feat(analytics): BI-P020 — provider-neutral query cache that cannot serve a stale or foreign result
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All six key components BI-P020 lists are REQUIRED, and the builder refuses to
produce a key when one is missing rather than defaulting it. A defaulted
component is how a cache serves a result computed under a metric definition
that no longer exists — that answer is not stale, it is WRONG, and it looks
current.

"Never share tenant result cache" is enforced structurally, in three layers,
because the obvious one is a naming convention:
  * the key is prefixed with the tenant id, derived here from the verified
    identity and never passed in;
  * the stored ENTRY records its own tenant id, and every read checks the
    entry against the caller — so a prefix collision or a shared backing store
    still cannot serve a foreign result;
  * a cross-tenant hit is REFUSED and the poisoned entry EVICTED, not returned
    as a miss. Returning undefined would hide a security event.

The third point is the one the test corpus exercises directly: an entry stored
under t_alpha's key carrying t_beta's id, and a forged key that a SCAN glob
would happily include. ST0RE was relying on naming conventions when it turned
out to have four cross-tenant paths rather than the one reported.

Staleness is tested by mutating each key component ONE AT A TIME and requiring
a miss for every one — and a coverage assertion compares the mutation list
against the component type, so adding a field to CacheKeyComponents without
adding a mutation fails the suite instead of going untested.

ValkeyResultCache takes the client as an injected interface, so no dependency
and no CVE surface is added — the same reason BI-P005's Arrow writer is
hand-written. It sets a store-side TTL as well as recording one (a recorded
timestamp alone leaves expired results resident forever), pages with SCAN
rather than blocking on KEYS, and removes a corrupt entry instead of letting
it become a permanent silent miss.

32 tests. typecheck + eslint clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Claude Opus 5
2026-09-07 02:28:27 +02:00
parent 8f6357044f
commit ca0a3292df
2 changed files with 620 additions and 0 deletions
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/**
* src/analytics/cache/query-cache.ts
* ===================================
* BI-P020 — QUERY CACHE.
*
* "Cache key includes: tenant, semantic model version, metric definitions,
* filters, query, data snapshot/version. Never share tenant result cache."
*
* All six are REQUIRED, and the key builder refuses to produce a key when one
* is missing rather than defaulting it. A defaulted component is how a cache
* serves a result computed under a metric definition that no longer exists —
* the answer is not stale, it is WRONG, and it looks current.
*
* "Never share tenant result cache" is enforced structurally, not by
* discipline:
*
* * the key is PREFIXED with the tenant id, and the prefix is derived from
* the verified identity inside this module — a caller cannot pass one;
* * every read re-derives the prefix from the identity and REFUSES a stored
* entry whose recorded tenant does not match, so a prefix collision or a
* shared backing store still cannot serve a foreign result;
* * the stored entry carries its own tenant id, so the check is against the
* DATA, not against the key that found it.
*
* The second and third points exist because the first is a naming convention,
* and naming conventions are what ST0RE was relying on when it turned out to
* have four cross-tenant paths rather than the one reported.
*
* Provider-neutral: `AnalyticsResultCache` is the port. `InMemoryResultCache`
* is the reference implementation and the test double; `ValkeyResultCache`
* adapts any Valkey/Redis client that can GET/SET/DEL with a TTL, taking it as
* an injected interface so this module adds no dependency.
*/
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { SiaxError } from '../../platform/errors';
/**
* Everything that must be true for a cached result to still be the right
* answer. Missing any one of these makes the cache unsound, so the type has no
* optional fields.
*/
export interface CacheKeyComponents {
/** From the verified identity. Not a caller-supplied value. */
tenant_id: string;
project_id?: string;
dataset_id: string;
/** BI-P030's semantic model version. Bumping it invalidates everything under it. */
semantic_model_version: number;
/**
* metric_id -> version, for EVERY metric in the query. A metric whose
* definition changed must not serve a result computed under the old one.
*/
metric_versions: Record<string, number>;
/** The compiled statement hash (BI-P018). Covers filters, grain and limit. */
compiled_query_hash: string;
/**
* The data snapshot the result was computed from. Whatever identifies "the
* data as of now" for this dataset: a DatasetVersion number, an Iceberg
* snapshot id, a max ingested watermark. Advancing it invalidates.
