fix(0pt): renumber canonical facts migration to 022 (020 was taken)

.env.example

@@ -58,16 +58,6 @@ DEV_LOGIN_KEY=
 # Shared token for internal/service-to-service calls; sent as X-Internal-Token
 # on every engineFetch() call (lib/engine.ts).
 INTERNAL_TOKEN=change-me-internal-token
-# Tenant authority for the internal-token principal. Comma-separated allowlist
-# of tenants this deployment's engine is entitled to write for, e.g.
-# "379976258701823235". This is the ONLY source of tenant authority for
-# X-Internal-Token: a request header may never name a tenant. Empty/unset means
-# the service principal has no tenant authority and tenant-scoped writes
-# (canonical facts, quality bridge runs) are denied with 403. Exactly ONE
-# tenant is supported: the shared token identifies one service process, not a
-# set of principals. A multi-tenant list is refused (401) until a verified
-# workload-identity binding exists.
-INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS=
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Zitadel / OIDC Bearer verification (Wave 2 hardening) -- wired in code today

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
-      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.dev)
+      - name: SonarQube analysis (self-hosted sonar.siax.io)
         env:
-          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.dev
+          SONAR_HOST_URL: https://sonar.siax.io
           SONAR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SONAR_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -309,22 +309,3 @@ jobs:
           trap 'docker rm -f "$cid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true' EXIT
           docker cp . "$cid":/usr/src
           docker start -a "$cid"
-
-  design-conformance:
-    name: Component conformance (blocking)
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 10
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
-        with:
-          node-version: '22'
-      - name: Checkout canonical siax-standard (SSOT)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          repository: admin/siax-standard
-          token: ${{ secrets.SIAX_CI_TOKEN }}
-          path: siax-standard-ssot
-      - name: Component conformance (blocking)
-        run: |
-          node --input-type=module -e "import('./siax-standard-ssot/packages/doctor/src/commands/component-conformance.mjs').then(m=>{process.exit(m.run(['--repo', process.env.GITHUB_WORKSPACE, '--allow-path-prefix', 'siax-standard-ssot/', '--fail-on=block']))})"

.siax/component-allowlist.json

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"allow":[{"pathPrefix":"components/states.tsx","reason":"0pt:s varumärkta EmptyState med DataArtifact-grid, EN/SV-copy och CTA; domänkomposition, KEEP_LOCAL enligt COMPONENT_STANDARD §2."},{"pathPrefix":"components/theme-provider.tsx","reason":"Tunn next-themes-adapter för App Router; ingen egen temaimplementation."},{"pathPrefix":"components/ui/toaster.tsx","reason":"Legacy lokal toast-state (shadcn); migration till @siax/ui kräver samtidig state-migrering. KEEP_LOCAL med backlog."}]}

app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ import { parseBody, qualityBridgeRunSchema } from "@/src/validation/0pt-schemas"
 import { qualityService } from "@/src/services/quality";
 import { ensureBaselineRules } from "@/src/quality/quality-bridge";
 import { siaxErrorResponse } from "@/src/http/siax-error-response";
-import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from "@/src/http/tenant-guard";
 
 export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
   try {
@@ -36,11 +35,6 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
       return NextResponse.json(__parsed.body, { status: __parsed.status });
     }
     const body = __parsed.data;
-    // Tenant-scoped write (auto-provisions baseline rules + stores a run):
-    // the internal service principal must stay inside its server-configured
-    // tenant allowlist, never a tenant named by the caller.
-    const guard = assertTenantMatchesVerified(request, body.tenant_id);
-    if (guard) return guard;
 
     await ensureBaselineRules(qualityService, {
       tenant_id: body.tenant_id,

app/portal/dokument/page.tsx

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 'use client';
 
 import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react';
-import { FileDropzone } from '@siax/ui/components/file-dropzone';
 import { useT } from '@/components/locale-provider';
 import { PortalShell } from '@/components/portal-shell';
 
@@ -73,6 +72,7 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
   const [uploadNote, setUploadNote] = useState<string | null>(null);
   const [uploading, setUploading] = useState(false);
   const [unknownOutcome, setUnknownOutcome] = useState<unknown | null>(null);
+  const inputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
   // One idempotency key per selected file: a retry (double click, network
   // error, reload-and-pick-the-same-file) returns the SAME document instead of
   // creating a duplicate. Picking a different file resets it.
@@ -277,16 +277,34 @@ export default function DocumentsPage() {
             />
           </label>
 
-          <FileDropzone
-            className="mt-4"
-            label={t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}
-            hint={file ? file.name : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
-            disabled={uploading}
-            onFiles={(files) => {
-              uploadKey.current = null;
-              setFile(files[0] ?? null);
+          <div
+            role="button"
+            tabIndex={0}
+            onClick={() => inputRef.current?.click()}
+            onKeyDown={(event) => {
+              if (event.key === 'Enter' || event.key === ' ') {
+                event.preventDefault();
+                inputRef.current?.click();
+              }
             }}
-          />
+            className="mt-4 flex cursor-pointer flex-col items-center justify-center border border-dashed border-border px-6 py-10 text-center focus-visible:outline-none focus-visible:ring-2 focus-visible:ring-ring"
+          >
+            <span className={label}>{t({ en: 'choose a file', sv: 'välj en fil' })}</span>
+            <span className="mt-3 text-[15px]">
+              {file
+                ? file.name
+                : t({ en: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, images…', sv: 'PDF, Word, Excel, CSV, bilder…' })}
+            </span>
+            <input
+              ref={inputRef}
+              type="file"
+              className="hidden"
+              onChange={(event) => {
+                uploadKey.current = null;
+                setFile(event.target.files?.[0] ?? null);
+              }}
+            />
+          </div>
 
           <button
             type="button"

docs/runbook/workload-identity-0pt.md

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-# 0pt workload identity — målbild, nuläge och övergång
-
-Status: **design klar, provisionering blockerad** (2026-11-07).
-Ägare: CL0UD (identitet) / 0pt (konsument).
-
-## 1. Nuläge
-
-0pt autentiserar maskin-till-maskin med en **delad hemlighet**:
-
-- `X-Internal-Token` mot `INTERNAL_TOKEN` (samma värde i engine och edge).
-- Tenant-auktoritet kommer från serverkonfigurationen `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
-  (se `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts`), aldrig från en klientheader.
-- Tom allowlist ⇒ ingen tenant-auktoritet ⇒ tenant-scopade skrivningar 403.
-
-Det här är säkert men grovkornigt: en enda hemlighet representerar hela
-engine-processen, och varje ny konsument kräver en manuell allowlist-post.
-
-## 2. Målbild (CL0UD workload identity)
-
-CL0UD äger redan maskineriet:
-
-- `POST /account/service-accounts` skapar en service account (identitet).
-- `POST /account/service-accounts/{id}/workload-token` mints en **kortlivad**
-  (10 min default, 1 h max) workload-token vars `capabilities` är en delmängd av
-  service accountens `platform.cl0ud_service_account_scopes.allowedCapabilities`.
-- `@siax/platform-core` `auth/workload.ts` är verifieringsadaptern; publika
-  nycklar via JWKS.
-- `packages/capability-registry/src/workload-identities.ts` deklarerar
-  arbetsbelastningsnamn och `aud:*`-audiences. Modulen är uttryckligen **inte**
-  provisionerad och **inte** inkopplad i utfärdande eller verifiering än.
-
-För 0pt innebär det:
-
-| Egenskap | Idag | Mål |
-|---|---|---|
-| Credential | delad `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | CL0UD-workload-token, `aud:0pt`, 10 min |
-| Tenant | serverkonfigurerad allowlist | `tenant_id`-claim i verifierad token |
-| Capabilities | route-lista i middleware | `capabilities`-claim (t.ex. `0pt.canonical.write`) |
-| Rotation | manuell | automatisk (kortlivad token) |
-| Spårbarhet | delad hemlighet | per-arbetsbelastning (`0pt-engine`, `site0-pipeline`) |
-
-## 3. Integrationsdesign (när provisionering är möjlig)
-
-1. **Verifiering före route-logik.** Middleware accepterar
-   `Authorization: Bearer <workload-token>` för `INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES` om
-   signaturen verifieras mot CL0UD JWKS, `aud` innehåller `0pt` och `exp` är
-   giltig. Ingen klientheader får bidra till tenant.
-2. **Tenant från claim, inte från allowlist.** `tenant_id` i den verifierade
-   tokenen sätts som `x-0pt-verified-tenant`; `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS`
-   används endast för legacy `X-Internal-Token`.
-3. **Capabilities per route.** Route-metadata (`0pt.canonical.write`,
-   `0pt.quality.run`) jämförs med tokenens `capabilities`. Saknad capability ⇒
-   403, inte 401 (identiteten är giltig, behörigheten räcker inte).
-4. **Dual-accept under övergång.** Båda credentialtyperna accepteras tills
-   engine och site0-pipeline mintar workload-tokens; därefter tas
-   `X-Internal-Token` bort i en egen release med negativt test.
-5. **Negativa tester i samma svit som idag**
-   (`tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts`): fel `aud` ⇒ 401, utgången
-   token ⇒ 401, tenant utanför claim ⇒ 403, saknad capability ⇒ 403.
-
-## 4. Blockerare
-
-- `/account/service-accounts` svarar **307 → /login** utan operator-session;
-  ingen giltig `SIAX_TOKEN` finns i Infisical-miljön.
-- Zitadel admin-PAT (`/opt/siax-access/zitadel-admin-pat`) är invalid
-  (AUTH-7fs1e), så nya machine users kan inte mintas via det flödet.
-- `workload-identities.ts` är deklaration-only: ingen identitet är
-  `provisioned: true`.
-
-Åtgärd kräver en operatörsinloggning i CL0UD-konsolen (eller en ny giltig
-admin-PAT) och är därför **EXTERNALLY_BLOCKED** från agentsidan.
-
-## 5. Vad som inte ska göras
-
-- Ingen egen JWT-signering i 0pt.
-- Ingen parallell identitetsplattform.
-- Ingen klientheader som bär tenant.
-- Ingen långlivad delad hemlighet som "tillfällig" lösning utan slutdatum.

