fix(bank): Swedish provider errors and a durable failure trail for bank connect attempts (#1841)

Issue #1716: a user stuck in Handelsbankens fullmakt step got a raw
provider token back (server_error, invalid_state) and support had nothing
to look at afterwards: the failed pending row is deleted by design, the
callback only logged to console (short retention), and event_log recorded
successes only. Diagnosis of the reported case: the failures were on the
bank's side (the corporate fullmakt requirement); both of the reporter's
companies connected successfully on 2026-08-12 with no code change on our
side in between, and the connections have been active and syncing since.

Changes:
- lib/errors/get-error-message.ts: getBankConnectionErrorMessage() maps
  PSD2 callback outcomes (access_denied, server_error,
  temporarily_unavailable, session expiry, plus the internal
  invalid_state, missing_parameters and invalid_code_format tokens) to
  Swedish user messages, appending the raw provider description so the
  underlying error is still surfaced.
- callback route: every bank_error redirect and the stored error_message
  now carry the mapped Swedish text; bank_error_code, bank_name and
  psu_type still flow so the settings page keeps its targeted guidance
  (Handelsbanken fullmakt steps included).
- New audit events bank_connection.consent_denied and
  bank_connection.finalize_failed are emitted on the two failure paths
  and persisted to event_log, so support can answer which attempt failed,
  with which provider error, on whose side, even after the row is gone.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SyDuePXxUFowaPBKpAv8SF

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jakob Wennberg
2026-08-26 09:35:26 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Jakob Wennberg Claude Fable 5
parent 1307d4db2e
commit 64119d30bc
6 changed files with 335 additions and 17 deletions
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ vi.mock('@/lib/cash-accounts/service', () => ({
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL', 'http://localhost:3000')
import { GET } from '../route'
import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events/bus'
function makeRequest(params: Record<string, string>) {
const url = new URL('http://localhost:3000/api/extensions/enable-banking/callback')
@@ -122,7 +123,9 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
expect(location).toContain('/settings/banking?')
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=invalid_state')
// The raw 'invalid_state' token used to be shown verbatim: the banner now
// carries the Swedish explanation instead (issue #1716).
expect(decodeURIComponent(location)).toContain('Starta bankkopplingen på nytt')
})
it('writes pending_selection and streams a finalizing page that redirects to the picker', async () => {
@@ -1085,7 +1088,9 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
expect(location).toContain('/settings/banking?')
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=User%20cancelled')
// The user-facing message is Swedish; a cancel is an expected outcome, so
// the raw provider text is not echoed back.
expect(decodeURIComponent(location)).toContain('Anslutningen avbröts hos banken')
// No state → no DB cleanup attempted
expect(mockFrom).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
@@ -1104,7 +1109,7 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
expect(location).toContain('/settings/banking?')
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=Denied%20data%20sharing%20consent')
expect(decodeURIComponent(location)).toContain('Anslutningen avbröts hos banken')
// Should clean up the pending row
expect(mockFrom).toHaveBeenCalledWith('bank_connections')
})
@@ -1138,7 +1143,9 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
// URLSearchParams encodes spaces as '+', unlike the encodeURIComponent
// fallback used when no matching row exists.
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=User+cancelled')
expect(decodeURIComponent(location.replace(/\+/g, ' '))).toContain(
'Anslutningen avbröts hos banken'
)
expect(deleteCalls).toHaveLength(1)
expect(updateCalls).toHaveLength(0)
})
@@ -1172,6 +1179,10 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(deleteCalls).toHaveLength(0)
expect(updateCalls).toHaveLength(1)
expect(updateCalls[0].status).toBe('expired')
// The stored error_message is user-facing on the connection card: Swedish
// explanation with the raw provider description surfaced in parentheses.
expect(updateCalls[0].error_message).toContain('inloggningssession')
expect(updateCalls[0].error_message).toContain('Session expired at ASPSP')
})
it('forwards bank_error_code and psu_type when the denied state matches a pending connection', async () => {
@@ -1190,8 +1201,9 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
expect(location).toContain('/settings/banking?')