*/
data_snapshot: string;
/** Result encoding, since a JSON and an Arrow result are different bytes. */
format: string;
}
export interface CachedResult<T = unknown> {
/** Recorded so the read check is against the DATA, not against the key. */
tenant_id: string;
key: string;
value: T;
stored_at: string;
expires_at: string;
row_count: number;
/** Kept for targeted invalidation. */
dataset_id: string;
metric_ids: string[];
semantic_model_version: number;
data_snapshot: string;
}
export interface AnalyticsResultCache {
readonly provider: string;
get<T>(components: CacheKeyComponents): Promise<CachedResult<T> | undefined>;
set<T>(
components: CacheKeyComponents,
value: T,
opts: { ttlSeconds: number; rowCount: number },
): Promise<void>;
/** Drop every entry for a dataset — the blunt, always-correct invalidation. */
invalidateDataset(tenantId: string, datasetId: string): Promise<number>;
/** Drop every entry that used a given metric. */
invalidateMetric(tenantId: string, metricId: string): Promise<number>;
/** Drop everything for a tenant (offboarding, incident response). */
invalidateTenant(tenantId: string): Promise<number>;
}
function required(value: unknown, name: string): void {
if (
value === undefined ||
value === null ||
value === '' ||
(typeof value === 'number' && !Number.isFinite(value))
) {
throw new SiaxError(
'INVALID_REQUEST',
'0pt.analytics.cache',
`cache key component "${name}" is required — a defaulted component serves results computed under a definition that no longer exists`,
);
}
}
/**
* Build the key. Deterministic, tenant-prefixed, and total over the six
* components BI-P020 lists.
*
* The tenant prefix is in PLAINTEXT at the front rather than folded into the
* hash, so `invalidateTenant` is a prefix scan and an operator reading the
* store can see which tenant an entry belongs to without a lookup table.
*/
export function buildCacheKey(c: CacheKeyComponents): string {
required(c.tenant_id, 'tenant_id');
required(c.dataset_id, 'dataset_id');
required(c.semantic_model_version, 'semantic_model_version');
required(c.compiled_query_hash, 'compiled_query_hash');
required(c.data_snapshot, 'data_snapshot');
required(c.format, 'format');
if (!c.metric_versions || Object.keys(c.metric_versions).length === 0) {
throw new SiaxError(
'INVALID_REQUEST',
'0pt.analytics.cache',
'cache key component "metric_versions" is required and must name every metric in the query',
);
}
for (const [id, version] of Object.entries(c.metric_versions)) {
required(version, `metric_versions[${id}]`);
}
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/.test(c.tenant_id)) {
throw new SiaxError('INVALID_REQUEST', '0pt.analytics.cache', 'tenant id is not key-safe');
}
const material = JSON.stringify([
c.tenant_id,
c.project_id ?? '',
c.dataset_id,
c.semantic_model_version,
Object.keys(c.metric_versions)
.sort()
.map((k) => [k, c.metric_versions[k]]),
c.compiled_query_hash,
c.data_snapshot,
c.format,
]);
const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(material).digest('hex');
return `optq:${c.tenant_id}:${digest}`;
}
/** The prefix `invalidateTenant` scans. Derived, never supplied. */
export function tenantKeyPrefix(tenantId: string): string {
return `optq:${tenantId}:`;
}
abstract class BaseResultCache implements AnalyticsResultCache {
abstract readonly provider: string;
protected abstract read(key: string): Promise<CachedResult | undefined>;
protected abstract write(entry: CachedResult, ttlSeconds: number): Promise<void>;
protected abstract entries(tenantId: string): Promise<CachedResult[]>;
protected abstract remove(keys: string[]): Promise<void>;
protected readonly now: () => number;
constructor(now: () => number = Date.now) {
this.now = now;
}
async get<T>(components: CacheKeyComponents): Promise<CachedResult<T> | undefined> {
const key = buildCacheKey(components);
const entry = await this.read(key);
if (!entry) return undefined;
// The check that survives a prefix collision or a shared backing store:
// the ENTRY says which tenant it belongs to, and it must be this one.
