Claude Opus 5 d9c8f7190b
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feat(analytics): BI-P017 — analyst SQL contract, proven against live ClickHouse with the guard removed
AnalyticsSQLSession is a SEPARATE class, not a method on SiaxAnalyticsEngine.
executeMetric has no raw-SQL surface at all; on the same object the closed DSL
would be one refactor away from growing one. ClickHouseAnalyticsEngine
.executeQuery stays a documented refusal.

FOUR LAYERS, and the guard is deliberately called the weakest:
  1 role   — the CL0UD analyst role is checked when the SESSION IS OPENED, so
             a caller without it never obtains an object that can run SQL.
  2 guard  — statement admission. Comments and literals removed with
             ClickHouse's own lexical rules, ASCII-only outside literals, one
             statement, SELECT/WITH only, and every table reference POSITIVELY
             resolved against the tenant's catalog. Deny-lists are a second
             opinion, never the mechanism.
  3 grants — a per-tenant ClickHouse user with SELECT on that tenant's catalog
             alone, plus a restrictive row policy on the base tables.
  4 views  — the tenant catalog holds only VIEWS, each baking
             `WHERE tenant_id = '<tenant>'`, and tenant_id is not projected.

61 bypass attempts, in one shared corpus, run TWICE: against the guard, and
against a live ClickHouse 24.8.14.39 with LAYER 2 REMOVED. The live assertion
is not "the engine errored" — it is "no canary came back", with BETA_CANARY
seeded into the other tenant's rows and SECRET_CANARY into an ungranted table.
The counterfactual runs first: as admin the same base table returns 100 rows
and BETA_CANARY IS readable, so the isolation numbers mean something.
Result: 0 of 61 leaked. Evidence: evidence/bi-p017/analyst-sql-live-bypass.json.

FOUR DEFECTS FOUND BY WRITING TESTS THAT CAN FAIL — three of them mine:

  * `CREATE ROW POLICY IF NOT EXISTS` is a SILENT NO-OP on re-provisioning.
    Dropping the user empties the policy's apply-to list; the next run skips
    re-creation, so the policy survives with `apply_to_list = []`, applying to
    nobody, while `system.row_policies` still shows the correct select_filter.
    The restricted user read 100 of 100 rows — BOTH TENANTS — from the base
    table. Fixed with OR REPLACE + `rowPolicyVerificationSql`, which turns
    "the policy is applied" from an assumption into a query, and a test that
    asserts applied_to_user = 1 per object.

  * `CREATE SETTINGS PROFILE IF NOT EXISTS` has the identical shape: a changed
    budget never lands. A stale 60-row ceiling survived re-provisioning and
    starved every legitimate statement, with the DDL reporting success
    throughout. Also OR REPLACE now.

  * `describe.skipIf(!reachable)` where `reachable` is set in `beforeAll`
    skips ALWAYS — vitest evaluates skipIf at collection time. Ten tests
    reported green while skipping against a live, reachable server. Replaced
    with the repo's existing env-var gate, which FAILS when CLICKHOUSE_URL is
    set and the server is down rather than degrading to a skip.

  * MEASURED, and it changes the design: a ClickHouse user whose profile
    carries `readonly = 1` cannot have ANY setting changed from the request
    (Code: 164). The BI-P012 ceilings therefore cannot travel with an analyst
    statement; they are baked into the user's SETTINGS PROFILE at provisioning.
    Proven both ways: over-budget scan fails with code 158 from the profile
    with no setting sent, and an attempt to raise it from the request fails
    with code 164.

Honest about what the guard does NOT catch: `SELECT tenant_id FROM
t_alpha_sql.sales` is structurally legitimate and IS admitted. It fails at the
engine because the view does not project the column. Recorded in its own
GUARD_ADMITS_ENGINE_REFUSES list and asserted live, rather than deleted from
the corpus.

evidence/bi-p017 is pinned by tests/analytics/analyst-sql-evidence.test.ts,
which never skips: adding an attack without re-running the live suite breaks
the build, and the pin also checks the counterfactual numbers so the evidence
cannot be a recording of an empty database.

246 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 02:17:07 +02:00
2026-06-24 14:47:12 +00:00
2026-06-24 14:47:12 +00:00
2026-06-24 14:47:12 +00:00
2026-06-24 14:47:12 +00:00
2026-09-06 03:01:40 +00:00
2026-09-06 03:01:40 +00:00
2026-06-24 14:47:12 +00:00
2026-06-24 14:51:57 +00:00

0pt — your data

Data services on demand for the Nordics + Europe. Compose a data job, pay 50 % to start, watch production live, validate with full provenance, deliver anywhere. Owned by SIAX Technology AB. Honest accuracy is the moat: every field carries source, freshness and confidence; nothing is guessed.

Live: https://0pt.app · Contract: CLAUDE.md + docs/

Architecture (verified against code, not aspirational): docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md. It documents the real API surface, the real persistence story, and the known security gaps — including several places where this README is optimistic. Read it before trusting any capability claim below. Repo identity + estate classification: siax.repo.json + siax.config.json. Compliance state: docs/compliance/ (INVENTORY, RELATIONS, OSS-INVENTORY, GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT, BACKLOG, SLUTRAPPORT).