// error_description is null for server_error, so the code doubles as message
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=server_error')
// A bare server_error used to surface as the literal token; the banner
// now gets the Swedish explanation (issue #1716).
expect(decodeURIComponent(location.replace(/\+/g, ' '))).toContain('fel på bankens sida')
expect(location).toContain('bank_name=Handelsbanken')
// The code is forwarded for every error, not just access_denied, together
// with the connection's psu_type — the settings page keys the Handelsbanken
@@ -1206,7 +1218,7 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
expect(location).toContain('/settings/banking?')
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=missing_parameters')
expect(decodeURIComponent(location)).toContain('ofullständigt svar')
})
it('redirects with error when code fails format validation', async () => {
@@ -1215,6 +1227,85 @@ describe('GET /api/extensions/enable-banking/callback', () => {
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const location = response.headers.get('location') || ''
expect(location).toContain('/settings/banking?')
expect(location).toContain('bank_error=invalid_code_format')
expect(decodeURIComponent(location)).toContain('ogiltigt svar')
})
it('emits a durable consent_denied audit event when the bank denies with a matching row', async () => {
const emitSpy = vi.spyOn(eventBus, 'emit').mockResolvedValue(undefined)
try {
mockFrom.mockImplementation(() =>
mockChain({
data: {
id: 'conn-1',
user_id: 'user-1',
company_id: 'company-1',
bank_name: 'Handelsbanken',
psu_type: 'business',
status: 'pending',
},
error: null,
})
)
const response = await GET(makeRequest({
error: 'server_error',
error_description: 'ASPSP authorization failed',
state: 'pending-state',
}))
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(emitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
type: 'bank_connection.consent_denied',
payload: {
connectionId: 'conn-1',
bankName: 'Handelsbanken',
psuType: 'business',
errorCode: 'server_error',
errorDescription: 'ASPSP authorization failed',
priorStatus: 'pending',
userId: 'user-1',
companyId: 'company-1',
},
})
} finally {
emitSpy.mockRestore()
}
})
it('emits a durable finalize_failed audit event when the session exchange fails', async () => {
const emitSpy = vi.spyOn(eventBus, 'emit').mockResolvedValue(undefined)
try {
mockFrom.mockImplementation(() =>
mockChain({
data: {
id: 'conn-1',
user_id: 'user-1',
company_id: 'company-1',
bank_name: 'TestBank',
status: 'pending',
},
error: null,
})
)
mockCreateSession.mockRejectedValue(new Error('upstream timeout'))
const response = await GET(makeRequest({ code: 'auth-code', state: 'valid-state' }))
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
await response.text()
expect(emitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
type: 'bank_connection.finalize_failed',
payload: {
connectionId: 'conn-1',
bankName: 'TestBank',
reason: 'upstream timeout',
priorStatus: 'pending',
userId: 'user-1',
companyId: 'company-1',
},
})
} finally {
emitSpy.mockRestore()
}
})
})
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
} from '@/lib/cash-accounts/service'
import { fanOutSessionRenewal } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/session-sharing'
import { supersedeSiblingConnections } from '@/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/supersede'
import { getBankConnectionErrorMessage } from '@/lib/errors/get-error-message'
import { renderFinalizeShell, renderFinalizeRedirect } from './finalize-page'
// This route emits bank_connection.consent_granted / .cash_account_mirror_failed
@@ -82,7 +83,11 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) {
const baseUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || 'http://localhost:3000'
if (error) {
const errorMessage = errorDescription || error
// Swedish user-facing message carrying the underlying provider error; the
// raw code/description stays in the log lines and the audit event below.