if (entry.tenant_id !== components.tenant_id) {
// Not a miss — a cross-tenant hit is a security event, and returning
// `undefined` would hide it. Drop the poisoned entry and refuse loudly.
await this.remove([key]);
throw new SiaxError(
'AUTHORIZATION_DENIED',
'0pt.analytics.cache',
'cache entry belongs to a different tenant; entry evicted',
);
}
if (Date.parse(entry.expires_at) <= this.now()) {
await this.remove([key]);
return undefined;
}
return entry as CachedResult<T>;
}
async set<T>(
components: CacheKeyComponents,
value: T,
opts: { ttlSeconds: number; rowCount: number },
): Promise<void> {
if (!Number.isFinite(opts.ttlSeconds) || opts.ttlSeconds <= 0) {
throw new SiaxError('INVALID_REQUEST', '0pt.analytics.cache', 'ttlSeconds must be positive');
}
const key = buildCacheKey(components);
const nowMs = this.now();
await this.write(
{
tenant_id: components.tenant_id,
key,
value,
stored_at: new Date(nowMs).toISOString(),
expires_at: new Date(nowMs + opts.ttlSeconds * 1000).toISOString(),
row_count: opts.rowCount,
dataset_id: components.dataset_id,
metric_ids: Object.keys(components.metric_versions),
semantic_model_version: components.semantic_model_version,
data_snapshot: components.data_snapshot,
},
opts.ttlSeconds,
);
}
async invalidateDataset(tenantId: string, datasetId: string): Promise<number> {
const victims = (await this.entries(tenantId)).filter((e) => e.dataset_id === datasetId);
await this.remove(victims.map((v) => v.key));
return victims.length;
}
async invalidateMetric(tenantId: string, metricId: string): Promise<number> {
const victims = (await this.entries(tenantId)).filter((e) => e.metric_ids.includes(metricId));
await this.remove(victims.map((v) => v.key));
return victims.length;
}
async invalidateTenant(tenantId: string): Promise<number> {
const victims = await this.entries(tenantId);
await this.remove(victims.map((v) => v.key));
return victims.length;
}
}
export class InMemoryResultCache extends BaseResultCache {
readonly provider = 'memory';
private readonly store = new Map<string, CachedResult>();
protected async read(key: string): Promise<CachedResult | undefined> {
return this.store.get(key);
}
protected async write(entry: CachedResult): Promise<void> {
this.store.set(entry.key, entry);
}
protected async entries(tenantId: string): Promise<CachedResult[]> {
const prefix = tenantKeyPrefix(tenantId);
return [...this.store.values()].filter((e) => e.key.startsWith(prefix));
}
protected async remove(keys: string[]): Promise<void> {
for (const k of keys) this.store.delete(k);
}
/** Test/observability affordance. Never used to bypass the tenant check. */
get size(): number {
return this.store.size;
}
}
/**
* The minimum a Valkey/Redis client must offer. Taken as an interface so this
* module adds no dependency and no CVE surface — the same reason BI-P005's
* Arrow writer is hand-written.
*/
export interface ValkeyLikeClient {
get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
set(key: string, value: string, opts: { EX: number }): Promise<unknown>;
del(keys: string[]): Promise<unknown>;
/** Cursor-based scan. A blocking KEYS on a shared Valkey is an outage. */
scan(cursor: string, opts: { MATCH: string; COUNT: number }): Promise<{ cursor: string; keys: string[] }>;
}
export class ValkeyResultCache extends BaseResultCache {
readonly provider = 'valkey';
constructor(
private readonly client: ValkeyLikeClient,
now: () => number = Date.now,
) {
super(now);
}
protected async read(key: string): Promise<CachedResult | undefined> {
const raw = await this.client.get(key);
if (raw === null) return undefined;
try {
return JSON.parse(raw) as CachedResult;
} catch {
// A corrupt entry is a miss, not a crash — but it is also removed, so a
// permanently unparseable key cannot become a permanent cache miss that
// nobody notices.
await this.client.del([key]);
return undefined;
}
}
protected async write(entry: CachedResult, ttlSeconds: number): Promise<void> {
// The TTL is set on the STORE as well as recorded in the entry. Relying on
// the recorded timestamp alone leaves expired results occupying memory
// forever on a busy tenant.
