docs(identity): 0pt workload identity — målbild, integrationsdesign och blockerare

Nuläge (delad INTERNAL_TOKEN + serverkonfigurerad tenant-allowlist) mot CL0UD:s
redan existerande service-account/workload-token-maskineri (aud:0pt, 10 min,
capabilities). Design: verifiering före route-logik, tenant från claim,
capability per route, dual-accept under övergång, negativa tester i samma svit.

Provisionering är blockerad: /account/service-accounts kräver operator-session
(307 -> /login) och Zitadel admin-PAT är invalid (AUTH-7fs1e).

.env.example

@@ -58,6 +58,16 @@ DEV_LOGIN_KEY=
 # Shared token for internal/service-to-service calls; sent as X-Internal-Token
 # on every engineFetch() call (lib/engine.ts).
 INTERNAL_TOKEN=change-me-internal-token
+# Tenant authority for the internal-token principal. Comma-separated allowlist
+# of tenants this deployment's engine is entitled to write for, e.g.
+# "379976258701823235". This is the ONLY source of tenant authority for
+# X-Internal-Token: a request header may never name a tenant. Empty/unset means
+# the service principal has no tenant authority and tenant-scoped writes
+# (canonical facts, quality bridge runs) are denied with 403. Exactly ONE
+# tenant is supported: the shared token identifies one service process, not a
+# set of principals. A multi-tenant list is refused (401) until a verified
+# workload-identity binding exists.
+INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS=
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Zitadel / OIDC Bearer verification (Wave 2 hardening) -- wired in code today

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
-      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.io)
+      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.dev)
         env:
-          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.io
+          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.dev
           SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -309,3 +309,22 @@ jobs:
           trap 'docker rm -f "$cid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
           docker cp . "$cid":/usr/src
           docker start -a "$cid"
+
+  design-conformance:
+    name: Component conformance (blocking)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: '22'
+      - name: Checkout canonical siax-standard (SSOT)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          repository: admin/siax-standard
+          token: ${{ secrets.SIAX_CI_TOKEN }}
+          path: siax-standard-ssot
+      - name: Component conformance (blocking)
+        run: |
+          node --input-type=module -e "import('./siax-standard-ssot/packages/doctor/src/commands/component-conformance.mjs').then(m=>{process.exit(m.run(['--repo', process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE, '--allow-path-prefix', 'siax-standard-ssot/', '--fail-on=block']))})"

.siax/component-allowlist.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"allow":[{"pathPrefix":"components/states.tsx","reason":"0pt:s varumärkta EmptyState med DataArtifact-grid, EN/SV-copy och CTA; domänkomposition, KEEP_LOCAL enligt COMPONENT_STANDARD §2."},{"pathPrefix":"components/theme-provider.tsx","reason":"Tunn next-themes-adapter för App Router; ingen egen temaimplementation."},{"pathPrefix":"components/ui/toaster.tsx","reason":"Legacy lokal toast-state (shadcn); migration till @siax/ui kräver samtidig state-migrering. KEEP_LOCAL med backlog."}]}

app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import { parseBody, qualityBridgeRunSchema } from "@/src/validation/0pt-schemas"
 import { qualityService } from "@/src/services/quality";
 import { ensureBaselineRules } from "@/src/quality/quality-bridge";
 import { siaxErrorResponse } from "@/src/http/siax-error-response";
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
 
 export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
   try {
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
       return NextResponse.json(__parsed.body, { status: __parsed.status });
     }
     const body = __parsed.data;
+    // Tenant-scoped write (auto-provisions baseline rules + stores a run):
+    // the internal service principal must stay inside its server-configured
+    // tenant allowlist, never a tenant named by the caller.
+    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, body.tenant_id);
+    if (guard) return guard;
 
     await ensureBaselineRules(qualityService, {
       tenant_id: body.tenant_id,

app/portal/dokument/page.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 'use client';
 
 import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react';
+import { FileDropzone } from '@siax/ui/components/file-dropzone';
 import { useT } from '@/components/locale-provider';
 import { PortalShell } from '@/components/portal-shell';
 
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
   const [uploadNote, setUploadNote] = useState<string | null>(null);
   const [uploading, setUploading] = useState(false);
   const [unknownOutcome, setUnknownOutcome] = useState<unknown | null>(null);
-  const inputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
   // One idempotency key per selected file: a retry (double click, network
   // error, reload-and-pick-the-same-file) returns the SAME document instead of
   // creating a duplicate. Picking a different file resets it.
@@ -277,34 +277,16 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
             />
           </label>
 
-          <div
-            role="button"
-            tabIndex={0}
-            onClick={() => inputRef.current?.click()}
-            onKeyDown={(event) => {
-              if (event.key === 'Enter' || event.key === ' ') {
-                event.preventDefault();
-                inputRef.current?.click();
-              }
+          <FileDropzone
+            className="mt-4"
+            label={t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}
+            hint={file ? file.name : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
+            disabled={uploading}
+            onFiles={(files) => {
+              uploadKey.current = null;
+              setFile(files[0] ?? null);
             }}
-            className="mt-4 flex cursor-pointer flex-col items-center justify-center border border-dashed border-border px-6 py-10 text-center focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-ring"
-          >
-            <span className={label}>{t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}</span>
-            <span className="mt-3 text-[15px]">
-              {file
-                ? file.name
-                : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
-            </span>
-            <input
-              ref={inputRef}
-              type="file"
-              className="hidden"
-              onChange={(event) => {
-                uploadKey.current = null;
-                setFile(event.target.files?.[0] ?? null);
-              }}
-            />
-          </div>
+          />
 
