security: protect evidence outbox dispatch as internal-only

This commit is contained in:
2026-09-07 17:15:55 +02:00
parent 56b1ce01b3
commit eab6a1fcce
+10 -51
View File
@@ -1,53 +1,17 @@
/**
* `middleware.ts` -- Next.js request middleware = 0pt's framework-level auth
* seam (the Next analog of a Fastify `onRequest` hook).
* Next.js auth seam for the complete /api/0pt capability surface.
*
* This runs the Zitadel verification (src/auth/context.ts ->
* src/auth/zitadel.ts) in front of every 0pt capability route (/api/0pt/*).
* It does NOT touch the v0-generated UI routes or the unrelated
* payment/order APIs (see the matcher below and the note in the PR that
* introduced the fail-closed default).
*
* AUTH_ENFORCE unset, or anything except "false" (DEFAULT, enforced):
* a valid verified token is required; 401 on missing/invalid, 403 when
* X-Tenant-Id disagrees with the token tenant. On success the verified
* principal is forwarded to the handler as `x-0pt-verified-sub` /
* `x-0pt-verified-tenant` request headers.
* AUTH_ENFORCE == "false" (explicit local-dev escape hatch): never rejects.
* REFUSED in production -- `assertAuthConfigSafe()` below throws at module
* load, so a production instance cannot boot with auth switched off.
*
* Health/metrics are exempt (they are also outside the matcher below, but the
* exemption is kept explicit for robustness).
*
* FIX (2026-08-31): matcher now covers BOTH /api/0pt (exact) and /api/0pt/:path*
* to close the gap where a bare GET /api/0pt (no trailing path) was routed around
* the middleware on Vercel's Edge runtime.
*
* FIX (P014): one route under this matcher, /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run, is
* not called by a customer's Zitadel-authenticated session at all -- it is
* called BY the Python engine (services/api/workers/quality_bridge.py) using
* the pre-existing X-Internal-Token shared-secret convention, never a Bearer
* token. Before this fix, that meant middleware always rejected the engine's
* real call with 401 (see src/auth/internal-token.ts's doc comment for the
* full story) -- the quality bridge was permanently unreachable in any
* environment enforcing auth. INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES lets a request to that
* ONE path through on a verified X-Internal-Token instead of a Bearer token;
* every other /api/0pt/* route is untouched and still requires the normal
* Zitadel flow below. A request to that route WITHOUT a valid internal token
* still falls through to the ordinary Bearer check (e.g. an operator testing
* it manually with their own token), it is not a blanket bypass.
* Customer calls use verified Zitadel bearer identity and receive immutable
* x-0pt-verified-* headers. Explicit machine-only routes may instead use the
* shared X-Internal-Token convention; those routes must also verify that token
* in their own handler for defence in depth.
*/
import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server';
import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
import { verifyInternalServiceToken } from '@/src/auth/internal-token';
// STARTUP GATE: fail to boot rather than serve /api/0pt/* openly in production.
assertAuthConfigSafe();
// Only guard the 0pt capability surface. The matcher keeps this middleware off
// the UI, auth, and payment routes entirely.
export const config = {
matcher: ['/api/0pt', '/api/0pt/:path*'],
};
@@ -58,11 +22,12 @@ const EXEMPT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
/^\/api\/admin\/metrics(\/|$)/,
];
/** The one 0pt route reached by a service (the Python engine), not a user session. */
const INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [/^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/];
/** Machine-to-machine surfaces. A valid internal token is required. */
const INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [
/^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/,
/^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/evidence-outbox\/dispatch$/,
];
// Module-level diagnostics counter — first 5 auth requests in a process lifetime
// log their outcome so the production auth gap (S1) can be traced to root cause.
let _authDiagCount = 0;
export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
@@ -72,12 +37,6 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
}
if (INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path)) && verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) {
// Machine-to-machine call, verified via the shared X-Internal-Token
// secret rather than a user's Bearer token. Deliberately does NOT set
// x-0pt-verified-* headers -- there is no per-user principal here, and
// the route requires+validates tenant_id from its own request body
// (qualityBridgeRunSchema), which is the actual tenant the engine is
// running the order for.
return NextResponse.next();
}