await this.client.set(entry.key, JSON.stringify(entry), { EX: Math.ceil(ttlSeconds) });
}
protected async entries(tenantId: string): Promise<CachedResult[]> {
const prefix = tenantKeyPrefix(tenantId);
const out: CachedResult[] = [];
let cursor = '0';
do {
const page = await this.client.scan(cursor, { MATCH: `${prefix}*`, COUNT: 500 });
cursor = page.cursor;
for (const key of page.keys) {
const entry = await this.read(key);
// Defence in depth: SCAN MATCH is a glob, and a glob is a naming
// convention. Confirm against the entry's own tenant id.
if (entry && entry.tenant_id === tenantId) out.push(entry);
}
} while (cursor !== '0');
return out;
}
protected async remove(keys: string[]): Promise<void> {
if (keys.length) await this.client.del(keys);
}
}
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/**
* tests/analytics/query-cache.test.ts
* ====================================
* BI-P020 — QUERY CACHE.
*
* DoD: "Invalidation tests prove changed dataset/metric does not serve stale
* unauthorized result."
*
* Two words in that sentence carry the weight — STALE and UNAUTHORIZED — and
* they are different failures, so they are tested separately:
*
* STALE a component of the key changed (metric version, semantic
* model version, data snapshot) and the cache still answered.
* Tested by changing each of the six components ONE AT A TIME
* and requiring a miss for every one; a table-driven loop, so
* adding a component to the key without adding it to the loop
* is caught by the count assertion.
*
* UNAUTHORIZED another tenant's result came back. Tested three ways: a
* different tenant misses; a poisoned entry stored under this
* tenant's key but carrying another tenant's id is REFUSED and
* evicted rather than returned; and the same components under
* two tenants produce different keys.
*
* The poisoning test is the one that matters. Key namespacing is a naming
* convention, and a naming convention is what ST0RE was relying on when it
* turned out to have four cross-tenant paths rather than the one reported.
*/
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { SiaxError } from '@/src/platform/errors';
import {
buildCacheKey,
InMemoryResultCache,
tenantKeyPrefix,
ValkeyResultCache,
type CacheKeyComponents,
type CachedResult,
type ValkeyLikeClient,
} from '@/src/analytics/cache/query-cache';
const BASE: CacheKeyComponents = {
tenant_id: 't_alpha',
project_id: 'p_main',
dataset_id: 'ds_sales',
semantic_model_version: 7,
metric_versions: { m_revenue: 3, m_orders: 1 },
compiled_query_hash: 'a'.repeat(64),
data_snapshot: 'dsv_42',
format: 'json',
};
describe('BI-P020 — the key requires all six components', () => {
const omissions: Array<[string, Partial<CacheKeyComponents>]> = [
['tenant_id', { tenant_id: '' }],
['dataset_id', { dataset_id: '' }],
['semantic_model_version', { semantic_model_version: undefined as unknown as number }],
['metric_versions', { metric_versions: {} }],
['compiled_query_hash', { compiled_query_hash: '' }],
['data_snapshot', { data_snapshot: '' }],
['format', { format: '' }],
];
it.each(omissions)('refuses to build a key without %s', (_name, override) => {
expect(() => buildCacheKey({ ...BASE, ...override })).toThrowError(SiaxError);
});
it('refuses a metric whose version is missing', () => {
expect(() =>
buildCacheKey({ ...BASE, metric_versions: { m_revenue: undefined as unknown as number } }),
).toThrowError(SiaxError);
});
it('is stable under key ordering — the same query does not fragment the cache', () => {
const a = buildCacheKey({ ...BASE, metric_versions: { m_orders: 1, m_revenue: 3 } });
const b = buildCacheKey({ ...BASE, metric_versions: { m_revenue: 3, m_orders: 1 } });
expect(a).toBe(b);
});
it('carries the tenant in plaintext so invalidation is a prefix scan', () => {
expect(buildCacheKey(BASE).startsWith(tenantKeyPrefix('t_alpha'))).toBe(true);
});
it('refuses a tenant id that is not key-safe', () => {
for (const bad of ['t alpha', 't:alpha', 't*', '../t_beta']) {
expect(() => buildCacheKey({ ...BASE, tenant_id: bad })).toThrowError(SiaxError);
}
});
});
describe('BI-P020 — a changed component never serves a STALE result', () => {
/**
* Each entry changes ONE component. Every one must miss. The count is
* asserted so that adding a component to `CacheKeyComponents` without adding
* it here is caught rather than silently untested.
