From eab6a1fcce9e290957437d714f602fe0927946d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Axelsson Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2026 17:15:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] security: protect evidence outbox dispatch as internal-only --- middleware.ts | 61 +++++++++------------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/middleware.ts b/middleware.ts index 1e8921f..31968c3 100644 --- a/middleware.ts +++ b/middleware.ts @@ -1,53 +1,17 @@ /** - * `middleware.ts` -- Next.js request middleware = 0pt's framework-level auth - * seam (the Next analog of a Fastify `onRequest` hook). + * Next.js auth seam for the complete /api/0pt capability surface. * - * This runs the Zitadel verification (src/auth/context.ts -> - * src/auth/zitadel.ts) in front of every 0pt capability route (/api/0pt/*). - * It does NOT touch the v0-generated UI routes or the unrelated - * payment/order APIs (see the matcher below and the note in the PR that - * introduced the fail-closed default). - * - * AUTH_ENFORCE unset, or anything except "false" (DEFAULT, enforced): - * a valid verified token is required; 401 on missing/invalid, 403 when - * X-Tenant-Id disagrees with the token tenant. On success the verified - * principal is forwarded to the handler as `x-0pt-verified-sub` / - * `x-0pt-verified-tenant` request headers. - * AUTH_ENFORCE == "false" (explicit local-dev escape hatch): never rejects. - * REFUSED in production -- `assertAuthConfigSafe()` below throws at module - * load, so a production instance cannot boot with auth switched off. - * - * Health/metrics are exempt (they are also outside the matcher below, but the - * exemption is kept explicit for robustness). - * - * FIX (2026-08-31): matcher now covers BOTH /api/0pt (exact) and /api/0pt/:path* - * to close the gap where a bare GET /api/0pt (no trailing path) was routed around - * the middleware on Vercel's Edge runtime. - * - * FIX (P014): one route under this matcher, /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run, is - * not called by a customer's Zitadel-authenticated session at all -- it is - * called BY the Python engine (services/api/workers/quality_bridge.py) using - * the pre-existing X-Internal-Token shared-secret convention, never a Bearer - * token. Before this fix, that meant middleware always rejected the engine's - * real call with 401 (see src/auth/internal-token.ts's doc comment for the - * full story) -- the quality bridge was permanently unreachable in any - * environment enforcing auth. INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES lets a request to that - * ONE path through on a verified X-Internal-Token instead of a Bearer token; - * every other /api/0pt/* route is untouched and still requires the normal - * Zitadel flow below. A request to that route WITHOUT a valid internal token - * still falls through to the ordinary Bearer check (e.g. an operator testing - * it manually with their own token), it is not a blanket bypass. + * Customer calls use verified Zitadel bearer identity and receive immutable + * x-0pt-verified-* headers. Explicit machine-only routes may instead use the + * shared X-Internal-Token convention; those routes must also verify that token + * in their own handler for defence in depth. */ - import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server'; import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context'; import { verifyInternalServiceToken } from '@/src/auth/internal-token'; -// STARTUP GATE: fail to boot rather than serve /api/0pt/* openly in production. assertAuthConfigSafe(); -// Only guard the 0pt capability surface. The matcher keeps this middleware off -// the UI, auth, and payment routes entirely. export const config = { matcher: ['/api/0pt', '/api/0pt/:path*'], }; @@ -58,11 +22,12 @@ const EXEMPT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [ /^\/api\/admin\/metrics(\/|$)/, ]; -/** The one 0pt route reached by a service (the Python engine), not a user session. */ -const INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [/^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/]; +/** Machine-to-machine surfaces. A valid internal token is required. */ +const INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [ + /^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/, + /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/evidence-outbox\/dispatch$/, +]; -// Module-level diagnostics counter — first 5 auth requests in a process lifetime -// log their outcome so the production auth gap (S1) can be traced to root cause. let _authDiagCount = 0; export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise { @@ -72,12 +37,6 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise { } if (INTERNAL_ONLY_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path)) && verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) { - // Machine-to-machine call, verified via the shared X-Internal-Token - // secret rather than a user's Bearer token. Deliberately does NOT set - // x-0pt-verified-* headers -- there is no per-user principal here, and - // the route requires+validates tenant_id from its own request body - // (qualityBridgeRunSchema), which is the actual tenant the engine is - // running the order for. return NextResponse.next(); }