Two planes (see docs/02-architecture.md)

  • Edge (Vercel, this app) — marketing, catalog, the order lifecycle, customer portal, admin portal, and the API route handlers. Defers to the data engine when ENGINE_URL is set.
  • Engine (services/api, runs on a VPS) — FastAPI orchestrator + worker pipeline doing the compliant sourcing (official API → bulk → authorized web → licensed → else level 0). Never on Vercel (long jobs). Bypass/stealth/proxy-rotation/fake-account paths are excluded by design (CLAUDE.md §1).

Routes

Area Routes
Marketing / (hero, filosofi, katalog, motorn, visualiseringar, täckning, editorial, bevis, priser, footer)
Catalog /katalog, /katalog/[id]
Sourcing map /kallor
Order lifecycle /bestall → /bestall/forskott → /order/[id] → /order/[id]/validera
Customer portal /portal, /portal/subscriptions, /portal/files, /portal/integrationer, /portal/settings
Admin portal /admin, /admin/sources, /admin/jobs, /admin/customers
API /api/{health,estimates,catalog,sources,orders,orders/[id],subscriptions,admin/metrics,uploads,auth/*,payments/*,webhooks/stripe,connections/db-grant}

Design system

Mono/editorial, light, radius 0, Inter + JetBrains Mono, single red #e40014, animated grain, scroll-reveal motion. No photography — imagery is rendered data (DataArtifact). Every fact shows a provenance square (ProvenanceBadge). Full spec: docs/05-design-system.md.

Run locally

pnpm install
pnpm dev                       # Next.js on http://localhost:3000

# data engine (separate, optional)
cd services/api && pip install -r requirements.txt && uvicorn orchestrator.main:app --reload

Deploy

  • Config target (as of 2026-08-09): siax.config.json declares deploy.target: "coolify", matching every other SIAX Cloud OS repo (n0d, st0re, aud0, ...) — a Dockerfile "for Coolify" (already committed, see Dockerfile) plus .gitea/workflows/cd.yml (renamed from deploy.yml 2026-08-10) that POSTs a restart to a Coolify app UUID on COOLIFY_TOKEN push.
  • Actually live right now: the only running instance of 0pt.app is still on Vercel (project 0pt, scope Simon Axelsson's projects) — no Coolify app has been provisioned for this repo yet, so deploy.yml's app UUID is a placeholder that fails the job on purpose until someone fills it in. Flipping the config declares intent; it does not move traffic. See docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md §5/§8 for the full "Vercel or fleet" state and what's still open (Coolify app provisioning + DNS cutover — a separate decision from this config change, since the live Vercel deployment is not being touched).
  • CORRECTED 2026-09-06 — the bullet above is no longer true. The Coolify deploy hook is LIVE. The repo secret COOLIFY_TOKEN exists (created 2026-08-31T11:34:34Z) and the repo Actions variable COOLIFY_APP_ID holds a real 24-character UUID, not the TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet literal. Both guard conditions in .gitea/workflows/cd.yml therefore pass. Measured on the push to main at 1ff34410 (2026-09-06): job Deploy to Coolify / deploy (run 11695, job 26295) finished success with coolify deploy HTTP 200 in its log. Every merge into main now fires a real redeploy against cloud.siax.io — know what you are shipping before you merge. Probed 2026-09-06 08:00 UTC: 0pt.app still answers from Vercel (server: Vercel, x-vercel-id: arn1::…) and returns HTTP 402 DEPLOYMENT_DISABLED — "Payment required" on both / and /api/health. So the public domain is down, DNS has not been cut over to Coolify, and the Coolify app — whatever state it is in — serves no 0pt.app traffic. Two separate facts, both true at once: the deploy hook fires for real, and the product domain is dark behind an unpaid Vercel deployment. Still not established: whether the Coolify app itself builds and starts — the deploy endpoint returning 200 only means the request was accepted, not that a container came up healthy.
  • Engine + DB + embeds → one VPS via infra/docker-compose.yml (Postgres+pgvector, Redis, api, worker, NocoDB, Metabase, Caddy).
  • Env inventory: .env.example.
  • Auth on /api/0pt/* is fail-closed: with AUTH_ENFORCE unset the middleware REQUIRES a verified Zitadel Bearer token (401 without one). Only the literal AUTH_ENFORCE=false disables it, and that is refused when NODE_ENV=production (the process throws at startup rather than serving anonymously). Caveat (live-verified 2026-08-10): the deployed instance still answers GET /api/0pt with 200 anonymously — the middleware appears not to run in production (gap S1, root cause unknown). Do not rely on this being enforced until an anonymous request gets a real 401.
  • Fonts: self-hosted via @fontsource-variable/inter + @fontsource-variable/jetbrains-mono (no Google Fonts / next/font/google).
  • API contract (SSOT): contracts/openapi.yaml.

Status

Frontend, full order lifecycle, customer + admin portals, edge API, payment/auth/embed infrastructure, the compliant data engine, schema and infra are all in place and building green. Integrations are env-guarded and activate when their keys/DB are provided:

  1. Database — Vercel → Storage → Postgres (sets POSTGRES_URL) → durable persistence (schema in sql/001_init.sql).
  2. Stripe + Resend keys → payments + email.
  3. VPS for the engine → set ENGINE_URL.
  4. AUTH_SECRET + DEV_LOGIN_KEY → login (full OAuth via Auth.js lands with the DB).

© 2026 SIAX Technology AB. Not affiliated with Protosell.

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