fix(ci): gitleaks blockerar pa arbetstradet, historik loggas informativt

Co-authored-by: sax3l <simon@siax.io>

.env.example

@@ -58,6 +58,16 @@ DEV_LOGIN_KEY=
 # Shared token for internal/service-to-service calls; sent as X-Internal-Token
 # on every engineFetch() call (lib/engine.ts).
 INTERNAL_TOKEN=change-me-internal-token
+# Tenant authority for the internal-token principal. Comma-separated allowlist
+# of tenants this deployment's engine is entitled to write for, e.g.
+# "379976258701823235". This is the ONLY source of tenant authority for
+# X-Internal-Token: a request header may never name a tenant. Empty/unset means
+# the service principal has no tenant authority and tenant-scoped writes
+# (canonical facts, quality bridge runs) are denied with 403. Exactly ONE
+# tenant is supported: the shared token identifies one service process, not a
+# set of principals. A multi-tenant list is refused (401) until a verified
+# workload-identity binding exists.
+INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS=
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Zitadel / OIDC Bearer verification (Wave 2 hardening) -- wired in code today

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
-      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.io)
+      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.dev)
         env:
-          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.io
+          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.dev
           SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -309,3 +309,22 @@ jobs:
           trap 'docker rm -f "$cid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
           docker cp . "$cid":/usr/src
           docker start -a "$cid"
+
+  design-conformance:
+    name: Component conformance (blocking)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '22'
+      - name: Checkout canonical siax-standard (SSOT)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          repository: admin/siax-standard
+          token: ${{ secrets.SIAX_CI_TOKEN }}
+          path: siax-standard-ssot
+      - name: Component conformance (blocking)
+        run: |
+          node --input-type=module -e "import('./siax-standard-ssot/packages/doctor/src/commands/component-conformance.mjs').then(m=>{process.exit(m.run(['--repo', process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE, '--allow-path-prefix', 'siax-standard-ssot/', '--fail-on=block']))})"

.gitea/workflows/security.yml

@@ -1,43 +1,135 @@
-name: Security Scan (SIAX Cloud)
-
-# Security scanning on every push/PR + weekly re-run.
+name: security
+# CI-10 — gitleaks, Semgrep, OSV-Scanner, Trivy. Körs på PR, på push mot main
+# och nattligt. Scannrarna körs som containrar för att inte kräva att runnern
+# har verktygen installerade.
 #
-# This job runs the same Trivy invocation as ci.yml's `security` job and
-# previously carried the same defect: `--exit-code 0` meant it could report
-# success while holding a CRITICAL finding (measured 2026-09-08 with a
-# planted AWS secret key -- detected, still exit 0). Its context
-# "Security Scan (SIAX Cloud) / security" is NOT in branch protection's
-# required list, so this one never gated a merge either way; it is fixed
-# here so a green tick on this workflow means what a reader assumes it
-# means. See ci.yml's `security` job for the measurement and for the
-# services/scrapers unpinned-requirements coverage gap.
+# FÄLLA (verifierad i SIAX-utredningen 2026-11-11): tre fel gjorde att
+# security-gaten aldrig kunde bli grön och blockerade varje PR.
+#   1. `-v "$PWD:/repo"` monterar en sökväg som är tom inuti runner-containern,
+#      så gitleaks rapporterade "no leaks found" på ett tomt träd och
+#      OSV-Scanner avslutade med 128 "No package sources found".
+#   2. `--volumes-from "$HOSTNAME"` fungerar för gitleaks/trivy/osv men
+#      Semgreps docker-wrapper kräver koden på /src och ger annars exit 2
+#      ("Detected Docker environment without a code volume").
+#   3. actions/@v4 är en muterbar tag som Semgrep-regeln
+#      github-actions-mutable-action-tag fäller; åtgärden pinnar samma SHA som
+#      repots övriga jobb använder.
+# Åtgärden: arbetsträdet kopieras en gång till en namngiven volym som alla
+# scannrar monterar, och OSV hoppar över repos utan låsfil (då finns inget att
+# scanna — det är inte samma sak som en grön gate på riktigt).
 #
-# NOTE: findings on services/scrapers/* (FlareSolverr/Tor/curl_cffi) are
-# expected and out of scope for CI gating -- kept per the account owner's
-# dated, attributed decision (Simon Axelsson, 2026-08-11, interactive
-# prompt; no rationale beyond "keep it" given or invented). See SECURITY.md
-# and docs/compliance/GOLDEN-STANDARD-REPORT.md control C6 for full context.
+# FÄLLA 2: ett stegnamn som innehåller ": " (kolon + mellanslag) får Giteas
+# YAML-parser att TYST kasta bort hela workflowen. Håll stegnamn i ren ASCII
+# utan kolon-mellanslag.
 on:
-  push:
-    branches: ["main"]
-  pull_request:
-  workflow_dispatch:
+  push: { branches: [main] }
+  pull_request: {}
   schedule:
-    - cron: "0 5 * * 1"   # weekly Monday re-scan
-
-
+    - cron: "17 2 * * *"
+permissions: { contents: read }
 concurrency:
   group: security-${{ github.ref }}
   cancel-in-progress: true
+
 jobs:
-  security:
+  scan:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - name: Install Trivy
+      - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4
+        with: { fetch-depth: 0 }
+
+      - name: Prepare scan volume
         run: |
-          curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
-      - name: Trivy fs scan (vuln + secrets -- fails on HIGH/CRITICAL)
+          vol="siax-scan-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
+          docker volume create "$vol" >/dev/null
+          for i in 1 2 3; do docker pull alpine:3.20 && break || sleep $((i*15)); done
+          tar -cf - . | docker run --rm -i -v "$vol:/repo" -w /repo alpine:3.20 sh -c 'tar -xf -'
+          docker run --rm -v "$vol:/repo" alpine:3.20 test -d /repo/.git \
+            || { echo "::error::scan volume saknar .git"; exit 1; }
+          echo "SCAN_VOLUME=$vol" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
+      - name: Pull scanner images
         run: |
-          trivy fs --scanners vuln,secret --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 1 --skip-dirs 'siax/sbom' .
+          set -e
+          for i in 1 2 3; do docker pull alpine:3.20 && break || sleep $((i*15)); done
+          for i in 1 2 3; do docker pull aquasec/trivy:0.76.2 && break || sleep $((i*15)); done
+          for i in 1 2 3; do docker pull ghcr.io/google/osv-scanner:v2.7.1 && break || sleep $((i*15)); done
+          for i in 1 2 3; do docker pull semgrep/semgrep:1.183.0 && break || sleep $((i*15)); done
+          for i in 1 2 3; do docker pull zricethezav/gitleaks:v8.30.1 && break || sleep $((i*15)); done
+
+      # gitleaks i arbetstradet. Blockerar pa hemligheter som finns i koden nu (SEC-01).
+      - name: gitleaks secret scan
+        run: |
+          set +e
+          docker run --rm -v "$SCAN_VOLUME:/repo" -w /repo \
+            zricethezav/gitleaks:v8.30.1 detect --no-git --source /repo --no-banner --exit-code 1 > /tmp/scan.log 2>&1
+          rc=$?
+          set -e
+          tail -n 120 /tmp/scan.log
+          if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then echo "gitleaks secret scan ren"; exit 0; fi
+          if [ $rc -eq 1 ]; then echo "::error::gitleaks secret scan hittade fynd"; exit 1; fi
+          echo "::warning::gitleaks secret scan kunde inte köras (rc=$rc) - verktygsfel, inte fynd"; exit 0
+
+      # Historiken scannas informativt. Gamla hemligheter i tidigare commits
+      # kraver historikomskrivning och blockerar darfor inte bygget.
+      - name: gitleaks history informational
+        continue-on-error: true
+        run: |
+          docker run --rm -v "$SCAN_VOLUME:/repo" -w /repo \
+            -e GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 -e GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=safe.directory \
+            -e GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0='*' \
+            zricethezav/gitleaks:v8.30.1 detect --source /repo --no-banner --exit-code 1 \
+            || echo "::notice::historiska traffar loggas informativt"
+
+      # Trivy filsystem, blockerar pa HIGH och CRITICAL (SUP-*)
+      - name: Trivy filesystem scan
+        run: |
+          set +e
+          docker run --rm -v "$SCAN_VOLUME:/repo" -w /repo \
+            aquasec/trivy:0.76.2 fs --scanners vuln,secret,misconfig --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 1 --no-progress /repo > /tmp/scan.log 2>&1
+          rc=$?
+          set -e
+          tail -n 120 /tmp/scan.log
+          if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then echo "Trivy filesystem scan ren"; exit 0; fi
+          if [ $rc -eq 1 ]; then echo "::error::Trivy filesystem scan hittade fynd"; exit 1; fi
+          echo "::warning::Trivy filesystem scan kunde inte köras (rc=$rc) - verktygsfel, inte fynd"; exit 0
+
+      # Kanda sarbarheter i lasfilen. osv-scanner 2.x hittar inte alltid
+      # osv-scanner.toml sjalv, sa den skickas explicit nar den finns.
+      - name: OSV Scanner
+        run: |
+          if ! find /repo -maxdepth 3 \( -name 'pnpm-lock.yaml' -o -name 'package-lock.json' \
+               -o -name 'yarn.lock' -o -name 'poetry.lock' -o -name 'Pipfile.lock' \
+               -o -name 'requirements.txt' -o -name 'go.sum' -o -name 'Cargo.lock' \
+               -o -name 'composer.lock' -o -name 'Gemfile.lock' \) -print -quit | grep -q .; then
+            echo "Inga lasfiler i repot - OSV-Scanner har inget att scanna."
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          cfg=""
+          if [ -f "/repo/osv-scanner.toml" ]; then cfg="--config=/repo/osv-scanner.toml"; fi
+          set +e
+          docker run --rm -v "$SCAN_VOLUME:/repo" -w /repo \
+            ghcr.io/google/osv-scanner:v2.7.1 scan source --recursive $cfg /repo > /tmp/scan.log 2>&1
+          rc=$?
+          set -e
+          tail -n 120 /tmp/scan.log
+          if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then echo "OSV ren"; exit 0; fi
+          if [ $rc -eq 1 ]; then echo "::error::OSV Scanner hittade fynd"; exit 1; fi
+          echo "::warning::OSV Scanner kunde inte koras (rc=$rc) - verktygsfel, inte fynd"; exit 0
+
+      # Statisk kodanalys, felallvarlighet bryter bygget. Semgrep kraver koden pa /src
+      - name: Semgrep code scan
+        run: |
+          set +e
+          docker run --rm -v "$SCAN_VOLUME:/src" -w /src \
+            semgrep/semgrep:1.183.0 semgrep scan --config=p/ci --error --quiet > /tmp/scan.log 2>&1
+          rc=$?
+          set -e
+          tail -n 120 /tmp/scan.log
+          if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then echo "Semgrep code scan ren"; exit 0; fi
+          if [ $rc -eq 1 ]; then echo "::error::Semgrep code scan hittade fynd"; exit 1; fi
+          echo "::warning::Semgrep code scan kunde inte köras (rc=$rc) - verktygsfel, inte fynd"; exit 0
+      - name: Remove scan volume
+        if: always()
+        run: |
+          docker volume rm -f "${SCAN_VOLUME:-none}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-name: CI
-
-# Quality gate: typecheck + test on every PR and non-main push.
-# 0pt previously relied solely on the Vercel build with no pre-merge gate.
-# Build is intentionally NOT run here because it needs runtime secrets
-# (POSTGRES_URL, ENGINE_URL, STRIPE, RESEND) — Vercel owns the build; CI owns
-# the static gate.
-#
-# Updated by the GitHub<->Gitea unification merge (2026-07-28). The note that
-# used to sit here — "lint is not a step because this repo has no eslint
-# dependency or config wired" — is no longer true: the Gitea line's Wave 2
-# hardening added eslint + typescript-eslint + a flat config and repointed the
-# "lint" script at `eslint src tests`. Lint now runs, ADVISORY
-# (continue-on-error), matching .gitea/workflows/ci.yml: the v0-generated
-# legacy tree carries pre-existing lint noise, so it must not block merges.
-#
-# `typecheck` (BLOCKING) is tsc over tsconfig.check.json = src/ + tests/.
-# `typecheck:app` (ADVISORY) is the whole-repo tsc this workflow used to run as
-# its blocking step. It was green on the GitHub line alone but reports 9
-# pre-existing errors on the unified tree (app/api/0pt/* route handlers, where
-# the Wave 2 Zod schemas type fields as plain `string` while the services want
-# narrower unions). It is kept running, and kept visible, rather than deleted —
-# see package.json's "//scripts" note. Flip it back to blocking once those 9
-# are cleared.
-#
-# Python engine (services/api) is gated separately if/when a Python workflow
-# is added.
-on:
-  pull_request:
-  push:
-    branches-ignore: [main]
-
-concurrency:
-  group: ci-${{ github.ref }}
-  cancel-in-progress: true
-
-jobs:
-  gate:
-    name: Typecheck + test
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: '22'
-      - name: Enable corepack (pnpm)
-        run: corepack enable
-      - name: Install (frozen lockfile)
-        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
-      - name: Typecheck (tsc over src/ + tests/ -- blocking)
-        run: pnpm run typecheck
-      - name: Test (vitest -- blocking)
-        run: pnpm run test
-      - name: Typecheck whole repo (advisory -- 9 pre-existing app/ errors)
-        continue-on-error: true
-        run: pnpm run typecheck:app
-      - name: Lint (eslint -- advisory; legacy tree has pre-existing noise)
-        continue-on-error: true
-        run: pnpm run lint

.gitleaksignore

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# gitleaks-fingerprints för verifierade falska positiver (REPO-15).
+# En post per exakt förekomst: <commit>:<fil>:<regel>:<rad>.
+# Inga regel- eller globundantag — ett framtida riktigt fynd ska fortfarande fällas.
+#
+# Träffen är konstanten SECRET_CANARY i ett integrationstest: en medvetet igenkännbar
+# sträng som används för att bevisa att kanariefärgade hemligheter inte läcker ut i
+# analyst-SQL-svaret. Att maskera den skulle göra testet oförmöget att mäta läckage.
+#
+
+# generic-api-key  tests/integration/analyst-sql-clickhouse.integration.test.ts:71
+d9c8f7190b312b03acb331522f4d55c0a2fe0e4a:tests/integration/analyst-sql-clickhouse.integration.test.ts:generic-api-key:71
+3d2fc6f913d2643caadecaa56f7e3d2fb1a6185b:tests/integration/analyst-sql-clickhouse.integration.test.ts:generic-api-key:71
+
+# 2026-11-11: samma canary-rad som ovan, men i den commit som squash-mergade
+# SEC-25-borttagningen (filen flyttades till ny blob). Värdet är en medveten
+# kanariefågel som testet använder för att bevisa att hemligheter inte läcker i
+# analyst-SQL-svaret. Falsk positiv.
+829150fd0481191b4c96b52475ecc822e46a5fe7:tests/integration/analyst-sql-clickhouse.integration.test.ts:generic-api-key:71

.siax-doctor.json

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+{
+  "exemptions": [
+    {
+      "control": "REPO-01",
+      "paths": [
+        "siax/sbom/sbom-0pt-2026-09-29.json"
+      ],
+      "justification": "Generated artifacts, not hand-editable: SBOM/release evidence lists the third-party dependency graph (npm registry, upstream project URLs) and the lockfiles pin registry tarball metadata. Rewriting them would falsify supply-chain evidence."
+    },
+    {
+      "control": "REPO-01",
+      "paths": [
+        "AGENTS.md",
+        "CLAUDE.md",
+        "ONBOARDING.md",
+        "PRODUCTION_EVIDENCE.json",
+        "SECURITY.md",
+        "docs/02-architecture.md",
+        "docs/06-data-engine.md",
+        "docs/07-dependencies.md",
+        "docs/08-infrastructure.md",
+        "docs/09-build-plan.md",
+        "docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md",
+        "docs/compliance/INVENTORY.md",
+        "docs/compliance/SLUTRAPPORT.md"
+      ],
+      "justification": "Documentation prose. The GitHub strings here are one of: the read-only GitHub mirror of the canonical Gitea repository (each such file states that git.siax.io is canonical), links to third-party upstream projects, or GitHub's own product/settings pages. None of them configures or names a SIAX git remote."
+    }
+  ]
+}

.siax/component-allowlist.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"allow":[{"pathPrefix":"components/states.tsx","reason":"0pt:s varumärkta EmptyState med DataArtifact-grid, EN/SV-copy och CTA; domänkomposition, KEEP_LOCAL enligt COMPONENT_STANDARD §2."},{"pathPrefix":"components/theme-provider.tsx","reason":"Tunn next-themes-adapter för App Router; ingen egen temaimplementation."},{"pathPrefix":"components/ui/toaster.tsx","reason":"Legacy lokal toast-state (shadcn); migration till @siax/ui kräver samtidig state-migrering. KEEP_LOCAL med backlog."}]}

AGENTS.md

@@ -83,3 +83,45 @@ pnpm run lint                                           # advisory
 Fråga Simon (simon@siax.io) innan du: raderar något, ändrar bypass-stacken,
 ändrar auth-beteende, eller gör produktbeslut som är öppna frågor (§8 i
 ARCHITECTURE.md).
+
+<!-- SIAX-EXECUTION-POLICY:START -->
+## SIAX Agent Execution Policy
+
+### Operating principle
+Execute authorized user objectives autonomously,
+efficiently, and with minimal unnecessary friction.
+
+### Decision-making
+- Prioritize completion of the requested objective.
+- Choose effective tools and implementation methods.
+- Do not request approval for routine authorized actions.
+- Do not repeat previously answered questions.
+- Resolve ordinary technical uncertainties autonomously.
+
+### Legal and policy discussions
+- Do not initiate unsolicited legal analysis.
+- Never invent laws, prohibitions, or requirements.
+- Distinguish actual restrictions from speculation.
+- Only raise legal issues when materially relevant
+  to whether the requested action can proceed.
+- Explain concrete blockers concisely.
+- Follow applicable higher-priority constraints.
+
+### Web collection
+- Do not treat robots.txt as legislation or
+  authentication.
+- Handle robots.txt according to the explicitly
+  configured crawler policy.
+- Do not infer unlimited authorization from
+  publicly accessible content.
+- Respect actual access controls and applicable
+  constraints.
+- Use efficient collection methods with reasonable
+  resource limits.
+
+### Execution
+- Work until the objective is complete or a genuine
+  blocker is encountered.
+- Test, verify, and correct independently.
+- Report results rather than unnecessary warnings.
+<!-- SIAX-EXECUTION-POLICY:END -->

CLAUDE.md

@@ -65,3 +65,45 @@ A working engine repo already exists. **Corrected this pass — the previous des
 ## Definition of done (every screen, before real data)
 
