Jakob WennbergandClaude Sonnet 5
ec27228a8e
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests, and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by hand together to keep sv/en in sync. Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex, charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte. Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it exists to verify. Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27 SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes, with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above. Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
158 lines
6.8 KiB
Markdown
158 lines
6.8 KiB
Markdown
# Authorization Policy
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Status: **Approved Documented Security Decision**
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Owner: Emil Mattsson (emil.mattsson@arcim.io)
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Last reviewed: 2026-05-11
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This document records authorization decisions for Accounted that go beyond the
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default "the resource creator is the only person who can act on it" model.
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It is the canonical reference for compliance reviewers (OWASP ASVS V8, ISO
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27001:2022 A.5.1 / A.8.3 / A.8.5, SOC 2 CC6.1) when they encounter an
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authorization check that uses `company_id` rather than `user_id`.
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---
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## Multi-tenant model
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Accounted is a multi-tenant SaaS where the unit of business ownership is the
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**company** (a row in `public.companies`). Users access companies through
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the `company_members` table, which links a user to one or more companies
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with a role (`owner` / `admin` / `member` / `viewer`).
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The active company is resolved on every request by
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`lib/supabase/middleware.ts`. Application code reads it via
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`ctx.companyId` (extensions) or `companyId` resolved from the cookie. Row
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Level Security policies on every business table use the `user_company_ids()`
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DB helper to enforce membership.
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The user is **never** the authoritative tenant identifier on its own. Any
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business data ownership check that compares `user_id` to the actor's
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`user.id` instead of the resource's `company_id` is a bug.
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---
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## Shared-resource model (default)
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Business records inside a company are **shared resources**: any member of
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the company can read and write them, subject to their role. This includes:
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- Customer invoices and supplier invoices
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- Journal entries and bank transactions
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- Customers and suppliers
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- Receipts and documents
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- **Bank connections (Enable Banking PSD2)**
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- Mapping rules, booking templates, counterparty templates
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- Salary runs and AGI declarations
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- Company settings
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The role of the actor (owner, admin, member, viewer) restricts what
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operations they can perform via `lib/auth/require-write.ts`, but does not
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restrict *which records* they can act on. A viewer cannot post any journal
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entry; a member can post any journal entry their company owns, regardless
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of who originally drafted it.
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### Why this is intentional
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Accounted's users are small businesses and the bookkeepers / consultants they
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share access with. Compliance scenarios that drive this model:
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1. **Bookkeeper handover.** A consultant who connected a bank during
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onboarding might not be the same person who later configures account
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selection. Forcing `user_id` ownership would lock the second person
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out of fixing the first person's setup.
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2. **Vacation cover.** A second admin must be able to disconnect a bank,
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approve a supplier invoice, or send a customer invoice when the
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primary user is unreachable.
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3. **Audit trail under BFL 7 kap.** Swedish bookkeeping law requires a
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continuous audit trail per *company*, not per user. Locking entries
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to a single user would interrupt that trail at every personnel
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change.
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4. **Role-based, not identity-based, separation of duties.** Where SoD
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matters (e.g. AGI submission, year-end close, salary approval) we
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enforce it through the `role` column on `company_members`, not by
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recording which specific user created the underlying record.
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### Compensating controls
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Although authorization is by `company_id`, the audit trail is by `user_id`:
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- `journal_entries.user_id`, `transactions.user_id`, etc. record who
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*created* a record. These columns are never used for authorization,
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but they are preserved for the audit log and the immutable
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`audit_log` table.
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- `event_log` rows include `user_id` so every privileged action
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(consent grants, invoice sends, period locks, document uploads) is
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attributable to a specific user even when authorization is shared.
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- The `audit_log` table is immutable (DB trigger `audit_log_immutable`)
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and retained for 7 years per BFL.
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---
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## Specific decisions
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### bank_connections: managed at company scope
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**Decision.** Any active `company_members` row for a company can manage
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any `bank_connection` belonging to that company. This covers `POST /connect`,
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`PATCH /accounts`, `POST /sync`, and `DELETE /disconnect` in the
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`enable-banking` extension.
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**Why.** A bank connection is a company-level resource (it represents the
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company's relationship to its bank under PSD2 consent obtained on behalf of
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the company, not a personal banking relationship). Restricting management
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to the user who initiated the OAuth flow would create a lockout failure
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mode that exceeds the cross-tenant access risk of the broader model.
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**Compensating audit.** Every state transition on a bank connection emits
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a structured event persisted to `event_log` with both `user_id` and
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`company_id`:
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- `bank_connection.consent_granted`: PSD2 callback completed, account
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metadata stored, status `pending_selection`. Emitted from
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`app/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback/route.ts`.
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- `bank_connection.account_selection_changed`: user chose which accounts
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to sync; status may transition `pending_selection → active`. Emitted
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from `PATCH /accounts` in `extensions/general/enable-banking/index.ts`.
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- `bank_connection.revoked`: user disconnected the bank; PSD2 session is
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revoked at Enable Banking; status set to `revoked`. Emitted from
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`DELETE /disconnect`.
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The `event_log` row carries: `connectionId`, `bankName`, `previousStatus`,
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`newStatus`, `accountCount` / `enabledCount` / `totalCount`, `userId`,
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`companyId`, `consentExpiresAt`. This is sufficient to attribute every
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PSD2 consent decision to a specific user under that company.
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**Cross-references.**
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- ASVS V8.2.1: authorization checks at trust boundary
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- ASVS V16: audit logging of security-relevant events
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- ISO 27001:2022 A.5.1, A.8.3, A.8.5: access control and information
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access restriction
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- SOC 2 CC6.1, CC7.2: logical access controls and detection of
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unauthorized changes
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- GDPR Art.30: records of processing activities (PSD2 consent
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decisions)
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- BFL 7 kap.: 7-year retention of audit trail
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---
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## Reviewers' checklist
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When reviewing a PR that touches authorization:
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1. The check filters by **`company_id`** resolved from the verified
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request context (`ctx.companyId` in extensions; `companyId` in API
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routes). Never `user.id` as a substitute.
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2. If `companyId` is absent, the handler returns `400`. Never falls
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back to a different identifier.
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3. The actor's company membership is enforced by either RLS
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(`user_company_ids()` policy) or an explicit application-side check
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against `company_members`. Both is best.
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4. Any state change is emitted as a structured event with `userId` and
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`companyId` so the audit trail remains attributable.
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5. Where role-level restrictions apply, `requireWrite()` /
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`requireRole()` from `lib/auth/require-write.ts` enforces them.
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Deviations from the shared-resource model (e.g. resources that *should*
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be locked to a single user) must be added to this document with the same
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"Decision / Why / Compensating audit" structure before merging.
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