BI-P018 — every field the prompt names, plus the one it names by its absence.
The record carries `compiled_query_hash` and never the statement, and that is
ENFORCED: `assertNoRawSql` runs before any record is emitted and refuses one
whose `error` field looks like SQL. The realistic leak is ClickHouse's own
error text, which echoes the query — the test uses exactly that string. The
recorder writes at EVERY transition, because a recorder that only writes at
the end loses precisely the executions worth investigating. Illegal state
transitions throw rather than overwrite a terminal row.
The one place raw SQL is retained stays BI-P017's analyst statement history,
where a privileged human ran unreviewed SQL and "who ran what" must survive.
Different record, different retention posture, stated in both files.
BI-P019 — "stops" is VERIFIED, not requested. Aborting the client stops US
waiting, not the server; KILL QUERY without SYNC tells you nothing; even SYNC
can return while the query unwinds. So cancelAndVerify aborts, kills, then
POLLS the process list until the query is GONE or the deadline passes — and
if the deadline passes it returns `verified_stopped: false` rather than a
cheerful `true`. The return type is an outcome object, not a boolean, so a
caller cannot mistake "we asked" for "it stopped". An unreachable engine is
read as "still running" (fail closed), so the kill is still attempted at the
moment an operator most needs it to be.
Proven live against ClickHouse 24.8.14.39, with the counterfactual first:
* an identical bomb left alone IS still running after 2s — so "gone after
we cancelled" is not just "the query was short";
* the cancelled query had read 6,559,476,156 rows, and was verified gone
57ms after the request;
* system.query_log records ExceptionWhileProcessing with code 394,
QUERY_WAS_CANCELLED — ClickHouse's verdict, not ours.
BI-P021 — the honest version. A budget checked once before execution bounds
nothing, and the module says so in its first paragraph. ClickHouse's
max_rows_to_read bounds ONE query; it cannot express "this tenant may scan X
per hour", which is what a budget is for. So enforcement polls the engine's
live read_rows/read_bytes counters and CANCELS the running query, through
BI-P019 with verification, when window spend would be exceeded.
Measured live: a 1,000,000-row window cancelled the query at 130,883,409 rows,
92ms in, verified stopped, code 394. THE OVERSHOOT IS DOCUMENTED, in the module
and in the evidence: enforcement is granular to the poll interval, so this is
a bound of the form "within roughly one poll interval of engine throughput",
not a hard cap. Quoting it as a hard cap would be wrong.
Two more things stated rather than implied:
* `enforceInFlight: false` is reported by describeEnforcement() as
"NOT ENFORCED — this budget is advisory", and the constructor REFUSES to
accept enforceInFlight without a process control;
* an unshared window store is reported as non-binding across replicas
("with N replicas a tenant can spend up to N times this budget").
* a query the budget killed is still charged for the work it burned. Not
charging is how a tenant learns the cheapest query is a cancelled one.
Evidence: evidence/bi-p019-p021/cancellation-and-budget.json
268 unit tests, 7 live tests. typecheck + eslint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
0pt — your data
Data services on demand for the Nordics + Europe. Compose a data job, pay 50 % to start, watch production live, validate with full provenance, deliver anywhere. Owned by SIAX Technology AB. Honest accuracy is the moat: every field carries source, freshness and confidence; nothing is guessed.
Live: https://0pt.app · Contract: CLAUDE.md + docs/
Architecture (verified against code, not aspirational):
docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md. It documents the real API surface, the real persistence story, and the known security gaps — including several places where this README is optimistic. Read it before trusting any capability claim below. Repo identity + estate classification:siax.repo.json+siax.config.json. Compliance state:docs/compliance/(INVENTORY, RELATIONS, OSS-INVENTORY, GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT, BACKLOG, SLUTRAPPORT).
Two planes (see docs/02-architecture.md)
- Edge (Vercel, this app) — marketing, catalog, the order lifecycle, customer portal,
admin portal, and the API route handlers. Defers to the data engine when
ENGINE_URLis set. - Engine (
services/api, runs on a VPS) — FastAPI orchestrator + worker pipeline doing the compliant sourcing (official API → bulk → authorized web → licensed → else level 0). Never on Vercel (long jobs). Bypass/stealth/proxy-rotation/fake-account paths are excluded by design (CLAUDE.md §1).