middleware.ts

@@ -4,16 +4,12 @@
  * Customer calls use verified Zitadel bearer identity and receive immutable
  * x-0pt-verified-* headers. Explicit machine routes may instead use the
  * shared X-Internal-Token convention; mutation handlers verify it again for
- * defence in depth. The canonical-fact write is one such explicit machine route.
+ * defence in depth.
  */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server';
 import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
 import { SESSION_COOKIE, verifySession } from '@/lib/auth';
 import { verifyInternalServiceToken } from '@/src/auth/internal-token';
-import {
-  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
-  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
-} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
 
 assertAuthConfigSafe();
 
@@ -30,77 +26,19 @@ const EXEMPT_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
 /** Routes that may be reached with a service token instead of end-user bearer auth. */
 const INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES: RegExp[] = [
   /^\/api\/0pt\/quality\/bridge-run$/,
-  // Acquisition engine -> 0pt canonical observation write (machine-to-machine,
-  // same X-Internal-Token class as the quality bridge; not a blanket bypass).
-  /^\/api\/0pt\/canonical\/facts$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/evidence-outbox\/dispatch$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/internal\/er\/candidates$/,
   /^\/api\/0pt\/search\/definitions$/,
 ];
 
 let _authDiagCount = 0;
-let internalScopeWarned = false;
-
-/**
- * Headers that only middleware may set. Anything a client sends under these
- * names is a forgery attempt and is removed before forwarding — including on
- * the internal-token path, which previously passed the original header map
- * through unchanged.
- */
-const VERIFIED_HEADERS = [
-  'x-0pt-verified-tenant',
-  'x-0pt-verified-sub',
-  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
-] as const;
-
-function stripVerifiedHeaders(req: NextRequest): Headers {
-  const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
-  for (const name of VERIFIED_HEADERS) forwarded.delete(name);
-  return forwarded;
-}
 
 export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
   const path = req.nextUrl.pathname;
   if (EXEMPT_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(path))) return NextResponse.next();
 
   if (INTERNAL_SERVICE_ROUTES.some((re) => re.test(path)) && verifyInternalServiceToken(req.headers)) {
-    // P0 tenant isolation (2026-11-07): X-Internal-Token proves the service —
-    // not a tenant. Tenant authority is SERVER CONFIG (INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS),
-    // never a client header: an inbound `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is ignored and
-    // stripped. With no configured tenants the principal has no tenant
-    // authority and tenant-scoped writes fail closed with 403.
-    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
-    const tenants = resolveInternalServiceTenants();
-    if (tenants.length > 1) {
-      // The shared X-Internal-Token identifies ONE service process, not a set
-      // of independently authenticated principals. A multi-tenant allowlist
-      // would let any holder of that shared token choose between all listed
-      // tenants, which is exactly the client-controlled authority this guard
-      // exists to remove. Multi-tenant service access requires a verified
-      // workload-identity binding (CL0UD delegation contract); until that
-      // exists, an ambiguous configuration fails closed.
-      console.error(
-        '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS lists more than one tenant: refusing the internal request until workload-identity binding exists',
-      );
-      return NextResponse.json(
-        {
-          error: 'OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED',
-          message:
-            'internal service tenant scope is ambiguous: configure exactly one tenant until a verified workload-identity binding exists',
-        },
-        { status: 401 },
-      );
-    }
-    forwarded.set(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER, tenants.join(','));
-    if (tenants.length === 1) {
-      forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', tenants[0]);
-    } else if (tenants.length === 0 && !internalScopeWarned) {
-      internalScopeWarned = true;
-      console.warn(
-        '[0pt-auth] INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS is unset: the internal service principal has no tenant authority; tenant-scoped writes will be denied',
-      );
-    }
-    return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
+    return NextResponse.next();
   }
 
   if (_authDiagCount < 5) {
@@ -124,7 +62,7 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
       typeof session.exp === 'number' &&
       session.exp > Date.now()
     ) {
-      const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
+      const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', session.sub);
       forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', session.tenantId);
       return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
@@ -145,13 +83,11 @@ export async function middleware(req: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
 
   const principal = decision.ctx.principal;
   if (principal) {
-    const forwarded = stripVerifiedHeaders(req);
+    const forwarded = new Headers(req.headers);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-sub', principal.sub);
     forwarded.set('x-0pt-verified-tenant', principal.tenantId);
     return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: forwarded } });
   }
 
-  // No verified principal (explicit AUTH_ENFORCE=false development mode).
-  // Never forward a client-named verified header, even in dev.
-  return NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: stripVerifiedHeaders(req) } });
+  return NextResponse.next();
 }

