resolve: README adopts main (newer, fail-closed auth docs)
This commit is contained in:
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-5
@@ -65,11 +65,13 @@ INTERNAL_TOKEN=change-me-internal-token
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#
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# Fleet Zitadel issuer (OIDC). Default when unset: https://id-customers.siax.io
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ZITADEL_ISSUER=https://id-customers.siax.io
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# Flag-gated enforcement. When != "true" (DEFAULT) auth is non-breaking:
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# a present Bearer token is best-effort verified and attached, but never
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# rejected. Set to "true" to REQUIRE a valid token on /api/0pt/* (401 on
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# missing/invalid, 403 when X-Tenant-Id disagrees with the token tenant).
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AUTH_ENFORCE=false
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# Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED. Leave this UNSET (or set it to "true") and a
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# valid, verified Bearer token is REQUIRED on /api/0pt/* -- 401 on
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# missing/invalid, 403 when X-Tenant-Id disagrees with the token tenant.
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# ONLY the literal value "false" disables authentication, and that value is
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# REFUSED when NODE_ENV=production: the app throws at startup instead of
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# serving openly. Use "false" for local development only.
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AUTH_ENFORCE=true
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# Optional override for the claim key that carries the SIAX tenant id. When
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# unset, tenant derivation uses the documented precedence:
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# urn:zitadel:iam:org:id -> urn:zitadel:iam:user:resourceowner:id -> tenant_id -> tenant.
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
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name: Health Check (SIAX Cloud)
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on:
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workflow_dispatch:
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schedule:
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- cron: "0 6 * * 1"
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jobs:
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health:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Required files
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run: |
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for f in README.md LICENSE .gitignore; do [ -f "$f" ] || echo "::warning file=$f,title=Missing::$f is missing"; done
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[ -f .gitea/workflows/ci.yml ] || echo "::warning title=No CI::No CI workflow found"
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- name: Install Trivy
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run: curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
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- name: Secret scan
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run: trivy fs --scanners secret --exit-code 0 .
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@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ confidence; nothing is guessed.
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**Live:** https://0pt.app · **Contract:** [`CLAUDE.md`](CLAUDE.md) + [`docs/`](docs/)
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> **Architecture (verified against code, not aspirational):**
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> [`docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md`](docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md).
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> It documents the real API surface, the real persistence story, and the known
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> security gaps — including several places where this README is optimistic. Read
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> it before trusting any capability claim below. Repo identity + estate
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> classification: [`siax.config.json`](siax.config.json).
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## Two planes (see [docs/02-architecture.md](docs/02-architecture.md))
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- **Edge (Vercel, this app)** — marketing, catalog, the order lifecycle, customer portal,
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@@ -16,16 +23,6 @@ confidence; nothing is guessed.
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Never on Vercel (long jobs). Bypass/stealth/proxy-rotation/fake-account paths are excluded
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by design (CLAUDE.md §1).
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> ⚠️ **The exclusion above is the POLICY, not the current state of this tree.**
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> `services/scrapers/` still contains 64 files implementing exactly what CLAUDE.md §1
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> prohibits — curl_cffi TLS impersonation, cloudscraper, Tor rotation, `WAFBypass`,
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> `ProxyRotator` — plus committed `__pycache__/*.pyc`. They arrived on the Gitea line on
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> 2026-07-13 and are documented in [docs/06-data-engine.md](docs/06-data-engine.md).
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> [PR #1](https://git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt/pulls/1) exists to delete them and has been open
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> since 2026-07-19. Nothing in the TypeScript tree imports them and they are not copied
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> into the runner stage, so they do not execute — but they are present, and this README
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> previously read as if they were not.
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## Routes
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| Area | Routes |
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@@ -33,11 +30,10 @@ confidence; nothing is guessed.
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| Marketing | `/` (hero, filosofi, katalog, motorn, visualiseringar, täckning, editorial, bevis, priser, footer) |
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| Catalog | `/katalog`, `/katalog/[id]` |
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| Sourcing map | `/kallor` |
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| Order lifecycle | `/bestall` → `/bestall/beskriv` → `/bestall/forskott` → `/order/[id]` → `/order/[id]/validera` |
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| Order lifecycle | `/bestall` → `/bestall/forskott` → `/order/[id]` → `/order/[id]/validera` |
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| Customer portal | `/portal`, `/portal/subscriptions`, `/portal/files`, `/portal/integrationer`, `/portal/settings` |
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| Admin portal | `/admin`, `/admin/sources`, `/admin/jobs`, `/admin/customers`, `/admin/verktyg` |
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| API | `/api/{health,estimates,catalog,sources,vehicles,screen,orders,orders/[id],subscriptions,admin/metrics,uploads,auth/*,ai/parse,payments/*,webhooks/stripe,connections/db-grant}` |
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| Data platform (P0) | `/api/0pt`, `/api/0pt/documents/capture`, `/api/0pt/documents/[documentId]/extraction`, `/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings[/[mappingId]/writes]`, `/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query`, `/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies[/[id]]` — ⚠ these read `tenant_id`/`project_id` from the request body or query string, not a server session. See **Known issues** below. |
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| Admin portal | `/admin`, `/admin/sources`, `/admin/jobs`, `/admin/customers` |
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| API | `/api/{health,estimates,catalog,sources,orders,orders/[id],subscriptions,admin/metrics,uploads,auth/*,payments/*,webhooks/stripe,connections/db-grant}` |
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## Design system
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Mono/editorial, light, radius 0, Inter + JetBrains Mono, single red `#e40014`, animated grain,
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@@ -56,54 +52,20 @@ cd services/api && pip install -r requirements.txt && uvicorn orchestrator.main:
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## Deploy
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- **Frontend** → Vercel (project `0pt`, scope *Simon Axelsson's projects*), domain `0pt.app`.