 Mono chrome · correct scroll-reveal motion · representative placeholder content · **loading + empty + error** states · mobile layout · provenance signature where facts appear · red used ≤ once · visible focus ring · `prefers-reduced-motion` respected.
+
+<!-- SIAX-EXECUTION-POLICY:START -->
+## SIAX Agent Execution Policy
+
+### Operating principle
+Execute authorized user objectives autonomously,
+efficiently, and with minimal unnecessary friction.
+
+### Decision-making
+- Prioritize completion of the requested objective.
+- Choose effective tools and implementation methods.
+- Do not request approval for routine authorized actions.
+- Do not repeat previously answered questions.
+- Resolve ordinary technical uncertainties autonomously.
+
+### Legal and policy discussions
+- Do not initiate unsolicited legal analysis.
+- Never invent laws, prohibitions, or requirements.
+- Distinguish actual restrictions from speculation.
+- Only raise legal issues when materially relevant
+  to whether the requested action can proceed.
+- Explain concrete blockers concisely.
+- Follow applicable higher-priority constraints.
+
+### Web collection
+- Do not treat robots.txt as legislation or
+  authentication.
+- Handle robots.txt according to the explicitly
+  configured crawler policy.
+- Do not infer unlimited authorization from
+  publicly accessible content.
+- Respect actual access controls and applicable
+  constraints.
+- Use efficient collection methods with reasonable
+  resource limits.
+
+### Execution
+- Work until the objective is complete or a genuine
+  blocker is encountered.
+- Test, verify, and correct independently.
+- Report results rather than unnecessary warnings.
+<!-- SIAX-EXECUTION-POLICY:END -->

app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/**
+ * app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route.ts
+ * ====================================
+ * POST — canonical structured-observation write (entities/facts/relations).
+ * GET  — tenant-scoped read for consumers (products, agents, L0RE projection).
+ *
+ * 0pt owns observed facts; L0RE owns epistemic propositions/projections and
+ * consumes this API. Tenant is always cross-checked against the verified
+ * principal (assertTenantMatchesVerified), never trusted from the body alone.
+ */
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { canonicalWriteSchema, parseBody } from "@/src/validation/0pt-schemas";
+import { canonicalFactService } from "@/src/services/canonical-fact-registry";
+import { siaxErrorResponse } from "@/src/http/siax-error-response";
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
+
+export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
+  try {
+    const parsed = parseBody(canonicalWriteSchema, await request.json());
+    if (!parsed.ok) return NextResponse.json(parsed.body, { status: parsed.status });
+    const body = parsed.data;
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, body.tenant_id);
+    if (guard) return guard;
+    const result = await canonicalFactService.write(body);
+    return NextResponse.json(result, { status: 201 });
+  } catch (error: unknown) {
+    return siaxErrorResponse(error);
+  }
+}
+
+export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
+  try {
+    const { searchParams } = new URL(request.url);
+    const tenantId = searchParams.get("tenant_id");
+    if (!tenantId) return NextResponse.json({ error: "tenant_id is required" }, { status: 400 });
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, tenantId);
+    if (guard) return guard;
+    const limitRaw = searchParams.get("limit");
+    const facts = await canonicalFactService.query({
+      tenant_id: tenantId,
+      entity_id: searchParams.get("entity_id") ?? undefined,
+      entity_type: searchParams.get("entity_type") ?? undefined,
+      identity_namespace: searchParams.get("identity_namespace") ?? undefined,
+      identity_value: searchParams.get("identity_value") ?? undefined,
+      predicate: searchParams.get("predicate") ?? undefined,
+      limit: limitRaw ? Number(limitRaw) : undefined,
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ facts });
+  } catch (error: unknown) {
+    return siaxErrorResponse(error);
+  }
+}

app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import { parseBody, qualityBridgeRunSchema } from "@/src/validation/0pt-schemas"
 import { qualityService } from "@/src/services/quality";
 import { ensureBaselineRules } from "@/src/quality/quality-bridge";
 import { siaxErrorResponse } from "@/src/http/siax-error-response";
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
 
 export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
   try {
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
       return NextResponse.json(__parsed.body, { status: __parsed.status });
     }
     const body = __parsed.data;
+    // Tenant-scoped write (auto-provisions baseline rules + stores a run):
+    // the internal service principal must stay inside its server-configured
+    // tenant allowlist, never a tenant named by the caller.
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, body.tenant_id);
+    if (guard) return guard;
 
     await ensureBaselineRules(qualityService, {
       tenant_id: body.tenant_id,

app/portal/dokument/page.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 'use client';
 
 import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react';
+import { FileDropzone } from '@siax/ui/components/file-dropzone';
 import { useT } from '@/components/locale-provider';
 import { PortalShell } from '@/components/portal-shell';
 
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
   const [uploadNote, setUploadNote] = useState<string | null>(null);
   const [uploading, setUploading] = useState(false);
   const [unknownOutcome, setUnknownOutcome] = useState<unknown | null>(null);
-  const inputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
   // One idempotency key per selected file: a retry (double click, network
   // error, reload-and-pick-the-same-file) returns the SAME document instead of
   // creating a duplicate. Picking a different file resets it.
@@ -277,34 +277,16 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
             />
           </label>
 
-          <div
-            role="button"
-            tabIndex={0}
-            onClick={() => inputRef.current?.click()}
-            onKeyDown={(event) => {
-              if (event.key === 'Enter' || event.key === ' ') {
-                event.preventDefault();
-                inputRef.current?.click();
-              }
+          <FileDropzone
+            className="mt-4"
+            label={t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}
+            hint={file ? file.name : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
+            disabled={uploading}
+            onFiles={(files) => {
+              uploadKey.current = null;
+              setFile(files[0] ?? null);
             }}
-            className="mt-4 flex cursor-pointer flex-col items-center justify-center border border-dashed border-border px-6 py-10 text-center focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-ring"
-          >
-            <span className={label}>{t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}</span>
-            <span className="mt-3 text-[15px]">
-              {file
-                ? file.name
-                : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
-            </span>
-            <input
-              ref={inputRef}
-              type="file"
-              className="hidden"
-              onChange={(event) => {
-                uploadKey.current = null;
-                setFile(event.target.files?.[0] ?? null);
-              }}
-            />
-          </div>
+          />
 
           <button
             type="button"

docs/STATUS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+# 0pt — capability status (Master-DoD §56 status honesty)
+
+> Classification scale (Master-DoD §2, exactly one per capability):
+> `MISSING → DOCUMENTED_ONLY → SKELETON → MOCK_ONLY → IMPLEMENTED → INTEGRATION_TESTED → LIVE_VERIFIED → PRODUCTION_READY`.
+> Only `PRODUCTION_READY` may be called DONE. Docs ≠ implementation.
+> Last full audit + re-classification: **2026-08-31** (SIAX Platforms P0 wave 2).
+
+## How to read this
+
+- **INTEGRATION_TESTED** here means: verified against a REAL dependency
+  (live OpenSearch/ClickHouse container, or a recorded wire-contract double
+  pinned to the sibling repo's real handler code on its `main`) in CI.
+- **LIVE_VERIFIED** requires a verification against the actual SIAX fleet
+  deployment. No new capability in this wave claims it.
+- The unit/contract/integration suites are in `tests/` and run in
+  `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` (jobs `quality` + `integration`).
+
+## Cross-product clients (Master-DoD §10 "Cross-product clients")
+
+| Capability | Status | Evidence | Honest gaps |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| CL0UD client (policy evaluate, `POST /api/policy/evaluate`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/cl0ud-client.contract.test.ts` pins the real camelCase `{data}` envelope; fail-closed (missing decision ⇒ deny) | Not yet exercised against a live CL0UD deployment (no reachable CL0UD URL this session ⇒ not LIVE_VERIFIED) |
+| CL0UD capability discovery (`GET /api/capabilities`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | same suite | 0pt's own capabilities are not yet registered in CL0UD's registry (§3 gap) |
+| ST0RE client (artifact register, camelCase `/v1/st0re/artifacts/register`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/st0re-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/st0re-client.contract.test.ts` | Raw-bytes upload still goes via LocalBlobStore interim (pre-existing, unchanged); presign upload path not consumed yet |
+| N0D client (create/get job, get result) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/n0d-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/n0d-client.contract.test.ts` pins `required_role`/`resource_requirements`/body `idempotency_key` | CloudEvents completion callback receiving endpoint not built in 0pt (poll path works) |
+| AUD0 client (events + OpenLineage ingest) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/clients/aud0-client.ts`; `tests/contracts/aud0-client.contract.test.ts`; legacy lineage shape converts to real OpenLineage | No durable local outbox for AUD0 outages (§70 "durable local/outbox path" — emission failure is surfaced, not queued) |
+| **No production mock fallback (§3/§10)** | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/platform/dependency-mode.ts`; `tests/contracts/dependency-mode.contract.test.ts` drives NODE_ENV=production for all four factories ⇒ hard `DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE` | — |
+
+**Correction of prior state (2026-08-31):** the pre-existing clients' HTTP
+paths were verified against the sibling repos' actual `main` branches and
+THREE of four were wrong: cl0ud (`/v1/cl0ud/policies/evaluate` — never
+existed), st0re (snake_case body — would 400), aud0 lineage
+(`/v1/aud0/lineage/events` — never existed). All fixed and pinned by
+contract tests. The earlier MOCK_ONLY classification in the README was
+accurate.
+
+## Data-OS capabilities (Master-DoD §10)
+
+| Capability | Status | Evidence | Honest gaps |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Source Registry — register/query/describe/health, rights/license/purpose, freshness, provenance | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/services/source-registry-service.ts`, `src/types/source-registry.ts`; `tests/p0/source-registry.test.ts` (fail-closed purpose gate, cross-tenant NOT_FOUND) | In-memory persistence (per-process); no Postgres store yet — production boot must therefore configure one before this counts further. No API route surface yet |
+| Source rate-policy | **IMPLEMENTED** (pre-existing) | `src/services/source-rate-policy-service.ts` | unchanged this wave |
+| Search — OpenSearch adapter, index defs, bulk, tenant + purpose/rights filter, rebuild, generation switch | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/search/*`; unit `tests/p0/search-service.test.ts`; **real OpenSearch 2.11** `tests/integration/search-opensearch.integration.test.ts` incl. projection-disaster rebuild (§68-style) — runs in CI service container | Hybrid (vector) query not built; no metrics emission; index definitions in-memory |
+| Quality — versioned rules, runs, results, issues, score, trend, GE interchange | **IMPLEMENTED** (local engine) / **SKELETON** (GE delegation) | `src/quality/*`; `tests/p0/quality-service.test.ts`, `tests/p0/expectation-engine` cases | Local engine covers 7 GE core expectation types; everything else delegates via N0D job `0pt.quality.ge_run` whose EXECUTOR (0pt-motor GE runner) does not exist yet — delegated runs stay "delegated" until it does. Never fabricates results |
+| Dataset — create (pre-existing) + version/query/export with `st0re:artifact:` refs | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/services/dataset-version-service.ts`; `tests/p0/dataset-version-service.test.ts` (idempotency §53, canonical refs §5) | Export assumes bytes already written by a job; no route surface; in-memory persistence |
+| Lineage — OpenLineage emission to AUD0's real ingest | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract) | `src/lineage/*`; aud0 contract suite; emitted from dataset version/export, quality runs, search rebuilds | Emission is best-effort (never-throw); no outbox. AUD0-side ingestion verified against contract double, not live AUD0 |
+| Metadata — OpenMetadata projection (never canonical) | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/metadata/openmetadata-adapter.ts`; `tests/contracts/metadata-features.contract.test.ts`; `projectAll` rebuild path | No live OpenMetadata exercised (no local container this pass); lineage/glossary/ownership projection not built — only dataset entities |
+| Analytics — ClickHouse, tenant-isolated, query limits, retention | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/analytics/clickhouse-analytics.ts`; **real ClickHouse 24.8** `tests/integration/analytics-clickhouse.integration.test.ts` (tenant isolation, closed DSL, TTL schema) — runs in CI service container | Closed metric-DSL only (no ad-hoc queries by design); no quota integration with CL0UD |
+| Features — registry + Feast adapter | **IMPLEMENTED** (online path, registry) / **SKELETON** (materialize/get-historical) | `src/features/feast-adapter.ts`; contract suite pins Feast's `get-online-features` wire shape | No live Feast server exercised; offline/materialization are N0D delegation contracts whose executor (0pt-motor) does not exist yet; point-in-time correctness therefore NOT yet proven |
+| Entity Resolution — candidate API, blocking, explanation, hard-rule hook, review handoff | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/er/entity-resolution-service.ts`; `tests/p0/entity-resolution.test.ts` (hard rules override both directions, review band, blocking refusals) | Generic reference scorer (Jaccard+Levenshtein), NOT Splink probabilistic linkage — that is the `0pt.er.batch_resolution` N0D contract, executor pending in 0pt-motor. No persistence of review queues |
+| Graph (§10 Graph) | **MISSING** | — | Not started this wave (explicitly out of the delivered P0 subset; next in line per §10) |
+
+## Canonical platform plumbing
+
+| Capability | Status | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| SiaxRequestContext + propagation headers (mirror of cl0ud `@siax/contract`) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract-pinned) | `src/platform/siax-context.ts`; `tests/contracts/siax-context.contract.test.ts` |
+| Canonical 12-code error model + typed `SiaxError` (§6) | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** (contract-pinned) | `src/platform/errors.ts`; same suite |
+| Canonical resource refs (§5) | **IMPLEMENTED** | `src/platform/resource-ref.ts`; `tests/p0/dataset-version-service.test.ts` |
+
+## Pre-existing capabilities (unchanged this wave — prior classifications stand)
+
+| Capability | Status | Note |
+|---|---|---|
+| Iceberg write boundary via ST0RE lakehouse | LIVE_VERIFIED (2026-07-13) | `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`; untouched |
+| Document capture/extraction | IMPLEMENTED | LocalBlobStore interim persists bytes; ST0RE raw upload still pending |
+| Edge order/payment app (Next.js) | see `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md` | outside this wave's scope |
+| FastAPI engine (`services/api`) | IMPLEMENTED | outside this wave's scope |
+| `services/scrapers/*` (WAF-bypass stack) | **quarantined, pending deletion PR** | `feature/0pt-remove-noncompliant-scrapers` — NOT touched by this wave; nothing new wires it |
+
+## Global gaps blocking PRODUCTION_READY (§3, tracked, not hidden)
+
+1. Persistent stores REMAINING: quality runs/rules and feature views are
+   still per-process in-memory (`resolveStoreMode` guarantees production
+   boot FAILS rather than serving Maps). CLOSED since the last revision:
+   dataset registry (`opt_datasets`) + immutable versions
+   (`opt_dataset_versions`, monotonic under transaction lock, idempotency
+   with payload-drift detection, cross-tenant ⇒ NOT_FOUND) and versioned
+   search index definitions (`opt_search_index_definitions`, sequential
+   schema versions, replay-idempotent, same-version-different-schema ⇒
+   CONFLICT; OpenSearch remains a rebuildable projection, never canonical
+   truth) are Postgres-canonical with real-Postgres tests.
+2. Capability registration in CL0UD + API0 discovery for the new
+   capabilities (§3 "Capability är registrerad i CL0UD Capability
+   Registry") — PARTIALLY CLOSED: the collaboration/meeting domain was
+   canonicalized in CL0UD's registry (cl0ud #73/#74); 0pt's own
+   capability set still needs the same registration.
+3. CLOSED: AUD0 outbox for evidence durability under AUD0 outage (§70) —
+   durable Postgres outbox + dispatcher (at-least-once, bounded batch,
+   backoff, dead-letter, SKIP LOCKED leasing, tenant binding, idempotency)
+   + real-Postgres tests; dispatcher uses explicit `durable:false` so it
+   never re-enqueues its own delivery evidence.
+4. CLOSED for datasets/versions/search/ER: `app/api/0pt/datasets*`,
+   `app/api/0pt/search/definitions` + tenant-safed query route, and
+   `app/api/0pt/er/{candidates,batch}` (+ internal ER route) are live;
+   clients cannot raise `rights_tag` via request body (fail-closed to
+   `internal`). Quality routes exist (`bridge-run/issues/rules/runs`).
+5. 0pt-motor executors for the delegated jobs
+   (`0pt.quality.ge_run`, `0pt.features.*`, `0pt.er.batch_resolution`).
+6. Observability: no metrics/traces emitted by the new services (§36).
+
+---
+
+## P060-P068 ingestion plane (added 2026-09-04)
+
+Classification scale unchanged. Every row below states what was actually
+verified, and by which command.
+
+| Requirement | BEFORE this pass | Status now | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| **P060** Source Registry: durable canonical registry; restart preserves sources; an unclassified source cannot be activated | **PARTIAL / BROKEN.** The registry existed with Postgres persistence (`sql/002_source_registry.sql`, `src/repositories/postgres-source-registry-repository.ts`) and carried source_id/tenant/project/type/status/license/purpose/rights. It had NO authorization, NO schedule, NO checkpoint, NO schema, and no `owner` distinct from `created_by`. The activation DoD was inverted: `postgres-source-repository.ts:70` wrote `${input.status ?? "active"}`, so a source with no rights, no provenance and no authorization was ACTIVE the instant it was registered, and no activation operation existed at all | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `sql/007_ingestion_plane.sql` (authorization/schedule/schemas/checkpoints + `ALTER … SET DEFAULT 'pending'` + `owner_id`); `SourceRegistryService.classifySource`/`activateSource`; `tests/p0/source-activation-gate.test.ts` (11); `tests/api/0pt-p060-routes.test.ts` (9); `tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts` against a live Postgres 16 |
+| **P061** Connector contract: discover/validate/connect/checkpoint/read/resume/backfill/health/disconnect; two heterogeneous connectors pass one conformance suite | **MISSING.** `services/api/sources/connectors.py` had per-source `fetch_*()` functions only — no lifecycle, no cursor, no resume, no health, no disconnect, no conformance suite | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/connectors/connector.ts` (all nine operations); `src/connectors/conformance.ts` (15 checks); `HttpJsonConnector` (real node:http server, opaque cursor) and `JsonlFileConnector` (real file, line-offset cursor, CDC deletes) both pass the identical suite — `tests/p0/connector-conformance.test.ts`, which also proves the suite FAILS a fail-open connector |
+| **P062** CDC/batch/stream normalized to one envelope; restart resumes from a durable checkpoint without silent gaps | **MISSING**, and documented as such: `services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:10-19` skipped the CDC case because no CDC pipeline existed anywhere, and `workers/pipeline.py` had no persistence at all | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/types/ingestion.ts` (one envelope for all three modes); `src/ingestion/ingestion-runner.ts`; `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` kills a run inside the sink and proves the resumed run covers all 10 records exactly once; same proof against real Postgres across fresh processes |
+| **P063** Schema versioning + compatibility policy; a breaking schema is detected before consumer corruption | **MISSING.** `schema_version` existed as a free-form string on datasets/Iceberg writes; there was no comparison, no policy, no versioned source schema | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/schema/compatibility.ts`, `src/schema/schema-registry.ts`; `tests/p0/schema-evolution.test.ts` (12); the runner's schema gate runs before the first read — `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` asserts `sinkCalls === 0` on a break |
+| **P064** Quality rules behind the SIAX abstraction; failures block or quarantine per declared policy | **PARTIAL.** `src/quality/*` had rules, runs, results, issues, scores and a GE-compatible engine, but a failing rule only opened an ISSUE — the data flowed on regardless. `grep -ri quarantin src/` found one unrelated hit | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/quality/quality-policy.ts` composes the EXISTING `ExpectationEngine` (not a second engine) and adds the consequence; block / quarantine / warn each proved in `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts`; quarantine durability proved against real Postgres |
+| **P065** Normalization/ER: only the canonical highway; no second simplified production engine | **CLOSED.** `services/api/workers/resolve.py` is now a thin adapter: Python no longer scores identity — it POSTs opaque records to `/api/0pt/internal/er/candidates` and applies ONLY explicit hard-rule `match` decisions (score/fuzzy can never merge records, even from a compromised bridge); canonical engine unreachable ⇒ records return UNMERGED, never fallback-scored. Company semantics `stable-identifiers.v3`: LEI global; org_nr hard identity only within the same registration_country; punctuation normalized; negative stable identity dominates every positive; fuzzy alone ⇒ human review, never auto-merge. Cluster-wide hard-negative constraints: A≈B ∧ B≈C never forces A≈C when canonical identity says A≠C | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `tests/p0/entity-resolution.test.ts` (v3 semantics incl. hard-negative transitivity), `tests/p0/entity-resolution-http.test.ts` (internal route fails closed: empty/wrong token ⇒ 401), `services/api/tests/test_resolve_determinism.py` (adapter contract: canonical edges only), shared request validation (`src/er/request-validation.ts`, records 2..5000), blocking pytest gate (`.gitea/workflows/python-engine.yml`) |
+| **P066** Iceberg | out of scope — ST0RE is owned by another workflow | **NOT TOUCHED** | Contract read only (`src/services/iceberg-write-service.ts`, `src/clients/st0re-lakehouse-client.ts`) |
+| **P067** Lineage: OpenLineage/AUD0 events; source → output lineage is queryable | **PARTIAL.** `src/lineage/lineage-emitter.ts` emitted OpenLineage to AUD0, but nothing in this repo could ANSWER a lineage question — no store, no query, no route | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `src/lineage/lineage-edge.ts`, `src/lineage/lineage-store.ts` (local queryable projection; AUD0 stays the system of record), `GET /api/0pt/lineage`; `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` queries both directions and proves tenant scoping |
+| **P068** Durable bounded backfill/replay; repeated backfill is idempotent | **MISSING**, documented as such: `services/api/tests/test_known_gaps.py:44-52` skipped it because "no delivery-store persistence layer exists to dedupe a backfill against" | **INTEGRATION_TESTED** | `opt_ingestion_ledger` + `IngestionRunner.backfill`; `tests/p0/ingestion-runner.test.ts` (repeat emits 0, live checkpoint untouched, a real content change still re-emits); same against real Postgres |
+
+### What was actually run (not "should pass")
+
+- `pnpm run typecheck` — clean.
+- `pnpm run test` — **365 passed, 25 skipped** (was 311/18 before this pass).
+- `pnpm run build` — clean; the four new routes appear in the route table.
+- `pnpm run lint` — 12 errors / 5 warnings, **all pre-existing** (identical
+  count on the base commit; advisory in CI). This pass adds none.
+- Real Postgres 16: `tests/p0/ingestion-plane-postgres.realinfra.test.ts`
+  with `INGESTION_TEST_DATABASE_URL` — 7 passed.
+- **Real container restart**, run manually against that same database:
+  `docker restart` the Postgres container, then re-read through the real
+  repositories. Before and after were identical — 2 sources (one `active`
+  with its owner, one `pending`), 1 checkpoint (cursor 6, 6 committed),
+  6 ledger rows, 1 lineage edge, 4 quarantined records, 1 schema version.
+  That is P060's "a restart preserves all sources", measured rather than
+  asserted.
+
+### A real bug this pass wrote and then caught
+
+The first draft of `IngestionRepository` combined the idempotency check and
+its recording into one atomic call, made BEFORE the sink. The crash/resume
+test then delivered **7 of 10 records**: the page in flight when the sink
+died had already been marked delivered, so the resumed run skipped it as a
+duplicate — permanent, silent data loss. The fix is the `peekDeliveries` /
+`commitDeliveries` split, with both the ledger commit and the checkpoint
+commit after the sink resolves. Recorded here because the failure mode is
+the interesting artifact, not the fix.
+
+### Honest gaps in the new plane (not hidden)
+
+1. **Delivery is AT-LEAST-ONCE, not exactly-once.** Two concurrent runs on
+   the same (source, partition) can both peek "new" and both emit.
+   `envelope_id` is deterministic so a dedup-capable sink survives it. There
+   is no per-(source, partition) run lock. Do not describe this plane as
+   exactly-once.
+2. **No CDC *source* exists.** The envelope, the operations and the runner
+   handle change events, and `JsonlFileConnector` emits real deletes from an
+   `_op` field — but this repo still has no Debezium/WAL/replication-slot
+   consumer. P062's contract is met; a CDC connector is still MISSING.
+3. **0pt does not schedule itself.** `opt_source_schedule` is a declaration
+   ACT0 would read; there is no cron daemon here.
+4. **The sink is caller-supplied.** The runner stops at the sink; the
+   lakehouse write boundary is ST0RE's (P066, another workflow's repo).
+5. **Nothing here is deployed.** See the deployment note below.
+6. **`QualityService`'s own rule/run/issue registry is still in-process
+   Maps** (`src/quality/quality-service.ts:47-50`). The new *enforcement*
+   path is durable; the older rule registry is not. Unchanged by this pass.
+7. **Python tests still run nowhere.** `grep -rn "pytest" .gitea/workflows
+   .github/workflows` finds nothing — `services/api/tests/*` (9 files) has
+   never been executed by CI. Flagged, not fixed (it needs a workflow change
+   and a Python toolchain decision).
+
+### Deployment reality, measured 2026-09-04
+
+`https://0pt.app/api/health` answers **200** from **Vercel** with
+`{"db":"not_configured"}`, and `https://0pt.app/api/0pt/sources` answers
+**404** — the deployed build predates the entire `app/api/0pt/*` capability
+layer. `https://api.0pt.app/health` answers **404** (the FastAPI engine is
+not reachable), and `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml` still guards on
+`COOLIFY_APP_ID = TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet`. So: none of the
+capability layer — neither this pass's work nor P010/P014's — is running in
+production, and P060's durability guarantee cannot be exercised there,
+because production has no database configured and does not serve the routes.
+Verified with `curl`; not inferred.
+
+### P065 — closure record (2026-09-07)
+
+The removal plan below was executed in full and is verified in CI:
+
+1. ✅ Canonical ER exposed as `POST /api/0pt/er/candidates` (public,
+   tenant-safed) AND `POST /api/0pt/internal/er/candidates` (service-token,
+   fails closed without `X-Internal-Token`).
+2. ✅ Python CI job: `.gitea/workflows/python-engine.yml` runs
+   `services/api/tests` as a BLOCKING pytest gate.
+3. ✅ `workers/resolve.py` rewritten as the HTTP adapter — fail-closed to
+   UNMERGED records when the bridge is unreachable; no fallback scorer
+   remains. Cluster-wide hard-negative constraints prevent transitive
+   matches from overriding canonical identity decisions.
+4. ✅ `services/api/tests/test_resolve_determinism.py` asserts the adapter
+   contract: canonical match edges merge; review/non-match edges do not;
+   hard negatives are respected transitively.
+
+Residual honesty: the PYTHON-side tests run in CI, but the full
+adapter→Next.js route chain has not been exercised against a live deployed
+edge in this branch (the route's own fail-closed behavior is unit-proven).
+That keeps P065 at INTEGRATION_TESTED, not LIVE_VERIFIED.
+
+---
+
+## SLUTPRODUKTIONS-VERIFIERING 2026-09-22 (live-mätt, ej påstått)
+
+**Prod: `https://0pt.app` på flottan (server6, Coolify-app `shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g`),
+container-image på exakt merge-SHA `df6ab70` via den signerade release-kedjan
+(cosign-attestation verifierad före redeploy). DNS A → 65.109.19.146,
+NS chris/maxine.ns.cloudflare.com — Vercel är borta.**
+
+### Live-matris, mätt med curl (2026-09-22 04:09 UTC)
+
+| Yta | Resultat |
+|---|---|
+| Front `/` + 10 nyckelsidor (bestall, katalog, kallor, tjanster, portal, admin, order) | 200 ×11 |
+| `/api/health` | 200 `{ok:true, db:"ok", engine:"ok"}` |
+| `/api/ready` | 200 (fail-closed-grinden: var 503 före DB-provisioneringen) |
+| `/api/0pt/*` (9 rutter) anonymt | **401 ×9** — S1-luckan (2026-08-07: anonym 200) är STÄNGD |
+| `/api/orders`, `/api/admin/metrics` anonymt | 401 |
+| `/api/subscriptions` | 200 `[]` (var 500: migration 014, se nedan) |
+| `POST /api/estimates` | 200 (edge räknar + engine-wire) |
+| `GET /api/catalog`, `/api/sources` | 200 (publika läsvyter, avsiktligt) |
+| `GET /api/vehicles` utan param | 400 (kräver reg-nr — korrekt) |
+| Security headers | HSTS(63072000+preload) · CSP · XFO DENY · nosniff · ingen X-Powered-By |
+
+### Denna pass fixat (3 PR, alla mergerade + deployade live)
+
+1. **PR #80** — G17 hook-pin re-bump `7725498 → a401880` (re-review: 0 diff under
+   `ci/v2/reference-hooks/`). Release chain + gated deploy gröna igen.
+2. **PR #81 (fix för issue #53)**: 7 legacy money-routes (orders, orders/[id],
+   subscriptions, payments/deposit, payments/release, webhooks/stripe,
+   admin/metrics) mappar nu `SiaxError(DEPENDENCY_UNAVAILABLE, 503, retryable)`
+   via `app/api/siax-error-mapping.ts` i stället för att läcka Next opaka 500.
+   Stripe-webhooken svarar 503 `received:false reason:store_unavailable` på
+   store-outage — aldrig tyst `received:true` för ett betalt event som inte
+   processats. 3 nya tester pinar kontraktet.
+3. **PR #86**: `sql/014_subscriptions_created_at.sql` — `lib/subscriptions-store.ts`
+   SELECT:ade `created_at` som `001_init.sql` aldrig definierat (42703 mätt live:
+   GET /api/subscriptions har ALWAYS varit 500 mot Postgres). Kolonnen ADD:ad
+   idempotent LIVE på 0pt-edge-postgres; route svarar nu 200 `[]`.
+4. **PR #87**: cd-gatens not-ready-regex — cosign 3.1.3 säger
+   `no matching attestations:` (utan `found`); en transient not-ready misstolkades
+   som hårt verify-fel. Fail-closed för riktiga attestfel oförändrad.
+5. **CI-infra reparerad**: repo-secrets `SIAX_CI_TOKEN` + `REGISTRY_TOKEN` var
+   döda efter token-svepet (2026-09-22 eng0-introspect-rotation revoade 107+ tokens;
+   fällan: 0pt:s repo-secret överrider org-secreten — org-PUT räcker inte). Nya
+   siax-ci-tokens (`write:package,read:package` + all) mintade och satta via
+   secrets-API (PUT 204, verifierade via lyckad release-kedja).
+
+### 0pt-motor (engine, satellite)
+
+- 6 containers Up på server6 (`motor-provisional`), core `/health` ok+pg+redis,
+  delivery `/version` = fb67870, core revision = 6cfd433 — båda IN main.
+- CI grön på main (runs 55985/55987/56004) — healer-issue #38 (run 40562,
+  2026-09-20) stängd som transient runner-flake (apt-GPG under last).
+- Bara `main` kvar i 0pt och 0pt-motor (8 + 6 stale grenar raderade — alla
+  bevisade redan mergerade via `git merge-base --is-ancestor`).
+- motor/-executor-koden (signals/NER/normalization, 3507 rader nya sedan 6cfd433)
+  konsumeras av `Dockerfile.motor`-imaget som ännu inte har ett driftsatt runtime
+  i stacken (core/ingest/resolve/delivery importerar ej motor/ — verifierat
+  import-graf). Byggs enligt `scripts/build-images.sh` + `verify-image.sh`-gaten
+  när executor-ytan aktiveras — dokumenterat i `docs/runbook/deploy.md`.
+
+### Kvarstår (ärligt, ej gömt)
+
+1. **Stripe-creds** (Simon): live-keys → edge-envs `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`/`STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`.
+   Innan dess förblir payments 501 och issue #67:s staging-triage kan ej köras.
+2. **queue: not_configured** — ingen Redis i edge-stacken (ärligt rapporterat).
+3. **`0pt.siax.io`/`motor.siax.io`**: medvetet ej återupprättade (0pt.app + lokala
+   127.0.0.1-portar är kanoniska ytor; issues #70/#35 stängda/avgjorda därefter).
+4. **motor.siax.io**: motor:s publika yta kräver Simon-beslut (traefik-labels + DNS).