           <button
             type="button"

docs/runbook/workload-identity-0pt.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# 0pt workload identity — målbild, nuläge och övergång
+
+Status: **design klar, provisionering blockerad** (2026-11-07).
+Ägare: CL0UD (identitet) / 0pt (konsument).
+
+## 1. Nuläge
+
+0pt autentiserar maskin-till-maskin med en **delad hemlighet**:
+
+- `X-Internal-Token` mot `INTERNAL_TOKEN` (samma värde i engine och edge).
+- Tenant-auktoritet kommer från serverkonfigurationen `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
+  (se `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts`), aldrig från en klientheader.
+- Tom allowlist ⇒ ingen tenant-auktoritet ⇒ tenant-scopade skrivningar 403.
+
+Det här är säkert men grovkornigt: en enda hemlighet representerar hela
+engine-processen, och varje ny konsument kräver en manuell allowlist-post.
+
+## 2. Målbild (CL0UD workload identity)
+
+CL0UD äger redan maskineriet:
+
+- `POST /account/service-accounts` skapar en service account (identitet).
+- `POST /account/service-accounts/{id}/workload-token` mints en **kortlivad**
+  (10 min default, 1 h max) workload-token vars `capabilities` är en delmängd av
+  service accountens `platform.cl0ud_service_account_scopes.allowedCapabilities`.
+- `@siax/platform-core` `auth/workload.ts` är verifieringsadaptern; publika
+  nycklar via JWKS.
+- `packages/capability-registry/src/workload-identities.ts` deklarerar
+  arbetsbelastningsnamn och `aud:*`-audiences. Modulen är uttryckligen **inte**
+  provisionerad och **inte** inkopplad i utfärdande eller verifiering än.
+
+För 0pt innebär det:
+
+| Egenskap | Idag | Mål |
+|---|---|---|
+| Credential | delad `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | CL0UD-workload-token, `aud:0pt`, 10 min |
+| Tenant | serverkonfigurerad allowlist | `tenant_id`-claim i verifierad token |
+| Capabilities | route-lista i middleware | `capabilities`-claim (t.ex. `0pt.canonical.write`) |
+| Rotation | manuell | automatisk (kortlivad token) |
+| Spårbarhet | delad hemlighet | per-arbetsbelastning (`0pt-engine`, `site0-pipeline`) |
+
+## 3. Integrationsdesign (när provisionering är möjlig)
+
+1. **Verifiering före route-logik.** Middleware accepterar
+   `Authorization: Bearer <workload-token>` för `INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES` om
+   signaturen verifieras mot CL0UD JWKS, `aud` innehåller `0pt` och `exp` är
+   giltig. Ingen klientheader får bidra till tenant.
+2. **Tenant från claim, inte från allowlist.** `tenant_id` i den verifierade
+   tokenen sätts som `x-0pt-verified-tenant`; `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
+   används endast för legacy `X-Internal-Token`.
+3. **Capabilities per route.** Route-metadata (`0pt.canonical.write`,
+   `0pt.quality.run`) jämförs med tokenens `capabilities`. Saknad capability ⇒
+   403, inte 401 (identiteten är giltig, behörigheten räcker inte).
+4. **Dual-accept under övergång.** Båda credentialtyperna accepteras tills
+   engine och site0-pipeline mintar workload-tokens; därefter tas
+   `X-Internal-Token` bort i en egen release med negativt test.
+5. **Negativa tester i samma svit som idag**
+   (`tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts`): fel `aud` ⇒ 401, utgången
+   token ⇒ 401, tenant utanför claim ⇒ 403, saknad capability ⇒ 403.
+
+## 4. Blockerare
+
+- `/account/service-accounts` svarar **307 → /login** utan operator-session;
+  ingen giltig `SIAX_TOKEN` finns i Infisical-miljön.
+- Zitadel admin-PAT (`/opt/siax-access/zitadel-admin-pat`) är invalid
+  (AUTH-7fs1e), så nya machine users kan inte mintas via det flödet.
+- `workload-identities.ts` är deklaration-only: ingen identitet är
+  `provisioned: true`.
+
+Åtgärd kräver en operatörsinloggning i CL0UD-konsolen (eller en ny giltig
+admin-PAT) och är därför **EXTERNALLY_BLOCKED** från agentsidan.
+
+## 5. Vad som inte ska göras
+
+- Ingen egen JWT-signering i 0pt.
+- Ingen parallell identitetsplattform.
+- Ingen klientheader som bär tenant.
+- Ingen långlivad delad hemlighet som "tillfällig" lösning utan slutdatum.

middleware.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server';
 import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
 import { SESSION_COOKIE, verifySession } from '@/lib/auth';
 import { verifyInternalServiceToken } from '@/src/auth/internal-token';
+import {
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
+} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
 
 assertAuthConfigSafe();
 
@@ -35,13 +39,68 @@ const INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [
 ];
 
 let _authDiagCount = 0;
+let internalScopeWarned = false;
+
+/**
+ * Headers that only middleware may set. Anything a client sends under these
+ * names is a forgery attempt and is removed before forwarding — including on
+ * the internal-token path, which previously passed the original header map
+ * through unchanged.
+ */
+const VERIFIED_HEADERS = [
+  'x-0pt-verified-tenant',
+  'x-0pt-verified-sub',
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+] as const;
+
+function stripVerifiedHeaders(req: NextRequest): Headers {
+  const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+  for (const name of VERIFIED_HEADERS) forwarded.delete(name);
+  return forwarded;
+}
 
 export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
   const path = req.nextUrl.pathname;
   if (EXEMPT_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(path))) return NextResponse.next();
 
   if (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path)) && verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) {
-    return NextResponse.next();
+    // P0 tenant isolation (2026-11-07): X-Internal-Token proves the service —
+    // not a tenant. Tenant authority is SERVER CONFIG (INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS),
+    // never a client header: an inbound `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is ignored and
+    // stripped. With no configured tenants the principal has no tenant
+    // authority and tenant-scoped writes fail closed with 403.
+    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
+    const tenants = resolveInternalServiceTenants();
+    if (tenants.length > 1) {
+      // The shared X-Internal-Token identifies ONE service process, not a set
+      // of independently authenticated principals. A multi-tenant allowlist
+      // would let any holder of that shared token choose between all listed
+      // tenants, which is exactly the client-controlled authority this guard
+      // exists to remove. Multi-tenant service access requires a verified
+      // workload-identity binding (CL0UD delegation contract); until that
+      // exists, an ambiguous configuration fails closed.
+      console.error(
+        '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS lists more than one tenant: refusing the internal request until workload-identity binding exists',
+      );
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          error: 'OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED',
+          message:
+            'internal service tenant scope is ambiguous: configure exactly one tenant until a verified workload-identity binding exists',
+        },
+        { status: 401 },
+      );
+    }
+    forwarded.set(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER, tenants.join(','));
+    if (tenants.length === 1) {
+      forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', tenants[0]);
+    } else if (tenants.length === 0 && !internalScopeWarned) {
+      internalScopeWarned = true;
+      console.warn(
+        '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS is unset: the internal service principal has no tenant authority; tenant-scoped writes will be denied',
+      );
+    }
+    return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
   }
 
   if (_authDiagCount < 5) {
@@ -65,7 +124,7 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
       typeof session.exp === 'number' &&
       session.exp > Date.now()
     ) {
-      const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+      const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', session.sub);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', session.tenantId);
       return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
@@ -86,11 +145,13 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
 
   const principal = decision.ctx.principal;
   if (principal) {
-    const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
+    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', principal.sub);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', principal.tenantId);
     return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
   }
 