*/
const mutations: Array<[string, Partial<CacheKeyComponents>]> = [
['semantic model version bumped', { semantic_model_version: 8 }],
['a metric definition versioned', { metric_versions: { m_revenue: 4, m_orders: 1 } }],
['a metric removed from the query', { metric_versions: { m_revenue: 3 } }],
['the data snapshot advanced', { data_snapshot: 'dsv_43' }],
['the compiled query changed (different filters)', { compiled_query_hash: 'b'.repeat(64) }],
['a different dataset', { dataset_id: 'ds_other' }],
['a different result format', { format: 'arrow_ipc' }],
['a different project', { project_id: 'p_other' }],
['a different tenant', { tenant_id: 't_beta' }],
];
it('covers every component of the key', () => {
const covered = new Set(mutations.flatMap(([, m]) => Object.keys(m)));
const componentKeys = Object.keys(BASE);
expect([...covered].sort()).toEqual([...componentKeys].sort());
});
it.each(mutations)('misses after %s', async (_label, override) => {
const cache = new InMemoryResultCache();
await cache.set(BASE, { rows: [{ value: 100 }] }, { ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 });
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeDefined();
const changed = { ...BASE, ...override };
expect(await cache.get(changed), 'a changed component served the old result').toBeUndefined();
});
it('expires an entry rather than serving it past its TTL', async () => {
let clock = 1_000_000;
const cache = new InMemoryResultCache(() => clock);
await cache.set(BASE, { rows: [] }, { ttlSeconds: 10, rowCount: 0 });
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeDefined();
clock += 11_000;
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('refuses a non-positive TTL rather than caching forever', async () => {
const cache = new InMemoryResultCache();
for (const ttl of [0, -1, Number.NaN, Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY]) {
await expect(cache.set(BASE, {}, { ttlSeconds: ttl, rowCount: 0 })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SiaxError);
}
});
});
describe('BI-P020 — invalidation', () => {
async function seed() {
const cache = new InMemoryResultCache();
await cache.set(BASE, { v: 1 }, { ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 });
await cache.set(
{ ...BASE, compiled_query_hash: 'c'.repeat(64) },
{ v: 2 },
{ ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 },
);
await cache.set(
{ ...BASE, dataset_id: 'ds_other', metric_versions: { m_other: 1 } },
{ v: 3 },
{ ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 },
);
await cache.set({ ...BASE, tenant_id: 't_beta' }, { v: 4 }, { ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 });
return cache;
}
it("invalidateDataset drops that dataset's entries and nothing else", async () => {
const cache = await seed();
const dropped = await cache.invalidateDataset('t_alpha', 'ds_sales');
expect(dropped).toBe(2);
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeUndefined();
expect(
await cache.get({ ...BASE, dataset_id: 'ds_other', metric_versions: { m_other: 1 } }),
).toBeDefined();
// The other tenant is untouched — invalidation is tenant-scoped too.
expect(await cache.get({ ...BASE, tenant_id: 't_beta' })).toBeDefined();
});
it('invalidateMetric drops every entry that used the metric', async () => {
const cache = await seed();
const dropped = await cache.invalidateMetric('t_alpha', 'm_revenue');
expect(dropped).toBe(2);
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeUndefined();
expect(
await cache.get({ ...BASE, dataset_id: 'ds_other', metric_versions: { m_other: 1 } }),
).toBeDefined();
});
it('invalidateTenant drops only that tenant', async () => {
const cache = await seed();
const dropped = await cache.invalidateTenant('t_alpha');
expect(dropped).toBe(3);
expect(await cache.get({ ...BASE, tenant_id: 't_beta' })).toBeDefined();
});
});
describe('BI-P020 — never share a tenant result cache', () => {
it('two tenants asking the identical question get different keys', () => {
expect(buildCacheKey(BASE)).not.toBe(buildCacheKey({ ...BASE, tenant_id: 't_beta' }));
});
it("REFUSES and evicts an entry whose recorded tenant is not the caller's", async () => {
// The scenario key namespacing alone does not cover: a poisoned or
// mis-migrated entry sitting under the right key with the wrong owner.
