AnalyticsSQLSession is a SEPARATE class, not a method on SiaxAnalyticsEngine.
executeMetric has no raw-SQL surface at all; on the same object the closed DSL
would be one refactor away from growing one. ClickHouseAnalyticsEngine
.executeQuery stays a documented refusal.
FOUR LAYERS, and the guard is deliberately called the weakest:
1 role — the CL0UD analyst role is checked when the SESSION IS OPENED, so
a caller without it never obtains an object that can run SQL.
2 guard — statement admission. Comments and literals removed with
ClickHouse's own lexical rules, ASCII-only outside literals, one
statement, SELECT/WITH only, and every table reference POSITIVELY
resolved against the tenant's catalog. Deny-lists are a second
opinion, never the mechanism.
3 grants — a per-tenant ClickHouse user with SELECT on that tenant's catalog
alone, plus a restrictive row policy on the base tables.
4 views — the tenant catalog holds only VIEWS, each baking
`WHERE tenant_id = '<tenant>'`, and tenant_id is not projected.
61 bypass attempts, in one shared corpus, run TWICE: against the guard, and
against a live ClickHouse 24.8.14.39 with LAYER 2 REMOVED. The live assertion
is not "the engine errored" — it is "no canary came back", with BETA_CANARY
seeded into the other tenant's rows and SECRET_CANARY into an ungranted table.
The counterfactual runs first: as admin the same base table returns 100 rows
and BETA_CANARY IS readable, so the isolation numbers mean something.
Result: 0 of 61 leaked. Evidence: evidence/bi-p017/analyst-sql-live-bypass.json.
FOUR DEFECTS FOUND BY WRITING TESTS THAT CAN FAIL — three of them mine:
* `CREATE ROW POLICY IF NOT EXISTS` is a SILENT NO-OP on re-provisioning.
Dropping the user empties the policy's apply-to list; the next run skips
re-creation, so the policy survives with `apply_to_list = []`, applying to
nobody, while `system.row_policies` still shows the correct select_filter.
The restricted user read 100 of 100 rows — BOTH TENANTS — from the base
table. Fixed with OR REPLACE + `rowPolicyVerificationSql`, which turns
"the policy is applied" from an assumption into a query, and a test that
asserts applied_to_user = 1 per object.
* `CREATE SETTINGS PROFILE IF NOT EXISTS` has the identical shape: a changed
budget never lands. A stale 60-row ceiling survived re-provisioning and
starved every legitimate statement, with the DDL reporting success
throughout. Also OR REPLACE now.
* `describe.skipIf(!reachable)` where `reachable` is set in `beforeAll`
skips ALWAYS — vitest evaluates skipIf at collection time. Ten tests
reported green while skipping against a live, reachable server. Replaced
with the repo's existing env-var gate, which FAILS when CLICKHOUSE_URL is
set and the server is down rather than degrading to a skip.
* MEASURED, and it changes the design: a ClickHouse user whose profile
carries `readonly = 1` cannot have ANY setting changed from the request
(Code: 164). The BI-P012 ceilings therefore cannot travel with an analyst
statement; they are baked into the user's SETTINGS PROFILE at provisioning.
Proven both ways: over-budget scan fails with code 158 from the profile
with no setting sent, and an attempt to raise it from the request fails
with code 164.
Honest about what the guard does NOT catch: `SELECT tenant_id FROM
t_alpha_sql.sales` is structurally legitimate and IS admitted. It fails at the
engine because the view does not project the column. Recorded in its own
GUARD_ADMITS_ENGINE_REFUSES list and asserted live, rather than deleted from
the corpus.
evidence/bi-p017 is pinned by tests/analytics/analyst-sql-evidence.test.ts,
which never skips: adding an attack without re-running the live suite breaks
the build, and the pin also checks the counterfactual numbers so the evidence
cannot be a recording of an empty database.
246 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
0pt — your data
Data services on demand for the Nordics + Europe. Compose a data job, pay 50 % to start, watch production live, validate with full provenance, deliver anywhere. Owned by SIAX Technology AB. Honest accuracy is the moat: every field carries source, freshness and confidence; nothing is guessed.
Live: https://0pt.app · Contract: CLAUDE.md + docs/
Architecture (verified against code, not aspirational):
docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md. It documents the real API surface, the real persistence story, and the known security gaps — including several places where this README is optimistic. Read it before trusting any capability claim below. Repo identity + estate classification:siax.repo.json+siax.config.json. Compliance state:docs/compliance/(INVENTORY, RELATIONS, OSS-INVENTORY, GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT, BACKLOG, SLUTRAPPORT).
Two planes (see docs/02-architecture.md)
- Edge (Vercel, this app) — marketing, catalog, the order lifecycle, customer portal,
admin portal, and the API route handlers. Defers to the data engine when
ENGINE_URLis set. - Engine (
services/api, runs on a VPS) — FastAPI orchestrator + worker pipeline doing the compliant sourcing (official API → bulk → authorized web → licensed → else level 0). Never on Vercel (long jobs). Bypass/stealth/proxy-rotation/fake-account paths are excluded by design (CLAUDE.md §1).