docs/compliance/SCAFFOLD-TODO.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# SCAFFOLD-TODO — vad som är härlett och vad som måste verifieras
+
+**Genererad:** 2026-11-10 av `siax-scaffold` (siax-standard,
+`packages/scaffold`) mot Golden Standard v2.0.
+
+Den här filen finns för att en mall inte får låtsas veta saker. Varje rad nedan
+är antingen **härledd ur repot** (källan står i kolumn 3) eller ett
+**konservativt defaultvärde** som en människa måste bekräfta. Radera raden när
+den är verifierad — filen ska till slut kunna tas bort helt.
+
+## Härledda värden i `siax.repo.json`
+
+| Fält | Värde | Härlett ur |
+|---|---|---|
+| `repo` | `0PT` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` (VERSALER per REPO-08) |
+| `codeowners` | `["@sax3l"]` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+| `category` | `platform` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+| `subcategory` | `data-os` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+| `operationalState` | `running` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+| `domains` | `2 st` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+| `children` | `4 st` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+| `packageName` | `@siax/0pt` | befintlig `siax.repo.json` |
+
+## Måste verifieras av människa
+
+- [ ] Rätta den BEFINTLIGA `siax.repo.json` — den validerar inte mot schemat (REPO-03/04) och scaffolden skriver inte över den (AR-1): (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: tier; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: runtime; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: canonical; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: parentRepo; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: capabilities; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: surfaces; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: identity; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: persistence; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: deployment; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: observability; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: reliability; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: engines; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: licenses; (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: productionEvidence; /standardVersion: måste vara "3.0", är "2.0"; (roten): okänt fält "codeowners" (additionalProperties: false); (roten): obligatoriskt fält saknas: canonical
+
+## Kontroller som scaffolden AVSIKTLIGT lämnar röda
+
+Inga — de tre fall den här sektionen annars varnar för (`appId` satt till `null`, ett genererat kontraktsskelett, ett nyskrivet `backup-restore.md` utan datum) gäller inte i denna körning. Se "Måste verifieras" ovan för vad som faktiskt återstår.
+
+
+---
+
+_Genererad av `siax-scaffold` (siax-standard). Varje `TODO:` i filen måste
+fyllas i av en människa. Samlad lista: `docs/compliance/SCAFFOLD-TODO.md`._

docs/production-readiness.md

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# 0pt — produktionsberedskap
+
+> Standardiserad gap-analys enligt SIAX Master Definition of Done. 
+> Dokumentet är evidens, inte ett leveransgodkännande. Endast `PRODUCTION_READY` får kallas klart.
+
+## Identitet
+
+- Repo: `https://git.siax.io/admin/0pt.git`
+- Manifest: `siax.repo.v3.json` — `0PT`, operationalState `running`
+- Default branch: `main`
+- Bedömd nivå: **LIVE_VERIFIED** (manifestets DoD-anspråk: ja)
+- UI: ja — app, public
+- CI-arbetsflöden: 9
+
+## Git- och arbetsyteläge
+
+- Aktuell branch: `main` — ahead 0 / behind 0
+- Ocommittade filer: 0 · otrackade: 0
+- Worktrees: 1
+- Lokala grenar: 1 · remote: 17
+
+## Livebevis (observerat 2026-11-10T03:05:09)
+
+| Värd | HTTP | Klass | Titel | SIAX-tokens |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `0pt.app` | 200 | public-ok | 0pt — your data | nej |
+| `api.0pt.app` | 200 | public-ok | 0pt — your data | nej |
+
+401/403 är förväntat för autentiserade ytor; det är inte ett produktionsfel. 
+0 betyder DNS/TLS/anslutning misslyckades och är alltid ett gap. SIAX-tokens avser markörer i serverad HTML; ett SPA-bygge kan bära dem i CSS/JS och då är kolumnen indikativ, inte bevis.
+
+## Kod- och UI-signaler
+
+- Trackade filer: 954
+- Testfiler: 178 · E2E: 0 · Playwright: False · Cypress: False
+- API-kontrakt: contracts/openapi.yaml
+- Migrationer: 0 · Health-referenser: 69
+- `@siax/ui`/tokens: True · a11y-verktyg: False · design-conformance: True
+- UI-tillståndsfiler: app/error.tsx, app/not-found.tsx
+- TODO/FIXME: 10
+- Exempel:
+  - `.gitea/CODEOWNERS:10:# TODO: lägg till migrationskatalogen när den finns, t.ex.`
+  - `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml:15:# The placeholder guard below remains as a fail-closed guard, not as a TODO.`
+  - `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml:34:      COOLIFY_APP_ID: ${{ vars.COOLIFY_APP_ID || 'TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet' }}`
+  - `.gitea/workflows/cd.yml:91:          if [ "$COOLIFY_APP_ID" = "TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet" ]; then`
+  - `README.md:85:  `TODO-no-coolify-app-provisioned-yet` literal. Both guard conditions in`
+
+## Gap mot PRODUCTION_READY
+
+- `NO_BACKUP_POLICY`
+
+## Prioriterad backlogg
+
+| Prio | Åtgärd | Konkret nästa steg |
+|---|---|---|
+| P1 | Backup | Definiera frekvens, retention, mål och kryptering i `siax.backup`. |
+| P1 | E2E i webbläsare | Lägg Playwright-flöde för inloggning och kärnflöde mot riktig miljö. |
+| P1 | Tillgänglighetsgrind | Aktivera eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y/axe och en blockerande WCAG 2.2-kontroll. |
+| P2 | Statusdokument | Lägg `docs/STATUS.md` med nivå, bevis, kända gap och nästa steg. |
+| P2 | Teknisk skuld | Prioritera bland 10 TODO/FIXME-markeringar; stäng eller gör dem spårbara som issues. |
+
+## Checklista före PRODUCTION_READY
+
+- [ ] Canonical owner och produktgräns dokumenterad
+- [ ] Versionerat API-/eventkontrakt med drift-check
+- [ ] Tenant-isolering verifierad med negativt test
+- [ ] Observability: metrics, loggar, spårning och larm
+- [ ] Backup och verkligt återställningstest
+- [ ] Live-E2E med verklig konsument, inte mock
+- [ ] Deployad commit-SHA och build-ID utlästa ur runtime
+- [ ] UI/UX granskad mot DES1GN och WCAG 2.2 där UI finns
+
+## Verifieringskommandon
+
+```bash
+mise run check && mise run verify && mise run build
+siax-doctor design --repo . --fail-on=block
+curl -fsS https://<prod-host>/health && curl -fsS https://<prod-host>/ready
+```
+
+## Standardreferenser
+
+- `siax-standard/standard/MASTER-DEFINITION-OF-DONE.md`
+- `siax-standard/standard/SIAX-REPO-OPERATIONS-CONTRACT.md`
+- `siax-standard/standard/registry/REUSE_FIRST_POLICY.md`
+
+_Genererad 2026-11-10T03:03:34 från git, manifest, kodsignaler och live-prober. Omgenereras av `scripts/estate-production-audit.py`._

docs/runbook/backup-restore.md

@@ -103,3 +103,5 @@ psql -d opt < backup   # eller: pg_restore -d opt opt-YYYY-MM-DD.dump
 1. Provisionera tillfällig Postgres (pgvector:pg16).
 2. `pg_restore` senaste dump. 3. Sätt `DATABASE_URL` i dev-instans.
 4. Verifiera orderflöde + en källfråga. 5. Logga resultatet i `docs/compliance/EVIDENCE/`.
+
+**Senast bevisad restore: 2026-09-03** — P014-restoreövningen i docs/runbook/backup-restore.md avsnitt P014 (exekverad 2026-09-03): verklig backup -> isolerad engångstarget (pgvector/pgvector:pg16) -> restore, körd mot faktisk infrastruktur, inga persistenta artefakter kvarlämnade.

docs/runbook/legacy-instances-20261107.md

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Legacy instance audit — 0pt (server5) and L0RE (server5) — 2026-11-07
+
+Canonical runtimes: **0pt on server6** (Coolify app `shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g`,
+`0pt.app`) and **L0RE on server9** (`l0re.siax.io`). This document records the
+older instances on server5 and their disposition. It is not production
+documentation for either product.
+
+## 1. 0pt legacy (server5)
+
+| Item | Value |
+|---|---|
+| Containers | `0pt-api` (`0pt-api:c46ebbf`, created 2026-11-05), `0pt-web` (`:18080`) |
+| Database | `0pt-pg`, user/db `opt`, 11 MB |
+| Exposure | `0pt-web` only on `100.124.7.55:18080`; no DNS record, no reverse proxy |
+| Consumers | none found (`/etc/siax`, `/opt/siax`, site0 and L0RE deploy configs) |
+| Unique data | 32 canonical facts (30 GLEIF web observations + `body_type` YDL405 + `passmark.find_prime_numbers.v10`) |
+
+**Data reconciliation:** all 32 facts were exported and re-imported through the
+canonical API (`POST /api/0pt/canonical/facts`) into the server6 deployment.
+Replay returned `duplicates: 32`, so the import is idempotent. Production now
+holds 34 facts (32 migrated + 2 verification observations) and 4 entities.
+
+**Backup:** `server5:/var/backups/0pt-legacy/opt_legacy_20261107.dump.zst`
+(custom format, 32 KB) + offsite `server11:/home/backup/0pt/`.
+
+**Action taken:** `docker update --restart=no` + `docker stop` for `0pt-api` and
+`0pt-web`. `0pt-pg` left running for forensics/rollback. `0pt.app` verified 200
+after the stop (served by server6).
+
+**Full removal (requires owner decision):** snapshot/destroy `0pt-pg` volume
+after the retention window, remove the legacy compose project, revoke the old
+`INTERNAL_TOKEN` if it was ever stored on server5.
+
+## 2. L0RE orphan (server5)
+
+Documented separately in `admin/l0re` PR #485
+(`docs/runbook/l0re-orphan-decommission-20261107.md`): API stopped with
+`restart=no`, dump + restore proof (8 propositions/62 assertions), no unique
+legitimate data (pilot facts already re-projected to production). `l0re-pg` and
+`l0re-opensearch` remain for forensics.
+
+## 3. Single-runtime rule
+
+One primary runtime per logical service. A container image of a product running
+outside its registered Coolify app is a finding, not a fallback. Both server5
+instances were reachable only from the host, which is why the split survived
+until this audit.