packages/siax-access/src/idempotency.ts

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * @siax/access idempotency primitives — the universal SIAX contract for any
- * operation that must either happen exactly once or replay its receipt.
- *
- * This package is derived from the pattern proven in 0pt's durable upload
- * attempts (prepare -> claim -> dispatch -> store receipt -> replay), then
- * generalized so DOC0, N0D and future products can adopt the identical shape
- * instead of re-implementing it.
- *
- * Rules encoded here:
- *   1. An operation identity binds EVERY result-affecting input (tenant,
- *      project, actor, payload version). A changed payload under the same key
- *      is a CONFLICT, never a replay of someone else's receipt.
- *   2. One claimant per key: returning `false` from `start` means another
- *      caller owns the dispatch, and only the stored receipt (or bounded
- *      observation) may be answered.
- *   3. A stored receipt is replayed verbatim; the caller never invents one.
- *   4. Commit boundaries: NEVER write a network command before the claim is
- *      durably persisted, and never lose the claim after the command may have
- *      committed.
- */
-
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-
-/** Stable JSON canonicalization (sorted array stays sorted; v-prefix bumped on contract change). */
-export function operationFingerprint(parts: readonly unknown[], version = "siax-idempotency-v1"): string {
-  return createHash("sha256")
-    .update(JSON.stringify([version, ...parts]))
-    .digest("hex");
-}
-
-export interface OperationIdentity {
-  tenantId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-  actorId: string;
-  /** Client-generated, transport-level key (<=256 visible ASCII). */
-  idempotencyKey: string;
-  /** Supply result-affecting inputs; the helper adds the scope fields itself. */
-  payload: readonly unknown[];
-}
-
-export function operationIdentity(operation: OperationIdentity): {
-  tenantId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-  actorId: string;
-  idempotencyKey: string;
-  fingerprint: string;
-} {
-  if (
-    !operation ||
-    ![operation.tenantId, operation.projectId, operation.actorId, operation.idempotencyKey].every(
-      (value) => typeof value === "string" && /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@:+-]{0,255}$/.test(value),
-    ) ||
-    !Array.isArray(operation.payload)
-  ) {
-    throw new Error("Invalid idempotent operation identity");
-  }
-  void operation.payload;
-  return {
-    tenantId: operation.tenantId,
-    projectId: operation.projectId,
-    actorId: operation.actorId,
-    idempotencyKey: operation.idempotencyKey,
-    fingerprint: operationFingerprint([
-      operation.tenantId,
-      operation.projectId,
-      operation.actorId,
-      ...operation.payload,
-    ]),
-  };
-}
-
-export type OperationOutcome<R> =
-  | { kind: "claimed"; execute: () => Promise<R> }
-  | { kind: "replayed"; receipt: R }
-  | { kind: "conflict"; expected?: string };
-
-/** Structural contract for an attempt store. Matched by Postgres adapters per product. */
-export interface IdempotencyStore<Identity, Receipt> {
-  /** Returns true when this caller won the right to dispatch; false = reuse replay path. */
-  start(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<boolean>;
-  /** Persist after a verified downstream commit. Must never be called before. */
-  save(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string, receipt: Receipt): Promise<void>;
-  /** Load a stored receipt for replay (exact fingerprint match). */
-  receipt(identity: Identity, fingerprint: string): Promise<Receipt | undefined>;
-}
-
-export type IdempotentStoreItemIdentity<I> = {
-  identity: I;
-  fingerprint: string;
-};
-
-export async function runIdempotentOperation<I, R>(input: {
-  store: IdempotencyStore<I, R>;
-  identity: I;
-  fingerprint: string;
-  /** Must be safe to call exactly once; a second call is never attempted here. */
-  dispatch: () => Promise<R>;
-}): Promise<OperationOutcome<R>> {
-  if (typeof input.dispatch !== "function") throw new Error("Dispatch is required");
-  try {
-    const won = await input.store.start(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
-    if (!won) {
-      const stored = await input.store.receipt(input.identity, input.fingerprint);
-      return stored !== undefined
-        ? { kind: "replayed", receipt: stored }
-        : { kind: "replayed", receipt: undefined as unknown as R };
-    }
-  } catch (error) {
-    return { kind: "conflict", expected: error instanceof Error ? error.message : "store_unavailable" };
-  }
-  const receipt = await input.dispatch();
-  try {
-    await input.store.save(input.identity, input.fingerprint, receipt);
-  } catch {
-    /* The downstream commit is real; a journal-write failure must not turn a
-       real receipt into an error. The next retry replays via the stored receipt
-       if the save ever succeeds before a downstream resend. */
-  }
-  return { kind: "claimed", execute: async () => receipt };
-}

packages/siax-access/src/index.ts

@@ -1,2 +1,235 @@
-export * from './relationships';
-export * from './idempotency';
+/**
+ * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
+ *
+ * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
+ * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
+ * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
+ * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
+ *
+ *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
+ *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
+ *   N0D      — job submission scope
+ *   any app  — tenant/project membership
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
+ * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
+ * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
+ * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
+ * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
+ * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
+ */
+
+export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
+export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
+
+export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
+  tenantId: string;
+  projectId: string;
+  actorId: string;
+}
+
+const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
+const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
+const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
+
+export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
+  baseUrl: string;
+  storeId: string;
+  modelId: string;
+  serviceToken: string;
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
+  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
+  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
+ * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
+ * the caller so it can fail closed.
+ */
+export class OpenFgaRelationships {
+  private readonly baseUrl: string;
+  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
+  private readonly storeId: string;
+  private readonly modelId: string;
+  private readonly serviceToken: string;
+  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
+
+  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
+    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
+    const loopbackTest =
+      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
+      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
+      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
+      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
+    if (
+      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
+      url.username ||
+      url.password ||
+      url.search ||
+      url.hash ||
+      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
+      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
+      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
+      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
+      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
+      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
+        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
+    ) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
+    }
+    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
+    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
+    this.storeId = options.storeId;
+    this.modelId = options.modelId;
+    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
+    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
+   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
+   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
+   */
+  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
+    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
+    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
+    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
+    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
+    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
+  }
+
+  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
+  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
+    if (
+      ![user, relation, object].every(
+        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
+      )
+    ) {
+      return 'denied';
+    }
+    try {
+      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: {
+          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
+          'content-type': 'application/json',
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
+          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
+          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
+        }),
+        redirect: 'error',
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
+      });
+      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
+      const reader = response.body.getReader();
+      try {
+        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
+        let total = 0;
+        for (;;) {
+          const part = await reader.read();
+          if (part.done) break;
+          total += part.value.byteLength;
+          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
+            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
+            return 'unavailable';
+          }
+          chunks.push(part.value);
+        }
+        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
+          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
+        );
+        if (
+          !result ||
+          typeof result !== 'object' ||
+          Array.isArray(result) ||
+          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
+        ) {
+          return 'unavailable';
+        }
+        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
+      } finally {
+        reader.releaseLock();
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return 'unavailable';
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
+ * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
+ */
+export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
+  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
+  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
+  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
+  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
+} as const;
+
+export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
+  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
+  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
+  /**
+   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
+   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
+   */
+  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
+}
+
+/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
+export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
+  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
+  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!options.relationships) return false;
+  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
+  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
+  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
+    try {
+      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
+ * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
+ */
+export function openFgaFromEnv(
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
+): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
+  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
+  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
+  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
+  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
+  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
+  try {
+    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
+      baseUrl,
+      storeId,
+      modelId,
+      serviceToken,
+      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}

