted-only: isAnalyticsEnabled() short-circuits on NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED and no Docker sentinel is added, so self-hosted runs with zero third-party runtime code. Recapt got that outcome only by accident, via a missing sentinel; here it is explicit and tested. vitest.config.ts aliases 'server-only' to a stub: it is a build-time guard whose real entry point always throws, which broke 48 test files the moment a server-only module entered the graph. request-context.ts was already carrying the same latent trap. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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f3eacb436d |
Fix/articles (#1216)
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise, while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production. Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that are not repeated. userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger. State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row, consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing. provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client. provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up. Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before the scoped check ran. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A) The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in 20260416120000; this bucket was left behind. Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining legacy prefix objects. The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail the whole query instead of filtering the row out. deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to erase. The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and SHA-256 identical before repointing the row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user had been removed from the company kept reading. Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error strings with the canonical envelope. Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every other v1 read endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and had become the top application consumer of production database time: measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at 7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on the booking path. PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side instead turns that into two indexed round trips. Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling. Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead, since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows. commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column, which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped on the newest rows indefinitely. The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap; the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly. ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change sort semantics on the route that currently works. Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had them. The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters, because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a write that never happened. dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write, and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to 5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0. Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the full tree. The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the lockfile, never workflow files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily. Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which settles the intent. documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession: the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention. webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line place to change that. A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list, and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they are named rather than silently rotting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email. This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined by next.config.ts. Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry personnummer and financial data. verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible. The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md. Structural roots closed: - resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking 1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING - ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document, not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed - sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed - tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all four baselines now empty - three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import, ungated-extension-route Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap), RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/ Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites with isSwedishUserMessage extended. Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice, recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep work and are verified green together. 13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge. 20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres). Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0 errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and ~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass: - replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid() (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo - bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns - credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no cross-tenant figures in exception text - link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end - personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE - same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse - receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts - period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap - documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping - invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression), duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran - match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat) - refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window) - KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint - personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools - worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths - MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk - observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True, cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings call removed) Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests * fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215 pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() = 'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text, reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved. Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column, and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no longer renders as already filed. Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern (all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215 - restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch - replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap warning texts and update the pinned test expectations - drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment - strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate the 2026-07-27 compliance and security review findings - ROT/RUT deduction base is arbetskostnaden INKLUSIVE moms (HUSFL 2009:194 6-9 par.): computeDeduction takes the line vat_rate, all five call sites pass it, and tests pin Skatteverkets worked example (18 000 kr excl = 22 500 incl, ROT 6 750). - Momsdeklaration: new SALES_OUTPUT_VAT_SHORTFALL warning catches output VAT short of the reported sales base (one-directional, never filing-blocking). - SIE import: #RAR records validated for every year index (dates, ordering, 18-month BFL cap as warn-and-keep). - build-invoice-write: SEK invoices populate the *_sek twin columns (rate 1) so both creation paths produce the same row shape. - CI: daily Trivy SCA scan of the npm lockfile (replaces removed Dependabot); compliance review fails loudly on empty review.md. - arcim migration FX logging routed through the redacting structured logger. - docs/security/: authorization policy for the SIE bulk-delete RPC pair and the observability redaction contract. - Rewrote the swedish-payroll ob-overtime reference (was a byte-identical copy of sick-pay.md); skills:generate emitted the atom-body seed migration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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f24b26a139 |
fix: similar-sweep currency remediation, security hardening and v1 API fixes (#1215)
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise, while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production. Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that are not repeated. userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger. State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row, consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing. provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client. provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up. Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before the scoped check ran. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A) The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in 20260416120000; this bucket was left behind. Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining legacy prefix objects. The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail the whole query instead of filtering the row out. deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to erase. The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and SHA-256 identical before repointing the row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user had been removed from the company kept reading. Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error strings with the canonical envelope. Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every other v1 read endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and had become the top application consumer of production database time: measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at 7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on the booking path. PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side instead turns that into two indexed round trips. Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling. Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead, since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows. commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column, which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped on the newest rows indefinitely. The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap; the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly. ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change sort semantics on the route that currently works. Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had them. The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters, because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a write that never happened. dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write, and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to 5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0. Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the full tree. The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the lockfile, never workflow files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily. Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which settles the intent. documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession: the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention. webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line place to change that. A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list, and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they are named rather than silently rotting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email. This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined by next.config.ts. Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry personnummer and financial data. verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible. The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md. Structural roots closed: - resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking 1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING - ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document, not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed - sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed - tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all four baselines now empty - three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import, ungated-extension-route Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap), RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/ Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites with isSwedishUserMessage extended. Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice, recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep work and are verified green together. 13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge. 20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres). Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0 errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and ~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass: - replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid() (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo - bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns - credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no cross-tenant figures in exception text - link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end - personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE - same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse - receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts - period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap - documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping - invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression), duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran - match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat) - refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window) - KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint - personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools - worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths - MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk - observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True, cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings call removed) Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests * fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215 pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() = 'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text, reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved. Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column, and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no longer renders as already filed. Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern (all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215 - restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch - replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap warning texts and update the pinned test expectations - drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment - strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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e11f70b347 |
Bug/gh issues fiz (#1103)
* refactor: optimize page loading and data fetching * fix: resolve recurring production runtime errors * feat: add MCP company and customer updates * fix: handle year-end tax adjustments * feat: harden annual report compliance * fix: expand invoice logo and font support * fix: sanitize API route error responses * fix: sanitize user-facing error messages * feat: persist onboarding and tax assessment notices * fix: reduce cloud backup audit churn * feat: refine invoice editor layout * fix: show saved tax adjustments in INK2 * fix: complete annual report API mappings * docs: record operational safeguards and decisions * fix: harden annual report review findings * fix: adjust column span for description based on VAT registration * New css class name |
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Jakob Wennberg
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ec27228a8e |
style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mattsson
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db8983ba9e |
Add/bokslut (#718)
* feat(arcim-migration): Briox provider with SIE-over-API import - Briox auth via account ID + application token (no app-level credentials); both tokens rotate on refresh and are persisted - New sie-fetcher pulls the general ledger as SIE through the provider API for Fortnox, Briox and Bjorn Lunden - Wizard stops on a failed SIE import and surfaces the real errors instead of proceeding to the misleading migrate-guard message - PROVIDER_SIE_ONLY_FORTNOX renamed to PROVIDER_SIE_NOT_SUPPORTED; new PROVIDER_TOKEN_INVALID for rejected provider credentials Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bookkeeping): per-line accruals (periodisering) on invoices and supplier invoices Defer revenue/costs per invoice line to 29xx/17xx interim accounts with automatic monthly dissolution (nightly cron + catch-up at registration), schedule cancellation on credit, year-end auto-detect exclusion for already-scheduled invoices, invoice-inbox service-period extraction for prefill, and an MCP tool to list schedules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bokslut): iXBRL arsredovisning generation and Bolagsverket digital filing Generate the annual report as iXBRL from a generated taxonomy registry (K2 element lists, taxonomy:generate/check scripts + CI guard), expose it via the fiscal-period API, and add the bolagsverket extension for digital submission to eget utrymme with webhook-driven status tracking (submissions table + pg tests, lifecycle events, year-end wizard UI). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(mcp): raise origin-guard test timeout to 20s The dynamic import pulls in the full server module; the parse alone flirts with the 5s default under full-suite parallel load. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add new scripts and documentation for K2 AB taxonomy generation and validation - Introduced `generate-taxonomy-registry.ts` to automate the generation of the iXBRL taxonomy concept registry from official element lists and tuple models. - Added `validate-ixbrl.mjs` for validating generated iXBRL reports against the official taxonomy package using Arelle. - Included new documentation files: - `k2-ab-arsredovisning-elementlista-2024-09-12_rev20250312_sv.xlsx` - `tuple-innehallsmodell-arsredovisning-k2-2024-09-12.xlsx` - `taxonomi-paket-2024-09-12_rev20250312.zip` * Add tests for bookkeeping accruals dissolution and supplier invoices - Implement tests for the POST /api/bookkeeping/accruals/[id]/dissolve route, covering success and error scenarios. - Add tests for the DELETE /api/supplier-invoices/[id] route, including authentication checks and validation of invoice deletion conditions. - Introduce tests for the Arcim migration provider client, ensuring token handling and error classification. - Create tests for the Bolagsverket extension, validating submission role enforcement and environment settings. - Add Zod schemas for Bolagsverket response payloads to ensure proper validation. - Implement tests for MCP server's list accrual schedules, confirming registration and scope mapping. - Add consistency tests for IXBRL document generation, ensuring duplicate facts and XML escaping are handled correctly. - Introduce typed domain errors for accrual schedules to improve error handling in the service. - Add tests for resolving consent with Briox token refresh concurrency, ensuring proper token management and error handling. * fix(tests): update payload size guard comments to reflect recent changes in tool descriptions and ceiling adjustments * fix(gitattributes): mark generated JSON files in bokslut taxonomy as linguist-generated * feat(migrations): add backfill for invoices.journal_entry_id and fallback for next_voucher_number user_id * feat(bokslut): enhance compliance and financial processing features with new submission details and security measures --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Oscar Holm
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23863371dd |
docs: add .env.example for non-Docker local development (#663)
Adds the .env.example file referenced by CONTRIBUTING.md, with the five required core vars from lib/init.ts plus commented optional extension vars. Un-ignores it in .gitignore with a !.env.example negation. Refs #564. Signed-off-by: Oscar Holm <oscar@numbery.se> |