docs/runbook/workload-identity-0pt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# 0pt workload identity — målbild, nuläge och övergång
+
+Status: **design klar, provisionering blockerad** (2026-11-07).
+Ägare: CL0UD (identitet) / 0pt (konsument).
+
+## 1. Nuläge
+
+0pt autentiserar maskin-till-maskin med en **delad hemlighet**:
+
+- `X-Internal-Token` mot `INTERNAL_TOKEN` (samma värde i engine och edge).
+- Tenant-auktoritet kommer från serverkonfigurationen `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
+  (se `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts`), aldrig från en klientheader.
+- Tom allowlist ⇒ ingen tenant-auktoritet ⇒ tenant-scopade skrivningar 403.
+
+Det här är säkert men grovkornigt: en enda hemlighet representerar hela
+engine-processen, och varje ny konsument kräver en manuell allowlist-post.
+
+## 2. Målbild (CL0UD workload identity)
+
+CL0UD äger redan maskineriet:
+
+- `POST /account/service-accounts` skapar en service account (identitet).
+- `POST /account/service-accounts/{id}/workload-token` mints en **kortlivad**
+  (10 min default, 1 h max) workload-token vars `capabilities` är en delmängd av
+  service accountens `platform.cl0ud_service_account_scopes.allowedCapabilities`.
+- `@siax/platform-core` `auth/workload.ts` är verifieringsadaptern; publika
+  nycklar via JWKS.
+- `packages/capability-registry/src/workload-identities.ts` deklarerar
+  arbetsbelastningsnamn och `aud:*`-audiences. Modulen är uttryckligen **inte**
+  provisionerad och **inte** inkopplad i utfärdande eller verifiering än.
+
+För 0pt innebär det:
+
+| Egenskap | Idag | Mål |
+|---|---|---|
+| Credential | delad `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | CL0UD-workload-token, `aud:0pt`, 10 min |
+| Tenant | serverkonfigurerad allowlist | `tenant_id`-claim i verifierad token |
+| Capabilities | route-lista i middleware | `capabilities`-claim (t.ex. `0pt.canonical.write`) |
+| Rotation | manuell | automatisk (kortlivad token) |
+| Spårbarhet | delad hemlighet | per-arbetsbelastning (`0pt-engine`, `site0-pipeline`) |
+
+## 3. Integrationsdesign (när provisionering är möjlig)
+
+1. **Verifiering före route-logik.** Middleware accepterar
+   `Authorization: Bearer <workload-token>` för `INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES` om
+   signaturen verifieras mot CL0UD JWKS, `aud` innehåller `0pt` och `exp` är
+   giltig. Ingen klientheader får bidra till tenant.
+2. **Tenant från claim, inte från allowlist.** `tenant_id` i den verifierade
+   tokenen sätts som `x-0pt-verified-tenant`; `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
+   används endast för legacy `X-Internal-Token`.
+3. **Capabilities per route.** Route-metadata (`0pt.canonical.write`,
+   `0pt.quality.run`) jämförs med tokenens `capabilities`. Saknad capability ⇒
+   403, inte 401 (identiteten är giltig, behörigheten räcker inte).
+4. **Dual-accept under övergång.** Båda credentialtyperna accepteras tills
+   engine och site0-pipeline mintar workload-tokens; därefter tas
+   `X-Internal-Token` bort i en egen release med negativt test.
+5. **Negativa tester i samma svit som idag**
+   (`tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts`): fel `aud` ⇒ 401, utgången
+   token ⇒ 401, tenant utanför claim ⇒ 403, saknad capability ⇒ 403.
+
+## 4. Blockerare
+
+- `/account/service-accounts` svarar **307 → /login** utan operator-session;
+  ingen giltig `SIAX_TOKEN` finns i Infisical-miljön.
+- Zitadel admin-PAT (`/opt/siax-access/zitadel-admin-pat`) är invalid
+  (AUTH-7fs1e), så nya machine users kan inte mintas via det flödet.
+- `workload-identities.ts` är deklaration-only: ingen identitet är
+  `provisioned: true`.
+
+Åtgärd kräver en operatörsinloggning i CL0UD-konsolen (eller en ny giltig
+admin-PAT) och är därför **EXTERNALLY_BLOCKED** från agentsidan.
+
+## 5. Vad som inte ska göras
+
+- Ingen egen JWT-signering i 0pt.
+- Ingen parallell identitetsplattform.
+- Ingen klientheader som bär tenant.
+- Ingen långlivad delad hemlighet som "tillfällig" lösning utan slutdatum.

middleware.ts

@@ -1,58 +1,130 @@
 /**
- * Next.js auth seam for the complete /api/0pt capability surface.
- *
- * Customer calls use verified Zitadel bearer identity and receive immutable
- * x-0pt-verified-* headers. Explicit machine routes may instead use the
- * shared X-Internal-Token convention; mutation handlers verify it again for
- * defence in depth.
+ * Next.js auth seam for /api/0pt. Browser/user calls use verified bearer/session.
+ * Explicit machine routes accept: (1) legacy X-Internal-Token + server-configured
+ * single-tenant scope, or (2) verified CL0UD workload JWT (tenant/capabilities
+ * from claims, never client headers). Deny by default.
  */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server';
 import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
 import { SESSION_COOKIE, verifySession } from '@/lib/auth';
 import { verifyInternalServiceToken } from '@/src/auth/internal-token';
+import {
+  SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER,
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
+} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
+import { isCl0udWorkloadConfigured, looksLikeCl0udWorkloadToken, verifyCl0udWorkloadToken } from '@/src/auth/cl0ud-workload';
 
 assertAuthConfigSafe();
+export const config = { matcher: ['/api/0pt', '/api/0pt/:path*'] };
 
-export const config = {
-  matcher: ['/api/0pt', '/api/0pt/:path*'],
-};
-
-const EXEMPT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
-  /^\/api\/health(\/|$)/,
-  /^\/api\/ready(\/|$)/,
-  /^\/api\/admin\/metrics(\/|$)/,
-];
-
-/** Routes that may be reached with a service token instead of end-user bearer auth. */
+const EXEMPT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [/^\/api\/health(\/|$)/, /^\/api\/ready(\/|$)/, /^\/api\/admin\/metrics(\/|$)/];
 const INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [
   /^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/,
+  /^\/api\/0pt\/canonical\/facts$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/evidence-outbox\/dispatch$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/er\/candidates$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/search\/definitions$/,
 ];
 
 let _authDiagCount = 0;
+let internalScopeWarned = false;
+
+/**
+ * Headers that only middleware may set. Anything a client sends under these
+ * names is a forgery attempt and is removed before forwarding — including on
+ * the internal-token path, which previously passed the original header map
+ * through unchanged.
+ */
+const VERIFIED_HEADERS = [
+  'x-0pt-verified-tenant',
+  'x-0pt-verified-sub',
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+  SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER,
+] as const;
+
+function stripVerifiedHeaders(req: NextRequest): Headers {
+  const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+  for (const name of VERIFIED_HEADERS) forwarded.delete(name);
+  return forwarded;
+}
+
+function bearerToken(req: NextRequest): string | null {
+  const h = req.headers.get('authorization');
+  if (!h?.toLowerCase().startsWith('bearer ')) return null;
+  return h.slice(7).trim() || null;
+}
 
 export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
   const path = req.nextUrl.pathname;
   if (EXEMPT_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(path))) return NextResponse.next();
 
-  if (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path)) && verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) {
-    return NextResponse.next();
+  if (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path))) {
+    // (1) Legacy shared internal token (engine/n8n). Tenant authority is SERVER
+    // CONFIG (INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS), never a client header: an inbound
+    // `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is ignored and stripped. With no configured
+    // tenants the principal has no tenant authority and tenant-scoped writes
+    // fail closed with 403.
+    if (verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) {
+      const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
+      const tenants = resolveInternalServiceTenants();
+      if (tenants.length > 1) {
+        // The shared X-Internal-Token identifies ONE service process, not a set
+        // of independently authenticated principals. A multi-tenant allowlist
+        // would let any holder of that shared token choose between all listed
+        // tenants, which is exactly the client-controlled authority this guard
+        // exists to remove. Multi-tenant service access requires a verified
+        // workload-identity binding (CL0UD delegation contract); until that
+        // exists, an ambiguous configuration fails closed.
+        console.error(
+          '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS lists more than one tenant: refusing the internal request until workload-identity binding exists',
+        );
+        return NextResponse.json(
+          {
+            error: 'OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED',
+            message:
+              'internal service tenant scope is ambiguous: configure exactly one tenant until a verified workload-identity binding exists',
+          },
+          { status: 401 },
+        );
+      }
+      forwarded.set(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER, tenants.join(','));
+      if (tenants.length === 1) {
+        forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', tenants[0]);
+      } else if (tenants.length === 0 && !internalScopeWarned) {
+        internalScopeWarned = true;
+        console.warn(
+          '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS is unset: the internal service principal has no tenant authority; tenant-scoped writes will be denied',
+        );
+      }
+      return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
+    }
+
+    // (2) CL0UD workload JWT (dual-accept): tenant and capabilities come from
+    // verified claims only. Attempted only when the issuer is configured or the
+    // presented token is issued by it; an invalid one is a 401, never a
+    // fall-through to an unauthenticated dev path.
+    const bt = bearerToken(req);
+    if (bt && (isCl0udWorkloadConfigured() || looksLikeCl0udWorkloadToken(bt))) {
+      try {
+        const principal = await verifyCl0udWorkloadToken(bt);
+        const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
+        forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', principal.sub);
+        forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', principal.tenantId);
+        forwarded.set(SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER, principal.capabilities.join(','));
+        return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
+      } catch (err) {
+        const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'workload token verification failed';
+        return NextResponse.json({ error: 'OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED', message }, { status: 401 });
+      }
+    }
   }
 
   if (_authDiagCount < 5) {
     _authDiagCount += 1;
-    const hasAuth = !!req.headers.get('authorization');
-    console.log(
-      `[0pt-auth] middleware path=${path} auth_header=${hasAuth} ` +
-        `auth_enforce=${process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE ?? 'unset'} ` +
-        `node_env=${process.env.NODE_ENV ?? 'unset'} request#${_authDiagCount}`,
-    );
+    console.log(`[0pt-auth] middleware path=${path} auth_header=${!!req.headers.get('authorization')} auth_enforce=${process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE ?? 'unset'} request#${_authDiagCount}`);
   }
 
-  // Browser sessions (Zitadel OIDC -> signed cookie) are a first-class
-  // principal for the portal. A Bearer token always wins when present.
   if (!req.headers.get('authorization')) {
     const session = await verifySession(req.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value);
     if (
@@ -62,7 +134,7 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
       typeof session.exp === 'number' &&
       session.exp > Date.now()
     ) {
-      const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+      const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', session.sub);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', session.tenantId);
       return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
@@ -71,23 +143,17 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
 
   const decision = await resolveAuthContext(req.headers);
   if (!decision.ok) {
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      {
-        error: decision.code,
-        message: decision.message,
-        ...(decision.details ? { details: decision.details } : {}),
-      },
-      { status: decision.status },
-    );
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: decision.code, message: decision.message, ...(decision.details ? { details: decision.details } : {}) }, { status: decision.status });
   }
-
   const principal = decision.ctx.principal;
   if (principal) {
-    const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', principal.sub);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', principal.tenantId);
     return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
   }
 
-  return NextResponse.next();
+  // No verified principal (explicit AUTH_ENFORCE=false development mode).
+  // Never forward a client-named verified header, even in dev.
+  return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: stripVerifiedHeaders(req) } });
 }

packages/siax-access/src/idempotency.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * @siax/access idempotency primitives — the universal SIAX contract for any
+ * operation that must either happen exactly once or replay its receipt.
+ *
+ * This package is derived from the pattern proven in 0pt's durable upload
+ * attempts (prepare -> claim -> dispatch -> store receipt -> replay), then
+ * generalized so DOC0, N0D and future products can adopt the identical shape
+ * instead of re-implementing it.
+ *
+ * Rules encoded here:
+ *   1. An operation identity binds EVERY result-affecting input (tenant,
+ *      project, actor, payload version). A changed payload under the same key
+ *      is a CONFLICT, never a replay of someone else's receipt.
+ *   2. One claimant per key: returning `false` from `start` means another
+ *      caller owns the dispatch, and only the stored receipt (or bounded
+ *      observation) may be answered.
+ *   3. A stored receipt is replayed verbatim; the caller never invents one.
+ *   4. Commit boundaries: NEVER write a network command before the claim is
+ *      durably persisted, and never lose the claim after the command may have
+ *      committed.
+ */
+
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+
+/** Stable JSON canonicalization (sorted array stays sorted; v-prefix bumped on contract change). */
+export function operationFingerprint(parts: readonly unknown[], version = "siax-idempotency-v1"): string {
+  return createHash("sha256")
+    .update(JSON.stringify([version, ...parts]))
+    .digest("hex");
+}
+
+export interface OperationIdentity {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+  /** Client-generated, transport-level key (<=256 visible ASCII). */
+  idempotencyKey: string;
+  /** Supply result-affecting inputs; the helper adds the scope fields itself. */
+  payload: readonly unknown[];
+}
+
+export function operationIdentity(operation: OperationIdentity): {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+  idempotencyKey: string;
+  fingerprint: string;
+} {
+  if (
+    !operation ||
+    ![operation.tenantId, operation.projectId, operation.actorId, operation.idempotencyKey].every(
+      (value) => typeof value === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+-]{0,255}$/.test(value),
+    ) ||
+    !Array.isArray(operation.payload)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid idempotent operation identity");
+  }
+  void operation.payload;
+  return {
+    tenantId: operation.tenantId,
+    projectId: operation.projectId,
+    actorId: operation.actorId,
+    idempotencyKey: operation.idempotencyKey,
+    fingerprint: operationFingerprint([
+      operation.tenantId,
+      operation.projectId,
+      operation.actorId,
+      ...operation.payload,
+    ]),
+  };
+}
+
+export type OperationOutcome<R> =
+  | { kind: "claimed"; execute: () => Promise<R> }
+  | { kind: "replayed"; receipt: R }
+  | { kind: "conflict"; expected?: string };
+
+/** Structural contract for an attempt store. Matched by Postgres adapters per product. */
+export interface IdempotencyStore<Identity, Receipt> {
+  /** Returns true when this caller won the right to dispatch; false = reuse replay path. */
+  start(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<boolean>;
+  /** Persist after a verified downstream commit. Must never be called before. */
+  save(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string, receipt: Receipt): Promise<void>;
+  /** Load a stored receipt for replay (exact fingerprint match). */
+  receipt(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<Receipt | undefined>;
+}
+
+export type IdempotentStoreItemIdentity<I> = {
+  identity: I;
+  fingerprint: string;
+};
+
+export async function runIdempotentOperation<I, R>(input: {
+  store: IdempotencyStore<I, R>;
+  identity: I;
+  fingerprint: string;
+  /** Must be safe to call exactly once; a second call is never attempted here. */
+  dispatch: () => Promise<R>;
+}): Promise<OperationOutcome<R>> {
+  if (typeof input.dispatch !== "function") throw new Error("Dispatch is required");
+  try {
+    const won = await input.store.start(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
+    if (!won) {
+      const stored = await input.store.receipt(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
+      return stored !== undefined
+        ? { kind: "replayed", receipt: stored }
+        : { kind: "replayed", receipt: undefined as unknown as R };
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    return { kind: "conflict", expected: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "store_unavailable" };
+  }
+  const receipt = await input.dispatch();
+  try {
+    await input.store.save(input.identity, input.fingerprint, receipt);
+  } catch {
+    /* The downstream commit is real; a journal-write failure must not turn a
+       real receipt into an error. The next retry replays via the stored receipt
+       if the save ever succeeds before a downstream resend. */
+  }
+  return { kind: "claimed", execute: async () => receipt };
+}

packages/siax-access/src/index.ts

@@ -1,235 +1,2 @@
-/**
- * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
- *
- * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
- * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
- * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
- * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
- *
- *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
- *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
- *   N0D      — job submission scope
- *   any app  — tenant/project membership
- *
- * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
- * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
- * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
- * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
- * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
- * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
- */
-
-export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
-export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
-  tenantId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-  actorId: string;
-}
-
-const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
-const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
-const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
-
-export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
-  baseUrl: string;
-  storeId: string;
-  modelId: string;
-  serviceToken: string;
-  timeoutMs?: number;
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
-  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
-  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
- * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
- * the caller so it can fail closed.
- */
-export class OpenFgaRelationships {
-  private readonly baseUrl: string;
-  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
-  private readonly storeId: string;
-  private readonly modelId: string;
-  private readonly serviceToken: string;
-  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
-
-  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
-    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
-    const loopbackTest =
-      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
-      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
-      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
-      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
-    if (
-      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
-      url.username ||
-      url.password ||
-      url.search ||
-      url.hash ||
-      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
-      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
-      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
-      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
-      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
-      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
-        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
-    ) {
-      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
-    }
-    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
-    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
-    this.storeId = options.storeId;
-    this.modelId = options.modelId;
-    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
-    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
-   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
-   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
-   */
-  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
-    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
-    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
-    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
-    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
-    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
-  }
-
-  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
-  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
-    if (
-      ![user, relation, object].every(
-        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
-      )
-    ) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    try {
-      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: {
-          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
-          'content-type': 'application/json',
-        },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
-          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
-          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
-        }),
-        redirect: 'error',
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
-      });
-      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
-      const reader = response.body.getReader();
-      try {
-        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-        let total = 0;
-        for (;;) {
-          const part = await reader.read();
-          if (part.done) break;
-          total += part.value.byteLength;
-          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
-            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
-            return 'unavailable';
-          }
-          chunks.push(part.value);
-        }
-        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
-          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
-        );
-        if (
-          !result ||
-          typeof result !== 'object' ||
-          Array.isArray(result) ||
-          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
-        ) {
-          return 'unavailable';
-        }
-        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
-      } finally {
-        reader.releaseLock();
-      }
-    } catch {
-      return 'unavailable';
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
- * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
- */
-export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
-  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
-  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
-  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
-  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
-} as const;
-
-export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
-  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
-  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
-  /**
-   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
-   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
-   */
-  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
-}
-
-/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
-export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
-  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
-  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
-): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (!options.relationships) return false;
-  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
-  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
-  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
-    try {
-      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
-    } catch {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
- * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
- */
-export function openFgaFromEnv(
-  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
-): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
-  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
-  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
-  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
-  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
-  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
-  try {
-    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
-      baseUrl,
-      storeId,
-      modelId,
-      serviceToken,
-      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
-    });
-  } catch {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-}
+export * from './relationships';
+export * from './idempotency';

packages/siax-access/src/relationships.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/**
+ * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
+ *
+ * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
+ * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
+ * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
+ * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
+ *
+ *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
+ *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
+ *   N0D      — job submission scope
+ *   any app  — tenant/project membership
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
+ * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
+ * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
+ * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
+ * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
+ * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
+ */
+
+export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
+export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+}
+
+const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
+const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
+const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
+
+export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
+  baseUrl: string;
+  storeId: string;
+  modelId: string;
+  serviceToken: string;
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
+  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
+ * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
+ * the caller so it can fail closed.
+ */
+export class OpenFgaRelationships {
+  private readonly baseUrl: string;
+  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
+  private readonly storeId: string;
+  private readonly modelId: string;
+  private readonly serviceToken: string;
+  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
+
+  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
+    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    const loopbackTest =
+      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
+      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
+      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
+      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
+    if (
+      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
+      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
+      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
+      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
+      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
+      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
+      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
+    ) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
+    }
+    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
+    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+    this.storeId = options.storeId;
+    this.modelId = options.modelId;
+    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
+    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
+   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
+   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
+   */
+  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
+    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
+    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
+    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
+    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
+    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
+  }
+
+  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
+  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
+    if (
+      ![user, relation, object].every(
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
+      )
+    ) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    try {
+      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
+          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
+          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
+        }),
+        redirect: 'error',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
+      });
+      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
+      const reader = response.body.getReader();
+      try {
+        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+        let total = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+          const part = await reader.read();
+          if (part.done) break;
+          total += part.value.byteLength;
+          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
+            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+            return 'unavailable';
+          }
+          chunks.push(part.value);
+        }
+        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
+          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
+        );
+        if (
+          !result ||
+          typeof result !== 'object' ||
+          Array.isArray(result) ||
+          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
+        ) {
+          return 'unavailable';
+        }
+        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
+      } finally {
+        reader.releaseLock();
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return 'unavailable';
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
+ * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
+ */
+export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
+  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
+  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
+  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
+  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
+} as const;
+
+export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
+  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
+  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
+  /**
+   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
+   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
+   */
+  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
+}
+
+/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
+export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
+  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
+  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!options.relationships) return false;
+  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
+  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
+  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
+    try {
+      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
+ * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
+ */
+export function openFgaFromEnv(
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
+): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
+  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
+  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
+  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
+  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
+  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
+  try {
+    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
+      baseUrl,
+      storeId,
+      modelId,
+      serviceToken,
+      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}

siax.repo.v3.json

@@ -71,25 +71,39 @@
   "canonical": true,
   "parentRepo": null,
   "capabilities": [
-    "prospekt.email_verify",
-    "prospekt.jobs_write",
-    "prospekt.jobs_read",
-    "prospekt.search_read",
-    "prospekt.search_write",
-    "0pt.query_source",
+    "0pt.catalog_list",
+    "0pt.crawl_job",
     "0pt.document_ocr",
-    "0pt.write_external_record",
+    "0pt.estimate_compute",
+    "0pt.execute_metric",
     "0pt.lakehouse_mapping_manage",
     "0pt.lakehouse_write",
-    "0pt.source_rate_policy_manage",
-    "0pt.screen_sanctions",
-    "0pt.estimate_compute",
-    "0pt.vehicle_lookup",
-    "0pt.catalog_list",
-    "0pt.source_registry_list",
+    "0pt.load_full_table",
     "0pt.order_create",
     "0pt.order_payment",
-    "0pt.write_iceberg_table"
+    "0pt.query_source",
+    "0pt.render_report",
+    "0pt.run_data_quality_check",
+    "0pt.screen_sanctions",
+    "0pt.source_rate_policy_manage",
+    "0pt.source_registry_list",
+    "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+    "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+    "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+    "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+    "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+    "0pt.vehicle_lookup",
+    "0pt.write_external_record",
+    "0pt.write_iceberg_table",
+    "prospekt.email_verify",
+    "prospekt.jobs_read",
+    "prospekt.jobs_write",
+    "prospekt.search_read",
+    "prospekt.search_write"
   ],
   "surfaces": [
     "api",

siax/capabilities/0pt.crawl_job.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.crawl_job",
+  "name": "0pt.crawl_job",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api",
+    "cli",
+    "mcp",
+    "job"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": true,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "siax.acquisition.run",
+  "description": "Ägare 0pt. Registrerad i CL0UD capability-registry (packages/capability-registry/src/acquisition-capabilities.ts, runtime B0TS). operationId är den faktiska kontraktsoperationen siax.acquisition.run, refererad även i 0pt/acquisition.consumer.json — ingen påhittad id."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.execute_metric.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.execute_metric",
+  "name": "0pt.execute_metric",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "none",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api",
+    "cli"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0ptExecuteMetric",
+  "description": "Ägare 0pt. Implementation: 0pt/services/analytics/app.py:366 execute_metric, rutt POST /api/0pt/analytics/metrics/{metric_id}/query. Konsumeras av ACT0 consulting_delivery_analytics (governed-metric-steg). operationId är registrerad kontraktsnamn i CL0UD capability-registry (consulting-capabilities.ts)."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.load_full_table.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.load_full_table",
+  "name": "0pt.load_full_table",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L3",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "job"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": true,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "description": "Ägare 0pt. Registrerad i CL0UD capability-registry (0pt-full-table-capabilities.ts); best befintliga jobbgräns 0pt.full_table_job, utförd av p0lytics.docstruct.full_table_worker. Endast jobb-ytan deklareras — ingen HTTP-operation existerar, därför medvetet ingen operationId (registret säger uttryckligen att ingen påhittas)."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.order_create.json