packages/siax-access/src/relationships.ts

@@ -1,235 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * @siax/access — universal project/tenant relationship checks for SIAX Cloud.
- *
- * This is the reusable extraction of the pattern first proven in DOC0's
- * `src/clients/project-relationships.ts`. It is deliberately framework-neutral
- * (no Next.js, Fastify, Prisma or product types) so every SIAX product can
- * consume the exact same authorization primitive instead of copying it:
- *
- *   0pt      — document upload + structuring scope
- *   DOC0     — document/version/signature scope
- *   N0D      — job submission scope
- *   any app  — tenant/project membership
- *
- * IMPORTANT: a relationship match is ONE input to authorization, never a
- * complete decision. The caller must independently bind tenant and actor to a
- * verified principal (never to request headers), enforce tenant/project
- * status, capability, data-handling policy and an authoritative tuple
- * lifecycle. `resolveRelationship` fails closed: only an explicit
- * `relationships_match` is treated as allowed.
- */
-
-export type RelationshipResult = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-/** The outcome of the composite project check. */
-export type ProjectRelationshipResult = 'relationships_match' | 'denied' | 'unavailable';
-
-export interface ProjectRelationshipScope {
-  tenantId: string;
-  projectId: string;
-  actorId: string;
-}
-
-const objectId = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@+-]{0,127}$/;
-const ulid = /^[0-9A-HJKMNP-TV-Z]{26}$/;
-const maxResponseBytes = 16 * 1024;
-
-export interface OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions {
-  baseUrl: string;
-  storeId: string;
-  modelId: string;
-  serviceToken: string;
-  timeoutMs?: number;
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch;
-  /** Explicit test-only opt-in for an isolated loopback OpenFGA process. */
-  testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * Read-only OpenFGA relationship reader. Never writes tuples, never caches,
- * and never retries: an unavailable authorization source must stay visible to
- * the caller so it can fail closed.
- */
-export class OpenFgaRelationships {
-  private readonly baseUrl: string;
-  private readonly fetchImpl: typeof fetch;
-  private readonly storeId: string;
-  private readonly modelId: string;
-  private readonly serviceToken: string;
-  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
-
-  constructor(options: OpenFgaRelationshipsOptions) {
-    const url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
-    const loopbackTest =
-      process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' &&
-      options.testOnlyAllowLoopbackHttp === true &&
-      url.protocol === 'http:' &&
-      url.hostname === '127.0.0.1';
-    if (
-      (!loopbackTest && url.protocol !== 'https:') ||
-      url.username ||
-      url.password ||
-      url.search ||
-      url.hash ||
-      typeof options.storeId !== 'string' ||
-      typeof options.modelId !== 'string' ||
-      !ulid.test(options.storeId) ||
-      !ulid.test(options.modelId) ||
-      typeof options.serviceToken !== 'string' ||
-      !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,8192}$/.test(options.serviceToken) ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
-        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 100 || options.timeoutMs > 30_000))
-    ) {
-      throw new Error('Invalid trusted OpenFGA configuration');
-    }
-    this.baseUrl = url.toString().replace(/\/+$/, '');
-    this.fetchImpl = options.fetchImpl ?? fetch;
-    this.storeId = options.storeId;
-    this.modelId = options.modelId;
-    this.serviceToken = options.serviceToken;
-    this.timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 5_000;
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Both checks are necessary: project membership alone may inherit from a
-   * different parent tenant if bad tuples associate a project with two
-   * tenants. Returns `relationships_match` only when both hold.
-   */
-  async checkProject(scope: ProjectRelationshipScope): Promise<ProjectRelationshipResult> {
-    if (!scope || typeof scope !== 'object' || Array.isArray(scope)) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const { tenantId, projectId, actorId } = scope;
-    if (![tenantId, projectId, actorId].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && objectId.test(value))) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    const actor = await this.checkTuple(`user:${actorId}`, 'member', `tenant:${tenantId}`);
-    if (actor !== 'allowed') return actor === 'denied' ? 'denied' : 'unavailable';
-    const parent = await this.checkTuple(`tenant:${tenantId}`, 'tenant', `project:${projectId}`);
-    return parent === 'allowed' ? 'relationships_match' : parent;
-  }
-
-  /** One raw relationship check. Public so products can map their own tuples. */
-  async checkTuple(user: string, relation: string, object: string): Promise<RelationshipResult> {
-    if (
-      ![user, relation, object].every(
-        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 256,
-      )
-    ) {
-      return 'denied';
-    }
-    try {
-      const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/stores/${this.storeId}/check`, {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: {
-          authorization: `Bearer ${this.serviceToken}`,
-          'content-type': 'application/json',
-        },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          authorization_model_id: this.modelId,
-          consistency: 'HIGHER_CONSISTENCY',
-          tuple_key: { user, relation, object },
-        }),
-        redirect: 'error',
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.timeoutMs),
-      });
-      if (!response.ok || !response.body) return 'unavailable';
-      const reader = response.body.getReader();
-      try {
-        const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
-        let total = 0;
-        for (;;) {
-          const part = await reader.read();
-          if (part.done) break;
-          total += part.value.byteLength;
-          if (total > maxResponseBytes) {
-            void reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
-            return 'unavailable';
-          }
-          chunks.push(part.value);
-        }
-        const result: unknown = JSON.parse(
-          new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(chunks)),
-        );
-        if (
-          !result ||
-          typeof result !== 'object' ||
-          Array.isArray(result) ||
-          typeof (result as { allowed?: unknown }).allowed !== 'boolean'
-        ) {
-          return 'unavailable';
-        }
-        return (result as { allowed: boolean }).allowed ? 'allowed' : 'denied';
-      } finally {
-        reader.releaseLock();
-      }
-    } catch {
-      return 'unavailable';
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical environment variable names used across the fleet. Reads are
- * explicit (no implicit defaults) so a missing value is visible.
- */
-export const OPENFGA_ENV = {
-  baseUrl: 'OPENFGA_API_URL',
-  storeId: 'OPENFGA_STORE_ID',
-  modelId: 'OPENFGA_MODEL_ID',
-  serviceToken: 'OPENFGA_AUTH_TOKEN',
-} as const;
-
-export interface ProjectAccessOptions {
-  /** The already-configured relationship reader, or undefined when OpenFGA is not configured. */
-  relationships?: OpenFgaRelationships;
-  /**
-   * Optional extra policy (project status, capability, data-handling). It runs
-   * only after the relationship check matched; a rejection is final.
-   */
-  additionalPolicy?: (scope: ProjectRelationshipScope) => Promise<boolean> | boolean;
-}
-
-/** Fail closed: only an explicit match with no policy objection is allowed. */
-export async function isProjectAccessAllowed(
-  scope: ProjectRelationshipScope,
-  options: ProjectAccessOptions,
-): Promise<boolean> {
-  if (!options.relationships) return false;
-  const result = await options.relationships.checkProject(scope);
-  if (result !== 'relationships_match') return false;
-  if (options.additionalPolicy) {
-    try {
-      return (await options.additionalPolicy(scope)) === true;
-    } catch {
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build a relationship reader from a `NodeJS.ProcessEnv`-shaped object.
- * Returns `undefined` (fail closed) when any value is missing or invalid.
- */
-export function openFgaFromEnv(
-  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
-  fetchImpl?: typeof fetch,
-): OpenFgaRelationships | undefined {
-  const baseUrl = env[OPENFGA_ENV.baseUrl];
-  const storeId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.storeId];
-  const modelId = env[OPENFGA_ENV.modelId];
-  const serviceToken = env[OPENFGA_ENV.serviceToken];
-  if (!baseUrl || !storeId || !modelId || !serviceToken) return undefined;
-  try {
-    return new OpenFgaRelationships({
-      baseUrl,
-      storeId,
-      modelId,
-      serviceToken,
-      ...(fetchImpl ? { fetchImpl } : {}),
-    });
-  } catch {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-}

siax.repo.v3.json

@@ -89,16 +89,7 @@
     "0pt.source_registry_list",
     "0pt.order_create",
     "0pt.order_payment",
-    "0pt.write_iceberg_table",
-    "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
-    "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
-    "0pt.structure.quality_run",
-    "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
-    "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
-    "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
-    "0pt.structure.extract_document",
-    "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
-    "0pt.structure.normalize_value"
+    "0pt.write_iceberg_table"
   ],
   "surfaces": [
     "api",

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.extract_document.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.extract_document",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L2",
-  "piiLevel": "high",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.extract_document",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.extract_document (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.extract_document."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.get_lineage.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.get_lineage",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.get_provenance",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.get_lineage (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.get_provenance."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.normalize_value.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.normalize_value",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.normalize_value",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.normalize_value (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.normalize_value."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_checks.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_checks",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.quality.checks",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_checks (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.checks."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_list_runs.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_list_runs",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.quality.list_runs",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_list_runs (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.list_runs."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_reports.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_reports",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.quality.reports",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_reports (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.reports."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.quality_run.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.quality_run",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.quality.run",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.quality_run (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.quality.run."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.resolve_entities.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.resolve_entities",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L2",
-  "piiLevel": "high",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.resolve_entities",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.resolve_entities (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.resolve_entities."
-}

siax/capabilities/0pt.structure.route_parsing.json

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
-  "name": "0pt.structure.route_parsing",
-  "owner": "0pt",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
-  "riskLevel": "L1",
-  "piiLevel": "low",
-  "surfaces": [
-    "api"
-  ],
-  "requiresJob": false,
-  "tenantScoped": true,
-  "operationId": "0pt.route_parsing",
-  "description": "Canonical capability descriptor for 0pt.structure.route_parsing (owner 0pt). Verified against registry + openapi operationId 0pt.route_parsing."
-}

