Credit ledger and purchase tables lacked database tenant isolation. Add forced RLS, transaction-local tenant scoping, and fail closed when the role bypasses RLS or the expected migration is not active. The scoped tenant must still come from independently authenticated and authorized application context. Global payment-reference uniqueness is preserved.
Validation: nine tests with a real isolated PostgreSQL non-superuser role, including cross-tenant reads/writes, concurrency, duplicate payments and disabled-RLS rejection; typecheck, targeted lint, full suite (1285 passed / 197 skipped), Next build. Additionally restored the current 0pt database dump into a network-isolated disposable Postgres, applied 017/018/019 with the 0pt application role, and observed five forced-RLS tables plus tenant A visible / tenant B hidden within a rolled-back transaction. This is a test restore, not a production migration or proof of offsite backup.
No customer billing route is enabled; payment, refund handling, project authorization and deployment still require independent verification.
Credit ledger and purchase tables lacked database tenant isolation. Add forced RLS, transaction-local tenant scoping, and fail closed when the role bypasses RLS or the expected migration is not active. The scoped tenant must still come from independently authenticated and authorized application context. Global payment-reference uniqueness is preserved.
Validation: nine tests with a real isolated PostgreSQL non-superuser role, including cross-tenant reads/writes, concurrency, duplicate payments and disabled-RLS rejection; typecheck, targeted lint, full suite (1285 passed / 197 skipped), Next build. Additionally restored the current 0pt database dump into a network-isolated disposable Postgres, applied 017/018/019 with the 0pt application role, and observed five forced-RLS tables plus tenant A visible / tenant B hidden within a rolled-back transaction. This is a test restore, not a production migration or proof of offsite backup.
No customer billing route is enabled; payment, refund handling, project authorization and deployment still require independent verification.
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Credit ledger and purchase tables lacked database tenant isolation. Add forced RLS, transaction-local tenant scoping, and fail closed when the role bypasses RLS or the expected migration is not active. The scoped tenant must still come from independently authenticated and authorized application context. Global payment-reference uniqueness is preserved.
Validation: nine tests with a real isolated PostgreSQL non-superuser role, including cross-tenant reads/writes, concurrency, duplicate payments and disabled-RLS rejection; typecheck, targeted lint, full suite (1285 passed / 197 skipped), Next build. Additionally restored the current 0pt database dump into a network-isolated disposable Postgres, applied 017/018/019 with the 0pt application role, and observed five forced-RLS tables plus tenant A visible / tenant B hidden within a rolled-back transaction. This is a test restore, not a production migration or proof of offsite backup.
No customer billing route is enabled; payment, refund handling, project authorization and deployment still require independent verification.