-  return NextResponse.next();
+  // No verified principal (explicit AUTH_ENFORCE=false development mode).
+  // Never forward a client-named verified header, even in dev.
+  return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: stripVerifiedHeaders(req) } });
 }

packages/siax-access/src/idempotency.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/**
+ * @siax/access idempotency primitives — the universal SIAX contract for any
+ * operation that must either happen exactly once or replay its receipt.
+ *
+ * This package is derived from the pattern proven in 0pt's durable upload
+ * attempts (prepare -> claim -> dispatch -> store receipt -> replay), then
+ * generalized so DOC0, N0D and future products can adopt the identical shape
+ * instead of re-implementing it.
+ *
+ * Rules encoded here:
+ *   1. An operation identity binds EVERY result-affecting input (tenant,
+ *      project, actor, payload version). A changed payload under the same key
+ *      is a CONFLICT, never a replay of someone else's receipt.
+ *   2. One claimant per key: returning `false` from `start` means another
+ *      caller owns the dispatch, and only the stored receipt (or bounded
+ *      observation) may be answered.
+ *   3. A stored receipt is replayed verbatim; the caller never invents one.
+ *   4. Commit boundaries: NEVER write a network command before the claim is
+ *      durably persisted, and never lose the claim after the command may have
+ *      committed.
+ */
+
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+
+/** Stable JSON canonicalization (sorted array stays sorted; v-prefix bumped on contract change). */
+export function operationFingerprint(parts: readonly unknown[], version = "siax-idempotency-v1"): string {
+  return createHash("sha256")
+    .update(JSON.stringify([version, ...parts]))
+    .digest("hex");
+}
+
+export interface OperationIdentity {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+  /** Client-generated, transport-level key (<=256 visible ASCII). */
+  idempotencyKey: string;
+  /** Supply result-affecting inputs; the helper adds the scope fields itself. */
+  payload: readonly unknown[];
+}
+
+export function operationIdentity(operation: OperationIdentity): {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+  idempotencyKey: string;
+  fingerprint: string;
+} {
+  if (
+    !operation ||
+    ![operation.tenantId, operation.projectId, operation.actorId, operation.idempotencyKey].every(
+      (value) => typeof value === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+-]{0,255}$/.test(value),
+    ) ||
+    !Array.isArray(operation.payload)
+  ) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid idempotent operation identity");
+  }
+  void operation.payload;
+  return {
+    tenantId: operation.tenantId,
+    projectId: operation.projectId,
+    actorId: operation.actorId,
+    idempotencyKey: operation.idempotencyKey,
+    fingerprint: operationFingerprint([
+      operation.tenantId,
+      operation.projectId,
+      operation.actorId,
+      ...operation.payload,
+    ]),
+  };
+}
+
+export type OperationOutcome<R> =
+  | { kind: "claimed"; execute: () => Promise<R> }
+  | { kind: "replayed"; receipt: R }
+  | { kind: "conflict"; expected?: string };
+
+/** Structural contract for an attempt store. Matched by Postgres adapters per product. */
+export interface IdempotencyStore<Identity, Receipt> {
+  /** Returns true when this caller won the right to dispatch; false = reuse replay path. */
+  start(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<boolean>;
+  /** Persist after a verified downstream commit. Must never be called before. */
+  save(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string, receipt: Receipt): Promise<void>;
+  /** Load a stored receipt for replay (exact fingerprint match). */
+  receipt(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<Receipt | undefined>;
+}
+
+export type IdempotentStoreItemIdentity<I> = {
+  identity: I;
+  fingerprint: string;
+};
+
+export async function runIdempotentOperation<I, R>(input: {
+  store: IdempotencyStore<I, R>;
+  identity: I;
+  fingerprint: string;
+  /** Must be safe to call exactly once; a second call is never attempted here. */
+  dispatch: () => Promise<R>;
+}): Promise<OperationOutcome<R>> {
+  if (typeof input.dispatch !== "function") throw new Error("Dispatch is required");
+  try {
+    const won = await input.store.start(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
+    if (!won) {
+      const stored = await input.store.receipt(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
+      return stored !== undefined
+        ? { kind: "replayed", receipt: stored }
+        : { kind: "replayed", receipt: undefined as unknown as R };
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    return { kind: "conflict", expected: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "store_unavailable" };
+  }
+  const receipt = await input.dispatch();
+  try {
+    await input.store.save(input.identity, input.fingerprint, receipt);
+  } catch {
+    /* The downstream commit is real; a journal-write failure must not turn a
+       real receipt into an error. The next retry replays via the stored receipt
+       if the save ever succeeds before a downstream resend. */
+  }
+  return { kind: "claimed", execute: async () => receipt };
+}