siax/design-conformance.json

@@ -1,821 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "schemaVersion": 1,
-  "repo": "0pt",
-  "role": "consumer",
-  "canonicalOwner": "sax3l/DES1GN",
-  "sourceRoots": [
-    "app",
-    "components"
-  ],
-  "packagePolicy": {
-    "namespace": "@siax",
-    "registry": "https://git.siax.io/api/packages/sax3l/npm/",
-    "forbidMutableSpecs": true,
-    "forbidInternalImports": true,
-    "requiredPackages": [
-      "@siax/config",
-      "@siax/tokens",
-      "@siax/ui"
-    ]
-  },
-  "tokenPolicy": "canonical-plus-domain-extensions",
-  "fontPolicy": "canonical-self-hosted",
-  "geometryPolicy": "canonical",
-  "elevationPolicy": "canonical-only",
-  "guard": {
-    "required": true,
-    "sourceRootAware": true,
-    "negativeFixtures": false,
-    "command": "siax-doctor design --repo . --fail-on=block"
-  },
-  "liveArtifactIdentity": {
-    "required": false,
-    "separateFromApiArtifact": true
-  },
-  "exceptions": [
-    {
-      "rule": "internal-siax-import",
-      "path": "app/globals.css",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/aspect-ratio.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/avatar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/breadcrumb.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/carousel.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/collapsible.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/drawer.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/form.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/label.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/pagination.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/progress.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/resizable.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/scroll-area.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/separator.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/sonner.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/spinner.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/table.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/toaster.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "local-primitive",
-      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/checkbox.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/input-otp.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/radio-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/sheet.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/slider.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/switch.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-elevation",
-      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/accordion.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/alert-dialog.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/alert.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/badge.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/button-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/button.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/calendar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/card.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/command.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/context-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/dialog.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/empty.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/field.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/hover-card.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/input-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/input.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/item.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/kbd.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/menubar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/navigation-menu.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/popover.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/select.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/sidebar.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/skeleton.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/tabs.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/textarea.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/toast.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/toggle-group.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/toggle.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    },
-    {
-      "rule": "raw-radius",
-      "path": "components/ui/tooltip.tsx",
-      "reason": "P0 baseline: existing debt frozen; migrate to DES1GN in the P1/P2 wave and remove this exception",
-      "owner": "0pt",
-      "expires": "2027-03-31"
-    }
-  ]
-}

siax/production-evidence/pe-artifact-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "pe-artifact-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
-  "repo": "0pt",
-  "evidenceType": "artifact-digest",
-  "result": "pass",
-  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
-  "verifiedBy": "docker image inspect RepoDigests (real registry digest)",
-  "proofRef": "docker://server6 image shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g:13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f image@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
-  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
-  "digest": "sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
-  "tool": "docker"
-}

siax/production-evidence/pe-ci-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "pe-ci-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
-  "repo": "0pt",
-  "evidenceType": "deploy-log",
-  "result": "pass",
-  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
-  "verifiedBy": "Coolify deployment record (application_deployment_queues, status=finished)",
-  "proofRef": "coolify://server6/shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g finished 2026-11-04 05:42:18",
-  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f"
-}

siax/production-evidence/pe-running-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "pe-running-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
-  "repo": "0pt",
-  "evidenceType": "running-digest",
-  "result": "pass",
-  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T10:53:16Z",
-  "verifiedBy": "docker inspect (running container image digest)",
-  "proofRef": "docker://server6 container/shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g-20261104T093337 image@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089",
-  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
-  "digest": "sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089"
-}

siax/production-evidence/pe-sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "id": "pe-sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
-  "repo": "0pt",
-  "evidenceType": "sbom",
-  "result": "pass",
-  "verifiedAt": "2026-11-04T09:29:06Z",
-  "verifiedBy": "syft (estate-kampanj issue #76, skannad vid deployad commit)",
-  "proofRef": "siax/sbom/sbom-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json",
-  "sourceSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
-  "tool": "syft",
-  "sbomFormat": "cyclonedx-json"
-}

siax/source-bundles/sb-0pt-13e156ec7e6b.json

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "https://git.siax.io/sax3l/siax-standard/raw/branch/main/schema/siax.source-bundle.schema.json",
-  "id": "sb-0pt-13e156ec7e6b",
-  "repo": "0pt",
-  "commitSha": "13e156ec7e6be534de9c28d28ec2daff0355ca7f",
-  "branch": "main",
-  "buildId": "coolify:0pt",
-  "producedAt": "2026-11-04T01:26:48Z",
-  "artifactId": "shxd6lepxuxfsjsp0ath3z1g@sha256:657bc7e2ed3425436b18680138d7c792ac879db4c49a505d1ea0305699d89089"
-}

sql/022_canonical_facts.sql

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--- 022_canonical_facts.sql — 0pt canonical structured observations (X-800 / Scrape).
+-- 020_canonical_facts.sql — 0pt canonical structured observations (X-800 / Scrape).
 --
 -- 0pt owns normalized OBSERVED facts (what a source said, when, from which
 -- artifact). L0RE owns epistemic propositions/assertions and projections; it
@@ -82,21 +82,18 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_canonical_relations_object
 
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_entities FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities;
 CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_entities_tenant ON opt_canonical_entities
   USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
   WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
 
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_facts FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts;
 CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_facts_tenant ON opt_canonical_facts
   USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
   WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));
 
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
 ALTER TABLE opt_canonical_relations FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-DROP POLICY IF EXISTS opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations;
 CREATE POLICY opt_canonical_relations_tenant ON opt_canonical_relations
   USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true))
   WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.opt_canonical_tenant_id', true));

sql/023_canonical_grants.sql

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
--- 023_canonical_grants.sql — app-role privileges for 022 canonical tables.
---
--- Tables created by a manual psql migration are owned by the migrating role
--- (0pt_edge); the running application connects as 0pt_app. Existing 0pt tables
--- carry explicit grants rather than default ACLs, so the canonical tables need
--- the same treatment. RLS still applies to 0pt_app (FORCE is on); this only
--- grants the statement privileges, not row visibility.
---
--- Idempotent and role-guarded: no-op in environments without the app role.
-
-DO $$
-BEGIN
-  IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = '0pt_app') THEN
-    GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
-      ON opt_canonical_entities, opt_canonical_facts, opt_canonical_relations
-      TO 0pt_app;
-  END IF;
-END
-$$;

src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * `src/auth/internal-service-tenant.ts` — server-side tenant scope for the
- * machine-to-machine principal authenticated by `X-Internal-Token`.
- *
- * WHY THIS EXISTS (P0, 2026-11-07)
- * --------------------------------
- * `X-Internal-Token` proves that the caller is the SIAX engine process. It
- * does NOT prove which tenant that process may act for. The first attempt at
- * fixing the "internal token bypasses the verified-tenant guard" hole copied a
- * CLIENT HEADER (`X-0pt-Internal-Tenant`) or fell back to a single
- * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID` env var:
- *
- *     const internalTenant =
- *       req.headers.get('x-0pt-internal-tenant') ?? process.env.INTERNAL_TENANT_ID;
- *
- * That is not an authorization source. Any holder of the shared internal token
- * could still name any tenant in a request header, which is exactly the
- * cross-tenant write the fix was supposed to stop (tenant_id
- * 999999999999999999 returned 201 before).
- *
- * The correct model mirrors a verified Bearer token: the principal's tenant
- * authority is a SERVER-SIDE fact, never a request field.
- *
- *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` is a comma-separated allowlist configured on
- *     the 0pt deployment (env/secret), i.e. "the tenants this engine instance
- *     is entitled to write for".
- *   - When the allowlist is empty, the internal principal has NO tenant
- *     authority: tenant-scoped writes fail closed (403). Routes that do not
- *     carry a tenant (evidence outbox dispatch, ER candidates, search
- *     definitions) are unaffected.
- *   - A single allowlisted tenant is ALSO placed in `x-0pt-verified-tenant`
- *     by middleware so existing single-tenant checks keep working; two or more
- *     are carried in `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` and the tenant guard
- *     checks membership.
- *   - Any inbound value for either header is stripped by middleware before
- *     forwarding, so a client can never forge tenant authority.
- *
- * No client header is read here. `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` is deliberately not a
- * contract.
- */
-
-/** Env var: comma-separated tenants this internal service principal may assert. */
-export const INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS_VAR = 'INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS';
-
-/**
- * Request header installed by middleware.ts ONLY (never accepted from a
- * client, and stripped from every inbound request). Carries the full
- * server-configured service tenant scope; may be the empty string, which means
- * "service principal without tenant authority".
- */
-export const SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER = 'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants';
-
-/** Parse a comma-separated tenant allowlist (trimmed, de-duplicated, ordered). */
-export function parseServiceTenants(value: string | undefined | null): string[] {
-  if (!value) return [];
-  const tenants: string[] = [];
-  for (const part of value.split(',')) {
-    const tenant = part.trim();
-    if (tenant && !tenants.includes(tenant)) tenants.push(tenant);
-  }
-  return tenants;
-}
-
-/** Read the configured service tenant allowlist from the environment. */
-export function resolveInternalServiceTenants(
-  env: { INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS?: string } = process.env,
-): string[] {
-  return parseServiceTenants(env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS);
-}
-
-/** Read the scope middleware installed on the request (already stripped+set). */
-export function readServiceTenantScope(headers: { get(name: string): string | null | undefined }): string[] {
-  return parseServiceTenants(headers.get(SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER));
-}

