fix(payments): authenticate order detail and deposit checkout

app/api/orders/[id]/route.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ import { getOrder, setStatusIfCurrent } from "@/lib/orders-store";
 import { requireRouteAuth } from "@/src/auth/require-route-auth";
 
 // GET /api/orders/{id}
-export async function GET(_req: NextRequest, ctx: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> }) {
+export async function GET(req: NextRequest, ctx: { params: Promise<{ id: string }> }) {
+  const auth = await requireRouteAuth(req);
+  if (auth.response) return auth.response;
   const { id } = await ctx.params;
   const order = await getOrder(id);
   if (!order) return NextResponse.json({ error: { code: "not_found", message: "Order saknas" } }, { status: 404 });

app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
 import { getOrder } from "@/lib/orders-store";
+import { requireRouteAuth } from "@/src/auth/require-route-auth";
 
 // POST /api/payments/[order_id]/deposit
 // Returns { url } for Stripe Checkout. Returns 501 when STRIPE_SECRET_KEY is absent.
@@ -7,6 +8,8 @@ export async function POST(
   request: NextRequest,
   { params }: { params: Promise<{ order_id: string }> },
 ) {
+  const auth = await requireRouteAuth(request);
+  if (auth.response) return auth.response;
   const { order_id } = await params;
 
   const secretKey = process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;

docs/architecture/ADR-001-order-ownership.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# ADR-001: Verified tenant ownership for payment orders
+
+**Status:** Proposed
+**Date:** 2026-09-15
+**Deciders:** SIAX 0pt product and platform owners
+
+## Context
+
+The existing order configurator creates anonymous drafts, stores no verified
+buyer or tenant on them, and later refers to an order by its ID. A valid
+Zitadel principal proves who is calling but does not prove that this caller
+owns that particular order. An order ID is an identifier, not an authorization
+secret. The nullable `orders.org_id` UUID cannot directly hold the verified
+tenant ID, which is a string. The repository has no automated SQL migration
+runner, and legacy rows may remain unowned.
+
+The payment flow must remain API-first and work consistently in UI, CLI and
+MCP. It must not make anonymous drafts payable by treating a guessed or leaked
+ID as ownership.
+
+## Decision
+
+Require a verified Zitadel principal before creating a payable order. Persist
+`tenant_id` and buyer subject on each new order in a database migration.
+Every read, status mutation and Checkout creation must use a tenant-scoped
+query predicate; a cross-tenant order returns 404. The Stripe webhook uses
+its verified signature plus recorded order ID and payment facts to advance
+status, never a browser-supplied tenant claim. Legacy null-owned orders remain
+unpayable until an audited, explicit migration or support workflow binds
+them to a verified buyer. Keep the anonymous configurator as an estimate
+without creating a payable order until sign-in.
+
+## Options considered
+
+| Option | Complexity | Scale | Consequence |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Authenticate only, lookup by order ID | Low | High | Rejected: any signed-in user can access another order. |
+| Bearer claim token for anonymous drafts | Medium | High | Requires capability issuance, hashing, secure browser storage and recovery. Not selected for initial production. |
+| Verified tenant + buyer subject at order creation | Medium | High | Chosen: explicit ownership at source, shared API boundary. |
+
+## Consequences
+
+- UI must obtain a Zitadel session before order creation and send credentials
+  to the order and payment APIs; estimates stay anonymous.
+- SQL migration must be applied and verified before the scoped code is deployed.
+- Existing unowned rows are not silently assigned to a tenant.
+- Idempotency keys must be scoped to the verified tenant.
+- Admin operations require an explicit, audited role-bound path rather than
+  bypassing the buyer predicate.
+
+## Action items
+
+1. [ ] Build and verify the migration and deploy runner.
+2. [ ] Bind create-order to verified tenant and buyer subject; scope idempotency.
+3. [ ] Scope GET/PATCH/deposit/release to tenant at the SQL boundary.
+4. [ ] Wire UI Zitadel login/session and CLI/MCP bearer auth; keep anonymous estimates.
+5. [ ] Test cross-tenant 404, legacy unowned rejection, webhook, and staging
+   purchase/refund end-to-end before enabling live Stripe.

docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ Risknivå = SIAX L0–L5-taxonomin, bedömd av mig utifrån vad handlern gör.
 | Sanktions-/PEP-screening | `GET /api/screen?q=` | L2 | Nej — proxar mot OpenSanctions |
 | AI-parsning av fritext | `POST /api/ai/parse` | L2 | Nej |
 | Skapa order | `POST /api/orders` | L2 | Nej |
-| **Lista alla ordrar** | `GET /api/orders` | **L3** | **Nej** — ingen org-scoping *(live: 200, `[]`)* |
-| Läs/ändra order | `GET,PATCH /api/orders/{id}` | L3 | Nej |
-| **Adminmetrik (orderpipeline, belopp)** | `GET /api/admin/metrics` | **L3** | **Nej** *(live-verifierat: 200 anonymt)* |
-| Deposition (Stripe checkout) | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/deposit` | **L4** | Nej |
-| **Frigör escrow-slutbetalning** | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` | **L4** | **Nej** — sätter dessutom status `delivered` (§8 S4) |
+| **Lista alla ordrar** | `GET /api/orders` | **L3** | Route-auth i source; org-scoping saknas |
+| Läs/ändra order | `GET,PATCH /api/orders/{id}` | L3 | Route-auth i source; orderägande saknas |
+| **Adminmetrik (orderpipeline, belopp)** | `GET /api/admin/metrics` | **L3** | Route-auth i source; äldre liveobservation ej omverifierad |
+| Deposition (Stripe checkout) | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/deposit` | **L4** | Route-auth i source; orderägande saknas |
+| **Frigör escrow-slutbetalning** | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` | **L4** | Route-auth i source; `delivered` först efter betald webhook; orderägande saknas |
 | Stripe-webhook | `POST /api/webhooks/stripe` | L3 | Signaturkontroll via `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` |
 | Prenumerationer | `GET,POST /api/subscriptions` | L2 | Nej |
 | Filuppladdning | `GET,POST /api/uploads` | L3 | Nej (`501` utan R2) |
@@ -356,6 +356,9 @@ Om/när Postgres provisioneras måste detta lösas separat — jfr estate-blocke
   också verifierad auth. **Fortfarande öppet före live-läge:** orderägarskap
   och tenant-bindning vid checkout/acceptance behöver implementeras och
   verifieras; en verifierad identitet ensam är inte per-order auktorisation.
+  Enskild order-GET och deposit-checkout kräver nu också route-auth; dessa
+  två vägar är inte längre anonyma i source. Ägarbindningens beslut och
+  beroenden dokumenteras i `ADR-001-order-ownership.md`.
 - `SECURITY.md` finns med rapporteringsväg (`security@siax.io`).
 