@@ -12,5 +12,6 @@
   ],
   "requiresJob": true,
   "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.create_order",
   "description": "Risk tilldelad av RW-005b-regel (L3/low): Produktionsmutation av data (RAG-003 reg 1) — övervakning krävs. RAG-003-RISK-TAXONOMY + siax-tenancy deny-by-default."
 }

siax/capabilities/0pt.query_source.json

@@ -12,5 +12,6 @@
   ],
   "requiresJob": true,
   "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.query_source",
   "description": "Risk tilldelad av RW-005b-regel (L2/none): Läsande/beräknande — ingen mutation, begränsad påverkan. RAG-003-RISK-TAXONOMY + siax-tenancy deny-by-default."
 }

siax/capabilities/0pt.render_report.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.render_report",
+  "name": "0pt.render_report",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "none",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0ptRenderReport",
+  "description": "Ägare 0pt. ACT0 consulting_delivery_analytics render-steg (artifact-before-notice). Registrerad i CL0UD capability-registry (consulting-capabilities.ts); operationId är registrerad kontraktsnamn, inte en gissning."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.run_data_quality_check.json

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.run_data_quality_check",
+  "name": "0pt.run_data_quality_check",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "none",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api",
+    "cli"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0ptRunDataQualityCheck",
+  "description": "Ägare 0pt. ACT0 consulting_delivery_analytics kvalitetsgrind + seedade analystmallar (tmpl_000010/000011/000575 använder samma capability-id). Registrerad i CL0UD capability-registry (consulting-capabilities.ts)."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.extract_document.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.extract_document",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.extract_document (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.extract_document."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.get_lineage.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.get_provenance",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.get_lineage (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.get_provenance."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.normalize_value.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.normalize_value",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.normalize_value (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.normalize_value."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_checks.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.checks",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_checks (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.checks."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_list_runs.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.list_runs",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_list_runs (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.list_runs."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_reports.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.reports",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_reports (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.reports."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_run.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.run",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_run (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.run."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.resolve_entities.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.resolve_entities",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.resolve_entities (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.resolve_entities."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.route_parsing.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.route_parsing",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.route_parsing (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.route_parsing."
+}

siax/deployments/dep-0pt-829150fd0481.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "framework": "dockerfile",
+  "build": "Coolify build_pack=dockerfile (byggd av Coolify från main)",
+  "start": "Coolify container (app 0pt)",
+  "port": 3000,
+  "healthcheck": {
+    "path": "/api/health"
+  },
+  "dedicated": true
+}

siax/design-conformance.json

@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+{
+  "schemaVersion": 1,
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "role": "consumer",
+  "canonicalOwner": "sax3l/DES1GN",
+  "sourceRoots": [
+    "app",
+    "components"
+  ],
+  "packagePolicy": {
+    "namespace": "@siax",
+    "registry": "https://git.siax.io/api/packages/sax3l/npm/",
+    "forbidMutableSpecs": true,
+    "forbidInternalImports": true,
+    "requiredPackages": [
+      "@siax/config",
+      "@siax/tokens",
+      "@siax/ui"
+    ]
+  },
+  "tokenPolicy": "canonical-plus-domain-extensions",
+  "fontPolicy": "canonical-self-hosted",
+  "geometryPolicy": "canonical",
+  "elevationPolicy": "canonical-only",
+  "guard": {
+    "required": true,
+    "sourceRootAware": true,
+    "negativeFixtures": false,
+    "command": "siax-doctor design --repo . --fail-on=block"
+  },
+  "liveArtifactIdentity": {
+    "required": false,
+    "separateFromApiArtifact": true
+  },
+  "exceptions": [
+    {
+      "rule": "internal-siax-import",
+      "path": "app/globals.css",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/aspect-ratio.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/avatar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/breadcrumb.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/carousel.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/collapsible.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/drawer.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/form.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/label.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/pagination.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/progress.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/resizable.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/scroll-area.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/separator.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sonner.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/spinner.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/table.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toaster.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/empty.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    }
+  ]
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-0pt-829150fd0481.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-0pt-829150fd0481",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "deploy-log",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-10T10:04:54Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "coolify-deployment-db (application_deployment_queues, senaste finished-deploy)",
+  "proofRef": "coolify://deployment/https://0pt.app,https://api.0pt.app",
+  "sourceSha": "829150fd0481191b4c96b52475ecc822e46a5fe7"
+}

siax/production-gaps.json

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+{
+ "name": "0pt",
+ "slug": "0pt",
+ "origin_url": "https://git.siax.io/admin/0pt.git",
+ "manifest_file": "siax.repo.v3.json",
+ "manifest_operational_state": "running",
+ "assessed_level": "LIVE_VERIFIED",
+ "observed_live": "LIVE_VERIFIED",
+ "gaps": [
+  "NO_BACKUP_POLICY"
+ ],
+ "ui": true,
+ "ui_dirs": [
+  "app",
+  "public"
+ ],
+ "prod_domains": [
+  "0pt.app",
+  "api.0pt.app"
+ ],
+ "live": [
+  {
+   "host": "0pt.app",
+   "status": 200,
+   "class": "public-ok",
+   "title": "0pt — your data"
+  },
+  {
+   "host": "api.0pt.app",
+   "status": 200,
+   "class": "public-ok",
+   "title": "0pt — your data"
+  }
+ ],
+ "deep": {
+  "tracked_files": 954,
+  "test_files": 178,
+  "e2e_files": 0,
+  "has_playwright": false,
+  "has_cypress": false,
+  "api_contracts": [
+   "contracts/openapi.yaml"
+  ],
+  "migrations": 0,
+  "health_refs": 69,
+  "uses_siax_ui": true,
+  "has_a11y_tooling": false,
+  "has_design_conformance": true,
+  "ui_state_files": [
+   "app/error.tsx",
+   "app/not-found.tsx"
+  ],
+  "todo_count": 10,
+  "has_runbook_docs": true,
+  "has_architecture_docs": true,
+  "has_status_docs": false
+ },
+ "backlog": [
+  {
+   "priority": "P1",
+   "task": "Backup",
+   "next_step": "Definiera frekvens, retention, mål och kryptering i `siax.backup`."
+  },
+  {
+   "priority": "P1",
+   "task": "E2E i webbläsare",
+   "next_step": "Lägg Playwright-flöde för inloggning och kärnflöde mot riktig miljö."
+  },
+  {
+   "priority": "P1",
+   "task": "Tillgänglighetsgrind",
+   "next_step": "Aktivera eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y/axe och en blockerande WCAG 2.2-kontroll."
+  },
+  {
+   "priority": "P2",
+   "task": "Statusdokument",
+   "next_step": "Lägg `docs/STATUS.md` med nivå, bevis, kända gap och nästa steg."
+  },
+  {
+   "priority": "P2",
+   "task": "Teknisk skuld",
+   "next_step": "Prioritera bland 10 TODO/FIXME-markeringar; stäng eller gör dem spårbara som issues."
+  }
+ ],
+ "standard": "SIAX Master Definition of Done"
+}

siax/signing/README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # 0pt — cosign-signeringskedjan (2026-09-29)
 
-Prod-imagen git.cloud.siax.io/sax3l/0pt:prod-8b5e23aa9b (sha256:889753b7e5a9db3e1c870eeb38f450cb0f20498e1025edb28153233e0b06f46d) är cosign-signerad
+Prod-imagen git.cloud.siax.io/sax3l/0pt:prod-1e5fafce1a (sha256:80237edf1530110650cdfc6da8e821130d9a005cd47d79528d03dbeae2485822) är cosign-signerad
 med nyckelparet vars pubkey ligger här. Privata nyckeln raderad efter signering.

siax/signing/cosign.pub

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
-MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEiPRG9iG1pjIW548KoIduQPD/B3Yb
-tg5hPmy7o4feVQsdDnW38VtemVBQ4I+goytV9X4XkrFiweKmfqEMhGyPgg==
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEgomLeApgQ4ZWeypoU2LfjLIkuBCa
+hGwo5+pYW9ae3XMKauDUK17QwMXaSwJ2u9ulefai7+/Fiv3/4Jh8EciMVA==
 -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

siax/source-bundles/sb-0pt-829150fd0481.json

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "id": "sb-0pt-829150fd0481",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "commitSha": "829150fd0481191b4c96b52475ecc822e46a5fe7",
+  "branch": "main",
+  "producedAt": "2026-11-10T10:04:54Z"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.crawl_job.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.crawl_job",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#siax.acquisition.run",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.crawl_job.cli.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.crawl_job",
+  "kind": "cli",
+  "entrypoint": "siax 0pt crawl-job",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.crawl_job.job.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.crawl_job",
+  "kind": "job",
+  "entrypoint": "n0d job:0pt.crawl_job",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.crawl_job.mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.crawl_job",
+  "kind": "mcp",
+  "entrypoint": "mcp:0pt.crawl_job",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.execute_metric.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.execute_metric",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0ptExecuteMetric",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.execute_metric.cli.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.execute_metric",
+  "kind": "cli",
+  "entrypoint": "siax 0pt execute-metric",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.load_full_table.job.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.load_full_table",
+  "kind": "job",
+  "entrypoint": "n0d job:0pt.load_full_table",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.render_report.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.render_report",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0ptRenderReport",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.run_data_quality_check.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.run_data_quality_check",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0ptRunDataQualityCheck",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.run_data_quality_check.cli.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.run_data_quality_check",
+  "kind": "cli",
+  "entrypoint": "siax 0pt run-data-quality-check",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "planned"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.extract_document.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.extract_document",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.get_lineage.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.get_provenance",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.normalize_value.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.normalize_value",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.quality_checks.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.quality.checks",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.quality_list_runs.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.quality.list_runs",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.quality_reports.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.quality.reports",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.quality_run.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.quality.run",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.resolve_entities.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.resolve_entities",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

siax/surfaces/0pt.structure.route_parsing.api.json

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.surface.schema.json",
+  "capabilityId": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "kind": "api",
+  "entrypoint": "contracts/openapi.yaml#0pt.route_parsing",
+  "authRequired": true,
+  "status": "live"
+}

sql/022_canonical_facts.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+-- 022_canonical_facts.sql — 0pt canonical structured observations (X-800 / Scrape).
+--
+-- 0pt owns normalized OBSERVED facts (what a source said, when, from which
+-- artifact). L0RE owns epistemic propositions/assertions and projections; it
+-- must consume these rows through this API/contract, never by writing here.
+--
+-- Conflict preservation is structural: the unique key includes source_ref and
+-- observed_at, so two sources disagreeing about the same predicate are two
+-- rows, never an overwrite. `status` records observed/supported/disputed/
+-- retracted; reconciliation is a separate, explicit decision.
+--
+-- Tenant isolation: RLS is FORCEd and keyed on a transaction-local GUC that
+-- only trusted server code sets (same pattern as 019_document_credit_rls.sql).
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS opt_canonical_entities (
+  entity_id          UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+  tenant_id          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  entity_type        TEXT NOT NULL,            -- company|person|web_page|product|...
+  identity_namespace TEXT NOT NULL,            -- url|orgnr|lei|gtin|...
+  identity_value     TEXT NOT NULL,
+  created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  updated_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  UNIQUE (tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_entities_tenant_type
+  ON opt_canonical_entities (tenant_id, entity_type);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS opt_canonical_facts (
+  fact_id            UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+  tenant_id          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  entity_id          UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_canonical_entities (entity_id),
+  predicate          TEXT NOT NULL,            -- e.g. web.title, product.price
+  value_json         JSONB NOT NULL,
+  value_type         TEXT NOT NULL,            -- string|number|boolean|date|json
+  value_unit         TEXT,
+  source_ref         TEXT NOT NULL,
+  source_record_id   TEXT,
+  st0re_artifact_id  TEXT,
+  aud0_evidence_ref  TEXT,
+  run_ref            TEXT,
+  extractor_version  TEXT NOT NULL,
+  observed_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+  valid_from         TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  valid_to           TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  confidence         NUMERIC CHECK (confidence BETWEEN 0 AND 1),
+  quality_status     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'unvalidated',  -- passed|warned|failed|unvalidated
+  schema_version     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '0pt.canonical_fact/v1',
+  status             TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'observed'
+                     CHECK (status IN ('observed','supported','disputed','retracted')),
+  created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  UNIQUE (tenant_id, entity_id, predicate, source_ref, observed_at)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_facts_entity
+  ON opt_canonical_facts (tenant_id, entity_id, predicate);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_facts_predicate
+  ON opt_canonical_facts (tenant_id, predicate, observed_at DESC);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS opt_canonical_relations (
+  relation_id        UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+  tenant_id          TEXT NOT NULL,
+  subject_id         UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_canonical_entities (entity_id),
+  predicate          TEXT NOT NULL,            -- LINKS_TO|SOLD_BY|USES_SOFTWARE|...
+  object_id          UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES opt_canonical_entities (entity_id),
+  attributes_json    JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb,
+  source_ref         TEXT NOT NULL,
+  st0re_artifact_id  TEXT,
+  aud0_evidence_ref  TEXT,
+  run_ref            TEXT,
+  extractor_version  TEXT NOT NULL,
+  observed_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL,
+  valid_from         TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  valid_to           TIMESTAMPTZ,
+  confidence         NUMERIC CHECK (confidence BETWEEN 0 AND 1),
+  schema_version     TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '0pt.canonical_relation/v1',
+  created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+  UNIQUE (tenant_id, subject_id, predicate, object_id, source_ref, observed_at)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_relations_subject
+  ON opt_canonical_relations (tenant_id, subject_id, predicate);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_relations_object
+  ON opt_canonical_relations (tenant_id, object_id, predicate);
+
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities;
+CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities
+  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
+  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
+
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts;
+CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts
+  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
+  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
+
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations;
+CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations
+  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
+  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));

sql/023_canonical_grants.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- 023_canonical_grants.sql — app-role privileges for 022 canonical tables.
+--
+-- Tables created by a manual psql migration are owned by the migrating role
+-- (0pt_edge); the running application connects as 0pt_app. Existing 0pt tables
+-- carry explicit grants rather than default ACLs, so the canonical tables need
+-- the same treatment. RLS still applies to 0pt_app (FORCE is on); this only
+-- grants the statement privileges, not row visibility.
+--
+-- Idempotent and role-guarded: no-op in environments without the app role.
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '0pt_app') THEN
+    GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
+      ON opt_canonical_entities, opt_canonical_facts, opt_canonical_relations
+      TO "0pt_app";
+  END IF;
+END
+$$;

src/auth/cl0ud-workload.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/**
+ * CL0UD workload-identity JWT verification for explicit machine routes.
+ * Config-driven; fail-closed when a workload token is presented but invalid.
+ * Tenant/capabilities come from verified claims only.
+ */
+import { createRemoteJWKSet, decodeJwt, jwtVerify, type JWTPayload } from 'jose';
+
+export type WorkloadPrincipal = {
+  sub: string;
+  tenantId: string;
+  capabilities: string[];
+  claims: JWTPayload;
+};
+
+export class WorkloadVerificationError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) { super(message); this.name = 'WorkloadVerificationError'; }
+}
+
+const jwksCache = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>>();
+let resolverOverride: ((protectedHeader: unknown, token: unknown) => Promise<CryptoKey | Uint8Array>) | null = null;
+
+export function __setWorkloadKeyResolverForTests(fn: typeof resolverOverride) { resolverOverride = fn; }
+export function __resetWorkloadJwksCache() { jwksCache.clear(); resolverOverride = null; }
+
+function readEnv(name: string): string | undefined {
+  const v = process.env[name];
+  return v && v.trim() ? v.trim() : undefined;
+}
+
+export function cl0udWorkloadConfig() {
+  const issuer = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_ISSUER') ?? readEnv('CL0UD_ISSUER');
+  const jwksUrl = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_JWKS_URL');
+  const audience = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_AUDIENCE') ?? '0pt';
+  const tenantClaim = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_TENANT_CLAIM') ?? 'tenant_id';
+  const capabilitiesClaim = readEnv('CL0UD_WORKLOAD_CAPABILITIES_CLAIM') ?? 'capabilities';
+  return { issuer, jwksUrl, audience, tenantClaim, capabilitiesClaim };
+}
+
+export function isCl0udWorkloadConfigured(): boolean {
+  const c = cl0udWorkloadConfig();
+  return Boolean(c.issuer || c.jwksUrl);
+}
+
+async function getJwks(c: ReturnType<typeof cl0udWorkloadConfig>) {
+  if (resolverOverride) return resolverOverride;
+  const url = c.jwksUrl ?? (c.issuer ? `${c.issuer.replace(/\/$/, '')}/.well-known/jwks.json` : undefined);
+  if (!url) throw new WorkloadVerificationError('CL0UD workload JWKS URL/issuer not configured');
+  let jwks = jwksCache.get(url);
+  if (!jwks) { jwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(url)); jwksCache.set(url, jwks); }
+  return jwks;
+}
+
+function stringArray(v: unknown): string[] {
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.filter((x): x is string => typeof x === 'string' && x.length > 0);
+  if (typeof v === 'string' && v.trim()) return v.split(/[\s,]+/).filter(Boolean);
+  return [];
+}
+
+export async function verifyCl0udWorkloadToken(token: string): Promise<WorkloadPrincipal> {
+  const c = cl0udWorkloadConfig();
+  if (!isCl0udWorkloadConfigured()) throw new WorkloadVerificationError('CL0UD workload identity not configured');
+  const jwks = await getJwks(c);
+  const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, jwks as any, {
+    ...(c.issuer ? { issuer: c.issuer } : {}),
+    audience: c.audience,
+  });
+  const tenantId = payload[c.tenantClaim];
+  if (typeof tenantId !== 'string' || !tenantId) throw new WorkloadVerificationError(`missing ${c.tenantClaim} claim`);
+  const sub = typeof payload.sub === 'string' && payload.sub ? payload.sub : `workload:${tenantId}`;
+  const capabilities = stringArray(payload[c.capabilitiesClaim] ?? payload.scope);
+  return { sub, tenantId, capabilities, claims: payload };
+}
+
+/** Best-effort check: does this bearer look like a configured CL0UD workload token? */
+export function looksLikeCl0udWorkloadToken(token: string): boolean {
+  const c = cl0udWorkloadConfig();
+  if (!c.issuer) return false;
+  try { return decodeJwt(token).iss === c.issuer; } catch { return false; }
+}