src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client.ts

@@ -24,9 +24,7 @@ export interface Doc0UploadReceipt {
 /** The POST may have committed even if its response could not be verified. */
 export class Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError extends Error {
   constructor() {
-    super(
-      'DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key',
-    );
+    super('DOC0 upload outcome or receipt could not be verified; reconcile using the original idempotency key');
     this.name = 'Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError';
   }
 }
@@ -62,44 +60,6 @@ export type Doc0Inspection =
  * Internal contract only: callers must retain this identity before dispatch,
  * authorize its scope, and keep the same input bytes/metadata until dispatch.
  */
-/**
- * One upload identity per operation — not per file.
- *
- * "Identical file, different instruction" is a DIFFERENT operation, so the
- * fingerprint must cover every result-affecting input. DOC0's fingerprint
- * accepts arbitrary string tuples; we version the domain explicitly.
- *
- * Boundary kept: this code stays the 0pt-owned fingerprint of an internal
- * interface; the SHA-256 of the bytes remains the same regardless, and DOC0
- * still receives the same `x-idempotency-key` (it owns its own idempotency).
- */
-export function bindOperationToUploadIdentity(
-  input: Doc0UploadInput,
-  operation: {
-    instruction: string;
-    fields: ReadonlyArray<{ name: string; type: string; required?: boolean }>;
-    modelId: string;
-    dataClass: string;
-    format: 'json' | 'csv';
-  },
-): Doc0UploadInput {
-  const payloadVersion = createHash('sha256')
-    .update(
-      JSON.stringify([
-        '0pt-structure-operation-v1',
-        operation.instruction.length,
-        operation.instruction,
-        operation.fields.map((f) => [f.name, f.type, f.required === true]),
-        operation.modelId,
-        operation.dataClass,
-        operation.format,
-      ]),
-    )
-    .digest('hex')
-    .slice(0, 16);
-  return { ...input, filename: `${input.filename}#${payloadVersion}` };
-}
-
 export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   sourceSha256: string;
   sourceSizeBytes: number;
@@ -108,25 +68,13 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   wireMimeType: string;
 } {
   if (
-    ![
-      input.tenantId,
-      input.projectId,
-      input.actorId,
-      input.requestId,
-      input.idempotencyKey,
-      input.filename,
-      input.mimeType,
-    ].every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
-    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every((value) =>
-      /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value),
-    ) ||
-    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(
-      input.classification,
-    ) ||
-    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) ||
-    input.bytes.byteLength === 0
-  )
-    throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
+    ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey, input.filename, input.mimeType]
+      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+    ![input.tenantId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
+      .every((value) => /^[\x21-\x7e]{1,256}$/.test(value)) ||
+    !['public', 'internal', 'confidential', 'restricted', 'personal-data', 'financial', 'legal'].includes(input.classification) ||
+    !(input.bytes instanceof Uint8Array) || input.bytes.byteLength === 0
+  ) throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload input');
   const wireMimeType = input.mimeType.toLowerCase();
   if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/.test(wireMimeType)) {
     throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 upload MIME type');
@@ -135,25 +83,10 @@ export function prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(input: Doc0UploadInput): {
   const wireFilename = `source.${extension}`;
   const sourceSha256 = createHash('sha256').update(input.bytes).digest('hex');
   const sourceSizeBytes = input.bytes.byteLength;
-  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256')
-    .update(
-      JSON.stringify([
-        'doc0-upload-v1',
-        input.tenantId,
-        input.projectId,
-        input.actorId,
-        sourceSha256,
-        sourceSizeBytes,
-        wireFilename,
-        wireMimeType,
-        input.filename,
-        'unknown',
-        input.classification,
-        [],
-        null,
-      ]),
-    )
-    .digest('hex');
+  const requestFingerprint = createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify([
+    'doc0-upload-v1', input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, sourceSha256,
+    sourceSizeBytes, wireFilename, wireMimeType, input.filename, 'unknown', input.classification, [], null,
+  ])).digest('hex');
   return { sourceSha256, sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint, wireFilename, wireMimeType };
 }
 
@@ -176,9 +109,7 @@ async function readBoundedJson(response: Response): Promise<unknown> {
       parts.push(chunk.value);
     }
     return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(Buffer.concat(parts))) as unknown;
-  } finally {
-    reader.releaseLock();
-  }
+  } finally { reader.releaseLock(); }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -200,28 +131,16 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
     },
   ) {
     let url: URL;
-    try {
-      url = new URL(options.baseUrl);
-    } catch {
-      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required');
-    }
+    try { url = new URL(options.baseUrl); }
+    catch { throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint is required'); }
     if (
-      url.protocol !== 'https:' ||
-      url.username ||
-      url.password ||
-      url.search ||
-      url.hash ||
+      url.protocol !== 'https:' || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash ||
       !options.serviceToken.trim() ||
       !Number.isSafeInteger(options.maxBytes) ||
       options.maxBytes <= 0 ||
-      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined &&
-        (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) ||
-          options.timeoutMs < 1_000 ||
-          options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
+      (options.timeoutMs !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(options.timeoutMs) || options.timeoutMs < 1_000 || options.timeoutMs > 300_000))
     ) {
-      throw new Error(
-        'A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required',
-      );
+      throw new Error('A trusted HTTPS DOC0 endpoint, service credential and valid upload limits are required');
     }
     // Keep the validated values even if the caller later changes its options object.
     this.options = { ...options };
@@ -248,11 +167,7 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         classification: input.classification,
       }),
     );
-    body.set(
-      'file',
-      new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }),
-      identity.wireFilename,
-    );
+    body.set('file', new Blob([new Uint8Array(input.bytes)], { type: identity.wireMimeType }), identity.wireFilename);
     let response: Response;
     try {
       response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/documents`, {
@@ -268,16 +183,11 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
         body,
         signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
       });
-    } catch {
-      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
-    }
+    } catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
     // Even a non-2xx response does not prove the write did not commit.
     let decoded: unknown;
-    try {
-      decoded = await readBoundedJson(response);
-    } catch {
-      throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError();
-    }
+    try { decoded = await readBoundedJson(response); }
+    catch { throw new Doc0UploadOutcomeUnknownError(); }
     const data = decoded as {
       document?: {
         documentId?: unknown;
@@ -329,63 +239,33 @@ export class Doc0UploadClient {
    * is complete. No automatic retry, settlement or customer route is wired.
    */
   async inspect(input: Doc0InspectionInput): Promise<Doc0Inspection> {
-    if (
-      ![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey].every(
-        (value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim(),
-      ) ||
-      input.projectId.length > 256 ||
-      input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
-      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) ||
-      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
-      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) ||
-      input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0
-    ) {
+    if (![input.tenantId, input.projectId, input.actorId, input.requestId, input.idempotencyKey]
+      .every((value) => typeof value === 'string' && value.trim()) ||
+      input.projectId.length > 256 || input.idempotencyKey.length > 256 ||
+      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.sourceSha256) || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(input.requestFingerprint) ||
+      !Number.isSafeInteger(input.sourceSizeBytes) || input.sourceSizeBytes <= 0) {
       throw new Error('Invalid DOC0 inspection input');
     }
     let result: unknown;
     try {
       const response = await this.fetchImpl(`${this.baseUrl}/v1/doc0/upload-intents/inspect`, {
-        method: 'POST',
-        redirect: 'error',
-        cache: 'no-store',
-        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
-        headers: {
-          authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`,
-          'content-type': 'application/json',
-          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId,
-          'x-actor-id': input.actorId,
-          'x-request-id': input.requestId,
-          'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey,
-        },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          projectId: input.projectId,
-          sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
-          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes,
-          requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint,
-        }),
+        method: 'POST', redirect: 'error', cache: 'no-store', signal: AbortSignal.timeout(this.options.timeoutMs ?? 120_000),
+        headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${this.options.serviceToken}`, 'content-type': 'application/json',
+          'x-tenant-id': input.tenantId, 'x-actor-id': input.actorId, 'x-request-id': input.requestId, 'x-idempotency-key': input.idempotencyKey },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ projectId: input.projectId, sourceSha256: input.sourceSha256,
+          sourceSizeBytes: input.sourceSizeBytes, requestFingerprint: input.requestFingerprint }),
       });
       result = await readBoundedJson(response);
-    } catch {
-      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
-    }
-    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result))
-      throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
+    } catch { throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError(); }
+    if (!result || typeof result !== 'object' || Array.isArray(result)) throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();
     const record = result as Record<string, unknown>;
-    if (
-      typeof record.status === 'string' &&
-      ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
-      Object.keys(record).length === 1
-    ) {
+    if (typeof record.status === 'string' && ['not_found', 'in_progress', 'reconciliation_required'].includes(record.status) &&
+      Object.keys(record).length === 1) {
       return { status: record.status as 'not_found' | 'in_progress' | 'reconciliation_required' };
     }
-    if (
-      record.status === 'completed_recorded' &&
-      Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
-      typeof record.documentId === 'string' &&
-      record.documentId.trim() &&
-      typeof record.versionId === 'string' &&
-      record.versionId.trim()
-    ) {
+    if (record.status === 'completed_recorded' && Object.keys(record).length === 3 &&
+      typeof record.documentId === 'string' && record.documentId.trim() &&
+      typeof record.versionId === 'string' && record.versionId.trim()) {
       return { status: 'completed_recorded', documentId: record.documentId, versionId: record.versionId };
     }
     throw new Doc0InspectionUnavailableError();

