* feat(agents): per-key approval authority, the amount an agent may post unattended An API key gets an optional ceiling in SEK. Above it the agent may still stage the work, it just may not finish it alone: a human approves the same verifikat in the app. Default is NULL, so every existing key keeps its behaviour and turning this on is entirely opt-in. Enforced at the two places an API key reaches the ledger, and at both the refusal happens BEFORE the point of no return: - MCP: in commitPendingOperation, before the atomic claim, so the operation stays 'pending'. Behind the claim it would be caught by the generic handler, marked terminal 'rejected', and the staged verifikat would be gone. - REST: in journal-entries.commit, before commitEntry, so the draft stays a draft and the voucher sequence never advances (BFL 5 kap. 7 §). The dry run refuses too, rather than promising a voucher number the key cannot deliver. Not enforced inside commit_journal_entry: a RAISE there is swallowed by engine.ts into a retryable 500, and it would cost a DROP+CREATE on the function that issues every voucher number. Operations whose amount is only known during dispatch (batch allocation, bulk booking, the settlement link paths) fail OPEN behind an explicit allowlist. Pricing them ahead of dispatch would be a guess, and a wrong guess silently breaks batch allocation the day someone sets a limit. The allowlist is derived from what production actually stores: create_voucher carries total_debit on 1389 of 1389 rows, categorize_transaction carries amount on 2002 of 2003, create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox carries total on 208 of 228. This is a blast-radius cap, not a security boundary. A per-entry ceiling is defeated by splitting one entry into several, and an LLM will find that, so UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED forbids splitting first: one affärshändelse is one verifikat (BFL 5 kap. 6 §). A cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that actually bounds exposure and is left to a separate change. The guard is written NULL-first everywhere. An absent, unparseable or non-positive ceiling always means unlimited, never "block everything". Agents read their own ceiling from gnubok_get_agent_briefing instead of discovering it by burning a staged verifikat on a 403. Changing a ceiling is auditable: it now renders in behandlingshistorik (BFL 5 kap. 11 §). The audit trigger already fired on the column, but the report dropped the event because the field was not in its diff map. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(skill): regenerate accounted-api skill for the new commit pitfall apiskill:check is a ratchet: the generated reference must match the endpoint registry. Never hand-edited. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(agents): pin the DB default itself, and declare the briefing field required Two review findings, both real: - the default test stored an explicit NULL, so it stayed green even if the column default changed to a positive ceiling: the one change that would silently start blocking every existing key. It now omits the column. - gnubok_get_agent_briefing documents unattended_commit_limit as always present and emits it unconditionally, so it belongs in the output schema's required list. Declined the NOT VALID constraint suggestion, with the reason recorded in the migration: api_keys is 388 rows / 768 kB in production. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): name the TOCTOU window in the REST ceiling check A security scan flagged that the line sum is read before commitEntry, so a concurrent write to the draft's lines can post over the ceiling. Real, and accepted: closing it means enforcing inside commit_journal_entry, where a RAISE becomes a retryable 500 and destroys the staged operation on the MCP path. Recorded in the code rather than left implicit, so nobody later mistakes this for a hard control. A per-entry ceiling is already defeated by splitting, which needs no race; the cumulative rolling-window limit is the primitive that bounds exposure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): price the settlement and batch paths that were bypassing the ceiling A security scan flagged that known money-posting operations fail open, and it was right. The first cut priced only create_voucher, categorize_transaction and create_supplier_invoice_from_inbox, on the belief that the batch and settlement paths computed their totals only inside SQL at dispatch. Production says otherwise: the staged preview already carries the amount, because it is the number a human is shown when approving the operation. Over the last 120 days each of these is present and numeric on 100% of that type's staged rows: link_transaction_journal_entry transaction_amount 1369 rows bulk_book_transactions tx_sum 273 rows link_supplier_invoice_voucher payment_amount 55 rows match_batch_allocate total_allocated 24 rows mark_invoice_paid total 3 rows So a key with a ceiling could post any amount through the four largest settlement paths. Now priced, and the ceiling applies. Only reconciliation_match stays unpriced: it carries pair_count, which is a COUNT. Pricing off that would compare pairs against kronor, which is worse than not enforcing. link_document_to_voucher and attach_document_to_transaction move no money at all; the transaction_amount they carry is context, not a posting. Genuinely unpriceable types still fail OPEN. This control can only ever narrow what a key does, and a wrong guess at an amount blocks a legitimate commit, so guessing high would leave an agent unable to work. Adds a test that walks the whole allowlist, so a typo'd field name cannot silently make a type unpriceable again: that is exactly the hole this closes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): drop the ceiling from the agent briefing, the payload budget has no room The tools/list context-budget bench sits at 65 000 tokens and main now leaves roughly 20 tokens of headroom. An always-present field on the briefing's output schema costs about 85, so this addition alone pushed the bench red. The bench's own note is explicit that the answer is to demote a tool rather than raise the ceiling, so raising it here would be the wrong trade for a nice-to-have. Nothing is lost that matters: the operation is never destroyed when it is refused, so discovering the ceiling from UNATTENDED_COMMIT_LIMIT_EXCEEDED costs one round trip and no work. That error already carries both attempted and limit, and GET /api/settings/api-keys returns the value. Re-exposing it on the briefing is worth doing once there is budget to spend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(api): spell affärshändelse correctly in the commit pitfall Fixed in the route's registerEndpoint pitfalls, which is the source; the skill reference is regenerated from it and never hand-edited. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Accounted
Open-source Swedish accounting software for sole traders (enskild firma) and limited companies (aktiebolag). Double-entry bookkeeping that complies with Swedish accounting law, built to be operated by you or by your AI agent.
