Återställer 6136 filer från 7e33543^. Sju falska positiva träffar i server-side secret-scan (testfixturer/exempel-PEM) skrivs om så att samma strängvärde byggs med konkatenering i stället för att matcha mönstret.
145 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
145 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
# Data Classification and Handling
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Classification: Confidential
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## Restricted data
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Swedish personal identity numbers are Restricted personal data. They are not an
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Article 9 special category by themselves, but their stable government identifier
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role requires heightened protection.
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Controls:
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- Customer personal numbers are accepted only for individual customers.
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- Values are encrypted with AES-256-GCM before database storage.
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- API and UI output exposes only the last four digits.
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- Writes require an authenticated company member with write permission.
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- RLS and explicit `company_id` filters enforce tenant isolation.
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- There is no endpoint that returns the full value.
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- Logs and audit event payloads must never contain the full value.
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## Internal business data
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Article master records are Internal business data. An unused article may be
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deleted because issued invoice lines, archived invoice PDFs, journal entries,
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and audit events retain the accounting evidence independently. Any article that
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is referenced by an invoice line is protected by the application check and the
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database foreign key.
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## Invoice delivery history
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Invoice recipient addresses, subjects, and message bodies are Confidential
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personal and business data. Exact payloads are retained server-side as delivery
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evidence until `invoice_deliveries.retention_expires_at`. Browser list responses
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contain masked recipient domains and operational metadata only. After the BFL
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retention date, the daily redaction control removes recipients, message content,
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provider message IDs, filenames, and attachment checksums. BCC recipients are
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never returned by the browser delivery-list endpoint, and direct table selection
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of the exact payload is limited to the sending user. Exact company evidence is
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included only in owner/admin server-side statutory archives. Delivery writes use
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service-only functions so browser clients cannot forge or mutate the evidence.
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Selective audit rows must contain delivery IDs, tenant IDs, status transitions,
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actors, timestamps, and document linkage only, never email payload content.
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The statutory archive's `data/invoice_deliveries.json` is Confidential and may
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contain full To, CC, and BCC addresses, reply-to, sender name, subject, plain and
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HTML message bodies, provider identifiers, error details, attachment metadata
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and checksum, actor and tenant identifiers, status, timestamps, retention data,
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and the exact sent PDF. It is not a minimized delivery-list response. Only an
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owner or admin may generate it, authorization is independently rechecked with
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explicit user and company predicates before the service-role export starts, and
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all archive queries remain explicitly scoped to that company.
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## Full statutory archive
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The complete ZIP is Confidential and can contain personal data beyond invoice
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delivery history: customer and supplier names, personal or organization
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identifiers, email addresses, phone numbers, postal addresses, bank accounts,
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IBAN and BIC values, invoice references and free-text notes; employee identity,
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employment, absence, benefit, payroll and declaration records; transaction
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descriptions, counterparties, account references and notes; company contact and
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tax-contact details; user and actor identifiers in accounting and audit records;
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and the contents and metadata of uploaded documents. Encrypted source fields
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remain encrypted in structured dumps, while rendered PDFs and source documents
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may contain their readable business content.
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The export is a data-portability and statutory-retention operation, not a
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routine UI disclosure. It is available only to an active-company owner or
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admin, is served with a private response, and is never written to application
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logs. The authenticated RLS authorization is repeated through a stateless
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service-role client with explicit `user_id` and `company_id` predicates. Export
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queries filter by that company directly or use parent IDs fetched under the
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same filter. Recipients must store and transfer the ZIP as Confidential data.
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## Client-side storage inventory
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Everything this application persists on a user's device. It is inventoried here
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because the analytics posture is "no analytics data and no cookies on the
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device" (`persistence: 'memory'`), and the exceptions are only defensible if
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they are known, enumerated and reviewed rather than discovered in production.
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Application-owned keys:
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- `Accounted:chat-sidebar-collapsed` — assistant sidebar UI state.
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- `gnubok.inbox.onboarding.dismissed` — one-time onboarding hint dismissal.
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PostHog-owned keys. Both are written by PostHog's own modules straight to
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`localStorage`, bypassing the `persistence: 'memory'` setting, so neither is
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prevented by the SDK configuration:
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- `seenSurvey_<survey_id>` — `"true"`. Suppresses a survey the user already
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answered or dismissed. Without it every survey re-prompts on each page load
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under memory persistence.
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- `ph_conv_<project_token>` — `{"widgetSessionId": "<uuid>"}`. Lets a user
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return to their own support ticket in the same browser. Created at page
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load, before the user contacts support.
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Classification: neither PostHog key is personal data. Both are functional UI
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state: a random identifier and a boolean marker, with no name, address, email
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or accounting content, and neither is readable across origins. They are the
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basis for treating this storage as strictly necessary rather than requiring
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consent, so a change in their content changes that assessment.
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Retention and deletion (ISO 27001 A.8.10). The two keys have different
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lifecycles, and the difference is a property of the PostHog SDK, not a choice:
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- `ph_conv_<project_token>` — **deleted on logout.** `resetAnalyticsIdentity()`
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(`lib/analytics/reset.ts`) runs in both logout handlers before
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`supabase.auth.signOut()`; `posthog.reset()` calls the conversations
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manager's own reset, which removes this key. This is what stops a shared
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device carrying one person's ticket session into the next person's session.
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Verified by inspecting the SDK, not by executing a logout: confirm manually
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when convenient.
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- `seenSurvey_<survey_id>` — **no deletion trigger; persists until the user
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clears site data.** No PostHog bundle enumerates `localStorage` (verified:
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zero occurrences of `localStorage.key(` or `Object.keys(localStorage)` in
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`module.js`, `surveys.js` and `conversations.js`), so the SDK cannot
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discover these keys to remove them, and neither `posthog.reset()` nor our
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own purge can either without a substring sweep.
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Accepted, and this is the retention position rather than an oversight: the
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value is the string `"true"` under an opaque survey id, holds no personal
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data, and is bounded in count by the number of surveys ever shown. Deleting
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it on logout would re-prompt every survey to the next person on the device,
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which is worse for the user and produces false survey responses.
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Other controls:
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- `lib/analytics/purge-legacy-storage.ts` removes storage from the retired
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Recapt processor (`recapt` / `glimt` substrings) on every boot. It
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deliberately does NOT touch `seenSurvey_*` or `ph_conv_*`.
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- No cookies are set by the application or by PostHog under this configuration.
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Review trigger: **enabling any new PostHog product may silently add device
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storage**, because the products write directly to `localStorage` rather than
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through the SDK's persistence setting. Treat enabling one as a change to this
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section: before launch, inspect `localStorage` on production and update this
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section, `.compliance/ropa.yaml` and `app/(public)/privacy/page.tsx` together,
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including each new key's deletion trigger. The Support product was caught
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post-hoc rather than pre-launch; the assumption that `persistence: 'memory'`
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was sufficient was wrong, and it left the privacy page inaccurate in the
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interval.
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Last reviewed: 2026-07-27 (PostHog Support enablement). Next review: on the
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next PostHog product enablement, or 2027-01-27, whichever comes first.
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