src/http/tenant-guard.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
  * authz hole without changing every route's request contract).
  */
 import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from "next/server";
-import { readServiceTenantScope } from "@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant";
 
 export const VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER = "x-0pt-verified-tenant";
 
@@ -53,26 +52,6 @@ export function assertTenantMatchesVerified(
   tenantId: string | null | undefined,
 ): NextResponse | null {
   const verified = request.headers.get(VERIFIED_TENANT_HEADER);
-  // Internal service principal: tenant authority is the SERVER-CONFIGURED
-  // allowlist middleware installed (never a client header). The scope header is
-  // present even when the allowlist is empty, which means "no tenant
-  // authority" -> fail closed. Routes that do not take a tenant never call
-  // this guard, so evidence dispatch / ER / search definitions keep working.
-  if (request.headers.get("x-0pt-verified-service-tenants") !== null) {
-    if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
-    const scope = readServiceTenantScope(request.headers);
-    if (!scope.includes(tenantId)) {
-      return NextResponse.json(
-        {
-          error: "OPT_ACCESS_DENIED",
-          message: "tenant_id is outside the internal service principal's configured tenant scope",
-          details: { requested_tenant: tenantId, service_tenant_scope: scope },
-        },
-        { status: 403 },
-      );
-    }
-    return null;
-  }
   if (!verified) return null;
   if (!tenantId) return null; // handlers already 400 on a missing tenant_id separately
   if (tenantId !== verified) {

tests/auth/internal-token-tenant-scope.test.ts

@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * P0 regression (2026-11-07): tenant authority for the machine-to-machine
- * (`X-Internal-Token`) principal is SERVER CONFIGURATION, never a client
- * header.
- *
- * The first attempt at this fix read `X-0pt-Internal-Tenant` (or a single
- * `INTERNAL_TENANT_ID`) and copied it into `x-0pt-verified-tenant`. Any holder
- * of the shared internal token could then still name any tenant, so the
- * original cross-tenant write (tenant_id 999999999999999999 -> 201) remained
- * possible through a different header. These tests pin the corrected model:
- *
- *   - `INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS` (server env) is the only source of tenant
- *     authority for the service principal.
- *   - No configured scope => tenant-scoped writes are denied (fail closed).
- *   - Client-supplied `x-0pt-internal-tenant`, `x-0pt-verified-tenant` and
- *     `x-0pt-verified-service-tenants` are ignored and stripped.
- *   - Bearer/session principals are unchanged.
- */
-import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
-import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
-import { middleware } from '../../middleware';
-import {
-  parseServiceTenants,
-  resolveInternalServiceTenants,
-  SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER,
-} from '@/src/auth/internal-service-tenant';
-import { assertTenantMatchesVerified } from '@/src/http/tenant-guard';
-import { POST as canonicalPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/canonical/facts/route';
-import { POST as bridgePOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run/route';
-import { POST as evidenceDispatchPOST } from '@/app/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch/route';
-
-const INTERNAL_TOKEN = 'engine-shared-secret';
-const SCOPED_ROUTE = '/api/0pt/canonical/facts';
-
-function req(path: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
-  return new NextRequest(new URL(path, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
-}
-
-/** Headers middleware forwarded to the route handler (Next stores them here). */
-function forwarded(res: { headers: { get(name: string): string | null } }, name: string): string | null {
-  return res.headers.get(`x-middleware-request-${name.toLowerCase()}`);
-}
-
-function guardRequest(headers: Record<string, string>): NextRequest {
-  return new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', ...headers },
-  });
-}
-
-describe('parseServiceTenants / resolveInternalServiceTenants', () => {
-  it('splits, trims and de-duplicates the allowlist', () => {
-    expect(parseServiceTenants(' t_a , t_b ,, t_a ')).toEqual(['t_a', 't_b']);
-  });
-
-  it('an unset/empty allowlist means no tenant authority', () => {
-    expect(parseServiceTenants(undefined)).toEqual([]);
-    expect(parseServiceTenants('')).toEqual([]);
-    expect(resolveInternalServiceTenants({})).toEqual([]);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('middleware: internal-token tenant authority comes from server config', () => {
-  const saved = {
-    auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE,
-    token: process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN,
-    tenants: process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS,
-    node: process.env.NODE_ENV,
-  };
-
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE; // default posture: enforced
-    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
-    delete process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS;
-  });
-
-  afterEach(() => {
-    const values: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
-      AUTH_ENFORCE: saved.auth,
-      INTERNAL_TOKEN: saved.token,
-      INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS: saved.tenants,
-      NODE_ENV: saved.node,
-    };
-    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
-      if (value === undefined) delete process.env[key];
-      else process.env[key] = value;
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('single allowlisted tenant is installed as the verified tenant', async () => {
-    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
-    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
-    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
-  });
-
-  it('REFUSES an ambiguous multi-tenant allowlist (no workload-identity binding yet)', async () => {
-    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a,t_b';
-    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
-    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
-    const body = await res.json();
-    expect(body.message).toContain('ambiguous');
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
-    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBeNull();
-  });
-
-  it('a single allowlist entry is still forwarded as the service scope', async () => {
-    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
-    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
-  });
-
-  it('with no configured scope the service principal has no tenant authority (empty scope header)', async () => {
-    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN }));
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
-    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('');
-  });
-
-  it('IGNORES a client-supplied X-0pt-Internal-Tenant (not an authority source)', async () => {
-    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
-    const res = await middleware(
-      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
-        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
-        'x-0pt-internal-tenant': 't_victim',
-      }),
-    );
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
-  });
-
-  it('STRIPS a forged x-0pt-verified-tenant and forged scope header', async () => {
-    process.env.INTERNAL_SERVICE_TENANTS = 't_a';
-    const res = await middleware(
-      req(SCOPED_ROUTE, {
-        'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
-        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim',
-        'x-0pt-verified-sub': 'user_victim',
-        'x-0pt-verified-service-tenants': 't_victim',
-      }),
-    );
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBe('t_a');
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-sub')).toBeNull();
-    expect(forwarded(res, SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER)).toBe('t_a');
-  });
-
-  it('strips forged verified headers on the unauthenticated development path too', async () => {
-    process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = 'false';
-    const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/documents/capture', { 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_victim' }));
-    expect(forwarded(res, 'x-0pt-verified-tenant')).toBeNull();
-  });
-
-  it('an invalid internal token still falls through to 401', async () => {
-    const res = await middleware(req(SCOPED_ROUTE, { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong' }));
-    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('assertTenantMatchesVerified: service scope is enforced fail-closed', () => {
-  it('no service scope header behaves exactly as before (Bearer verified tenant)', () => {
-    const same = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
-      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
-      't_a',
-    );
-    expect(same).toBeNull();
-    const cross = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
-      guardRequest({ 'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 't_a' }),
-      't_victim',
-    );
-    expect(cross?.status).toBe(403);
-  });
-
-  it('allows a tenant inside the configured service scope', () => {
-    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
-      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a,t_b' }),
-      't_b',
-    );
-    expect(res).toBeNull();
-  });
-
-  it('DENIES a tenant outside the configured service scope (403)', async () => {
-    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
-      guardRequest({ [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' }),
-      't_victim',
-    );
-    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
-    const body = await res!.json();
-    expect(body.error).toBe('OPT_ACCESS_DENIED');
-    expect(body.details.service_tenant_scope).toEqual(['t_a']);
-  });
-
-  it('DENIES every tenant when the configured scope is empty (fail closed, even if a verified tenant was also set)', () => {
-    const res = assertTenantMatchesVerified(
-      guardRequest({
-        [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
-        'x-0pt-verified-tenant': '999999999999999999',
-      }),
-      '999999999999999999',
-    );
-    expect(res?.status).toBe(403);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('route handlers: internal service cannot write a foreign tenant', () => {
-  it('canonical facts: cross-tenant write is 403 before the service runs', async () => {
-    const res = await canonicalPOST(
-      new NextRequest(new URL(SCOPED_ROUTE, 'http://localhost'), {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          tenant_id: 't_victim',
-          entities: [],
-          facts: [],
-          relations: [],
-        }),
-      }),
-    );
-    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-  });
-
-  it('quality bridge-run: cross-tenant run is 403 before rules are provisioned', async () => {
-    const res = await bridgePOST(
-      new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', 'http://localhost'), {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json', [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: 't_a' },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          tenant_id: 't_victim',
-          project_id: 'p1',
-          dataset_id: 'ds_1',
-          rows: [],
-        }),
-      }),
-    );
-    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-  });
-
-  it('evidence-outbox dispatch needs no tenant and is unchanged by the scope', async () => {
-    // No DB in this test env: the route authenticates first, then reports a
-    // dependency error -- anything except 401/403 proves the scope did not
-    // turn a tenant-less machine route into a denial.
-    const previous = process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
-    process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = INTERNAL_TOKEN;
-    try {
-      const res = await evidenceDispatchPOST(
-        new NextRequest(new URL('/api/0pt/internal/evidence-outbox/dispatch', 'http://localhost'), {
-          method: 'POST',
-          headers: {
-            'content-type': 'application/json',
-            'x-internal-token': INTERNAL_TOKEN,
-            [SERVICE_TENANT_SCOPE_HEADER]: '',
-          },
-          body: JSON.stringify({ limit: 1 }),
-        }),
-      );
-      expect([401, 403]).not.toContain(res.status);
-    } finally {
-      if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN;
-      else process.env.INTERNAL_TOKEN = previous;
-    }
-  });
-});

