Jakob Wennberg
18cbc4c30a
* fix(security): bind api_keys to the caller, lock hash-as-bearer RPCs and provider token tables Security audit 2026-09-01, critical items. - api_keys INSERT requires user_id = auth.uid() again (an admin could forge a key for any co-member and act as them in every company they belong to); SELECT is own-keys-or-admin; a BEFORE trigger freezes the identity and credential columns against user-session UPDATEs. - rotate_mcp_refresh_token and validate_and_increment_api_key become service_role only: they match rows by a presented SHA-256, so a hash readable by co-members was a bearer credential. - validate_and_increment_api_key fails closed when the key's user is no longer a member of the key's company. - provider_consent_tokens and provider_otc: the DELETE policies collapsed to "caller has any team row" (correlated subquery on a non-existent team_members.company_id). All member policies dropped; service_role only, matching every existing code path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): role gates, ownership guards and posting integrity in the database Security audit 2026-09-01, high items at the database layer. - One table-level guard, enforce_company_writer_role(), blocks the read-only viewer role on 55 company-scoped tables including through the 15 membership-only SECURITY DEFINER writers. Keyed on the JWT role claim so it fires inside definer bodies; no-op for service_role and trigger cascades. - company_members user_id/company_id immutable from user sessions; invitations can never grant owner; team_members gains a transition guard (admins keep non-owner role moves); companies team_id and archiving are owner-only and team attachment needs team membership. - Direct statements (current_user = authenticated) can no longer insert posted headers, add lines under posted verifikat, or post a draft with a voucher number the sequence never issued. Sanctioned RPCs run as the definer and are untouched; the engine's own draft-then-post shapes still pass. - create_document_version refuses viewers and foreign storage paths; validate_version_chain needs membership and loses anon EXECUTE; match_documents / match_booking_templates lose anon; cron maintenance RPCs become service_role only; the production-only seed_asset_categories is dropped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * build: pin tsx as an exact devDependency instead of fetching it with npx at build time prebuild ran "npx tsx" with no lockfile entry, so every Vercel, Docker and CI build downloaded tsx@latest and its transitive tree from the registry with no integrity check, inside the build environment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): refuse the viewer role on API-key and MCP write paths The v1 wrapper and the MCP company routing checked company membership but never role, and both run as service role, so a read-only viewer holding an API key could post vouchers and change settings through the API. Mutating methods and non-read scopes now return 403 ROLE_READ_ONLY for viewers on v1; MCP write tools refuse viewers the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop serving uploaded SVG, XML and HTML as executable content on the app origin Uploads persisted the browser-declared mime type and the inline proxy served it verbatim, sandboxing only text/html; the storage proxy forwarded the uploader's Content-Type. Any writer, or any Peppol sender, could plant a scripted SVG or XHTML that executed on app.gnubok.se. - inline route: allow-list of natively safe types (PDF, raster images) served as before; everything else gets the opaque sandbox CSP. - storage proxy: octet-stream + attachment + sandbox unless the DB mime for the key is on the allow-list. - document-service: the stored mime is the magic-byte validated type. - logo upload: magic-byte validation, SVG refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): byrå brand logo upload decides the type by magic bytes and drops SVG Same pattern as the company logo route: the logos bucket is public, so a scripted SVG (or anything declared as an image) must never land there. The upload pickers stop advertising SVG. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Enable Banking, Stripe and WooCommerce callbacks to the initiating user The callbacks resolved the pending row by oauth_state alone, so a victim who completed an attacker-initiated consent had their bank account, merchant account or store attached to the attacker's company. requireFlowInitiator() now requires the cookie session of the user who started the flow: no session redirects to login with the callback URL preserved, a different user is refused and nothing is exchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): guard tenant-controlled outbound fetches and surface the disabled rate limiter WooCommerce and Shopify syncs fetched a member-editable store URL with plain fetch() and redirect following under the service role, and the invoice PDF renderer fetched company_settings.logo_url unguarded. All