Routes
| Area | Routes |
|---|---|
| Marketing | / (hero, filosofi, katalog, motorn, visualiseringar, täckning, editorial, bevis, priser, footer) |
| Catalog | /katalog, /katalog/[id] |
| Sourcing map | /kallor |
| Order lifecycle | /bestall → /bestall/forskott → /order/[id] → /order/[id]/validera |
| Customer portal | /portal, /portal/subscriptions, /portal/files, /portal/integrationer, /portal/settings |
| Admin portal | /admin, /admin/sources, /admin/jobs, /admin/customers |
| API | /api/{health,estimates,catalog,sources,orders,orders/[id],subscriptions,admin/metrics,uploads,auth/*,payments/*,webhooks/stripe,connections/db-grant} |
Design system
Mono/editorial, light, radius 0, Inter + JetBrains Mono, single red #e40014, animated grain,
scroll-reveal motion. No photography — imagery is rendered data (DataArtifact). Every fact
shows a provenance square (ProvenanceBadge). Full spec: docs/05-design-system.md.
Run locally
pnpm install
pnpm dev # Next.js on http://localhost:3000
# data engine (separate, optional)
cd services/api && pip install -r requirements.txt && uvicorn orchestrator.main:app --reload
Deploy
- Config target (as of 2026-08-09):
siax.config.jsondeclaresdeploy.target: "coolify", matching every other SIAX Cloud OS repo (n0d, st0re, aud0, ...) — a Dockerfile "for Coolify" (already committed, seeDockerfile) plus.gitea/workflows/cd.yml(renamed fromdeploy.yml2026-08-10) that POSTs a restart to a Coolify app UUID onCOOLIFY_TOKENpush. Actually live right now: the only running instance ofSee0pt.appis still on Vercel (project0pt, scope Simon Axelsson's projects) — no Coolify app has been provisioned for this repo yet, sodeploy.yml's app UUID is a placeholder that fails the job on purpose until someone fills it in. Flipping the config declares intent; it does not move traffic.docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md§5/§8 for the full "Vercel or fleet" state and what's still open (Coolify app provisioning + DNS cutover — a separate decision from this config change, since the live Vercel deployment is not being touched).- CORRECTED 2026-09-06 — the bullet above is no longer true. The Coolify deploy hook is LIVE.
The repo secret
COOLIFY_TOKENexists (created 2026-08-31T11:34:34Z) and the repo Actions variableCOOLIFY_APP_IDholds a real 24-character UUID, not theTODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yetliteral. Both guard conditions in.gitea/workflows/cd.ymltherefore pass. Measured on the push tomainat1ff34410(2026-09-06): jobDeploy to Coolify / deploy(run 11695, job 26295) finished success withcoolify deploy HTTP 200in its log. Every merge intomainnow fires a real redeploy againstcloud.siax.io— know what you are shipping before you merge. Probed 2026-09-06 08:00 UTC:0pt.appstill answers from Vercel (server: Vercel,x-vercel-id: arn1::…) and returns HTTP 402DEPLOYMENT_DISABLED— "Payment required" on both/and/api/health. So the public domain is down, DNS has not been cut over to Coolify, and the Coolify app — whatever state it is in — serves no0pt.apptraffic. Two separate facts, both true at once: the deploy hook fires for real, and the product domain is dark behind an unpaid Vercel deployment. Still not established: whether the Coolify app itself builds and starts — the deploy endpoint returning 200 only means the request was accepted, not that a container came up healthy. - Engine + DB + embeds → one VPS via
infra/docker-compose.yml(Postgres+pgvector, Redis, api, worker, NocoDB, Metabase, Caddy). - Env inventory:
.env.example. - Auth on
/api/0pt/*is fail-closed: withAUTH_ENFORCEunset the middleware REQUIRES a verified Zitadel Bearer token (401 without one). Only the literalAUTH_ENFORCE=falsedisables it, and that is refused whenNODE_ENV=production(the process throws at startup rather than serving anonymously). Caveat (live-verified 2026-08-10): the deployed instance still answersGET /api/0ptwith 200 anonymously — the middleware appears not to run in production (gap S1, root cause unknown). Do not rely on this being enforced until an anonymous request gets a real 401. - Fonts: self-hosted via
@fontsource-variable/inter+@fontsource-variable/jetbrains-mono(no Google Fonts /next/font/google). - API contract (SSOT):
contracts/openapi.yaml.
Status
Frontend, full order lifecycle, customer + admin portals, edge API, payment/auth/embed infrastructure, the compliant data engine, schema and infra are all in place and building green. Integrations are env-guarded and activate when their keys/DB are provided:
- Database — Vercel → Storage → Postgres (sets
POSTGRES_URL) → durable persistence (schema insql/001_init.sql). - Stripe + Resend keys → payments + email.
- VPS for the engine → set
ENGINE_URL. AUTH_SECRET+DEV_LOGIN_KEY→ login (full OAuth via Auth.js lands with the DB).
© 2026 SIAX Technology AB. Not affiliated with Protosell.