// Previously the raw provider text was passed through verbatim, which
// gave a stuck user nothing to act on (issue #1716).
const userMessage = getBankConnectionErrorMessage(error, errorDescription)
// access_denied is the user cancelling at the bank — an expected outcome,
// not a runtime error. Only bank-side failures stay at error level.
const isUserCancel =
@@ -104,7 +109,7 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) {
// (which stays 'expired' during the round-trip) is also handled.
const { data: pendingConn } = await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.select('id, user_id, bank_name, psu_type, status')
.select('id, user_id, company_id, bank_name, psu_type, status')
.eq('oauth_state', state)
.in('status', ['pending', 'expired', 'error'])
.single()
@@ -142,16 +147,41 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) {
await supabase
.from('bank_connections')
.update({ status: isSessionExpiry ? 'expired' : 'error', error_message: errorMessage, oauth_state: null })
.update({ status: isSessionExpiry ? 'expired' : 'error', error_message: userMessage, oauth_state: null })
.eq('id', pendingConn.id)
}
// Durable audit trail for the failed attempt (issue #1716): the
// fresh-connect row was just deleted and console logs expire, so
// event_log is the only place support can later see which attempt
// failed with which provider error.
try {
await eventBus.emit({
type: 'bank_connection.consent_denied',
payload: {
connectionId: pendingConn.id,
bankName: pendingConn.bank_name ?? null,
psuType: pendingConn.psu_type ?? null,
errorCode: error,
errorDescription: errorDescription ?? null,
priorStatus: pendingConn.status,
userId: pendingConn.user_id,
companyId: pendingConn.company_id,
},
})
} catch (emitError) {
log.error(AUDIT_EMIT_FAILED, emitError as Error, {
eventType: 'bank_connection.consent_denied',
connectionId: pendingConn.id,
})
}
// Include bank name, error code, and psu_type in the redirect so the
// UI can render targeted guidance (e.g. PSU-type retry on
// access_denied, or the Handelsbanken corporate fullmakt steps on
// server_error for a business connect).
const params = new URLSearchParams({
bank_error: errorMessage,
bank_error: userMessage,
...(pendingConn.bank_name ? { bank_name: pendingConn.bank_name } : {}),
bank_error_code: error,
...(pendingConn.psu_type ? { psu_type: pendingConn.psu_type } : {}),
@@ -164,18 +194,22 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) {
}
return NextResponse.redirect(
`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent(errorMessage)}`
`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent(userMessage)}`
)
}
if (!code || !state) {
return NextResponse.redirect(`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=missing_parameters`)
return NextResponse.redirect(
`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent(getBankConnectionErrorMessage('missing_parameters'))}`
)
}
// Validate authorization code format
const codePattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9._~+\/-]{8,2048}$/
if (!codePattern.test(code)) {
return NextResponse.redirect(`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=invalid_code_format`)
return NextResponse.redirect(
`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent(getBankConnectionErrorMessage('invalid_code_format'))}`
)
}
const supabase = await createServiceClient()
@@ -201,7 +235,7 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) {
hasCode: !!code,
})
return NextResponse.redirect(
`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent('invalid_state')}`
`${baseUrl}/settings/banking?bank_error=${encodeURIComponent(getBankConnectionErrorMessage('invalid_state'))}`
)
}
@@ -214,13 +248,36 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) {
try {
return await finalizeConnection(supabase, pendingConnection, code)
} catch (finalizeError) {
const reason =
finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.message : String(finalizeError)
console.error('[enable-banking] Callback error', {
message: finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.message : String(finalizeError),
message: reason,
stack: finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.stack : undefined,
name: finalizeError instanceof Error ? finalizeError.name : undefined,
state,
connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
})
// Durable audit trail (issue #1716): the fresh-connect row is deleted by
// the cleanup below and console logs expire, so event_log is the only
// place support can later see that this attempt failed and why.
try {
await eventBus.emit({
type: 'bank_connection.finalize_failed',
payload: {
connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
bankName: pendingConnection.bank_name ?? null,
reason,
priorStatus: pendingConnection.status,
userId: pendingConnection.user_id,
companyId: pendingConnection.company_id,
},
})
} catch (emitError) {
log.error(AUDIT_EMIT_FAILED, emitError as Error, {
eventType: 'bank_connection.finalize_failed',
connectionId: pendingConnection.id,
})
}
return cleanupFailedFinalize(supabase, pendingConnection)
}
})()
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
import { getBankConnectionErrorMessage } from '../get-error-message'
// The PSD2 callback mapper (issue #1716): raw provider tokens used to reach
// the user verbatim ("server_error", "invalid_state"), which left them with
// nothing to act on and support with nothing to answer.