three go through a new safeFetch() (public-IP validation via url-guard, https only, redirect: 'manual', body size cap) and re-normalise the stored host at use time. checkRateLimit() keeps failing open on hosted but logs one error per process when Upstash is not configured and exports isRateLimiterConfigured(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): decide the API MFA gate from server-authenticated factors, not the session cookie getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel() without arguments derives nextLevel from session.user.factors, which comes from the unsigned sb-*-auth-token cookie. Deleting factors from the cookie made an enrolled account look like it had nothing to step up to, on every /api route and in requireAuth. Both gates now read factors from the getUser() result or listFactors() and the level from the verified JWT claim, and fail closed on errors. Page-branch gate hardened the same way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind Fortnox/Visma, Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks to the initiating user The arcim-migration callback exchanged the provider code onto whatever consent the one-time state named, with no check of who completed the flow and no org-number comparison, so a phished Fortnox admin handed their ledger to the attacker's company. provider_otc now records the initiating user (migration 20260902100000); the callback requires that session and, after the exchange, refuses a provider company whose org number differs from the consent's company. The Gmail and Skatteverket callbacks enforce the same initiator check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): BankID signup confirms the email before linking the identity Signup created an email-confirmed, MFA-exempt account for any address the caller typed and returned a magic link, so an attacker could pre-register a victim's email and keep a permanent BankID login into the account the victim later adopted. The user is now created unconfirmed, the identity carries email_verified_at NULL (migration 20260902101000), bankid_linked is not set until the mailed confirmation is clicked, and BankID login of a pending identity is refused with the confirmation re-sent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): bind MCP OAuth redirect URIs to the consenting user and cap scopes A user-registered redirect URI was allowlisted globally, the consent page named no client, and all scopes were pre-checked, so one phishing link handed an attacker a full-scope key for the victim's company. Registered URIs now resolve only for the registrant or a colleague sharing a company; the consent page shows the client identity and redirect host; non-built-in clients default to read-only pre-checks; scopes are capped by the user's role (viewer: read only) at consent and at /token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): client follow-ups for BankID confirmation, callback mismatch copy and decision log - register client handles the new confirmation_sent response from BankID signup with the existing inbox screen instead of calling verifyOtp. - BankID login surfaces the email_unconfirmed explanation. - WooCommerce settings map woocommerce_error=wrong_user to its own copy. - Logo help text no longer advertises SVG. - DECISIONS.md records the audit remediation choices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp-oauth): literal SoD columns in the api_keys insert so the phantom-column scanner resolves them Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(logo): type the upload fixtures as Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> so they are valid BlobParts Fixes the typecheck ratchet on PR #2155 and ratchets the baseline down by the one legacy error the change removed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accounted
Open-source Swedish accounting software for sole traders (enskild firma) and limited companies (aktiebolag). Double-entry bookkeeping that complies with Swedish accounting law, built to be operated by you or by your AI agent.
Website · Hosted app · Documentation
Why Accounted?
Compliant by construction. Accounted implements double-entry bookkeeping under Swedish accounting law (Bokföringslagen). Voucher immutability, sequential voucher numbering, period locks, and 7-year document retention are enforced by database triggers, not by convention. Corrections are made the legal way, with reversal entries (storno), never by editing history. See ARCHITECTURE.md for how.
Agent-native. The full bookkeeping engine is exposed as 150+ MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools with scoped API keys or OAuth, so an AI agent can do the books in Accounted: categorize transactions, draft vouchers, reconcile periods, and prepare declarations. Posting is staged for human approval, so the agent proposes and you decide.
Yours to run. AGPL-3.0 licensed and fully self-hostable with Docker and Supabase. Use the hosted version at app.gnubok.se or run your own.