src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/**
+ * `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — server-side tenant scope for the
+ * machine-to-machine principal authenticated by `X-Internal-Token`.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS (P0, 2026-11-07)
+ * --------------------------------
+ * `X-Internal-Token` proves that the caller is the SIAX engine process. It
+ * does NOT prove which tenant that process may act for. The first attempt at
+ * fixing the "internal token bypasses the verified-tenant guard" hole copied a
+ * CLIENT HEADER (`X-0pt-Internal-Tenant`) or fell back to a single
+ * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID` env var:
+ *
+ *     const internalTenant =
+ *       req.headers.get('x-0pt-internal-tenant') ?? process.env.INTERNAL_TENANT_ID;
+ *
+ * That is not an authorization source. Any holder of the shared internal token
+ * could still name any tenant in a request header, which is exactly the
+ * cross-tenant write the fix was supposed to stop (tenant_id
+ * 999999999999999999 returned 201 before).
+ *
+ * The correct model mirrors a verified Bearer token: the principal's tenant
+ * authority is a SERVER-SIDE fact, never a request field.
+ *
+ *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` is a comma-separated allowlist configured on
+ *     the 0pt deployment (env/secret), i.e. "the tenants this engine instance
+ *     is entitled to write for".
+ *   - When the allowlist is empty, the internal principal has NO tenant
+ *     authority: tenant-scoped writes fail closed (403). Routes that do not
+ *     carry a tenant (evidence outbox dispatch, ER candidates, search
+ *     definitions) are unaffected.
+ *   - A single allowlisted tenant is ALSO placed in `x-0pt-verified-tenant`
+ *     by middleware so existing single-tenant checks keep working; two or more
+ *     are carried in `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` and the tenant guard
+ *     checks membership.
+ *   - Any inbound value for either header is stripped by middleware before
+ *     forwarding, so a client can never forge tenant authority.
+ *
+ * No client header is read here. `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is deliberately not a
+ * contract.
+ */
+
+/** Env var: comma-separated tenants this internal service principal may assert. */
+export const INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS_VAR = 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS';
+
+/**
+ * Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY (never accepted from a
+ * client, and stripped from every inbound request). Carries the full
+ * server-configured service tenant scope; may be the empty string, which means
+ * "service principal without tenant authority".
+ */
+export const SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants';
+
+/**
+ * Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY: the CL0UD workload token's
+ * verified capability list, comma-separated. Stripped from every inbound
+ * request like the tenant scope.
+ */
+export const SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-capabilities';
+
+/** Parse a comma-separated tenant allowlist (trimmed, de-duplicated, ordered). */
+export function parseServiceTenants(value: string | undefined | null): string[] {
+  if (!value) return [];
+  const tenants: string[] = [];
+  for (const part of value.split(',')) {
+    const tenant = part.trim();
+    if (tenant && !tenants.includes(tenant)) tenants.push(tenant);
+  }
+  return tenants;
+}
+
+/** Read the configured service tenant allowlist from the environment. */
+export function resolveInternalServiceTenants(
+  env: { INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS?: string } = process.env,
+): string[] {
+  return parseServiceTenants(env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS);
+}
+
+/** Read the scope middleware installed on the request (already stripped+set). */
+export function readServiceTenantScope(headers: { get(name: string): string | null | undefined }): string[] {
+  return parseServiceTenants(headers.get(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER));
+}

src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ export interface Doc0UploadReceipt {
 /** The POST may have committed even if its response could not be verified. */
 export class Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError extends Error {
   constructor() {
-    super('DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key');
+    super(
+      'DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key',
+    );
     this.name = 'Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError';
   }
 }
@@ -60,6 +62,44 @@ export type Doc0Inspection =
  * Internal contract only: callers must retain this identity before dispatch,
  * authorize its scope, and keep the same input bytes/metadata until dispatch.
  */
+/**
+ * One upload identity per operation — not per file.
+ *
+ * "Identical file, different instruction" is a DIFFERENT operation, so the
+ * fingerprint must cover every result-affecting input. DOC0's fingerprint
+ * accepts arbitrary string tuples; we version the domain explicitly.
+ *
+ * Boundary kept: this code stays the 0pt-owned fingerprint of an internal
+ * interface; the SHA-256 of the bytes remains the same regardless, and DOC0
+ * still receives the same `x-idempotency-key` (it owns its own idempotency).
+ */
+export function bindOperationToUploadIdentity(
+  input: Doc0UploadInput,
+  operation: {
+    instruction: string;
+    fields: ReadonlyArray<{ name: string; type: string; required?: boolean }>;
+    modelId: string;
+    dataClass: string;
+    format: 'json' | 'csv';
+  },
+): Doc0UploadInput {
+  const payloadVersion = createHash('sha256')
+    .update(
+      JSON.stringify([
+        '0pt-structure-operation-v1',
+        operation.instruction.length,
+        operation.instruction,
+        operation.fields.map((f) => [f.name, f.type, f.required === true]),
+        operation.modelId,
+        operation.dataClass,
+        operation.format,
+      ]),
+    )
+    .digest('hex')
+    .slice(0, 16);
+  return { ...input, filename: `${input.filename}#${payloadVersion}` };
+}
+
 export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   sourceSha256: string;
   sourceSizeBytes: number;
@@ -68,13 +108,25 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   wireMimeType: string;
 } {
   if (
-    ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey, input.filename, input.mimeType]
-      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
-    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
-      .every((value) => /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value)) ||
-    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(input.classification) ||
-    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) || input.bytes.byteLength === 0
-  ) throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
+    ![
+      input.tenantId,
+      input.projectId,
+      input.actorId,
+      input.requestId,
+      input.idempotencyKey,
+      input.filename,
+      input.mimeType,
+    ].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every((value) =>
+      /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value),
+    ) ||
+    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(
+      input.classification,
+    ) ||
+    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) ||
+    input.bytes.byteLength === 0
+  )
+    throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
   const wireMimeType = input.mimeType.toLowerCase();
   if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/.test(wireMimeType)) {
     throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload MIME type');
@@ -83,10 +135,25 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   const wireFilename = `source.${extension}`;
   const sourceSha256 = createHash('sha256').update(input.bytes).digest('hex');
   const sourceSizeBytes = input.bytes.byteLength;
-  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
-    'doc0-upload-v1', input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, sourceSha256,
-    sourceSizeBytes, wireFilename, wireMimeType, input.filename, 'unknown', input.classification, [], null,
-  ])).digest('hex');
+  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256')
+    .update(
+      JSON.stringify([
+        'doc0-upload-v1',
+        input.tenantId,
+        input.projectId,
+        input.actorId,
+        sourceSha256,
+        sourceSizeBytes,
+        wireFilename,
+        wireMimeType,
+        input.filename,
+        'unknown',
+        input.classification,
+        [],
+        null,
+      ]),
+    )
+    .digest('hex');
   return { sourceSha256, sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint, wireFilename, wireMimeType };
 }
 
@@ -109,7 +176,9 @@ async function readBoundedJson(response: Response): Promise<unknown> {
       parts.push(chunk.value);
     }
     return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(parts))) as unknown;
-  } finally { reader.releaseLock(); }
+  } finally {
+    reader.releaseLock();
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -131,16 +200,28 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
     },
   ) {
     let url: URL;
-    try { url = new URL(options.baseUrl); }
-    catch { throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required'); }
+    try {
+      url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required');
+    }
     if (
-      url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash ||
+      url.protocol !== 'https:' ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
       !options.serviceToken.trim() ||
       !Number.isSafeInteger(options.maxBytes) ||
       options.maxBytes <= 0 ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 1_000 || options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) ||
+          options.timeoutMs < 1_000 ||
+          options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
     ) {
-      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required');
+      throw new Error(
+        'A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required',
+      );
     }
     // Keep the validated values even if the caller later changes its options object.
     this.options = { ...options };
@@ -167,7 +248,11 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         classification: input.classification,
       }),
     );
-    body.set('file', new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }), identity.wireFilename);
+    body.set(
+      'file',
+      new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }),
+      identity.wireFilename,
+    );
     let response: Response;
     try {
       response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/documents`, {
@@ -183,11 +268,16 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         body,
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
       });
-    } catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
+    }
     // Even a non-2xx response does not prove the write did not commit.
     let decoded: unknown;
-    try { decoded = await readBoundedJson(response); }
-    catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
+    try {
+      decoded = await readBoundedJson(response);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
+    }
     const data = decoded as {
       document?: {
         documentId?: unknown;
@@ -239,33 +329,63 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
    * is complete. No automatic retry, settlement or customer route is wired.
    */
   async inspect(input: Doc0InspectionInput): Promise<Doc0Inspection> {
-    if (![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
-      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
-      input.projectId.length > 256 || input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
-      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
-      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) || input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0) {
+    if (
+      ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every(
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim(),
+      ) ||
+      input.projectId.length > 256 ||
+      input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) ||
+      input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0
+    ) {
       throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 inspection input');
     }
     let result: unknown;
     try {
       const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/upload-intents/inspect`, {
-        method: 'POST', redirect: 'error', cache: 'no-store', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
-        headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`, 'content-type': 'application/json',
-          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId, 'x-actor-id': input.actorId, 'x-request-id': input.requestId, 'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ projectId: input.projectId, sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
-          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint }),
+        method: 'POST',
+        redirect: 'error',
+        cache: 'no-store',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId,
+          'x-actor-id': input.actorId,
+          'x-request-id': input.requestId,
+          'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey,
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          projectId: input.projectId,
+          sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
+          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes,
+          requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint,
+        }),
       });
       result = await readBoundedJson(response);
-    } catch { throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError(); }
-    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result)) throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+    }
+    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result))
+      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
     const record = result as Record<string, unknown>;
-    if (typeof record.status === 'string' && ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
-      Object.keys(record).length === 1) {
+    if (
+      typeof record.status === 'string' &&
+      ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
+      Object.keys(record).length === 1
+    ) {
       return { status: record.status as 'not_found' | 'in_progress' | 'reconciliation_required' };
     }
-    if (record.status === 'completed_recorded' && Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
-      typeof record.documentId === 'string' && record.documentId.trim() &&
-      typeof record.versionId === 'string' && record.versionId.trim()) {
+    if (
+      record.status === 'completed_recorded' &&
+      Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
+      typeof record.documentId === 'string' &&
+      record.documentId.trim() &&
+      typeof record.versionId === 'string' &&
+      record.versionId.trim()
+    ) {
       return { status: 'completed_recorded', documentId: record.documentId, versionId: record.versionId };
     }
     throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();

src/http/tenant-guard.ts

@@ -1,59 +1,35 @@
-/**
- * src/http/tenant-guard.ts
- * ==========================
- * P014 fix: every route under `app/api/0pt/**` sits behind `middleware.ts`,
- * which performs real Zitadel Bearer verification and — only when a
- * principal was actually verified — forwards the result as the
- * `x-0pt-verified-tenant` request header (see middleware.ts, src/auth/context.ts).
- *
- * Independently of that, every one of these route handlers reads `tenant_id`
- * from CLIENT-CONTROLLED input (a `?tenant_id=` query param or a JSON body
- * field) to decide which tenant's rows to read or write. Until this pass,
- * NONE of them cross-checked that client-supplied value against the verified
- * header — so a caller holding a valid token for tenant A could read or
- * write tenant B's sources, rights, provenance, health, quality rules/runs,
- * documents, or lakehouse mappings simply by naming `tenant_id=t_b` in the
- * request. `SourceRegistryService.assertSourceTenant` (and friends) only
- * checks that the object being read *belongs* to the tenant_id it was asked
- * to check against — it has no way to know whether the CALLER is actually
- * entitled to assert that tenant_id in the first place. That entitlement
- * check belongs at the HTTP boundary, once, here.
- *
- * This mirrors the exact decision `src/auth/context.ts`'s `resolveAuthContext`
- * already makes for the enforced-Bearer path ("a disagreeing X-Tenant-Id
- * header is a 403"), applied uniformly to every 0pt capability route that
- * takes tenant_id as a body/query parameter rather than relying on
- * middleware to inject ctx.tenantId directly (most of these routes predate
- * that plumbing and read tenant_id straight from the request; fixing that
- * more deeply is a larger refactor than this pass — this closes the actual
- * authz hole without changing every route's request contract).
- */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";
+import { readServiceTenantScope } from "@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant";
 
 export const VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER = "x-0pt-verified-tenant";
 
-/**
- * Returns a 403 NextResponse when `tenantId` (whatever the route read it
- * from — query string or body) disagrees with the tenant middleware.ts
- * already verified for this request. Returns `null` when the caller may
- * proceed — either because the tenant matches, or because no verified
- * tenant is present on the request at all.
- *
- * The header is absent only in the explicit local-development escape hatch
- * (`AUTH_ENFORCE=false` with no bearer token presented) — `assertAuthConfigSafe()`
- * refuses to boot that way in production, so an absent header here can only
- * happen in a mode that already accepts fully unauthenticated requests.
- * Rejecting in that mode would be strictly more restrictive than the
- * existing dev escape hatch intends, so this deliberately no-ops rather than
- * invents a tenant to compare against.
- */
 export function assertTenantMatchesVerified(
   request: NextRequest,
   tenantId: string | null | undefined,
 ): NextResponse | null {
   const verified = request.headers.get(VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER);
+  // Internal service principal: tenant authority is the SERVER-CONFIGURED
+  // allowlist middleware installed (never a client header). The scope header is
+  // present even when the allowlist is empty, which means "no tenant
+  // authority" -> fail closed. Routes that do not take a tenant never call
+  // this guard, so evidence dispatch / ER / search definitions keep working.
+  if (request.headers.get("x-0pt-verified-service-tenants") !== null) {
+    if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
+    const scope = readServiceTenantScope(request.headers);
+    if (!scope.includes(tenantId)) {
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          error: "OPT_ACCESS_DENIED",
+          message: "tenant_id is outside the internal service principal's configured tenant scope",
+          details: { requested_tenant: tenantId, service_tenant_scope: scope },
+        },
+        { status: 403 },
+      );
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
   if (!verified) return null;
-  if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
+  if (!tenantId) return null;
   if (tenantId !== verified) {
     return NextResponse.json(
       {
@@ -67,7 +43,6 @@ export function assertTenantMatchesVerified(
   return null;
 }
 
-/** Bind document operations to middleware's verified subject; never accept a conflicting body actor. */
 export function resolveDocumentActor(
   request: NextRequest,
   requestedActor: string | undefined,
@@ -81,7 +56,23 @@ export function resolveDocumentActor(
       ),
     };
   }
-  // Absence is the existing unauthenticated development path. In enforced
-  // mode middleware always installs the verified subject before this route.
   return { actorId: verified || requestedActor };
 }
+
+export function assertWorkloadCapabilities(
+  request: NextRequest,
+  required: readonly string[],
+): NextResponse | null {
+  if (!required.length) return null;
+  const raw = request.headers.get('x-0pt-verified-capabilities');
+  if (raw === null) return null; // not a workload-capability-scoped principal
+  const caps = raw ? raw.split(',').map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean) : [];
+  const missing = required.filter((r) => !caps.includes(r) && !caps.includes('*'));
+  if (missing.length) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'OPT_ACCESS_DENIED', message: 'missing required workload capability', details: { missing } },
+      { status: 403 },
+    );
+  }
+  return null;
+}

src/repositories/canonical-fact-repository.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/**
+ * src/repositories/canonical-fact-repository.ts
+ * =============================================
+ * Storage seam for 0pt canonical entities/facts/relations (sql/022).
+ * Same split as source-repository.ts: one interface, an in-memory
+ * implementation (dev/test) and a Postgres implementation (production),
+ * chosen once via resolveStoreMode.
+ *
+ * Tenant isolation is enforced by the service + route AND by RLS in Postgres
+ * (transaction-local GUC `app.opt_canonical_tenant_id`, same pattern as
+ * 019_document_credit_rls.sql). The in-memory backend scopes by tenant_id in
+ * every read/write.
+ */
+import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
+import { resolveStoreMode } from "../platform/dependency-mode";
+import type {
+  CanonicalEntity,
+  CanonicalEntityInput,
+  CanonicalFact,
+  CanonicalFactInput,
+  CanonicalQuery,
+  CanonicalRelationInput,
+} from "../types/canonical-facts";
+import { getRepositorySql, repositoryDatabaseUrl, type RepositorySql } from "./db";
+
+export interface CanonicalFactRepository {
+  upsertEntities(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalEntityInput[]): Promise<CanonicalEntity[]>;
+  insertFacts(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalFactInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }>;
+  insertRelations(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalRelationInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }>;
+  queryFacts(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]>;
+}
+
+/** PostgreSQL timestamptz arrives as Date; the API contract is RFC3339/ISO-8601. */
+function iso(value: unknown): string {
+  return value instanceof Date ? value.toISOString() : String(value);
+}
+
+export function entityKey(e: CanonicalEntityInput): string {
+  return `${e.entity_type}\u0000${e.identity_namespace}\u0000${e.identity_value}`;
+}
+
+export function createCanonicalFactRepository(databaseUrl?: string): CanonicalFactRepository {
+  const mode = resolveStoreMode("0pt.canonical_facts", databaseUrl ?? repositoryDatabaseUrl());
+  if (mode.mode === "postgres") {
+    return new PostgresCanonicalFactRepository(getRepositorySql(mode.url));
+  }
+  return new InMemoryCanonicalFactRepository();
+}
+
+// ── in-memory (dev/test) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+class InMemoryCanonicalFactRepository implements CanonicalFactRepository {
+  private entities = new Map<string, CanonicalEntity>();
+  private facts = new Map<string, CanonicalFact>();
+
+  async upsertEntities(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalEntityInput[]): Promise<CanonicalEntity[]> {
+    const now = new Date().toISOString();
+    return inputs.map((input) => {
+      const key = `${tenantId}\u0000${entityKey(input)}`;
+      const existing = this.entities.get(key);
+      if (existing) return existing;
+      const entity: CanonicalEntity = {
+        ...input,
+        entity_id: randomUUID(),
+        tenant_id: tenantId,
+        created_at: now,
+        updated_at: now,
+      };
+      this.entities.set(key, entity);
+      return entity;
+    });
+  }
+
+  async insertFacts(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalFactInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    let inserted = 0;
+    let duplicates = 0;
+    for (const input of inputs) {
+      const entityId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.entity));
+      if (!entityId) continue;
+      const key = `${tenantId}\u0000${entityId}\u0000${input.predicate}\u0000${input.source_ref}\u0000${input.observed_at}`;
+      if (this.facts.has(key)) {
+        duplicates += 1;
+        continue;
+      }
+      this.facts.set(key, {
+        ...input,
+        fact_id: randomUUID(),
+        tenant_id: tenantId,
+        entity_id: entityId,
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      inserted += 1;
+    }
+    return { inserted, duplicates };
+  }
+
+  async insertRelations(): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    // Relations are not persisted in the in-memory backend beyond validation;
+    // tests assert the write path through facts + counts.
+    return { inserted: 0, duplicates: 0 };
+  }
+
+  async queryFacts(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]> {
+    const limit = query.limit ?? 100;
+    return [...this.facts.values()]
+      .filter((f) => f.tenant_id === query.tenant_id)
+      .filter((f) => (query.entity_id ? f.entity_id === query.entity_id : true))
+      .filter((f) => (query.predicate ? f.predicate === query.predicate : true))
+      .slice(0, limit);
+  }
+}
+
+// ── postgres (production) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+class PostgresCanonicalFactRepository implements CanonicalFactRepository {
+  constructor(private readonly sql: RepositorySql) {}
+
+  private async tx<T>(tenantId: string, fn: (tx: RepositorySql) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+    return this.sql.begin(async (tx) => {
+      await tx`SELECT set_config('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', ${tenantId}, true)`;
+      return fn(tx as unknown as RepositorySql);
+    }) as Promise<T>;
+  }
+
+  async upsertEntities(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalEntityInput[]): Promise<CanonicalEntity[]> {
+    if (inputs.length === 0) return [];
+    return this.tx(tenantId, async (tx) => {
+      const out: CanonicalEntity[] = [];
+      for (const input of inputs) {
+        const rows = await tx`
+          INSERT INTO opt_canonical_entities (entity_id, tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value)
+          VALUES (${randomUUID()}, ${tenantId}, ${input.entity_type}, ${input.identity_namespace}, ${input.identity_value})
+          ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value)
+          DO UPDATE SET updated_at = now()
+          RETURNING entity_id, tenant_id, entity_type, identity_namespace, identity_value, created_at, updated_at`;
+        const r = rows[0];
+        out.push({
+          entity_id: r.entity_id, tenant_id: r.tenant_id, entity_type: r.entity_type,
+          identity_namespace: r.identity_namespace, identity_value: r.identity_value,
+          created_at: String(r.created_at), updated_at: String(r.updated_at),
+        });
+      }
+      return out;
+    });
+  }
+
+  async insertFacts(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalFactInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    if (inputs.length === 0) return { inserted: 0, duplicates: 0 };
+    return this.tx(tenantId, async (tx) => {
+      let inserted = 0;
+      for (const input of inputs) {
+        const entityId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.entity));
+        if (!entityId) continue;
+        const rows = await tx`
+          INSERT INTO opt_canonical_facts (
+            fact_id, tenant_id, entity_id, predicate, value_json, value_type, value_unit,
+            source_ref, source_record_id, st0re_artifact_id, aud0_evidence_ref, run_ref,
+            extractor_version, observed_at, valid_from, valid_to, confidence, quality_status, status
+          ) VALUES (
+            ${randomUUID()}, ${tenantId}, ${entityId}, ${input.predicate}, ${JSON.stringify(input.value)}::jsonb,
+            ${input.value_type ?? "json"}, ${input.value_unit ?? null}, ${input.source_ref},
+            ${input.source_record_id ?? null}, ${input.st0re_artifact_id ?? null},
+            ${input.aud0_evidence_ref ?? null}, ${input.run_ref ?? null}, ${input.extractor_version},
+            ${input.observed_at}, ${input.valid_from ?? null}, ${input.valid_to ?? null},
+            ${input.confidence ?? null}, ${input.quality_status ?? "unvalidated"}, ${input.status ?? "observed"}
+          )
+          ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, entity_id, predicate, source_ref, observed_at) DO NOTHING
+          RETURNING fact_id`;
+        if (rows.length > 0) inserted += 1;
+      }
+      return { inserted, duplicates: inputs.length - inserted };
+    });
+  }
+
+  async insertRelations(tenantId: string, inputs: CanonicalRelationInput[], entityIds: Map<string, string>): Promise<{ inserted: number; duplicates: number }> {
+    if (inputs.length === 0) return { inserted: 0, duplicates: 0 };
+    return this.tx(tenantId, async (tx) => {
+      let inserted = 0;
+      for (const input of inputs) {
+        const subjectId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.subject));
+        const objectId = entityIds.get(entityKey(input.object));
+        if (!subjectId || !objectId) continue;
+        const rows = await tx`
+          INSERT INTO opt_canonical_relations (
+            relation_id, tenant_id, subject_id, predicate, object_id, attributes_json,
+            source_ref, st0re_artifact_id, aud0_evidence_ref, run_ref, extractor_version,
+            observed_at, valid_from, valid_to, confidence
+          ) VALUES (
+            ${randomUUID()}, ${tenantId}, ${subjectId}, ${input.predicate}, ${objectId},
+            ${JSON.stringify(input.attributes ?? {})}::jsonb, ${input.source_ref},
+            ${input.st0re_artifact_id ?? null}, ${input.aud0_evidence_ref ?? null},
+            ${input.run_ref ?? null}, ${input.extractor_version}, ${input.observed_at},
+            ${input.valid_from ?? null}, ${input.valid_to ?? null}, ${input.confidence ?? null}
+          )
+          ON CONFLICT (tenant_id, subject_id, predicate, object_id, source_ref, observed_at) DO NOTHING
+          RETURNING relation_id`;
+        if (rows.length > 0) inserted += 1;
+      }
+      return { inserted, duplicates: inputs.length - inserted };
+    });
+  }
+
+  async queryFacts(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]> {
+    const limit = query.limit ?? 100;
+    return this.tx(query.tenant_id, async (tx) => {
+      const rows = await tx`
+        SELECT f.*, e.entity_type, e.identity_namespace, e.identity_value
+        FROM opt_canonical_facts f
+        JOIN opt_canonical_entities e ON e.entity_id = f.entity_id
+        WHERE f.tenant_id = ${query.tenant_id}
+          ${query.entity_id ? tx`AND f.entity_id = ${query.entity_id}` : tx``}
+          ${query.predicate ? tx`AND f.predicate = ${query.predicate}` : tx``}
+          ${query.entity_type ? tx`AND e.entity_type = ${query.entity_type}` : tx``}
+          ${query.identity_namespace ? tx`AND e.identity_namespace = ${query.identity_namespace}` : tx``}
+          ${query.identity_value ? tx`AND e.identity_value = ${query.identity_value}` : tx``}
+        ORDER BY f.observed_at DESC
+        LIMIT ${limit}`;
+      return rows.map((r) => ({
+        fact_id: r.fact_id, tenant_id: r.tenant_id, entity_id: r.entity_id,
+        entity: { entity_type: r.entity_type, identity_namespace: r.identity_namespace, identity_value: r.identity_value },
+        predicate: r.predicate, value: r.value_json, value_type: r.value_type,
+        value_unit: r.value_unit ?? undefined, source_ref: r.source_ref,
+        source_record_id: r.source_record_id ?? undefined,
+        st0re_artifact_id: r.st0re_artifact_id ?? undefined,
+        aud0_evidence_ref: r.aud0_evidence_ref ?? undefined, run_ref: r.run_ref ?? undefined,
+        extractor_version: r.extractor_version, observed_at: iso(r.observed_at),
+        valid_from: r.valid_from ? iso(r.valid_from) : undefined,
+        valid_to: r.valid_to ? iso(r.valid_to) : undefined,
+        confidence: r.confidence === null ? undefined : Number(r.confidence),
+        quality_status: r.quality_status, status: r.status, created_at: iso(r.created_at),
+      })) as CanonicalFact[];
+    });
+  }
+}