describe('getBankConnectionErrorMessage', () => {
it('maps a user cancel (access_denied) without echoing the provider text', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('access_denied', 'User cancelled')
expect(msg).toContain('Anslutningen avbröts hos banken')
expect(msg).not.toContain('User cancelled')
})
it('treats "Cancelled by user" descriptions as a cancel regardless of code', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('server_error', 'Cancelled by user')
expect(msg).toContain('Anslutningen avbröts hos banken')
})
it('maps a bare server_error to the bank-side failure explanation', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('server_error')
expect(msg).toContain('fel på bankens sida')
// The Handelsbanken corporate case: point at mandates without naming a bank
// (the settings page adds the bank-specific steps from bank_error_code).
expect(msg).toContain('fullmakt')
})
it('surfaces the provider description in parentheses on unknown codes', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('aspsp_error', 'PSU lacks corporate mandate')
expect(msg).toContain('Banken avvisade anslutningen')
expect(msg).toContain('(PSU lacks corporate mandate)')
})
it('does not duplicate the code when the description equals the code', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('server_error', 'server_error')
expect(msg).toContain('fel på bankens sida')
expect(msg).not.toContain('(server_error)')
})
it('maps session-expiry descriptions to the expired-session message', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('server_error', 'Session expired at ASPSP')
expect(msg).toContain('inloggningssession')
expect(msg).toContain('(Session expired at ASPSP)')
})
it('maps the internal invalid_state token to a retry explanation', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('invalid_state')
expect(msg).toContain('Starta bankkopplingen på nytt')
expect(msg).not.toContain('invalid_state')
})
it('maps missing_parameters and invalid_code_format to Swedish', () => {
expect(getBankConnectionErrorMessage('missing_parameters')).toContain('ofullständigt svar')
expect(getBankConnectionErrorMessage('invalid_code_format')).toContain('ogiltigt svar')
})
it('maps temporarily_unavailable to the try-later message', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('temporarily_unavailable')
expect(msg).toContain('tillfälligt otillgänglig')
})
it('falls back to a Swedish rejection message for unknown codes without description', () => {
const msg = getBankConnectionErrorMessage('weird_code')
expect(msg).toContain('Banken avvisade anslutningen')
expect(msg).not.toContain('weird_code')
})
})
+69
View File
@@ -574,6 +574,75 @@ export function getErrorMessage(
return pick(GENERIC_FALLBACK, locale)
}
// PSD2 bank-connection OAuth callback errors. The Enable Banking callback
// route redirects the browser back to /settings/banking with a user-facing
// message. The raw provider code/description used to be passed through
// verbatim ("server_error", "invalid_state"), which left a stuck user with
// nothing to act on and support with nothing to answer (issue #1716: the
// Handelsbanken corporate fullmakt failures). Known codes get a Swedish
// explanation; the raw provider description is appended in parentheses so
// the underlying error still reaches the user (and a screenshot to support).
const BANK_CONNECTION_ERROR_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
server_error:
'Banken kunde inte slutföra godkännandet på grund av ett fel på bankens sida. Försök igen om en stund. Gäller det företagskonton kan banken kräva en fullmakt innan kopplingen godkänns.',
temporarily_unavailable:
'Bankens anslutningstjänst är tillfälligt otillgänglig. Försök igen om en stund.',
invalid_request:
'Banken avvisade anslutningsförfrågan som ogiltig. Försök igen, och kontakta supporten om felet kvarstår.',
// Internal callback tokens (not from the bank) that were previously shown raw.
invalid_state:
'Anslutningsförsöket kunde inte matchas mot ett pågående försök. Det kan hända om försöket tog för lång tid eller om ett nytt försök startades under tiden. Starta bankkopplingen på nytt.',
missing_parameters:
'Banken skickade ett ofullständigt svar tillbaka. Starta bankkopplingen på nytt.',
invalid_code_format:
'Banken skickade ett ogiltigt svar tillbaka. Starta bankkopplingen på nytt.',
}
const BANK_CONNECTION_CANCELLED_MESSAGE =
'Anslutningen avbröts hos banken innan den slutfördes. Ingen bankkoppling skapades. Försök igen och slutför alla steg hos banken.'
const BANK_CONNECTION_SESSION_EXPIRED_MESSAGE =
'Bankens inloggningssession hann gå ut innan anslutningen slutfördes. Starta bankkopplingen på nytt och slutför alla steg hos banken direkt.'
const BANK_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_MESSAGE =
'Banken avvisade anslutningen. Försök igen, och kontakta supporten om felet kvarstår.'