Features
- Double-entry bookkeeping -- BAS 2026 chart of accounts, draft/commit workflow, sequential voucher numbering
- Invoicing -- Create, send, and track invoices with mixed VAT rates and PDF generation
- Bank reconciliation -- PSD2 bank connection via Enable Banking, 4-pass automatic matching
- VAT declaration -- SKV 4700 form mapping, per-rate breakdown, EU/export handling
- Tax reports -- NE-bilaga, INK2, SRU export for Skatteverket
- Payroll -- Salary runs, payslips, and AGI (arbetsgivardeklaration) employer declarations
- Supplier invoices -- Registration, payment tracking, input VAT deduction
- Supplier payment files (betalfil) -- Batch supplier payments into ISO 20022 pain.001 files for upload to the bank, rendered byte-identical on every download
- E-invoicing (Peppol) -- Send and receive Peppol BIS Billing 3 e-invoices through Qvalia, a certified Swedish Access Point; received documents land in the supplier invoice inbox
- Skattekonto -- Tax account transactions synced from Skatteverket or imported from statement files, linked to the booked 1630 movements for reconciliation
- Document archive -- SHA-256 integrity, 7-year retention enforcement, full archive ZIP export
- SIE import/export -- Standard Swedish accounting interchange format
- Agent access (MCP) -- 150+ bookkeeping tools over the Model Context Protocol, with scoped API keys and staged approvals
- Claude connector and plugin -- Connect Claude.ai or Claude Code over OAuth 2.1 and install approval-gated workflow skills (
/accounted:bookkeep,/accounted:vat,/accounted:year-end, ...) from claude-plugin/ - Extension system -- Opt-in plugins for AI categorization, receipt OCR, email, calendar, and more
Self-Hosting
git clone https://github.com/erp-mafia/accounted.git
cd accounted
./setup.sh # Prompts for Supabase credentials, generates .env
docker compose up -d
You need a Supabase project and must apply the database migrations before first use. See docs/SELF-HOSTING.md for the full step-by-step guide, including Supabase setup, auth configuration, optional features (AI, email, push notifications), and troubleshooting. To run everything on Swedish infrastructure (your own Supabase stack, Swedish hosting, AI on Swedish GPUs), see docs/SOVEREIGN.md.
Development Setup
Prerequisites: Node.js 20 or newer (CI runs Node 20; the Docker image ships Node 22), a Supabase project.
npm install
npm run dev # Start dev server (auto-generates extension registry)
npm test # Run tests
npm run build # Production build
npm run lint # ESLint
See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full development workflow.
Tech Stack
- Framework: Next.js 16 (App Router), React 19, TypeScript (strict)
- Database: Supabase (PostgreSQL + Row Level Security + email/password auth + TOTP MFA)
- Styling: Tailwind CSS 4 + shadcn/ui
- Integrations: Enable Banking (PSD2), Qvalia (Peppol), Skatteverket, Anthropic SDK on Amazon Bedrock (eu-north-1; direct Anthropic or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint for self-hosted via the Vercel AI SDK), Resend, JSZip
Documentation
- User and API documentation -- Guides for using the product and the public API
- ARCHITECTURE.md -- How the system is built: bookkeeping engine, legal enforcement, tenancy, extensions, agent surface
- docs/SELF-HOSTING.md -- Full self-hosting guide (Docker, Supabase setup, migrations, optional features)
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md -- Extension development guide
- docs/DOCKER.md -- Docker deployment reference
- CONTRIBUTING.md -- Development workflow, code style, pull request process
- SECURITY.md -- Vulnerability reporting policy
Community
- Found a bug or have an idea? Open an issue
- Security vulnerabilities: see SECURITY.md, never a public issue
- Everyone interacting in the project is expected to follow the Code of Conduct
Contributing
Contributions are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full guide.
All commits require a DCO sign-off (git commit -s).
License
AGPL-3.0-or-later with an extension exception: third-party extensions that interact solely through the documented Extension API may be licensed under any terms, including proprietary. See LICENSE for details and NOTICE for third-party attributions.