 ### KÄNDA LUCKOR
@@ -387,18 +390,20 @@ alltså en innehavare av ett giltigt token för tenant A skicka
 `X-Tenant-Id`-konflikt hjälper inte — den kontrollerar bara *headern*, inte
 *bodyn*. **Tenantisolering är inte implementerad.**
 
-**S3 — Hela det icke-`/api/0pt`-prefixade API:t saknar auth.**
-Matchern täcker bara `/api/0pt/:path*`. Ordrar, adminmetrik, betalningar,
-prenumerationer, uppladdningar, AI-parsning och DB-grants är oskyddade i koden.
-*(live-verifierat: `GET /api/admin/metrics` och `GET /api/orders` svarar 200
-anonymt.)* De är tomma idag enbart för att produktionsinstansen saknar databas.
+**S3 — Historiskt anonymt icke-`/api/0pt`-API; delvis åtgärdat i source.**
+Matchern täcker bara `/api/0pt/:path*`. Orderkö/adminmetrik, enskild
+order-GET, deposit- och release-checkout samt order-PATCH har nu explicita
+route-auth-grindar i source. De äldre live-observationerna av anonymt 200
+beskriver tidigare deploy, inte verifierat nuläge. Övriga icke-prefixade
+API:er kräver egen inventering, och per-order tenantägande är fortfarande
+öppet enligt ADR-001.
 
-**S4 — Anonym anropare kan trigga escrow-slutbetalning och flagga leverans.**
-`POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` kräver ingen identitet. Den skapar en
-Stripe-checkout på `order.balance_ore` och kör därefter
-`setStatus(order_id, "delivered")` **oavsett om betalningen genomförs**.
-Statusövergången sker alltså på begäran, inte på betalning. (Skyddas i praktiken
-idag bara av att `getOrder` inte hittar något utan databas.)
+**S4 — Historisk escrow-bugg åtgärdad i source; tenantägande återstår.**
+`POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` kräver nu route-auth och skapar
+Checkout först efter `accepted`. En skapad session sätter inte `delivered`;
+endast en signerad, betald och matchande Stripe-webhook får göra det.
+Cross-tenant-skydd av den enskilda ordern saknas fortfarande, så livebetalning
+får inte aktiveras innan ADR-001 är genomförd och verifierad.
 
 **S5 — CL0UD-policyklienten är fail-open utan produktionsspärr.**
 `src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts:45` — saknas `CL0UD_URL` returneras alltid

tests/api/anonymous-routes-auth.test.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@
 import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
 import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
 import { GET as ordersGET } from '@/app/api/orders/route';
+import { GET as orderGET } from '@/app/api/orders/[id]/route';
 import { GET as adminMetricsGET } from '@/app/api/admin/metrics/route';
+import { POST as depositPOST } from '@/app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route';
 
 function req(url: string, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): NextRequest {
   return new NextRequest(new URL(url, 'http://localhost'), { headers });
@@ -49,6 +51,20 @@ describe('anonymous-access regression: /api/orders (GET) and /api/admin/metrics
     expect(res.status).toBe(401);
   });
 
+  it('GET /api/orders/{id} rejects anonymous and spoofed-tenant reads before loading an order', async () => {
+    const params = { params: Promise.resolve({ id: 'order-unknown' }) };
+    expect((await orderGET(req('/api/orders/order-unknown'), params)).status).toBe(401);
+    expect((await orderGET(req('/api/orders/order-unknown', {
+      'x-0pt-verified-tenant': 'tenant_attacker',
+    }), params)).status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  it('deposit checkout rejects anonymous callers before checking Stripe credentials or order id', async () => {
+    const request = req('/api/payments/order-unknown/deposit');
+    const result = await depositPOST(request, { params: Promise.resolve({ order_id: 'order-unknown' }) });
+    expect(result.status).toBe(401);
+  });
+
   it('REGRESSION: GET /api/admin/metrics 401s with no Authorization header (was: 200 + financial aggregates)', async () => {
     const res = await adminMetricsGET(req('/api/admin/metrics'));
     expect(res.status).toBe(401);

tests/api/stripe-deposit-metadata.test.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
 vi.mock("@/lib/orders-store", () => ({
   getOrder: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ order_id: "order-1", deposit_ore: 5000 }),
 }));
+vi.mock("@/src/auth/require-route-auth", () => ({
+  requireRouteAuth: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ctx: { tenantId: "tenant-test" } }),
+}));
 
 import { POST } from "@/app/api/payments/[order_id]/deposit/route";