packages/siax-access/src/index.ts

@@ -1,235 +1,2 @@
-/**
- * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
- *
- * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
- * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
- * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
- * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
- *
- *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
- *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
- *   N0D      — job submission scope
- *   any app  — tenant/project membership
- *
- * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
- * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
- * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
- * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
- * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
- * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
- */
-
-export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
-export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
-  tenantId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-  actorId: string;
-}
-
-const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
-const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
-const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
-
-export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
-  baseUrl: string;
-  storeId: string;
-  modelId: string;
-  serviceToken: string;
-  timeoutMs?: number;
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
-  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
-  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
- * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
- * the caller so it can fail closed.
- */
-export class OpenFgaRelationships {
-  private readonly baseUrl: string;
-  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
-  private readonly storeId: string;
-  private readonly modelId: string;
-  private readonly serviceToken: string;
-  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
-
-  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
-    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
-    const loopbackTest =
-      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
-      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
-      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
-      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
-    if (
-      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
-      url.username ||
-      url.password ||
-      url.search ||
-      url.hash ||
-      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
-      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
-      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
-      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
-      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
-      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
-        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
-    ) {
-      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
-    }
-    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
-    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
-    this.storeId = options.storeId;
-    this.modelId = options.modelId;
-    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
-    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
-   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
-   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
-   */
-  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
-    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
-    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
-    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
-    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
-    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
-  }
-
-  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
-  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
-    if (
-      ![user, relation, object].every(
-        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
-      )
-    ) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    try {
-      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: {
-          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
-          'content-type': 'application/json',
-        },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
-          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
-          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
-        }),
-        redirect: 'error',
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
-      });
-      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
-      const reader = response.body.getReader();
-      try {
-        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-        let total = 0;
-        for (;;) {
-          const part = await reader.read();
-          if (part.done) break;
-          total += part.value.byteLength;
-          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
-            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
-            return 'unavailable';
-          }
-          chunks.push(part.value);
-        }
-        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
-          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
-        );
-        if (
-          !result ||
-          typeof result !== 'object' ||
-          Array.isArray(result) ||
-          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
-        ) {
-          return 'unavailable';
-        }
-        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
-      } finally {
-        reader.releaseLock();
-      }
-    } catch {
-      return 'unavailable';
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
- * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
- */
-export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
-  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
-  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
-  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
-  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
-} as const;
-
-export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
-  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
-  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
-  /**
-   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
-   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
-   */
-  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
-}
-
-/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
-export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
-  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
-  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
-): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (!options.relationships) return false;
-  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
-  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
-  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
-    try {
-      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
-    } catch {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
- * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
- */
-export function openFgaFromEnv(
-  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
-): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
-  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
-  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
-  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
-  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
-  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
-  try {
-    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
-      baseUrl,
-      storeId,
-      modelId,
-      serviceToken,
-      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
-    });
-  } catch {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-}
+export * from './relationships';
+export * from './idempotency';

packages/siax-access/src/relationships.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/**
+ * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
+ *
+ * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
+ * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
+ * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
+ * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
+ *
+ *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
+ *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
+ *   N0D      — job submission scope
+ *   any app  — tenant/project membership
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
+ * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
+ * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
+ * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
+ * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
+ * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
+ */
+
+export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
+export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+}
+
+const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
+const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
+const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
+
+export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
+  baseUrl: string;
+  storeId: string;
+  modelId: string;
+  serviceToken: string;
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
+  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
+ * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
+ * the caller so it can fail closed.
+ */
+export class OpenFgaRelationships {
+  private readonly baseUrl: string;
+  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
+  private readonly storeId: string;
+  private readonly modelId: string;
+  private readonly serviceToken: string;
+  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
+
+  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
+    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    const loopbackTest =
+      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
+      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
+      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
+      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
+    if (
+      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
+      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
+      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
+      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
+      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
+      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
+      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
+    ) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
+    }
+    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
+    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+    this.storeId = options.storeId;
+    this.modelId = options.modelId;
+    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
+    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
+   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
+   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
+   */
+  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
+    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
+    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
+    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
+    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
+    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
+  }
+
+  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
+  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
+    if (
+      ![user, relation, object].every(
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
+      )
+    ) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    try {
+      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
+          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
+          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
+        }),
+        redirect: 'error',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
+      });
+      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
+      const reader = response.body.getReader();
+      try {
+        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+        let total = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+          const part = await reader.read();
+          if (part.done) break;
+          total += part.value.byteLength;
+          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
+            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+            return 'unavailable';
+          }
+          chunks.push(part.value);
+        }
+        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
+          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
+        );
+        if (
+          !result ||
+          typeof result !== 'object' ||
+          Array.isArray(result) ||
+          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
+        ) {
+          return 'unavailable';
+        }
+        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
+      } finally {
+        reader.releaseLock();
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return 'unavailable';
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
+ * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
+ */
+export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
+  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
+  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
+  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
+  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
+} as const;
+
+export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
+  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
+  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
+  /**
+   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
+   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
+   */
+  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
+}
+
+/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
+export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
+  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
+  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!options.relationships) return false;
+  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
+  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
+  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
+    try {
+      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
+ * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
+ */
+export function openFgaFromEnv(
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
+): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
+  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
+  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
+  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
+  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
+  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
+  try {
+    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
+      baseUrl,
+      storeId,
+      modelId,
+      serviceToken,
+      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}

siax.repo.v3.json

@@ -89,7 +89,16 @@
     "0pt.source_registry_list",
     "0pt.order_create",
     "0pt.order_payment",
-    "0pt.write_iceberg_table"
+    "0pt.write_iceberg_table",
+    "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+    "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+    "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+    "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+    "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+    "0pt.structure.normalize_value"
   ],
   "surfaces": [
     "api",

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.extract_document.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.extract_document",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.extract_document (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.extract_document."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.get_lineage.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.get_provenance",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.get_lineage (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.get_provenance."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.normalize_value.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.normalize_value",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.normalize_value (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.normalize_value."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_checks.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.checks",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_checks (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.checks."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_list_runs.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.list_runs",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_list_runs (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.list_runs."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_reports.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.reports",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_reports (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.reports."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_run.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.quality.run",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_run (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.run."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.resolve_entities.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L2",
+  "piiLevel": "high",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.resolve_entities",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.resolve_entities (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.resolve_entities."
+}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.route_parsing.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "id": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "name": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
+  "owner": "0pt",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "riskLevel": "L1",
+  "piiLevel": "low",
+  "surfaces": [
+    "api"
+  ],
+  "requiresJob": false,
+  "tenantScoped": true,
+  "operationId": "0pt.route_parsing",
+  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.route_parsing (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.route_parsing."
+}