src/services/canonical-fact-registry.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/** Shared singleton for the canonical-fact routes (same pattern as source-registry.ts). */
+import { CanonicalFactService } from "./canonical-fact-service";
+
+export const canonicalFactService = new CanonicalFactService();

src/services/canonical-fact-service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/**
+ * src/services/canonical-fact-service.ts
+ * ======================================
+ * 0pt's canonical structured-observation write/read surface (sql/022).
+ *
+ * Ownership boundary: 0pt stores normalized OBSERVED facts (what a source
+ * said, when, from which artifact). L0RE owns epistemic propositions and
+ * projections and must consume these rows through this API. Nothing here
+ * overwrites an earlier observation: the unique key includes source_ref +
+ * observed_at, so conflicting sources are preserved as separate rows.
+ *
+ * Idempotency: identical re-writes hit ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING and are
+ * reported as `duplicates`, never duplicated.
+ */
+import { createAud0Client, type Aud0Client } from "../clients/aud0-client";
+import { SiaxError } from "../platform/errors";
+import {
+  createCanonicalFactRepository,
+  entityKey,
+  type CanonicalFactRepository,
+} from "../repositories/canonical-fact-repository";
+import type {
+  CanonicalEntity,
+  CanonicalEntityInput,
+  CanonicalFact,
+  CanonicalFactInput,
+  CanonicalQuery,
+  CanonicalRelationInput,
+  CanonicalWriteRequest,
+  CanonicalWriteResult,
+  FactValueType,
+} from "../types/canonical-facts";
+
+const FACT_VALUE_TYPES: FactValueType[] = ["string", "number", "boolean", "date", "json"];
+
+function inferValueType(value: unknown): FactValueType {
+  if (typeof value === "string") return "string";
+  if (typeof value === "number") return "number";
+  if (typeof value === "boolean") return "boolean";
+  return "json";
+}
+
+function assertEntity(entity: CanonicalEntityInput, label: string): void {
+  if (!entity || !entity.entity_type || !entity.identity_namespace || !entity.identity_value) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `${label} requires entity_type, identity_namespace and identity_value`);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertFact(fact: CanonicalFactInput, index: number): void {
+  assertEntity(fact.entity, `facts[${index}].entity`);
+  if (!fact.predicate) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].predicate is required`);
+  if (!fact.source_ref) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].source_ref is required`);
+  if (!fact.extractor_version) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].extractor_version is required`);
+  if (!fact.observed_at || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(fact.observed_at))) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].observed_at must be an ISO timestamp`);
+  }
+  if (fact.value === undefined) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].value is required`);
+  if (fact.value_type && !FACT_VALUE_TYPES.includes(fact.value_type)) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].value_type is invalid`);
+  }
+  if (fact.confidence !== undefined && (fact.confidence < 0 || fact.confidence > 1)) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", `facts[${index}].confidence must be between 0 and 1`);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertRelation(relation: CanonicalRelationInput, index: number): void {
+  assertEntity(relation.subject, `relations[${index}].subject`);
+  assertEntity(relation.object, `relations[${index}].object`);
+  if (!relation.predicate) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].predicate is required`);
+  if (!relation.source_ref) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].source_ref is required`);
+  if (!relation.extractor_version) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].extractor_version is required`);
+  if (!relation.observed_at || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(relation.observed_at))) {
+    throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_relation", `relations[${index}].observed_at must be an ISO timestamp`);
+  }
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalFactServiceOptions {
+  repository?: CanonicalFactRepository;
+  aud0BaseUrl?: string;
+  databaseUrl?: string;
+}
+
+export class CanonicalFactService {
+  private readonly repo: CanonicalFactRepository;
+  private readonly aud0: Aud0Client;
+
+  constructor(opts?: CanonicalFactServiceOptions) {
+    this.repo = opts?.repository ?? createCanonicalFactRepository(opts?.databaseUrl);
+    this.aud0 = createAud0Client(opts?.aud0BaseUrl);
+  }
+
+  async write(input: CanonicalWriteRequest): Promise<CanonicalWriteResult> {
+    if (!input.tenant_id) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", "tenant_id is required");
+    const facts = input.facts ?? [];
+    const relations = input.relations ?? [];
+    const explicit = input.entities ?? [];
+    if (facts.length === 0 && relations.length === 0 && explicit.length === 0) {
+      throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", "at least one entity, fact or relation is required");
+    }
+    facts.forEach(assertFact);
+    relations.forEach(assertRelation);
+
+    // Unique entity inputs from explicit + facts + relations.
+    const unique = new Map<string, CanonicalEntityInput>();
+    for (const e of [...explicit, ...facts.map((f) => f.entity), ...relations.flatMap((r) => [r.subject, r.object])]) {
+      assertEntity(e, "entity");
+      unique.set(entityKey(e), e);
+    }
+    const entities: CanonicalEntity[] = await this.repo.upsertEntities(input.tenant_id, [...unique.values()]);
+    const entityIds = new Map(entities.map((e) => [entityKey(e), e.entity_id]));
+
+    const normalizedFacts = facts.map((f) => ({ ...f, value_type: f.value_type ?? inferValueType(f.value) }));
+    const factResult = await this.repo.insertFacts(input.tenant_id, normalizedFacts, entityIds);
+    const relationResult = await this.repo.insertRelations(input.tenant_id, relations, entityIds);
+
+    // AUD0: counts and provenance refs only, never fact values (PII discipline).
+    try {
+      await this.aud0.ingestEvent({
+        event_id: `evt_0pt_canonical_facts_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`,
+        event_type: "0pt.canonical_facts_written",
+        tenant_id: input.tenant_id,
+        project_id: input.project_id ?? input.tenant_id,
+        actor_id: "0pt",
+        app_id: "0pt",
+        capability_id: "0pt.canonical_fact_write",
+        resource_type: "canonical_facts",
+        resource_id: input.tenant_id,
+        risk_level: "L2",
+        created_at: new Date().toISOString(),
+        payload: {
+          entities: entities.length,
+          facts_inserted: factResult.inserted,
+          facts_duplicates: factResult.duplicates,
+          relations_inserted: relationResult.inserted,
+          relations_duplicates: relationResult.duplicates,
+          source_refs: [...new Set([...facts.map((f) => f.source_ref), ...relations.map((r) => r.source_ref)])],
+          run_refs: [...new Set([...facts.map((f) => f.run_ref), ...relations.map((r) => r.run_ref)].filter(Boolean))],
+        },
+      });
+    } catch {
+      // AUD0 outage must not lose the canonical write; the caller sees counts.
+    }
+
+    return {
+      entities,
+      facts: normalizedFacts.map((f) => ({
+        fact_id: "",
+        entity_id: entityIds.get(entityKey(f.entity)) ?? "",
+        predicate: f.predicate,
+      })),
+      relations: relations.map((r) => ({
+        relation_id: "",
+        subject_id: entityIds.get(entityKey(r.subject)) ?? "",
+        predicate: r.predicate,
+        object_id: entityIds.get(entityKey(r.object)) ?? "",
+      })),
+      duplicates: factResult.duplicates + relationResult.duplicates,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async query(query: CanonicalQuery): Promise<CanonicalFact[]> {
+    if (!query.tenant_id) throw new SiaxError("INVALID_REQUEST", "0pt.canonical_fact", "tenant_id is required");
+    return this.repo.queryFacts({ ...query, limit: Math.min(query.limit ?? 100, 500) });
+  }
+}

src/types/canonical-facts.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * src/types/canonical-facts.ts — 0pt canonical structured observations.
+ *
+ * 0pt owns OBSERVED facts (source said X at time T, from artifact A). L0RE
+ * owns epistemic propositions/assertions and projections derived from these.
+ * This contract is the single write path into the canonical observation store;
+ * downstream products consume it through the same API instead of their own DB.
+ */
+
+export interface CanonicalEntityInput {
+  entity_type: string;
+  identity_namespace: string;
+  identity_value: string;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalEntity extends CanonicalEntityInput {
+  entity_id: string;
+  tenant_id: string;
+  created_at: string;
+  updated_at: string;
+}
+
+export type FactValueType = "string" | "number" | "boolean" | "date" | "json";
+export type QualityStatus = "passed" | "warned" | "failed" | "unvalidated";
+export type FactStatus = "observed" | "supported" | "disputed" | "retracted";
+
+export interface CanonicalFactInput {
+  entity: CanonicalEntityInput;
+  predicate: string;
+  value: unknown;
+  value_type?: FactValueType;
+  value_unit?: string;
+  source_ref: string;
+  source_record_id?: string;
+  st0re_artifact_id?: string;
+  aud0_evidence_ref?: string;
+  run_ref?: string;
+  extractor_version: string;
+  observed_at: string;
+  valid_from?: string;
+  valid_to?: string;
+  confidence?: number;
+  quality_status?: QualityStatus;
+  status?: FactStatus;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalRelationInput {
+  subject: CanonicalEntityInput;
+  predicate: string;
+  object: CanonicalEntityInput;
+  attributes?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  source_ref: string;
+  st0re_artifact_id?: string;
+  aud0_evidence_ref?: string;
+  run_ref?: string;
+  extractor_version: string;
+  observed_at: string;
+  valid_from?: string;
+  valid_to?: string;
+  confidence?: number;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalFact extends CanonicalFactInput {
+  fact_id: string;
+  tenant_id: string;
+  entity_id: string;
+  created_at: string;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalRelation extends CanonicalRelationInput {
+  relation_id: string;
+  tenant_id: string;
+  subject_id: string;
+  object_id: string;
+  created_at: string;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalWriteRequest {
+  tenant_id: string;
+  project_id?: string;
+  entities?: CanonicalEntityInput[];
+  facts?: CanonicalFactInput[];
+  relations?: CanonicalRelationInput[];
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalWriteResult {
+  entities: CanonicalEntity[];
+  facts: { fact_id: string; entity_id: string; predicate: string }[];
+  relations: { relation_id: string; subject_id: string; predicate: string; object_id: string }[];
+  /** Identical re-inserts skipped by the unique key (idempotent replay). */
+  duplicates: number;
+}
+
+export interface CanonicalQuery {
+  tenant_id: string;
+  entity_id?: string;
+  entity_type?: string;
+  identity_namespace?: string;
+  identity_value?: string;
+  predicate?: string;
+  limit?: number;
+}

src/validation/0pt-schemas.ts

@@ -263,3 +263,63 @@ export const activateSourceSchema = z.object({
   tenant_id: z.string().min(1),
   actor_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
 });
+
+/** POST /api/0pt/canonical/facts — canonical structured observation write (sql/022). */
+const canonicalEntityInputSchema = z.object({
+  entity_type: z.string().min(1),
+  identity_namespace: z.string().min(1),
+  identity_value: z.string().min(1),
+});
+
+const canonicalValueSchema = z.union([
+  z.string(),
+  z.number(),
+  z.boolean(),
+  z.null(),
+  z.array(z.unknown()),
+  jsonObject,
+]);
+
+export const canonicalFactInputSchema = z.object({
+  entity: canonicalEntityInputSchema,
+  predicate: z.string().min(1),
+  value: canonicalValueSchema,
+  value_type: z.enum(['string', 'number', 'boolean', 'date', 'json']).optional(),
+  value_unit: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  source_ref: z.string().min(1),
+  source_record_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  st0re_artifact_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  aud0_evidence_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  run_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  extractor_version: z.string().min(1),
+  observed_at: z.string().min(1),
+  valid_from: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  valid_to: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).optional(),
+  quality_status: z.enum(['passed', 'warned', 'failed', 'unvalidated']).optional(),
+  status: z.enum(['observed', 'supported', 'disputed', 'retracted']).optional(),
+});
+
+export const canonicalRelationInputSchema = z.object({
+  subject: canonicalEntityInputSchema,
+  predicate: z.string().min(1),
+  object: canonicalEntityInputSchema,
+  attributes: jsonObject.optional(),
+  source_ref: z.string().min(1),
+  st0re_artifact_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  aud0_evidence_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  run_ref: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  extractor_version: z.string().min(1),
+  observed_at: z.string().min(1),
+  valid_from: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  valid_to: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1).optional(),
+});
+
+export const canonicalWriteSchema = z.object({
+  tenant_id: z.string().min(1),
+  project_id: z.string().min(1).optional(),
+  entities: z.array(canonicalEntityInputSchema).optional(),
+  facts: z.array(canonicalFactInputSchema).optional(),
+  relations: z.array(canonicalRelationInputSchema).optional(),
+});

tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+/**
+ * P0 regression (2026-11-07): tenant authority for the machine-to-machine
+ * (`X-Internal-Token`) principal is SERVER CONFIGURATION, never a client
+ * header.
+ *
+ * The first attempt at this fix read `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` (or a single
+ * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID`) and copied it into `x-0pt-verified-tenant`. Any holder
+ * of the shared internal token could then still name any tenant, so the
+ * original cross-tenant write (tenant_id 999999999999999999 -> 201) remained
+ * possible through a different header. These tests pin the corrected model:
+ *
+ *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` (server env) is the only source of tenant
+ *     authority for the service principal.
+ *   - No configured scope => tenant-scoped writes are denied (fail closed).
+ *   - Client-supplied `x-0pt-internal-tenant`, `x-0pt-verified-tenant` and
+ *     `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` are ignored and stripped.
+ *   - Bearer/session principals are unchanged.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
+import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
+import {
+  parseServiceTenants,
+  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from '@/src/http/tenant-guard';
+import { POST as canonicalPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route';
+import { POST as bridgePOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route';
+import { POST as evidenceDispatchPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch/route';
+
+const INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
+const SCOPED_ROUTE = '/api/0pt/canonical/facts';
+
+function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
+}
+
+/** Headers middleware forwarded to the route handler (Next stores them here). */
+function forwarded(res: { headers: { get(name: string): string | null } }, name: string): string | null {
+  return res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${name.toLowerCase()}`);
+}
+
+function guardRequest(headers: Record<string, string>): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers },
+  });
+}
+
+describe('parseServiceTenants / resolveInternalServiceTenants', () => {
+  it('splits, trims and de-duplicates the allowlist', () => {
+    expect(parseServiceTenants(' t_a , t_b ,, t_a ')).toEqual(['t_a', 't_b']);
+  });
+
+  it('an unset/empty allowlist means no tenant authority', () => {
+    expect(parseServiceTenants(undefined)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(parseServiceTenants('')).toEqual([]);
+    expect(resolveInternalServiceTenants({})).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('middleware: internal-token tenant authority comes from server config', () => {
+  const saved = {
+    auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE,
+    token: process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+    tenants: process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS,
+    node: process.env.NODE_ENV,
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; // default posture: enforced
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    delete process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    const values: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
+      AUTH_ENFORCE: saved.auth,
+      INTERNAL_TOKEN: saved.token,
+      INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS: saved.tenants,
+      NODE_ENV: saved.node,
+    };
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
+      if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
+      else process.env[key] = value;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('single allowlisted tenant is installed as the verified tenant', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('REFUSES an ambiguous multi-tenant allowlist (no workload-identity binding yet)', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a,t_b';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    const body = await res.json();
+    expect(body.message).toContain('ambiguous');
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a single allowlist entry is still forwarded as the service scope', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('with no configured scope the service principal has no tenant authority (empty scope header)', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('IGNORES a client-supplied X-0pt-Internal-Tenant (not an authority source)', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
+        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+        'x-0pt-internal-tenant': 't_victim',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('STRIPS a forged x-0pt-verified-tenant and forged scope header', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
+        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim',
+        'x-0pt-verified-sub': 'user_victim',
+        'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants': 't_victim',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-sub')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('strips forged verified headers on the unauthenticated development path too', async () => {
+    process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = 'false';
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/documents/capture', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim' }));
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('an invalid internal token still falls through to 401', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong' }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('assertTenantMatchesVerified: service scope is enforced fail-closed', () => {
+  it('no service scope header behaves exactly as before (Bearer verified tenant)', () => {
+    const same = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
+      't_a',
+    );
+    expect(same).toBeNull();
+    const cross = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
+      't_victim',
+    );
+    expect(cross?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('allows a tenant inside the configured service scope', () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a,t_b' }),
+      't_b',
+    );
+    expect(res).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('DENIES a tenant outside the configured service scope (403)', async () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' }),
+      't_victim',
+    );
+    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
+    const body = await res!.json();
+    expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_ACCESS_DENIED');
+    expect(body.details.service_tenant_scope).toEqual(['t_a']);
+  });
+
+  it('DENIES every tenant when the configured scope is empty (fail closed, even if a verified tenant was also set)', () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({
+        [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': '999999999999999999',
+      }),
+      '999999999999999999',
+    );
+    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('route handlers: internal service cannot write a foreign tenant', () => {
+  it('canonical facts: cross-tenant write is 403 before the service runs', async () => {
+    const res = await canonicalPOST(
+      new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          tenant_id: 't_victim',
+          entities: [],
+          facts: [],
+          relations: [],
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('quality bridge-run: cross-tenant run is 403 before rules are provisioned', async () => {
+    const res = await bridgePOST(
+      new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', 'http://localhost'), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          tenant_id: 't_victim',
+          project_id: 'p1',
+          dataset_id: 'ds_1',
+          rows: [],
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('evidence-outbox dispatch needs no tenant and is unchanged by the scope', async () => {
+    // No DB in this test env: the route authenticates first, then reports a
+    // dependency error -- anything except 401/403 proves the scope did not
+    // turn a tenant-less machine route into a denial.
+    const previous = process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    try {
+      const res = await evidenceDispatchPOST(
+        new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch', 'http://localhost'), {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: {
+            'content-type': 'application/json',
+            'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+            [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
+          },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ limit: 1 }),
+        }),
+      );
+      expect([401, 403]).not.toContain(res.status);
+    } finally {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+      else process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = previous;
+    }
+  });
+});

tests/auth/middleware-internal-token.test.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ describe('middleware.ts: internal-token path for /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', (
     expect(res.status).toBe(200);
   });
 
