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chore(salvage): preserve uncommitted WIP from /opt/vehiq-work/0pt-p060-p068_0pt before machine cleanup (2026-09-27)
This snapshot was found sitting uncommitted in a stale /opt/vehiq-work
lane clone dated ~2026-09-09..18, base branch: feat/p060-p068-ingestion-plane.
Not reviewed, not verified against current main. Pushed only so the
directory could be deleted without losing the diff.
2026-09-27 12:58:50 +02:00

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# Security Policy
0pt (SIAX Core Platform: Data OS) is proprietary software operated by SIAX
Technology AB. This document explains how to report a suspected security
vulnerability.
## Reporting a vulnerability
Do not open a public GitHub issue for a suspected security problem.
Email: security@siax.io (fallback: simon@siax.io)
Include, if possible:
- A description of the issue and the impact you believe it has.
- Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept request/response.
- The route, endpoint, or component affected.
- Whether the issue is already publicly known or exploited.
## Response expectations
- Acknowledgement: within 2 business days.
- Initial triage and severity assessment: within 5 business days.
- Remediation timeline: communicated after triage, based on severity.
Confirmed high/critical issues are prioritized ahead of other work.
We will keep you informed of progress until the report is resolved and, where
appropriate, credit you in internal release notes (no public bug bounty
program exists at this time).
## Scope
In scope:
- The 0pt application and its API routes at 0pt.app.
- The 0pt engine/orchestrator services in this repository.
- Infrastructure-as-code and CI/CD configuration in this repository.
Out of scope:
- Third-party services and dependencies not maintained in this repository
(report those to the respective vendor).
- Denial-of-service testing, spam, or social engineering against SIAX staff
or customers.
- Automated scanning that generates excessive load against production
systems without prior coordination.
Note: `github.com/sax3l/0pt` (this checkout's `origin`) and
`git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt` (Gitea) are two diverged remotes that share part of
this codebase's history — see README "Known issues" for what's known and
what isn't about the relationship between them. Which one is deployed to
0pt.app is currently unconfirmed; if your finding is remote-specific, say
which remote/branch you tested against.
## Known, already-tracked gaps
The following are **not** news to us — they are open, named gaps as of this
pass, not secrets, and reporting them again mainly helps confirm priority
rather than surfacing something new:
- **Zitadel bearer verification exists in code (fail-closed), but the deployed
instance still answers `/api/0pt/*` anonymously (gap S1).** `src/auth/zitadel.ts`
+ `middleware.ts` implement real JWKS-based verification with a fail-closed
default (`assertAuthConfigSafe()` refuses `AUTH_ENFORCE=false` in production),
yet a live probe (2026-08-10) got HTTP 200 without any token. Root cause is
unconfirmed — do not treat the public instance as authenticated until an
anonymous request receives 401. Additionally, no handler reads the verified
tenant headers (`x-0pt-verified-tenant`): the P0 routes under `/api/0pt/*`
(`lakehouse/mappings`, `sources/rate-policies`, `sources/[sourceId]/query`,
`documents/capture`) accept `tenant_id`/`project_id` **from the client-supplied
request body or query string** rather than from a server-bound session — a
violation of this platform's own tenant-isolation rule (tenant_id must never be
trusted from client input). This is an open, prioritized gap (BACKLOG P0-1/P0-2),
not an intentional design.
- **The non-`/api/0pt` API surface has no authentication at all.** Orders,
admin metrics, payments (including the escrow `release` that flips an order to
`delivered`), subscriptions, uploads and DB-grant endpoints are unprotected in
code (live-verified 200 anonymously on `/api/orders` and `/api/admin/metrics`).
- **The legacy WAF-bypass scraper stack is kept for migration.** `services/scrapers/*`
(`waf_bypass.py`: FlareSolverr, Tor, cloudscraper, curl_cffi, proxy rotation,
fake identities) and `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml`
(flaresolverr/tor containers) contradict this repo's own compliance docs.
A cleanup PR that surgically removed this stack (PR #7, verified clean, 128/128
tests) was closed unmerged by the account owner. **The account owner, Simon
Axelsson, was asked directly via an interactive decision prompt on 2026-08-11
whether to keep or remove this code, and explicitly chose to keep it.** No
additional rationale beyond "keep it" was recorded — none is invented here.
The 2026-09-16 capability-neutral decision supersedes the earlier blanket
anti-evasion rule: functions are preserved and made optional, scoped and
isolated. Active provider/route ownership moves to b0ts + 1p; this local stack
remains migration-era code until parity is verified. See
`docs/architecture/1P_PROXY_PLATFORM_INTEGRATION.md`.
- Beyond those items, other authentication gaps on internal API routes may still
exist and are tracked internally pending an intentional, reviewed fix; reporting
any you find is still welcome and helps confirm priority.
## Disclosure
Please give us a reasonable opportunity to investigate and remediate an
issue before any public disclosure. We aim to coordinate disclosure timing
with reporters wherever possible.