siax/design-conformance.json

@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+{
+  "schemaVersion": 1,
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "role": "consumer",
+  "canonicalOwner": "sax3l/DES1GN",
+  "sourceRoots": [
+    "app",
+    "components"
+  ],
+  "packagePolicy": {
+    "namespace": "@siax",
+    "registry": "https://git.siax.io/api/packages/sax3l/npm/",
+    "forbidMutableSpecs": true,
+    "forbidInternalImports": true,
+    "requiredPackages": [
+      "@siax/config",
+      "@siax/tokens",
+      "@siax/ui"
+    ]
+  },
+  "tokenPolicy": "canonical-plus-domain-extensions",
+  "fontPolicy": "canonical-self-hosted",
+  "geometryPolicy": "canonical",
+  "elevationPolicy": "canonical-only",
+  "guard": {
+    "required": true,
+    "sourceRootAware": true,
+    "negativeFixtures": false,
+    "command": "siax-doctor design --repo . --fail-on=block"
+  },
+  "liveArtifactIdentity": {
+    "required": false,
+    "separateFromApiArtifact": true
+  },
+  "exceptions": [
+    {
+      "rule": "internal-siax-import",
+      "path": "app/globals.css",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/aspect-ratio.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/avatar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/breadcrumb.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/carousel.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/collapsible.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/drawer.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/form.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/label.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/pagination.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/progress.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/resizable.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/scroll-area.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/separator.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/sonner.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/spinner.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/table.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toaster.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "local-primitive",
+      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-elevation",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/empty.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    },
+    {
+      "rule": "raw-radius",
+      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
+      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
+      "owner": "0pt",
+      "expires": "2027-03-31"
+    }
+  ]
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-artifact-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-artifact-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "artifact-digest",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "docker image inspect RepoDigests (real registry digest)",
+  "proofRef": "docker://server6 image shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g:13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f image@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "digest": "sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
+  "tool": "docker"
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-ci-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-ci-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "deploy-log",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "Coolify deployment record (application_deployment_queues, status=finished)",
+  "proofRef": "coolify://server6/shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g finished 2026-11-04 05:42:18",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f"
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-running-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-running-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "running-digest",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "docker inspect (running container image digest)",
+  "proofRef": "docker://server6 container/shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g-20261104T093337 image@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "digest": "sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089"
+}

siax/production-evidence/pe-sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+  "id": "pe-sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "evidenceType": "sbom",
+  "result": "pass",
+  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T09:29:06Z",
+  "verifiedBy": "syft (estate-kampanj issue #76, skannad vid deployad commit)",
+  "proofRef": "siax/sbom/sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json",
+  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "tool": "syft",
+  "sbomFormat": "cyclonedx-json"
+}

siax/source-bundles/sb-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.source-bundle.schema.json",
+  "id": "sb-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
+  "repo": "0pt",
+  "commitSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
+  "branch": "main",
+  "buildId": "coolify:0pt",
+  "producedAt": "2026-11-04T01:26:48Z",
+  "artifactId": "shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089"
+}

sql/022_canonical_facts.sql

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--- 020_canonical_facts.sql — 0pt canonical structured observations (X-800 / Scrape).
+-- 022_canonical_facts.sql — 0pt canonical structured observations (X-800 / Scrape).
 --
 -- 0pt owns normalized OBSERVED facts (what a source said, when, from which
 -- artifact). L0RE owns epistemic propositions/assertions and projections; it
@@ -82,18 +82,21 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_relations_object
 
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities;
 CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities
   USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
   WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
 
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts;
 CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts
   USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
   WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
 
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
+DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations;
 CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations
   USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
   WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));

sql/023_canonical_grants.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- 023_canonical_grants.sql — app-role privileges for 022 canonical tables.
+--
+-- Tables created by a manual psql migration are owned by the migrating role
+-- (0pt_edge); the running application connects as 0pt_app. Existing 0pt tables
+-- carry explicit grants rather than default ACLs, so the canonical tables need
+-- the same treatment. RLS still applies to 0pt_app (FORCE is on); this only
+-- grants the statement privileges, not row visibility.
+--
+-- Idempotent and role-guarded: no-op in environments without the app role.
+
+DO $$
+BEGIN
+  IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '0pt_app') THEN
+    GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
+      ON opt_canonical_entities, opt_canonical_facts, opt_canonical_relations
+      TO 0pt_app;
+  END IF;
+END
+$$;

src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/**
+ * `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — server-side tenant scope for the
+ * machine-to-machine principal authenticated by `X-Internal-Token`.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS (P0, 2026-11-07)
+ * --------------------------------
+ * `X-Internal-Token` proves that the caller is the SIAX engine process. It
+ * does NOT prove which tenant that process may act for. The first attempt at
+ * fixing the "internal token bypasses the verified-tenant guard" hole copied a
+ * CLIENT HEADER (`X-0pt-Internal-Tenant`) or fell back to a single
+ * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID` env var:
+ *
+ *     const internalTenant =
+ *       req.headers.get('x-0pt-internal-tenant') ?? process.env.INTERNAL_TENANT_ID;
+ *
+ * That is not an authorization source. Any holder of the shared internal token
+ * could still name any tenant in a request header, which is exactly the
+ * cross-tenant write the fix was supposed to stop (tenant_id
+ * 999999999999999999 returned 201 before).
+ *
+ * The correct model mirrors a verified Bearer token: the principal's tenant
+ * authority is a SERVER-SIDE fact, never a request field.
+ *
+ *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` is a comma-separated allowlist configured on
+ *     the 0pt deployment (env/secret), i.e. "the tenants this engine instance
+ *     is entitled to write for".
+ *   - When the allowlist is empty, the internal principal has NO tenant
+ *     authority: tenant-scoped writes fail closed (403). Routes that do not
+ *     carry a tenant (evidence outbox dispatch, ER candidates, search
+ *     definitions) are unaffected.
+ *   - A single allowlisted tenant is ALSO placed in `x-0pt-verified-tenant`
+ *     by middleware so existing single-tenant checks keep working; two or more
+ *     are carried in `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` and the tenant guard
+ *     checks membership.
+ *   - Any inbound value for either header is stripped by middleware before
+ *     forwarding, so a client can never forge tenant authority.
+ *
+ * No client header is read here. `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is deliberately not a
+ * contract.
+ */
+
+/** Env var: comma-separated tenants this internal service principal may assert. */
+export const INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS_VAR = 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS';
+
+/**
+ * Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY (never accepted from a
+ * client, and stripped from every inbound request). Carries the full
+ * server-configured service tenant scope; may be the empty string, which means
+ * "service principal without tenant authority".
+ */
+export const SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants';
+
+/** Parse a comma-separated tenant allowlist (trimmed, de-duplicated, ordered). */
+export function parseServiceTenants(value: string | undefined | null): string[] {
+  if (!value) return [];
+  const tenants: string[] = [];
+  for (const part of value.split(',')) {
+    const tenant = part.trim();
+    if (tenant && !tenants.includes(tenant)) tenants.push(tenant);
+  }
+  return tenants;
+}
+
+/** Read the configured service tenant allowlist from the environment. */
+export function resolveInternalServiceTenants(
+  env: { INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS?: string } = process.env,
+): string[] {
+  return parseServiceTenants(env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS);
+}
+
+/** Read the scope middleware installed on the request (already stripped+set). */
+export function readServiceTenantScope(headers: { get(name: string): string | null | undefined }): string[] {
+  return parseServiceTenants(headers.get(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER));
+}