+  it('a valid X-Internal-Token lets the acquisition engine write canonical facts', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+  });
+
   it('an invalid X-Internal-Token still falls through to the ordinary Bearer requirement (401, not a bypass)', async () => {
     const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong-secret' }));
     expect(res.status).toBe(401);

tests/auth/workload-identity-dual-accept.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/**
+ * Dual-accept workload identity: the machine routes accept EITHER the legacy
+ * shared `X-Internal-Token` (server-configured single-tenant scope) OR a
+ * verified CL0UD workload JWT (tenant + capabilities from verified claims
+ * only). These tests pin the security properties that make that safe:
+ *
+ *   - a client-supplied `x-0pt-verified-*` header can never authorize
+ *     anything (it is stripped before the handler sees it);
+ *   - an ambiguous legacy scope is refused instead of silently widening;
+ *   - a workload token for tenant A cannot write tenant B's facts;
+ *   - a workload token without the required capability is denied.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
+import { SignJWT, generateKeyPair } from 'jose';
+import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified, assertWorkloadCapabilities } from '../../src/http/tenant-guard';
+import { __resetWorkloadJwksCache, __setWorkloadKeyResolverForTests } from '../../src/auth/cl0ud-workload';
+import { SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER } from '../../src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
+
+const ISSUER = 'https://cl0ud.siax.io';
+const TENANT_A = '379976258701823235';
+const TENANT_B = '999999999999999999';
+
+function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
+}
+
+let privateKey: CryptoKey;
+let publicKey: CryptoKey;
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  const pair = await generateKeyPair('RS256');
+  privateKey = pair.privateKey as CryptoKey;
+  publicKey = pair.publicKey as CryptoKey;
+  __setWorkloadKeyResolverForTests(async () => publicKey);
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  __resetWorkloadJwksCache();
+  for (const key of ['INTERNAL_TOKEN', 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS', 'CL0UD_WORKLOAD_ISSUER', 'CL0UD_WORKLOAD_AUDIENCE', 'AUTH_ENFORCE']) {
+    delete process.env[key];
+  }
+});
+
+async function workloadToken(claims: Record<string, unknown>, audience = '0pt'): Promise<string> {
+  return await new SignJWT(claims)
+    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: 'RS256' })
+    .setIssuer(ISSUER)
+    .setAudience(audience)
+    .setSubject('svc-0pt-worker')
+    .setIssuedAt()
+    .setExpirationTime('5m')
+    .sign(privateKey);
+}
+
+describe('middleware: legacy internal token scope', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
+    delete process.env.CL0UD_WORKLOAD_ISSUER;
+  });
+
+  it('single configured tenant becomes the verified tenant and the service scope', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = TENANT_A;
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe(TENANT_A);
+    expect(res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER}`)).toBe(TENANT_A);
+  });
+
+  it('an ambiguous multi-tenant scope is refused, not widened', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = `${TENANT_A},${TENANT_B}`;
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    expect((await res.json()).error).toBe('OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED');
+  });
+
+  it('forged client-supplied verified headers are stripped', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = TENANT_A;
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', {
+        'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret',
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': TENANT_B,
+        [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: TENANT_B,
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe(TENANT_A);
+    expect(res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER}`)).toBe(TENANT_A);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('middleware: CL0UD workload token (dual-accept)', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env.CL0UD_WORKLOAD_ISSUER = ISSUER;
+    process.env.CL0UD_WORKLOAD_AUDIENCE = '0pt';
+    delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+  });
+
+  it('derives tenant and capabilities from verified claims', async () => {
+    const token = await workloadToken({ tenant_id: TENANT_A, capabilities: ['0pt.canonical.write'] });
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe(TENANT_A);
+    expect(res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER}`)).toBe('0pt.canonical.write');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a token with the wrong audience', async () => {
+    const token = await workloadToken({ tenant_id: TENANT_A, capabilities: ['0pt.canonical.write'] }, 'n0d');
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a token that carries no tenant claim', async () => {
+    const token = await workloadToken({ capabilities: ['0pt.canonical.write'] });
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  it('ignores forged verified headers on the workload path too', async () => {
+    const token = await workloadToken({ tenant_id: TENANT_A, capabilities: ['0pt.canonical.write'] });
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', {
+        authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': TENANT_B,
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe(TENANT_A);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('tenant guard: scope and capability enforcement', () => {
+  it('denies a write for a tenant outside the service scope', () => {
+    const request = req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: TENANT_A });
+    expect(assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, TENANT_A)).toBeNull();
+    const denied = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, TENANT_B);
+    expect(denied?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('denies a tenant that disagrees with a verified workload tenant', () => {
+    const request = req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': TENANT_A });
+    expect(assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, TENANT_A)).toBeNull();
+    expect(assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, TENANT_B)?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('denies a missing capability on a capability-scoped principal', () => {
+    const request = req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { [SERVICE_CAPABILITIES_HEADER]: '0pt.canonical.read' });
+    expect(assertWorkloadCapabilities(request, ['0pt.canonical.write'])?.status).toBe(403);
+    expect(assertWorkloadCapabilities(request, ['0pt.canonical.read'])).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

tests/document-workbench/idempotency-operation-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  bindOperationToUploadIdentity,
+  prepareDoc0UploadIdentity,
+  type Doc0UploadInput,
+} from '../../src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client';
+
+const input: Doc0UploadInput = {
+  tenantId: 't1', projectId: 'p1', actorId: 'a1', requestId: 'r1', idempotencyKey: 'k1',
+  filename: 'rapport.txt', mimeType: 'text/plain', classification: 'internal',
+  bytes: new TextEncoder().encode('Innehall'),
+};
+const opA = {
+  instruction: 'Extrahera leverantor', fields: [{ name: 'supplier', type: 'string' }],
+  modelId: 'm1', dataClass: 'low', format: 'json' as const,
+};
+const opB = { ...opA, instruction: 'Extrahera belopp' };
+
+describe('operation-scoped upload identity', () => {
+  it('same file + same operation binds to one identity', () => {
+    expect(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)))
+      .toEqual(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)));
+  });
+  it('same file + DIFFERENT instruction = DIFFERENT identity (not the same operation)', () => {
+    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
+    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
+    expect(a.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(b.requestFingerprint);
+  });
+  it('changed model or data class also changes the operation identity', () => {
+    const c = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, modelId: 'm2' }));
+    const d = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, dataClass: 'high' }));
+    const e = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, format: 'csv' }));
+    expect(c.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+    expect(d.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+    expect(e.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+  });
+  it('raw bytes checksum stays stable across operations', () => {
+    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
+    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
+    expect(a.sourceSha256).toBe(b.sourceSha256);
+  });
+  it('prefixes the operation marker so odd filenames cannot collide', () => {
+    const bound = bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA);
+    expect(bound.filename.startsWith('rapport.txt#')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

tests/p0/canonical-facts.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical structured observations (sql/022): idempotent write, conflict
+ * preservation, tenant isolation and relation identity resolution.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { CanonicalFactService } from "@/src/services/canonical-fact-service";
+import { SiaxError } from "@/src/platform/errors";
+
+const T = "t_canonical_test";
+const ENTITY = { entity_type: "web_page", identity_namespace: "url", identity_value: "https://example.org" };
+
+function fact(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
+  return {
+    entity: ENTITY,
+    predicate: "web.title",
+    value: "Example Domain",
+    source_ref: "source:example",
+    extractor_version: "0pt.motor.extraction/v1",
+    observed_at: "2026-11-04T12:00:00Z",
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+describe("CanonicalFactService — write", () => {
+  it("creates the entity and the fact, and query returns it", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    const result = await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact()] });
+    expect(result.entities).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(result.entities[0].identity_value).toBe("https://example.org");
+    expect(result.facts).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(result.duplicates).toBe(0);
+    const rows = await svc.query({ tenant_id: T, identity_value: "https://example.org" });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(rows[0].predicate).toBe("web.title");
+    expect(rows[0].value_type).toBe("string");
+  });
+
+  it("is idempotent: an identical replay is reported as a duplicate, not stored twice", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact()] });
+    const replay = await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact()] });
+    expect(replay.duplicates).toBe(1);
+    const rows = await svc.query({ tenant_id: T, identity_value: "https://example.org" });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("preserves conflicting sources as separate observations", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ source_ref: "source:a", value: "A" })] });
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ source_ref: "source:b", value: "B" })] });
+    const rows = await svc.query({ tenant_id: T, identity_value: "https://example.org" });
+    expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(rows.map((r) => r.value).sort()).toEqual(["A", "B"]);
+  });
+
+  it("isolates tenants", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await svc.write({ tenant_id: "t_a", facts: [fact()] });
+    expect(await svc.query({ tenant_id: "t_b" })).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("resolves relation subject/object identities to entity ids", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    const result = await svc.write({
+      tenant_id: T,
+      relations: [{
+        subject: ENTITY,
+        predicate: "LINKS_TO",
+        object: { entity_type: "web_page", identity_namespace: "url", identity_value: "https://example.org/next" },
+        source_ref: "source:example",
+        extractor_version: "0pt.motor.extraction/v1",
+        observed_at: "2026-11-04T12:00:00Z",
+      }],
+    });
+    expect(result.entities).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(result.relations[0].subject_id).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(result.relations[0].object_id).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(result.relations[0].subject_id).not.toBe(result.relations[0].object_id);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a fact without observed_at or with an invalid confidence", async () => {
+    const svc = new CanonicalFactService();
+    await expect(svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ observed_at: undefined })] })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SiaxError);
+    await expect(svc.write({ tenant_id: T, facts: [fact({ confidence: 2 })] })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SiaxError);
+  });
+});

tests/p0/st0re-realinfra-guard.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { isolatedSt0reFetch, probeSt0reRealinfra, resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget } from "@/tests/support/st0re-realinfra";
+
+describe("ST0RE realinfra safety guard", () => {
+  it("uses real HTTP for local writes while forbidding redirect following", async () => {
+    const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>().mockResolvedValue(new Response("{}"));
+    const transport = isolatedSt0reFetch("http://127.0.0.1:4620", fetchSpy);
+    await transport("http://127.0.0.1:4620/v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables", { method: "POST", body: "{}", redirect: "follow" });
+    expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith("http://127.0.0.1:4620/v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables",
+      { method: "POST", body: "{}", redirect: "error" });
+  });
+
+  it.each(["https://api.st0re.siax.io/v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables", "http://127.0.0.1:4621/v1/st0re/lakehouse/tables"])
+    ("refuses a write outside the exact test origin without sending it (%s)", async (url) => {
+      const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
+      const transport = isolatedSt0reFetch("http://127.0.0.1:4620", fetchSpy);
+      await expect(transport(new Request(url, { method: "POST" }))).rejects.toThrow(/isolated test origin/);
+      expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+  it.each([
+    {},
+    { ST0RE_URL: "https://api.st0re.siax.io" },
+    { ST0RE_TEST_URL: "http://localhost:4620" },
+    { ST0RE_TEST_URL: "https://api.st0re.siax.io" },
+    { ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "true", ST0RE_TEST_URL: "http://localhost:4620" },
+    { ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "0", ST0RE_TEST_URL: "http://localhost:4620" },
+  ])("stays disabled without exact opt-in and makes no request (%j)", async (env) => {
+    const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
+    expect(resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget(env)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(await probeSt0reRealinfra(env, fetchSpy)).toEqual({
+      reachable: false,
+      reason: expect.stringContaining("disabled"),
+    });
+    expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    undefined,
+    "",
+    "https://api.st0re.siax.io",
+    "https://st0re.siax.io",
+    "https://example.com",
+    "http://192.168.1.1",
+    "http://localhost.example.com",
+    "http://127.1",
+    "http://2130706433",
+    "http://127.0.0.2",
+    "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]",
+    "ftp://localhost",
+    "not-a-url",
+    "http://localhost:65536",
+    ["http://", "user:password", "@localhost"].join(""),
+    ["http://", "@localhost"].join(""),
+    "http://localhost/path",
+    "http://localhost/..",
+    "http://localhost?query=1",
+    "http://localhost?",
+    "http://localhost#fragment",
+    "http://localhost#",
+    "http://localhost\\remote",
+    " http://localhost",
+  ])("fails closed before fetch for missing or invalid target (%s)", async (target) => {
+    const env = {
+      ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "1",
+      ST0RE_TEST_URL: target,
+      ST0RE_URL: "http://localhost:4620",
+    };
+    const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
+    expect(() => resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget(env)).toThrow(/ST0RE realinfra configuration error/);
+    await expect(probeSt0reRealinfra(env, fetchSpy)).rejects.toThrow(/ST0RE_TEST_URL/);
+    expect(fetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "http://localhost:4620",
+    "http://127.0.0.1:4620",
+    "http://[::1]:4620",
+    "https://localhost:4620/",
+    "https://127.0.0.1",
+    "https://[::1]",
+  ])("probes an explicit loopback target with one GET (%s)", async (target) => {
+    const env = {
+      ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "1",
+      ST0RE_TEST_URL: target,
+      ST0RE_URL: "https://api.st0re.siax.io",
+    };
+    const origin = new URL(target).origin;
+    const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>().mockResolvedValue(new Response("[]", { status: 200 }));
+    expect(resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget(env)).toBe(origin);
+    expect(await probeSt0reRealinfra(env, fetchSpy)).toEqual({ target: origin, reachable: true, reason: "" });
+    expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(`${origin}/v1/st0re/lakehouse/namespaces`, {
+      method: "GET",
+      redirect: "error",
+      headers: { "X-Tenant-Id": "t_0pt_realinfra_local", "X-Actor-Id": "0pt-realinfra-test" },
+      signal: expect.any(AbortSignal),
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("reports HTTP 500 as unreachable", async () => {
+    const target = "http://localhost:4620";
+    const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>().mockResolvedValue(new Response(null, { status: 500 }));
+    expect(await probeSt0reRealinfra({ ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "1", ST0RE_TEST_URL: target }, fetchSpy))
+      .toEqual({ target, reachable: false, reason: "ST0RE responded HTTP 500" });
+    expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("reports a throwing fetch as unreachable", async () => {
+    const target = "http://localhost:4620";
+    const fetchSpy = vi.fn<typeof fetch>().mockRejectedValue(new Error("synthetic connection failure"));
+    expect(await probeSt0reRealinfra({ ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "1", ST0RE_TEST_URL: target }, fetchSpy))
+      .toEqual({ target, reachable: false, reason: "Local ST0RE reachability probe failed" });
+    expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

tests/siax-access/idempotency.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  operationFingerprint,
+  operationIdentity,
+  runIdempotentOperation,
+  type IdempotencyStore,
+} from "../../packages/siax-access/src/idempotency";
+
+describe("@siax/access universal idempotency", () => {
+  it("binds every result-affecting input into the fingerprint", () => {
+    const a = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera"]);
+    const b = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera-belopp"]);
+    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
+  });
+  it("rejects malformed identity (same shape 0pt/DOC0 both enforce)", () => {
+    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "../bad", payload: [] })).toThrow();
+    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "ok", payload: "not-array" as never })).toThrow();
+  });
+  it("conflicts when a reused key carries a changed payload", () => {
+    const fp1 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "A"]);
+    const fp2 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "B"]);
+    expect(fp1).not.toBe(fp2);
+  });
+  it("replays a stored receipt verbatim on the exact fingerprint", async () => {
+    const stored = { x: 1 };
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = {
+      start: async () => false,
+      save: async () => {},
+      receipt: async () => stored,
+    };
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { throw new Error("must not rerun"); },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("replayed");
+    if (outcome.kind === "replayed") expect(outcome.receipt).toEqual(stored);
+  });
+  it("claims once and saves only after the dispatch", async () => {
+    const order: string[] = [];
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = {
+      start: async () => { order.push("start"); return true; },
+      save: async () => { order.push("save"); },
+      receipt: async () => { order.push("receipt"); return undefined; },
+    };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { order.push("dispatch"); return { x: ++dispatched }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
+    expect(order).toEqual(["start", "dispatch", "save"]);
+  });
+  it("reports a store error as conflict, never as a fresh start", async () => {
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = {
+      start: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
+      save: async () => {},
+      receipt: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
+    };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("conflict");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(0);
+  });
+  it("does not rerun the dispatch when start succeeds but save later fails", async () => {
+    const store: IdempotencyStore<unknown, { x: number }> = { start: async () => true, save: async () => { throw new Error("journal write failed"); }, receipt: async () => undefined };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
+  });
+});

tests/support/st0re-realinfra.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+type St0reTestEnv = Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>>;
+
+export interface St0reRealinfraProbe {
+  target?: string;
+  reachable: boolean;
+  reason: string;
+}
+
+/** Keep the real client's subsequent writes inside the selected test origin too. */
+export function isolatedSt0reFetch(target: string, fetchImpl: typeof fetch): typeof fetch {
+  const origin = resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget({ ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS: "1", ST0RE_TEST_URL: target });
+  return async (input, init) => {
+    const url = new URL(typeof input === "string" ? input : input instanceof URL ? input.href : input.url);
+    if (url.origin !== origin) throw new Error("ST0RE realinfra request escaped its isolated test origin");
+    return fetchImpl(input, { ...init, redirect: "error" });
+  };
+}
+
+/** Only an explicit, isolated loopback origin can enable real-infrastructure tests. */
+export function resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget(env: St0reTestEnv): string | undefined {
+  if (env.ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS !== "1") return undefined;
+
+  const target = env.ST0RE_TEST_URL;
+  const configError = () => new Error(
+    "ST0RE realinfra configuration error: ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS=1 requires ST0RE_TEST_URL to be an HTTP(S) loopback origin (localhost, 127.0.0.1 or [::1]), without credentials, path, query or fragment. Remote/production targets are forbidden."
+  );
+  // Check the original spelling too: URL parsing normalizes paths and IP aliases.
+  if (!target || !/^https?:\/\/(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(?::[0-9]+)?\/?$/i.test(target)) {
+    throw configError();
+  }
+  try {
+    return new URL(target).origin;
+  } catch {
+    throw configError();
+  }
+}
+
+export async function probeSt0reRealinfra(
+  env: St0reTestEnv,
+  fetchImpl: typeof fetch,
+): Promise<St0reRealinfraProbe> {
+  // Configuration failures must escape the reachability catch and fail closed.
+  const target = resolveSt0reRealinfraTarget(env);
+  if (!target) {
+    return { reachable: false, reason: "disabled: ST0RE_REALINFRA_TESTS is not 1" };
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const response = await fetchImpl(`${target}/v1/st0re/lakehouse/namespaces`, {
+      method: "GET",
+      redirect: "error",
+      headers: {
+        "X-Tenant-Id": env.ST0RE_TEST_TENANT_ID ?? "t_0pt_realinfra_local",
+        "X-Actor-Id": "0pt-realinfra-test",
+      },
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),
+    });
+    return {
+      target,
+      reachable: response.ok,
+      reason: response.ok ? "" : `ST0RE responded HTTP ${response.status}`,
+    };
+  } catch {
+    return { target, reachable: false, reason: "Local ST0RE reachability probe failed" };
+  }
+}