Mattsson
f7f3a31f8e
* fix(sandbox): repair the silently-failing nightly sandbox cleanup and lock down its RPCs
The daily cleanup cron has deleted nothing for months: cleanup_sandbox_user
died on the journal-line immutability trigger for every user (the seed posts
vouchers since spring), and cleanup_expired_sandbox_users swallowed each
failure as a WARNING while reporting success. 658 expired sandbox users plus
21 orphaned anonymous users had accumulated in prod auth.users.
- cleanup_sandbox_user sets the sanctioned gnubok.allow_delete flag plus a
new transaction-local gnubok.sandbox_cleanup flag, only after verifying
is_sandbox; write_audit_log, audit_log_immutable (DELETE only, per-row
sandbox re-check), enforce_dimension_registry_guards (DELETE only) and
enforce_pending_operations_no_delete (DELETE only) respect it
- clears salary_runs voucher-link FKs and purges the sandbox company's
audit rows before the auth.users cascade
- cleanup_expired_sandbox_users returns {cleaned, failed, orphans_removed},
additionally sweeps expired anonymous users that never got a
company_settings row, and takes an optional p_limit for bounded batches;
the cron route logs failures at error level and accepts both return shapes
- both RPCs lose their default PUBLIC EXECUTE grant (anon and authenticated
could call them via PostgREST) and are now service_role-only
- validated by replaying the full delete chain against prod inside aborted
transactions (21 users sampled across all seed eras, zero failures) and a
committed staging run; pg-real suite + cron route unit tests added
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): per-row sandbox re-verification in teardown guards, is_anonymous column guard
Resolution pass for PR #1449 review findings and the pg-real CI failure:
- Swedish accounting review: enforce_dimension_registry_guards and
enforce_pending_operations_no_delete now re-verify per row that
OLD.company_id belongs to a sandbox company (same pattern as
audit_log_immutable) instead of trusting the gnubok.sandbox_cleanup flag
alone. Because that re-check needs company_settings to still exist,
cleanup_sandbox_user deletes pending_operations and dimensions explicitly
before the auth.users cascade.
- pg-real CI: auth.users.is_anonymous does not exist in the CI
supabase/postgres image (or on older self-hosted stacks); the orphan sweep
in cleanup_expired_sandbox_users is now guarded on the column's existence,
and the pg test skips the orphan assertions on such stacks.
Re-validated on staging end-to-end: {cleaned: 5, failed: 0,
orphans_removed: 1}, fresh users and non-sandbox rows untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): make company_settings.is_sandbox write-once, prove orphan sweep fails loudly
Round-2 review findings (Swedish accounting review on PR #1449):
- Every teardown bypass trusts company_settings.is_sandbox, and RLS lets an
owner update their own settings row via PostgREST, so a real company that
flipped the flag would become eligible for full deletion by the nightly
cron. New trigger makes the flag write-once (no application path updates
it; a future sandbox-to-real conversion would ship its own migration).
- New pg test pins the reviewer's remaining concern: an anonymous user who
somehow has bookkeeping but no company_settings row is NOT silently
deleted by the orphan sweep; the unbypasseed immutability triggers make
the deletion fail loudly into the summary's failed count.
Validated on staging: flip blocked in both directions, unrelated
company_settings updates unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): guard is_sandbox provenance at INSERT, make orphan sweep exclusions explicit
Round-3 review hardening, approved by Emil:
- is_sandbox = true can now only be created by an anonymous-user JWT (the
sandbox seed's actor), service_role, or a direct database session. A
regular authenticated user could previously insert their settings row
pre-flagged and have the nightly cron destroy their real books, which
BFL 7 kap. forbids even self-inflicted. Claims are read from the
request.jwt.* GUCs directly so the check behaves identically on hosted,
self-hosted, and the CI auth shim.
- The orphan sweep now explicitly excludes anonymous users attached to any
companies or company_members row, instead of relying on downstream
immutability triggers throwing (emergent safety) to protect half-seeded
users.
- pg tests updated accordingly: blocked/allowed provenance paths, and the
half-seeded user is proven unreachable rather than merely failing loudly.
Validated on staging: authed insert blocked, anonymous-claim insert
allowed, half-seeded user untouched, sweep summary failed=0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): all-rows sandbox check, cleared bypass flags, tighter insert guard
CodeRabbit review pass on PR #1449 (its first non-rate-limited run):
- cleanup_sandbox_user now requires EVERY company_settings row of the user
to be sandbox-flagged, not an arbitrary single row: a hypothetical
mixed-company user would otherwise have their real company's rows reached
by the user-scoped deletes.
- Both bypass flags are cleared before the RPC returns, so later work in
the same transaction (the expired loop's next iterations, the orphan
sweep) never runs with them still armed.
