Files
accounted/lib/entitlements/keys.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5 707d597b2e feat(woocommerce): store order/refund feed extension (#1442)
* feat(woocommerce): store order/refund feed extension

Connect a WooCommerce store via the wc-auth key handshake (manual key
fallback) with per-store consumer key/secret AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest,
and import paid orders and refunds into the transactions inbox as a
bank-style feed on the 1680 cash account. Feed-only: nothing auto-books,
gateway fees/payouts are out of scope (core wc/v3 does not expose them).

Sync is cursor-paginated on modified_after (offset pages only inside
same-second date_modified ties), terminates on an empty page, holds the
cursor below failed refund fetches / ingest errors / deadline-skipped work,
checks the time budget between refund fetches, and drops rows dated on or
before bookkeeping_locked_through on every run. Nightly cron gated on the
extension registry + new paid capability woocommerce_sync (backfilled to
existing bank_sync grant holders).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): move woocommerce migrations past main's 20260806090000

origin/main gained 20260806090000_recurring_schedule_interval_months while
this branch was in flight; identical version timestamps abort the Supabase
apply, so the two new migrations move to 20260806170000/20260806170100.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(woocommerce): resolve CodeRabbit review findings

- callback 503s early when WOOCOMMERCE_CREDENTIALS_ENCRYPTION_KEY is
  unset: encryptCredential would otherwise throw after the probe and
  strand the pending row without error_message
- disconnect and upstream-revoke clear the encrypted consumer key/secret:
  nothing reads them after revoke and keeping decryptable dead
  credentials is unnecessary retention
- manual sync gets a 240s time budget and the panel reports a truncated
  run as 'partial, sync again' instead of a normal completion
- listOrderRefunds terminates on an empty batch (hosts may cap per_page),
  dedupes by id against hosts that ignore page, and caps total pages
- unparseable money strings count as errors and log instead of being
  silently identical to a zero total
- pg test uses per-run unique store URLs so committed rows cannot hit
  the store_url partial unique index across pg-real runs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(woocommerce): resolve CodeRabbit cycle-2 findings

- listOrderRefunds throws when the page cap is exhausted with data still
  flowing, instead of returning a silently partial list the sync cursor
  would advance past; the error routes into the existing held-cursor
  refund-retry path
- partial sync results keep the row-error count, and the partial toast
  string surfaces it (ICU plural, hidden at zero) in both locales

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: retrigger CI after dropped push event

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 23:30:00 +02:00

124 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Capability keys: the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
*
* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
*/
export const CAPABILITY = {
/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
ai: 'ai',
/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
/** Skatteverket filing/sync (VAT, AGI, skattekonto) via BankID. */
skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
email_send: 'email_send',
/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free: never hold a customer's data hostage). */
cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
migration: 'migration',
/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
/** Stripe Connect: auto payment links on invoices + payment/payout sync. */
stripe_payments: 'stripe_payments',
/** WooCommerce store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
woocommerce_sync: 'woocommerce_sync',
} as const
export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
/**
* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
* services only.
*
* KEPT FREE on purpose:
* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login:
* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
*
* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
* as an auth step: what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
* filing service, not the identity check.
*/
export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
CAPABILITY.ai,
CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
CAPABILITY.email_send,
CAPABILITY.stripe_payments,
CAPABILITY.woocommerce_sync,
] as const
/**
* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). External-service WRITE tools
* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
* stay free: the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
*
* The document upload tools invoke AI (Bedrock document OCR via
* extractInvoiceFields), so they are gated on CAPABILITY.ai: the same paywall
* the HTTP inbox upload/attach/retry paths enforce. Without these entries a
* free-tier API key could trigger paid AI extraction. bank_sync has no MCP
* tool (bank sync is cron/HTTP only).
*/
export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
// AI document OCR (Bedrock): the inbox's paid extraction, reachable via MCP.
gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/**
* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
* committed once the grant has expired, regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
*/
export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
} as const
/**
* Extension workspace → required capability, keyed by `sector/slug`. This is the
* page/nav twin of the API-route gates: an extension whose entire value is a
* paid service should not just 403 its writes but be hidden from the sidebar and
* blocked at the page so a non-payer never lands on a dead workspace.
*
* invoice-inbox is fully gated on `ai`: its reason to exist is the AI field
* extraction (extractInvoiceFields / gnubok_upload_document), already the paid
* chokepoint on every other surface (HTTP upload/attach/retry, the MCP tool).
* Both the sidebar item and the /e/[sector]/[slug] page read this map so the two
* surfaces can never drift apart.
*/
export const EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
'general/invoice-inbox': CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/** Which paid capability (if any) an extension workspace requires to be usable. */
export function requiredCapabilityForExtension(
sector: string,
slug: string,
): CapabilityKey | undefined {
return EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY[`${sector}/${slug}`]
}