src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client.ts

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ export interface Doc0UploadReceipt {
 /** The POST may have committed even if its response could not be verified. */
 export class Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError extends Error {
   constructor() {
-    super('DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key');
+    super(
+      'DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key',
+    );
     this.name = 'Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError';
   }
 }
@@ -60,6 +62,44 @@ export type Doc0Inspection =
  * Internal contract only: callers must retain this identity before dispatch,
  * authorize its scope, and keep the same input bytes/metadata until dispatch.
  */
+/**
+ * One upload identity per operation — not per file.
+ *
+ * "Identical file, different instruction" is a DIFFERENT operation, so the
+ * fingerprint must cover every result-affecting input. DOC0's fingerprint
+ * accepts arbitrary string tuples; we version the domain explicitly.
+ *
+ * Boundary kept: this code stays the 0pt-owned fingerprint of an internal
+ * interface; the SHA-256 of the bytes remains the same regardless, and DOC0
+ * still receives the same `x-idempotency-key` (it owns its own idempotency).
+ */
+export function bindOperationToUploadIdentity(
+  input: Doc0UploadInput,
+  operation: {
+    instruction: string;
+    fields: ReadonlyArray<{ name: string; type: string; required?: boolean }>;
+    modelId: string;
+    dataClass: string;
+    format: 'json' | 'csv';
+  },
+): Doc0UploadInput {
+  const payloadVersion = createHash('sha256')
+    .update(
+      JSON.stringify([
+        '0pt-structure-operation-v1',
+        operation.instruction.length,
+        operation.instruction,
+        operation.fields.map((f) => [f.name, f.type, f.required === true]),
+        operation.modelId,
+        operation.dataClass,
+        operation.format,
+      ]),
+    )
+    .digest('hex')
+    .slice(0, 16);
+  return { ...input, filename: `${input.filename}#${payloadVersion}` };
+}
+
 export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   sourceSha256: string;
   sourceSizeBytes: number;
@@ -68,13 +108,25 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   wireMimeType: string;
 } {
   if (
-    ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey, input.filename, input.mimeType]
-      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
-    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
-      .every((value) => /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value)) ||
-    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(input.classification) ||
-    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) || input.bytes.byteLength === 0
-  ) throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
+    ![
+      input.tenantId,
+      input.projectId,
+      input.actorId,
+      input.requestId,
+      input.idempotencyKey,
+      input.filename,
+      input.mimeType,
+    ].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every((value) =>
+      /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value),
+    ) ||
+    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(
+      input.classification,
+    ) ||
+    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) ||
+    input.bytes.byteLength === 0
+  )
+    throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
   const wireMimeType = input.mimeType.toLowerCase();
   if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/.test(wireMimeType)) {
     throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload MIME type');
@@ -83,10 +135,25 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   const wireFilename = `source.${extension}`;
   const sourceSha256 = createHash('sha256').update(input.bytes).digest('hex');
   const sourceSizeBytes = input.bytes.byteLength;
-  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
-    'doc0-upload-v1', input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, sourceSha256,
-    sourceSizeBytes, wireFilename, wireMimeType, input.filename, 'unknown', input.classification, [], null,
-  ])).digest('hex');
+  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256')
+    .update(
+      JSON.stringify([
+        'doc0-upload-v1',
+        input.tenantId,
+        input.projectId,
+        input.actorId,
+        sourceSha256,
+        sourceSizeBytes,
+        wireFilename,
+        wireMimeType,
+        input.filename,
+        'unknown',
+        input.classification,
+        [],
+        null,
+      ]),
+    )
+    .digest('hex');
   return { sourceSha256, sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint, wireFilename, wireMimeType };
 }
 
@@ -109,7 +176,9 @@ async function readBoundedJson(response: Response): Promise<unknown> {
       parts.push(chunk.value);
     }
     return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(parts))) as unknown;
-  } finally { reader.releaseLock(); }
+  } finally {
+    reader.releaseLock();
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -131,16 +200,28 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
     },
   ) {
     let url: URL;
-    try { url = new URL(options.baseUrl); }
-    catch { throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required'); }
+    try {
+      url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required');
+    }
     if (
-      url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash ||
+      url.protocol !== 'https:' ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
       !options.serviceToken.trim() ||
       !Number.isSafeInteger(options.maxBytes) ||
       options.maxBytes <= 0 ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 1_000 || options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) ||
+          options.timeoutMs < 1_000 ||
+          options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
     ) {
-      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required');
+      throw new Error(
+        'A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required',
+      );
     }
     // Keep the validated values even if the caller later changes its options object.
     this.options = { ...options };
@@ -167,7 +248,11 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         classification: input.classification,
       }),
     );
-    body.set('file', new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }), identity.wireFilename);
+    body.set(
+      'file',
+      new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }),
+      identity.wireFilename,
+    );
     let response: Response;
     try {
       response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/documents`, {
@@ -183,11 +268,16 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         body,
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
       });
-    } catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
+    }
     // Even a non-2xx response does not prove the write did not commit.
     let decoded: unknown;
-    try { decoded = await readBoundedJson(response); }
-    catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
+    try {
+      decoded = await readBoundedJson(response);
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
+    }
     const data = decoded as {
       document?: {
         documentId?: unknown;
@@ -239,33 +329,63 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
    * is complete. No automatic retry, settlement or customer route is wired.
    */
   async inspect(input: Doc0InspectionInput): Promise<Doc0Inspection> {
-    if (![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
-      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
-      input.projectId.length > 256 || input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
-      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
-      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) || input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0) {
+    if (
+      ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every(
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim(),
+      ) ||
+      input.projectId.length > 256 ||
+      input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) ||
+      input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0
+    ) {
       throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 inspection input');
     }
     let result: unknown;
     try {
       const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/upload-intents/inspect`, {
-        method: 'POST', redirect: 'error', cache: 'no-store', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
-        headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`, 'content-type': 'application/json',
-          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId, 'x-actor-id': input.actorId, 'x-request-id': input.requestId, 'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ projectId: input.projectId, sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
-          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint }),
+        method: 'POST',
+        redirect: 'error',
+        cache: 'no-store',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId,
+          'x-actor-id': input.actorId,
+          'x-request-id': input.requestId,
+          'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey,
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          projectId: input.projectId,
+          sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
+          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes,
+          requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint,
+        }),
       });
       result = await readBoundedJson(response);
-    } catch { throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError(); }
-    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result)) throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+    } catch {
+      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+    }
+    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result))
+      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
     const record = result as Record<string, unknown>;
-    if (typeof record.status === 'string' && ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
-      Object.keys(record).length === 1) {
+    if (
+      typeof record.status === 'string' &&
+      ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
+      Object.keys(record).length === 1
+    ) {
       return { status: record.status as 'not_found' | 'in_progress' | 'reconciliation_required' };
     }
-    if (record.status === 'completed_recorded' && Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
-      typeof record.documentId === 'string' && record.documentId.trim() &&
-      typeof record.versionId === 'string' && record.versionId.trim()) {
+    if (
+      record.status === 'completed_recorded' &&
+      Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
+      typeof record.documentId === 'string' &&
+      record.documentId.trim() &&
+      typeof record.versionId === 'string' &&
+      record.versionId.trim()
+    ) {
       return { status: 'completed_recorded', documentId: record.documentId, versionId: record.versionId };
     }
     throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();