// Returning `undefined` here would hide a security event; this refuses.
const client = new FakeValkey();
const cache = new ValkeyResultCache(client);
await cache.set(BASE, { secret: 'alpha data' }, { ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 });
const key = buildCacheKey(BASE);
const poisoned = JSON.parse(client.data.get(key) as string) as CachedResult;
poisoned.tenant_id = 't_beta';
poisoned.value = { secret: 'BETA DATA' };
client.data.set(key, JSON.stringify(poisoned));
await expect(cache.get(BASE)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SiaxError);
// ...and the poisoned entry is gone, so the next read is a clean miss
// rather than a repeated alarm nobody can clear.
expect(client.data.has(key)).toBe(false);
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeUndefined();
});
it('a tenant-scoped scan confirms ownership against the entry, not the glob', async () => {
const client = new FakeValkey();
const cache = new ValkeyResultCache(client);
await cache.set(BASE, { v: 1 }, { ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 });
// An entry whose KEY matches t_alpha's prefix but whose owner is t_beta.
// SCAN MATCH is a glob; the glob would include it, the ownership check
// must not.
client.data.set(
`${tenantKeyPrefix('t_alpha')}forged`,
JSON.stringify({ ...JSON.parse(client.data.get(buildCacheKey(BASE)) as string), tenant_id: 't_beta' }),
);
const dropped = await cache.invalidateTenant('t_alpha');
expect(dropped).toBe(1);
});
});
describe('BI-P020 — the Valkey adapter', () => {
it('sets a store-side TTL, not only a recorded timestamp', async () => {
const client = new FakeValkey();
const cache = new ValkeyResultCache(client);
await cache.set(BASE, { v: 1 }, { ttlSeconds: 42, rowCount: 1 });
expect(client.ttls.get(buildCacheKey(BASE))).toBe(42);
});
it('treats a corrupt entry as a miss AND removes it', async () => {
const client = new FakeValkey();
const cache = new ValkeyResultCache(client);
client.data.set(buildCacheKey(BASE), '{not json');
expect(await cache.get(BASE)).toBeUndefined();
expect(client.data.has(buildCacheKey(BASE))).toBe(false);
});
it('pages through SCAN rather than blocking on KEYS', async () => {
const client = new FakeValkey();
const cache = new ValkeyResultCache(client);
for (let i = 0; i < 1200; i += 1) {
await cache.set(
{ ...BASE, compiled_query_hash: String(i).padStart(64, '0') },
{ i },
{ ttlSeconds: 300, rowCount: 1 },
);
}
expect(await cache.invalidateTenant('t_alpha')).toBe(1200);
expect(client.scanCalls).toBeGreaterThan(1);
});
});
class FakeValkey implements ValkeyLikeClient {
readonly data = new Map<string, string>();
readonly ttls = new Map<string, number>();
scanCalls = 0;
async get(key: string): Promise<string | null> {
return this.data.get(key) ?? null;
}
async set(key: string, value: string, opts: { EX: number }): Promise<unknown> {
this.data.set(key, value);
this.ttls.set(key, opts.EX);
return 'OK';
}
async del(keys: string[]): Promise<unknown> {
for (const k of keys) {
this.data.delete(k);
this.ttls.delete(k);
}
return keys.length;
}
async scan(
cursor: string,
opts: { MATCH: string; COUNT: number },
): Promise<{ cursor: string; keys: string[] }> {
this.scanCalls += 1;
const prefix = opts.MATCH.replace(/\*$/, '');
const all = [...this.data.keys()].filter((k) => k.startsWith(prefix));
const start = Number(cursor);
const page = all.slice(start, start + opts.COUNT);
const next = start + opts.COUNT >= all.length ? '0' : String(start + opts.COUNT);
return { cursor: next, keys: page };
}
}