Routes
| Area | Routes |
|---|---|
| Marketing | / (hero, filosofi, katalog, motorn, visualiseringar, täckning, editorial, bevis, priser, footer) |
| Catalog | /katalog, /katalog/[id] |
| Sourcing map | /kallor |
| Order lifecycle | /bestall → /bestall/forskott → /order/[id] → /order/[id]/validera |
| Customer portal | /portal, /portal/subscriptions, /portal/files, /portal/integrationer, /portal/settings |
| Admin portal | /admin, /admin/sources, /admin/jobs, /admin/customers |
| API | /api/{health,estimates,catalog,sources,orders,orders/[id],subscriptions,admin/metrics,uploads,auth/*,payments/*,webhooks/stripe,connections/db-grant} |
Design system
Mono/editorial, light, radius 0, Inter + JetBrains Mono, single red #e40014, animated grain,
scroll-reveal motion. No photography — imagery is rendered data (DataArtifact). Every fact
shows a provenance square (ProvenanceBadge). Full spec: docs/05-design-system.md.
Run locally
pnpm install
pnpm dev # Next.js on http://localhost:3000
# data engine (separate, optional)
cd services/api && pip install -r requirements.txt && uvicorn orchestrator.main:app --reload
Deploy
- Config target (as of 2026-08-09):
siax.config.jsondeclaresdeploy.target: "coolify", matching every other SIAX Cloud OS repo (n0d, st0re, aud0, ...) — a Dockerfile "for Coolify" (already committed, seeDockerfile) plus.gitea/workflows/cd.yml(renamed fromdeploy.yml2026-08-10) that POSTs a restart to a Coolify app UUID onCOOLIFY_TOKENpush. Actually live right now: the only running instance ofSee0pt.appis still on Vercel (project0pt, scope Simon Axelsson's projects) — no Coolify app has been provisioned for this repo yet, sodeploy.yml's app UUID is a placeholder that fails the job on purpose until someone fills it in. Flipping the config declares intent; it does not move traffic.docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md§5/§8 for the full "Vercel or fleet" state and what's still open (Coolify app provisioning + DNS cutover — a separate decision from this config change, since the live Vercel deployment is not being touched).- CORRECTED 2026-09-06 — the bullet above is no longer true. The Coolify deploy hook is LIVE.
The repo secret
COOLIFY_TOKENexists (created 2026-08-31T11:34:34Z) and the repo Actions variableCOOLIFY_APP_IDholds a real 24-character UUID, not theTODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yetliteral. Both guard conditions in.gitea/workflows/cd.ymltherefore pass. Measured on the push tomainat1ff34410(2026-09-06): jobDeploy to Coolify / deploy(run 11695, job 26295) finished success withcoolify deploy HTTP 200in its log. Every merge intomainnow fires a real redeploy againstcloud.siax.io— know what you are shipping before you merge. Probed 2026-09-06 08:00 UTC:0pt.appstill answers from Vercel (server: Vercel,x-vercel-id: arn1::…) and returns HTTP 402DEPLOYMENT_DISABLED— "Payment required" on both/and/api/health. So the public domain is down, DNS has not been cut over to Coolify, and the Coolify app — whatever state it is in — serves no0pt.apptraffic. Two separate facts, both true at once: the deploy hook fires for real, and the product domain is dark behind an unpaid Vercel deployment. Still not established: whether the Coolify app itself builds and starts — the deploy endpoint returning 200 only means the request was accepted, not that a container came up healthy. - Engine + DB + embeds → one VPS via
infra/docker-compose.yml(Postgres+pgvector, Redis, api, worker, NocoDB, Metabase, Caddy). - Env inventory:
.env.example. - Auth on
/api/0pt/*is fail-closed: withAUTH_ENFORCEunset the middleware REQUIRES a verified Zitadel Bearer token (401 without one). Only the literalAUTH_ENFORCE=falsedisables it, and that is refused whenNODE_ENV=production(the process throws at startup rather than serving anonymously). Caveat (live-verified 2026-08-10): the deployed instance still answersGET /api/0ptwith 200 anonymously — the middleware appears not to run in production (gap S1, root cause unknown). Do not rely on this being enforced until an anonymous request gets a real 401. - Fonts: self-hosted via
@fontsource-variable/inter+@fontsource-variable/jetbrains-mono(no Google Fonts /next/font/google). - API contract (SSOT):
contracts/openapi.yaml.
Status
Frontend, full order lifecycle, customer + admin portals, edge API, payment/auth/embed infrastructure, the compliant data engine, schema and infra are all in place and building green. Integrations are env-guarded and activate when their keys/DB are provided:
- Database — Vercel → Storage → Postgres (sets
POSTGRES_URL) → durable persistence (schema insql/001_init.sql). - Stripe + Resend keys → payments + email.
- VPS for the engine → set
ENGINE_URL. AUTH_SECRET+DEV_LOGIN_KEY→ login (full OAuth via Auth.js lands with the DB).
© 2026 SIAX Technology AB. Not affiliated with Protosell.