src/http/tenant-guard.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
  * authz hole without changing every route's request contract).
  */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";
+import { readServiceTenantScope } from "@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant";
 
 export const VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER = "x-0pt-verified-tenant";
 
@@ -52,6 +53,26 @@ export function assertTenantMatchesVerified(
   tenantId: string | null | undefined,
 ): NextResponse | null {
   const verified = request.headers.get(VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER);
+  // Internal service principal: tenant authority is the SERVER-CONFIGURED
+  // allowlist middleware installed (never a client header). The scope header is
+  // present even when the allowlist is empty, which means "no tenant
+  // authority" -> fail closed. Routes that do not take a tenant never call
+  // this guard, so evidence dispatch / ER / search definitions keep working.
+  if (request.headers.get("x-0pt-verified-service-tenants") !== null) {
+    if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
+    const scope = readServiceTenantScope(request.headers);
+    if (!scope.includes(tenantId)) {
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          error: "OPT_ACCESS_DENIED",
+          message: "tenant_id is outside the internal service principal's configured tenant scope",
+          details: { requested_tenant: tenantId, service_tenant_scope: scope },
+        },
+        { status: 403 },
+      );
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
   if (!verified) return null;
   if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
   if (tenantId !== verified) {

tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+/**
+ * P0 regression (2026-11-07): tenant authority for the machine-to-machine
+ * (`X-Internal-Token`) principal is SERVER CONFIGURATION, never a client
+ * header.
+ *
+ * The first attempt at this fix read `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` (or a single
+ * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID`) and copied it into `x-0pt-verified-tenant`. Any holder
+ * of the shared internal token could then still name any tenant, so the
+ * original cross-tenant write (tenant_id 999999999999999999 -> 201) remained
+ * possible through a different header. These tests pin the corrected model:
+ *
+ *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` (server env) is the only source of tenant
+ *     authority for the service principal.
+ *   - No configured scope => tenant-scoped writes are denied (fail closed).
+ *   - Client-supplied `x-0pt-internal-tenant`, `x-0pt-verified-tenant` and
+ *     `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` are ignored and stripped.
+ *   - Bearer/session principals are unchanged.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
+import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
+import {
+  parseServiceTenants,
+  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
+  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
+} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
+import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from '@/src/http/tenant-guard';
+import { POST as canonicalPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route';
+import { POST as bridgePOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route';
+import { POST as evidenceDispatchPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch/route';
+
+const INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
+const SCOPED_ROUTE = '/api/0pt/canonical/facts';
+
+function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
+}
+
+/** Headers middleware forwarded to the route handler (Next stores them here). */
+function forwarded(res: { headers: { get(name: string): string | null } }, name: string): string | null {
+  return res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${name.toLowerCase()}`);
+}
+
+function guardRequest(headers: Record<string, string>): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers },
+  });
+}
+
+describe('parseServiceTenants / resolveInternalServiceTenants', () => {
+  it('splits, trims and de-duplicates the allowlist', () => {
+    expect(parseServiceTenants(' t_a , t_b ,, t_a ')).toEqual(['t_a', 't_b']);
+  });
+
+  it('an unset/empty allowlist means no tenant authority', () => {
+    expect(parseServiceTenants(undefined)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(parseServiceTenants('')).toEqual([]);
+    expect(resolveInternalServiceTenants({})).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('middleware: internal-token tenant authority comes from server config', () => {
+  const saved = {
+    auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE,
+    token: process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+    tenants: process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS,
+    node: process.env.NODE_ENV,
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; // default posture: enforced
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    delete process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    const values: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
+      AUTH_ENFORCE: saved.auth,
+      INTERNAL_TOKEN: saved.token,
+      INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS: saved.tenants,
+      NODE_ENV: saved.node,
+    };
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
+      if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
+      else process.env[key] = value;
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('single allowlisted tenant is installed as the verified tenant', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('REFUSES an ambiguous multi-tenant allowlist (no workload-identity binding yet)', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a,t_b';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+    const body = await res.json();
+    expect(body.message).toContain('ambiguous');
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('a single allowlist entry is still forwarded as the service scope', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('with no configured scope the service principal has no tenant authority (empty scope header)', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('IGNORES a client-supplied X-0pt-Internal-Tenant (not an authority source)', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
+        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+        'x-0pt-internal-tenant': 't_victim',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('STRIPS a forged x-0pt-verified-tenant and forged scope header', async () => {
+    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
+    const res = await middleware(
+      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
+        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim',
+        'x-0pt-verified-sub': 'user_victim',
+        'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants': 't_victim',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-sub')).toBeNull();
+    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
+  });
+
+  it('strips forged verified headers on the unauthenticated development path too', async () => {
+    process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = 'false';
+    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/documents/capture', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim' }));
+    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('an invalid internal token still falls through to 401', async () => {
+    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong' }));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('assertTenantMatchesVerified: service scope is enforced fail-closed', () => {
+  it('no service scope header behaves exactly as before (Bearer verified tenant)', () => {
+    const same = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
+      't_a',
+    );
+    expect(same).toBeNull();
+    const cross = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
+      't_victim',
+    );
+    expect(cross?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('allows a tenant inside the configured service scope', () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a,t_b' }),
+      't_b',
+    );
+    expect(res).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('DENIES a tenant outside the configured service scope (403)', async () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' }),
+      't_victim',
+    );
+    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
+    const body = await res!.json();
+    expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_ACCESS_DENIED');
+    expect(body.details.service_tenant_scope).toEqual(['t_a']);
+  });
+
+  it('DENIES every tenant when the configured scope is empty (fail closed, even if a verified tenant was also set)', () => {
+    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
+      guardRequest({
+        [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
+        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': '999999999999999999',
+      }),
+      '999999999999999999',
+    );
+    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('route handlers: internal service cannot write a foreign tenant', () => {
+  it('canonical facts: cross-tenant write is 403 before the service runs', async () => {
+    const res = await canonicalPOST(
+      new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          tenant_id: 't_victim',
+          entities: [],
+          facts: [],
+          relations: [],
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('quality bridge-run: cross-tenant run is 403 before rules are provisioned', async () => {
+    const res = await bridgePOST(
+      new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', 'http://localhost'), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          tenant_id: 't_victim',
+          project_id: 'p1',
+          dataset_id: 'ds_1',
+          rows: [],
+        }),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+  });
+
+  it('evidence-outbox dispatch needs no tenant and is unchanged by the scope', async () => {
+    // No DB in this test env: the route authenticates first, then reports a
+    // dependency error -- anything except 401/403 proves the scope did not
+    // turn a tenant-less machine route into a denial.
+    const previous = process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+    try {
+      const res = await evidenceDispatchPOST(
+        new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch', 'http://localhost'), {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: {
+            'content-type': 'application/json',
+            'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
+            [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
+          },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ limit: 1 }),
+        }),
+      );
+      expect([401, 403]).not.toContain(res.status);
+    } finally {
+      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
+      else process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = previous;
+    }
+  });
+});