Website · Hosted app · Documentation
Why Accounted?
Compliant by construction. Accounted implements double-entry bookkeeping under Swedish accounting law (Bokföringslagen). Voucher immutability, sequential voucher numbering, period locks, and 7-year document retention are enforced by database triggers, not by convention. Corrections are made the legal way, with reversal entries (storno), never by editing history. See ARCHITECTURE.md for how.
Agent-native. The full bookkeeping engine is exposed as 150+ MCP (Model Context Protocol) tools with scoped API keys or OAuth, so an AI agent can do the books in Accounted: categorize transactions, draft vouchers, reconcile periods, and prepare declarations. Posting is staged for human approval, so the agent proposes and you decide.
Yours to run. AGPL-3.0 licensed and fully self-hostable with Docker and Supabase. Use the hosted version at app.gnubok.se or run your own.
Features
- Double-entry bookkeeping -- BAS 2026 chart of accounts, draft/commit workflow, sequential voucher numbering
- Invoicing -- Create, send, and track invoices with mixed VAT rates and PDF generation
- Bank reconciliation -- PSD2 bank connection via Enable Banking, 4-pass automatic matching
- VAT declaration -- SKV 4700 form mapping, per-rate breakdown, EU/export handling
- Tax reports -- NE-bilaga, INK2, SRU export for Skatteverket
- Payroll -- Salary runs, payslips, and AGI (arbetsgivardeklaration) employer declarations
- Supplier invoices -- Registration, payment tracking, input VAT deduction
- Supplier payment files (betalfil) -- Batch supplier payments into ISO 20022 pain.001 files for upload to the bank, rendered byte-identical on every download
- E-invoicing (Peppol) -- Send and receive Peppol BIS Billing 3 e-invoices through Qvalia, a certified Swedish Access Point; received documents land in the supplier invoice inbox
- Skattekonto -- Tax account transactions synced from Skatteverket or imported from statement files, linked to the booked 1630 movements for reconciliation
- Document archive -- SHA-256 integrity, 7-year retention enforcement, full archive ZIP export
- SIE import/export -- Standard Swedish accounting interchange format
- Agent access (MCP) -- 150+ bookkeeping tools over the Model Context Protocol, with scoped API keys and staged approvals
- Claude connector and plugin -- Connect Claude.ai or Claude Code over OAuth 2.1 and install approval-gated workflow skills (
/accounted:bookkeep,/accounted:vat,/accounted:year-end, ...) from claude-plugin/ - Extension system -- Opt-in plugins for AI categorization, receipt OCR, email, calendar, and more
Self-Hosting
git clone https://github.com/erp-mafia/accounted.git
cd accounted
./setup.sh # Prompts for Supabase credentials, generates .env
docker compose up -d
You need a Supabase project and must apply the database migrations before first use. See docs/SELF-HOSTING.md for the full step-by-step guide, including Supabase setup, auth configuration, optional features (AI, email, push notifications), and troubleshooting. To run everything on Swedish infrastructure (your own Supabase stack, Swedish hosting, AI on Swedish GPUs), see docs/SOVEREIGN.md.
Development Setup
Prerequisites: Node.js 20 or newer (CI runs Node 20; the Docker image ships Node 22), a Supabase project.
npm install
npm run dev # Start dev server (auto-generates extension registry)
npm test # Run tests
npm run build # Production build
npm run lint # ESLint
See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full development workflow.
Tech Stack
- Framework: Next.js 16 (App Router), React 19, TypeScript (strict)
- Database: Supabase (PostgreSQL + Row Level Security + email/password auth + TOTP MFA)
- Styling: Tailwind CSS 4 + shadcn/ui
- Integrations: Enable Banking (PSD2), Qvalia (Peppol), Skatteverket, Anthropic SDK on Amazon Bedrock (eu-north-1; direct Anthropic or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint for self-hosted via the Vercel AI SDK), Resend, JSZip
Documentation
- User and API documentation -- Guides for using the product and the public API
- ARCHITECTURE.md -- How the system is built: bookkeeping engine, legal enforcement, tenancy, extensions, agent surface
- docs/SELF-HOSTING.md -- Full self-hosting guide (Docker, Supabase setup, migrations, optional features)
- docs/EXTENSIONS.md -- Extension development guide
- docs/DOCKER.md -- Docker deployment reference
- CONTRIBUTING.md -- Development workflow, code style, pull request process
- SECURITY.md -- Vulnerability reporting policy
Community
- Found a bug or have an idea? Open an issue
- Security vulnerabilities: see SECURITY.md, never a public issue
- Everyone interacting in the project is expected to follow the Code of Conduct
Contributing
Contributions are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full guide.
All commits require a DCO sign-off (git commit -s).
License
AGPL-3.0-or-later with an extension exception: third-party extensions that interact solely through the documented Extension API may be licensed under any terms, including proprietary. See LICENSE for details and NOTICE for third-party attributions.