// Same shape the callback route keys its expired-vs-error decision on.
const BANK_SESSION_EXPIRY_PATTERN =
/session.?expired|expired.?session|closed.?session|session.?closed|invalid.?session|session.?not.?found/i
/**
* Map a PSD2 authorization callback outcome (OAuth error code plus optional
* provider description) to a Swedish user message. Always Swedish: the bank
* redirect carries no locale, and bank-connection surfaces follow the
* user-facing-errors-are-Swedish rule.
*/
export function getBankConnectionErrorMessage(
errorCode: string,
errorDescription?: string | null
): string {
const code = errorCode.trim()
const description = errorDescription?.trim() || null
const combined = `${code} ${description ?? ''}`
// User cancelled at the bank: an expected outcome, keep it clean without
// echoing the provider text back.
if (code === 'access_denied' || /cancel/i.test(combined)) {
return BANK_CONNECTION_CANCELLED_MESSAGE
}
let base: string
if (BANK_SESSION_EXPIRY_PATTERN.test(combined)) {
base = BANK_CONNECTION_SESSION_EXPIRED_MESSAGE
} else {
base = BANK_CONNECTION_ERROR_MAP[code] ?? BANK_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_MESSAGE
}
// Surface the underlying provider error: without it the user (and support,
// via a screenshot) cannot tell one failure from another.
return description && description !== code ? `${base} (${description})` : base
}
/**
* Helper that parses a Response body and returns a user-friendly error message.
*/
+6
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ const PERSISTED_EVENT_TYPES: CoreEventType[] = [
// Bank connection consent lifecycle: required audit trail per ASVS V16
// and GDPR Art.30 (records of processing) for PSD2 consent decisions.
'bank_connection.consent_granted',
// Denied/failed consent attempts: the pending bank_connections row is
// deleted on failure and console logs expire, so this durable trail is the
// only way support can answer "which attempt, which error, whose side"
// (issue #1716).
'bank_connection.consent_denied',
'bank_connection.finalize_failed',
'bank_connection.account_selection_changed',
'bank_connection.revoked',
'bank_connection.superseded',
+29
View File
@@ -90,6 +90,35 @@ export type CoreEvent =
// superseded_by pointing at the replacement, and its transactions are
// re-pointed. connectionId is the SUPERSEDED (old) row, mirroring .revoked.
| { type: 'bank_connection.superseded'; payload: { connectionId: string; supersededById: string; bankName: string | null; userId: string; companyId: string } }
// Emitted when the bank/provider redirects the OAuth callback back with an
// error instead of an authorization code: denied consent, a bank-side
// failure (e.g. Handelsbanken's missing corporate fullmakt), or an expired
// signing session. Durable failure trail (issue #1716): the pending row is
// deleted right after and console logs expire, so without this event
// support cannot answer which attempt failed, with which error, on whose
// side. connectionId may reference a row deleted by the same request.
| { type: 'bank_connection.consent_denied'; payload: {
connectionId: string
bankName: string | null
psuType: string | null
errorCode: string
errorDescription: string | null
priorStatus: string
userId: string
companyId: string
} }
// Emitted when the code-for-session exchange or connection finalization
// throws after the bank redirected back successfully. Same audit doctrine
// as consent_denied: the fresh-connect row is deleted by cleanup and the
// console log expires, leaving support nothing to answer from.
| { type: 'bank_connection.finalize_failed'; payload: {
connectionId: string
bankName: string | null
reason: string
priorStatus: string
userId: string
companyId: string
} }
// Emitted when the PSD2 callback fails to mirror a returned account into
// cash_accounts. ASVS V16 / ISO 27001 A.8.15: security-relevant failures
// must land in a structured audit log (event_log, 30-day TTL) rather than