- The is_sandbox insert guard now treats ANY PostgREST claims context
(claims json without a role claim included) as guarded, instead of
falling open when the role claim is absent.
- The flag-leak pg test now runs inside an explicit transaction (the old
version could not observe transaction-local GUCs at all), and a new test
covers the mixed sandbox/real user refusal.
Declined: replacing the em dashes inside the two replicated Swedish
exception messages; they are byte-identical copies of the strings already
deployed by migration 20260702084500 and changing them would alter live
user-facing errors out of scope.
Validated on staging: mixed user refused, flags cleared post-teardown,
role-less claims blocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accounted
Open-source Swedish accounting software for sole traders (enskild firma) and limited companies (aktiebolag). Double-entry bookkeeping that complies with Swedish accounting law, built to be operated by you or by your AI agent.
Website · Hosted app · Documentation
Why Accounted?
Compliant by construction. Accounted implements double-entry bookkeeping under Swedish accounting law (Bokföringslagen). Voucher immutability, sequential voucher numbering, period locks, and 7-year document retention are enforced by database triggers, not by convention. Corrections are made the legal way, with reversal entries (storno), never by editing history. See ARCHITECTURE.md for how.
Agent-native. The full bookkeeping engine is exposed as 100+ MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools with scoped API keys, so an AI agent can do the books in Accounted: categorize transactions, draft vouchers, reconcile periods, and prepare declarations. Posting is staged for human approval, so the agent proposes and you decide.
Yours to run. AGPL-3.0 licensed and fully self-hostable with Docker and Supabase. Use the hosted version at app.gnubok.se or run your own.
Features
- Double-entry bookkeeping -- BAS 2026 chart of accounts, draft/commit workflow, sequential voucher numbering
- Invoicing -- Create, send, and track invoices with mixed VAT rates and PDF generation
- Bank reconciliation -- PSD2 bank connection via Enable Banking, 4-pass automatic matching
- VAT declaration -- SKV 4700 form mapping, per-rate breakdown, EU/export handling
- Tax reports -- NE-bilaga, INK2, SRU export for Skatteverket
- Payroll -- Salary runs, payslips, and AGI (arbetsgivardeklaration) employer declarations
- Supplier invoices -- Registration, payment tracking, input VAT deduction
- Document archive -- SHA-256 integrity, 7-year retention enforcement, full archive ZIP export
- SIE import/export -- Standard Swedish accounting interchange format
- Agent access (MCP) -- 100+ bookkeeping tools over the Model Context Protocol, with scoped API keys and staged approvals
- Extension system -- Opt-in plugins for AI categorization, receipt OCR, email, calendar, and more
Self-Hosting
git clone https://github.com/erp-mafia/accounted.git
cd accounted
./setup.sh # Prompts for Supabase credentials, generates .env
docker compose up -d
You need a Supabase project and must apply the database migrations before first use. See docs/SELF-HOSTING.md for the full step-by-step guide, including Supabase setup, auth configuration, optional features (AI, email, push notifications), and troubleshooting.
Development Setup
Prerequisites: Node.js 20+, a Supabase project.
npm install
npm run dev # Start dev server (auto-generates extension registry)
npm test # Run tests
npm run build # Production build
npm run lint # ESLint
See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full development workflow.
Tech Stack
- Framework: Next.js 16 (App Router), React 19, TypeScript (strict)
- Database: Supabase (PostgreSQL + Row Level Security + email/password auth + TOTP MFA)
- Styling: Tailwind CSS 4 + shadcn/ui
- Integrations: Enable Banking (PSD2), Anthropic SDK, LangChain, OpenAI, Resend, JSZip
Documentation
- User and API documentation -- Guides for using the product and the public API
- ARCHITECTURE.md -- How the system is built: bookkeeping engine, legal enforcement, tenancy, extensions, agent surface
- docs/SELF-HOSTING.md -- Full self-hosting guide (Docker, Supabase setup, migrations, optional features)
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md -- Extension development guide
- docs/DOCKER.md -- Docker deployment reference
- CONTRIBUTING.md -- Development workflow, code style, pull request process
- SECURITY.md -- Vulnerability reporting policy
Community
- Found a bug or have an idea? Open an issue
- Security vulnerabilities: see SECURITY.md, never a public issue
- Everyone interacting in the project is expected to follow the Code of Conduct
Contributing
Contributions are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full guide.
All commits require a DCO sign-off (git commit -s).
License
AGPL-3.0-or-later with an extension exception: third-party extensions that interact solely through the documented Extension API may be licensed under any terms, including proprietary. See LICENSE for details and NOTICE for third-party attributions.