docs(compliance): record dated provenance for evasion-stack keep decision
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AGENTS.md and SECURITY.md previously attributed keeping the WAF-bypass/
Tor/FlareSolverr/curl_cffi/cloudscraper stack to an unattributed,
unverified "medvetet användarbeslut" (deliberate user decision) with no
stated author or date -- flagged by a prior audit as unverified provenance.

Replace with an accurate, dated statement: the account owner (Simon
Axelsson) was asked directly via an interactive decision prompt on
2026-08-11, in direct response to a compliance audit's removal proposal
(the surgically-clean removal PR #7, verified 128/128 tests, was closed
unmerged), and explicitly chose to keep the code. No business or legal
rationale beyond "keep it" was given or is invented here.

This is a narrow, scoped exception for the existing 0PT/0pt-motor sourcing
engine. CLAUDE.md §1's general anti-evasion policy text is untouched and
remains in force as written unless/until the account owner says otherwise.

No code changes -- documentation only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-11 11:32:13 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 5f41047546
commit a14911b263
2 changed files with 19 additions and 4 deletions
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@@ -19,8 +19,15 @@ entity-resolution, provenance per fält, adaptive router, orderflöde med
## Viktiga förhållanden
- **Bypass-stacken** (`services/scrapers/*`, `waf_bypass.py`, data-stack-compose,
`adaptive_router.py`) är **medvetet behållen per användarbeslut** — rör den inte,
och nämn alltid "medvetet användarbeslut" om den dyker upp i compliance-rapporter.
`adaptive_router.py`) är **behållen** — rör den inte. Kontoägaren Simon Axelsson
fattade detta beslut explicit via en interaktiv beslutsprompt **2026-08-11**, som
direkt svar på ett compliance-uppdrags förslag att ta bort stacken (den städade
borttagnings-PR:en #7 verifierades ren men stängdes omergad av kontoägaren).
Beslutet saknar en dokumenterad affärs-/juridisk motivering utöver "behåll" —
hitta inte på en sådan om den dyker upp i compliance-rapporter. Detta är ett
specifikt, avgränsat undantag för den befintliga 0PT/0pt-motor-sourcingmotorn:
CLAUDE.md §1:s generella anti-evasion-policy ändras INTE av detta beslut och
gäller som skriven, om inte kontoägaren säger annat.
- **Auth:** `/api/0pt/*` fail-closed i kod (Zitadel via middleware), men live-instansen
svarade 2026-08-10 anonymt 200 (lucka S1 — rotorsaksanalys ej klar). Påstå aldrig
att produktionen är skyddad innan en anonym request fått 401.
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@@ -77,8 +77,16 @@ rather than surfacing something new:
(`waf_bypass.py`: FlareSolverr, Tor, cloudscraper, curl_cffi, proxy rotation,
fake identities) and `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml`
(flaresolverr/tor containers) contradict this repo's own compliance docs.
They are retained **as an explicit user decision** (2026-08-10) and are out of
scope for deletion — see `docs/compliance/GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.md` control C6.
A cleanup PR that surgically removed this stack (PR #7, verified clean, 128/128
tests) was closed unmerged by the account owner. **The account owner, Simon
Axelsson, was asked directly via an interactive decision prompt on 2026-08-11
whether to keep or remove this code, and explicitly chose to keep it.** No
business or legal justification beyond "keep it" was recorded — none is
invented here. This is a narrow, scoped exception for the existing 0PT/0pt-motor
sourcing engine; it does not change `CLAUDE.md` §1's general anti-evasion policy,
which remains in force as written unless/until the account owner says otherwise.
Out of scope for deletion — see `docs/compliance/GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.md`
control C6.
- Beyond those items, other authentication gaps on internal API routes may still
exist and are tracked internally pending an intentional, reviewed fix; reporting
any you find is still welcome and helps confirm priority.