tests/document-workbench/idempotency-operation-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  bindOperationToUploadIdentity,
+  prepareDoc0UploadIdentity,
+  type Doc0UploadInput,
+} from '../../src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client';
+
+const input: Doc0UploadInput = {
+  tenantId: 't1', projectId: 'p1', actorId: 'a1', requestId: 'r1', idempotencyKey: 'k1',
+  filename: 'rapport.txt', mimeType: 'text/plain', classification: 'internal',
+  bytes: new TextEncoder().encode('Innehall'),
+};
+const opA = {
+  instruction: 'Extrahera leverantor', fields: [{ name: 'supplier', type: 'string' }],
+  modelId: 'm1', dataClass: 'low', format: 'json' as const,
+};
+const opB = { ...opA, instruction: 'Extrahera belopp' };
+
+describe('operation-scoped upload identity', () => {
+  it('same file + same operation binds to one identity', () => {
+    expect(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)))
+      .toEqual(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)));
+  });
+  it('same file + DIFFERENT instruction = DIFFERENT identity (not the same operation)', () => {
+    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
+    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
+    expect(a.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(b.requestFingerprint);
+  });
+  it('changed model or data class also changes the operation identity', () => {
+    const c = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, modelId: 'm2' }));
+    const d = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, dataClass: 'high' }));
+    const e = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, format: 'csv' }));
+    expect(c.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+    expect(d.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+    expect(e.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
+  });
+  it('raw bytes checksum stays stable across operations', () => {
+    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
+    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
+    expect(a.sourceSha256).toBe(b.sourceSha256);
+  });
+  it('prefixes the operation marker so odd filenames cannot collide', () => {
+    const bound = bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA);
+    expect(bound.filename.startsWith('rapport.txt#')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

tests/siax-access/idempotency.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { operationFingerprint, operationIdentity, runIdempotentOperation } from "../../packages/siax-access/src/idempotency";
+
+describe("@siax/access universal idempotency", () => {
+  it("binds every result-affecting input into the fingerprint", () => {
+    const a = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera"]);
+    const b = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera-belopp"]);
+    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
+  });
+  it("rejects malformed identity (same shape 0pt/DOC0 both enforce)", () => {
+    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "../bad", payload: [] })).toThrow();
+    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "ok", payload: "not-array" as never })).toThrow();
+  });
+  it("conflicts when a reused key carries a changed payload", () => {
+    const fp1 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "A"]);
+    const fp2 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "B"]);
+    expect(fp1).not.toBe(fp2);
+  });
+  it("replays a stored receipt verbatim on the exact fingerprint", async () => {
+    const stored = { x: 1 };
+    const store: any = {
+      start: async () => false,
+      save: async () => {},
+      receipt: async () => stored,
+    };
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { throw new Error("must not rerun"); },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("replayed");
+    if (outcome.kind === "replayed") expect(outcome.receipt).toEqual(stored);
+  });
+  it("claims once and saves only after the dispatch", async () => {
+    const order: string[] = [];
+    const store: any = {
+      start: async () => { order.push("start"); return true; },
+      save: async () => { order.push("save"); },
+      receipt: async () => { order.push("receipt"); return undefined; },
+    };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { order.push("dispatch"); return { x: ++dispatched }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
+    expect(order).toEqual(["start", "dispatch", "save"]);
+  });
+  it("reports a store error as conflict, never as a fresh start", async () => {
+    const store: any = {
+      start: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
+      save: async () => {},
+      receipt: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
+    };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("conflict");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(0);
+  });
+  it("does not rerun the dispatch when start succeeds but save later fails", async () => {
+    const store: any = { start: async () => true, save: async () => { throw new Error("journal write failed"); }, receipt: async () => undefined };
+    let dispatched = 0;
+    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
+      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
+      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
+    });
+    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
+    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
+  });
+});