* docs: full accuracy overhaul, grounded claim-by-claim in real code Every doc in this repo (CLAUDE.md, README.md, SECURITY.md, docs/*.md) was audited and rewritten by a multi-pass process: independent rewrite per cluster, adversarial re-verification of that rewrite against the actual code, then a final cross-doc consistency pass — each stage re-checking claims against the repo directly rather than trusting the previous stage. Two corrections matter most: 1. docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md, docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md, and docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md asserted src/services/quality-check-service.ts, quality-report-service.ts, src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts, and sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql/sql/003_*.sql as real, tested code. git log --all across every branch shows zero commits for any of these paths, ever. 0pt's data-quality/QA enforcement does not exist in code. Corrected everywhere, with a new docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md added as an explicit target-spec (not-yet-built) replacement. 2. github.com/sax3l/0pt (this repo) and git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt (Gitea) are two diverged remotes sharing part of the same history (services/api/ workers/adaptive_router.py is byte-identical between them). Gitea's main independently accumulated a WAF-bypass/proxy-rotation scraper stack in three 2026-07-13 commits, since removed via a Gitea PR; GitHub's main never had it. Which remote is canonical/deployed is unresolved — flagged consistently across the corpus, not decided here. Also newly and consistently documented: the tenant_id/project_id-read-from- client-body gap on the P0 lakehouse/rate-policy/source-query routes (no auth/session system exists anywhere in this repo yet); that every CL0UD/ N0D/AUD0/ST0RE platform client is real but mock-only (zero process.env reads for any of their *_URL vars); that two P0 mutation routes (lakehouse/mappings, sources/rate-policies) always fail over HTTP today because their prerequisite entity can never be created via any route; a schema bug in sql/004 (FK references to opt_datasets/opt_sources, which don't exist); and that 0pt.app's live deployment was independently confirmed (curled this pass) to be running this exact codebase with DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL unset in production. New file: docs/12-edge-capability-api.md — the edge-native P0 TypeScript capability contract (app/api/0pt/*, /api/screen, /api/ai/parse), previously undocumented and distinct from docs/04-api.md's FastAPI-engine-only scope. Verified before commit: tsc --noEmit clean; vitest run 88 passed, 1 todo, 0 failures (13 files) — docs-only change, no source touched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: reflect PR #5's lakehouse-mapping-registry + status-code fixes Follow-up to keep docs/12-edge-capability-api.md accurate once both PRs land: fix/0pt-full-bug-hunt (#5) fixed the shared-instance bug in the lakehouse mapping routes and added proper status-code mapping to the document extraction route. This doc was written against the pre-fix state in the same pass that added it, so it needs the same correction. Does not claim the lakehouse write path fully works now -- the deeper dataset-registration gap (no route ever calls DatasetService.registerDataset) is unchanged and still blocks it end-to-end; only the shared-instance half of the bug is fixed. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3.6 KiB
Markdown
82 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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0pt (SIAX Core Platform: Data OS) is proprietary software operated by SIAX
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Technology AB. This document explains how to report a suspected security
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vulnerability.
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Do not open a public GitHub issue for a suspected security problem.
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Email: security@siax.io (fallback: simon@siax.io)
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Include, if possible:
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- A description of the issue and the impact you believe it has.
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- Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept request/response.
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- The route, endpoint, or component affected.
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- Whether the issue is already publicly known or exploited.
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## Response expectations
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- Acknowledgement: within 2 business days.
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- Initial triage and severity assessment: within 5 business days.
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- Remediation timeline: communicated after triage, based on severity.
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Confirmed high/critical issues are prioritized ahead of other work.
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We will keep you informed of progress until the report is resolved and, where
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appropriate, credit you in internal release notes (no public bug bounty
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program exists at this time).
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## Scope
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In scope:
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- The 0pt application and its API routes at 0pt.app.
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- The 0pt engine/orchestrator services in this repository.
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- Infrastructure-as-code and CI/CD configuration in this repository.
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Out of scope:
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- Third-party services and dependencies not maintained in this repository
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(report those to the respective vendor).
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- Denial-of-service testing, spam, or social engineering against SIAX staff
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or customers.
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- Automated scanning that generates excessive load against production
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systems without prior coordination.
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Note: `github.com/sax3l/0pt` (this checkout's `origin`) and
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`git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` (Gitea) are two diverged remotes that share part of
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this codebase's history — see README "Known issues" for what's known and
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what isn't about the relationship between them. Which one is deployed to
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0pt.app is currently unconfirmed; if your finding is remote-specific, say
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which remote/branch you tested against.
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## Known, already-tracked gaps
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The following are **not** news to us — they are open, named gaps as of this
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pass, not secrets, and reporting them again mainly helps confirm priority
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rather than surfacing something new:
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- **No authentication or tenant-isolation system exists in this repo yet.**
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The only gate in front of any route is a `DEV_LOGIN_KEY` dev-login scaffold
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(`app/api/auth/login/route.ts`) — there is no session-to-tenant binding.
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`app/api/orders/route.ts`'s `GET` handler carries the literal comment
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`// GET /api/orders — list (org scoping added with auth).`, confirming this
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directly. As a consequence, the P0 data-platform routes under `/api/0pt/*`
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(`lakehouse/mappings`, `sources/rate-policies`, `sources/[sourceId]/query`)
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and `src/services/document-capture-service.ts` accept `tenant_id`/
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`project_id` **from the client-supplied request body or query string**
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rather than from a server-bound session — a violation of this platform's
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own tenant-isolation rule (tenant_id must never be trusted from client
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input). This is an open, prioritized gap pending real auth (Phase 3,
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`docs/09-build-plan.md`), not an intentional design. Do not treat this repo
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as tenant-isolated until that lands.
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- Beyond that specific item, other authentication gaps on internal API
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routes may still exist and are tracked internally pending an intentional,
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reviewed fix; reporting any you find is still welcome and helps confirm
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priority.
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## Disclosure
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Please give us a reasonable opportunity to investigate and remediate an
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issue before any public disclosure. We aim to coordinate disclosure timing
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with reporters wherever possible.
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