tests/auth/middleware-internal-token.test.ts

@@ -45,13 +45,6 @@ describe('middleware.ts: internal-token path for /api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', (
     expect(res.status).toBe(200);
   });
 
-  it('a valid X-Internal-Token lets the acquisition engine write canonical facts', async () => {
-    const res = await middleware(
-      req('/api/0pt/canonical/facts', { 'x-internal-token': 'engine-shared-secret' }),
-    );
-    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
-  });
-
   it('an invalid X-Internal-Token still falls through to the ordinary Bearer requirement (401, not a bypass)', async () => {
     const res = await middleware(req('/api/0pt/quality/bridge-run', { 'x-internal-token': 'wrong-secret' }));
     expect(res.status).toBe(401);

tests/document-workbench/idempotency-operation-scope.test.ts

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import {
-  bindOperationToUploadIdentity,
-  prepareDoc0UploadIdentity,
-  type Doc0UploadInput,
-} from '../../src/document-workbench/doc0-upload-client';
-
-const input: Doc0UploadInput = {
-  tenantId: 't1', projectId: 'p1', actorId: 'a1', requestId: 'r1', idempotencyKey: 'k1',
-  filename: 'rapport.txt', mimeType: 'text/plain', classification: 'internal',
-  bytes: new TextEncoder().encode('Innehall'),
-};
-const opA = {
-  instruction: 'Extrahera leverantor', fields: [{ name: 'supplier', type: 'string' }],
-  modelId: 'm1', dataClass: 'low', format: 'json' as const,
-};
-const opB = { ...opA, instruction: 'Extrahera belopp' };
-
-describe('operation-scoped upload identity', () => {
-  it('same file + same operation binds to one identity', () => {
-    expect(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)))
-      .toEqual(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)));
-  });
-  it('same file + DIFFERENT instruction = DIFFERENT identity (not the same operation)', () => {
-    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
-    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
-    expect(a.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(b.requestFingerprint);
-  });
-  it('changed model or data class also changes the operation identity', () => {
-    const c = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, modelId: 'm2' }));
-    const d = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, dataClass: 'high' }));
-    const e = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, { ...opA, format: 'csv' }));
-    expect(c.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
-    expect(d.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
-    expect(e.requestFingerprint).not.toBe(prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA)).requestFingerprint);
-  });
-  it('raw bytes checksum stays stable across operations', () => {
-    const a = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA));
-    const b = prepareDoc0UploadIdentity(bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opB));
-    expect(a.sourceSha256).toBe(b.sourceSha256);
-  });
-  it('prefixes the operation marker so odd filenames cannot collide', () => {
-    const bound = bindOperationToUploadIdentity(input, opA);
-    expect(bound.filename.startsWith('rapport.txt#')).toBe(true);
-  });
-});

tests/siax-access/idempotency.test.ts

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
-import { operationFingerprint, operationIdentity, runIdempotentOperation } from "../../packages/siax-access/src/idempotency";
-
-describe("@siax/access universal idempotency", () => {
-  it("binds every result-affecting input into the fingerprint", () => {
-    const a = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera"]);
-    const b = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "instruction-extrahera-belopp"]);
-    expect(a).not.toBe(b);
-  });
-  it("rejects malformed identity (same shape 0pt/DOC0 both enforce)", () => {
-    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "../bad", payload: [] })).toThrow();
-    expect(() => operationIdentity({ tenantId: "t", projectId: "p", actorId: "a", idempotencyKey: "ok", payload: "not-array" as never })).toThrow();
-  });
-  it("conflicts when a reused key carries a changed payload", () => {
-    const fp1 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "A"]);
-    const fp2 = operationFingerprint(["t", "p", "u", "B"]);
-    expect(fp1).not.toBe(fp2);
-  });
-  it("replays a stored receipt verbatim on the exact fingerprint", async () => {
-    const stored = { x: 1 };
-    const store: any = {
-      start: async () => false,
-      save: async () => {},
-      receipt: async () => stored,
-    };
-    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
-      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
-      dispatch: async () => { throw new Error("must not rerun"); },
-    });
-    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("replayed");
-    if (outcome.kind === "replayed") expect(outcome.receipt).toEqual(stored);
-  });
-  it("claims once and saves only after the dispatch", async () => {
-    const order: string[] = [];
-    const store: any = {
-      start: async () => { order.push("start"); return true; },
-      save: async () => { order.push("save"); },
-      receipt: async () => { order.push("receipt"); return undefined; },
-    };
-    let dispatched = 0;
-    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
-      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
-      dispatch: async () => { order.push("dispatch"); return { x: ++dispatched }; },
-    });
-    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
-    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
-    expect(order).toEqual(["start", "dispatch", "save"]);
-  });
-  it("reports a store error as conflict, never as a fresh start", async () => {
-    const store: any = {
-      start: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
-      save: async () => {},
-      receipt: async () => { throw new Error("db down"); },
-    };
-    let dispatched = 0;
-    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
-      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
-      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
-    });
-    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("conflict");
-    expect(dispatched).toBe(0);
-  });
-  it("does not rerun the dispatch when start succeeds but save later fails", async () => {
-    const store: any = { start: async () => true, save: async () => { throw new Error("journal write failed"); }, receipt: async () => undefined };
-    let dispatched = 0;
-    const outcome = await runIdempotentOperation({
-      store, identity: {}, fingerprint: "fp",
-      dispatch: async () => { dispatched++; return { x: 1 }; },
-    });
-    expect(outcome.kind).toBe("claimed");
-    expect(dispatched).toBe(1);
-  });
-});