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- **Engine + DB + embeds** → one VPS via [`infra/docker-compose.yml`](infra/docker-compose.yml) (Postgres+pgvector, Redis, api, worker, NocoDB, Metabase, Caddy).
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- Env inventory: `.env.example` — **not on `main` yet.** It exists on branch/PR
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[`feature/0pt-env-example`](https://github.com/sax3l/0pt/pull/3) (github.com/sax3l/0pt PR #3, unmerged as of
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this pass), added after discovering `.gitignore`'s blanket `.env*` rule had silently kept it out of every
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commit despite `docs/09-build-plan.md` Phase 0 requiring it. Until that PR merges, use
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[`docs/08-infrastructure.md`](docs/08-infrastructure.md) as the source of truth for env var names.
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- Env inventory: [`.env.example`](.env.example).
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- **Auth on `/api/0pt/*` is fail-closed**: with `AUTH_ENFORCE` unset the middleware
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REQUIRES a verified Zitadel Bearer token (401 without one). Only the literal
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`AUTH_ENFORCE=false` disables it, and that is refused when `NODE_ENV=production`
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(the process throws at startup rather than serving anonymously).
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## Status
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Frontend (marketing, catalog, order lifecycle UI, customer + admin portals) and the edge API route
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handlers build and typecheck green. That is a statement about the code compiling and running, **not**
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about the platform being production-ready — read **Known issues** below before relying on any of this
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against real tenants or real money.
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Frontend, full order lifecycle, customer + admin portals, edge API, payment/auth/embed
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infrastructure, the compliant data engine, schema and infra are all in place and building green.
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Integrations are env-guarded and activate when their keys/DB are provided:
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1. **Database** — Vercel → Storage → Postgres (sets `POSTGRES_URL`) → durable persistence (schema in [`sql/001_init.sql`](sql/001_init.sql)). Without it, orders fall back to an in-memory, non-durable store (`lib/orders-store.ts`).
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2. **Stripe** keys → payments (`app/api/payments/*`, `app/api/webhooks/stripe`) — this is wired code, not just a plan. **Resend** is documented as the email provider (`docs/08-infrastructure.md`) but has no call site anywhere in this repo yet — treat "+ email" as not-yet-implemented, not merely unconfigured.
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3. **VPS** for the engine (`services/api`) → set `ENGINE_URL` so edge routes defer to it (`lib/engine.ts`). Unset, several routes (`/api/screen`, `/api/vehicles`, `/api/ai/parse`) fall back to calling public sources directly or computing locally instead.
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4. **`AUTH_SECRET` + `DEV_LOGIN_KEY`** → a guarded **dev-only** login (`app/api/auth/login/route.ts`): an HMAC-signed session cookie (`lib/auth.ts`), not a real auth system. Full OAuth via Auth.js is Phase 3 of `docs/09-build-plan.md` and has not been built — see Known issues.
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## Known issues
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Blunt on purpose, per `CLAUDE.md`'s own house rule ("flag conflicts ... and propose the reconciliation
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rather than guessing"). These are open, real gaps as of this pass — not silently patched, not guessed at.
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1. **No authentication or tenant scoping is wired anywhere in this repo.** The only thing that exists is
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the `DEV_LOGIN_KEY` dev gate described above. There is no session-to-org/tenant binding at all —
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`app/api/orders/route.ts`'s own `GET` handler carries the literal comment `// GET /api/orders — list
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(org scoping added with auth).`, i.e. not yet. As a direct consequence, the newer P0 data-platform
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routes read `tenant_id`/`project_id` **from the client-supplied request body or query string** instead
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of a server-bound session:
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- `app/api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/route.ts` and `.../[mappingId]/writes/route.ts`
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- `app/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies/route.ts` and `.../[sourceRatePolicyId]/route.ts`
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- `app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts`
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- `src/services/document-capture-service.ts` (called from `app/api/0pt/documents/capture/route.ts`)
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This violates the platform-wide hard rule that `tenant_id` must be server-bound to an authenticated
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session and never read from client input. It is not a deliberate two-tier design — it exists because no
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auth/session system has been built yet. Do not expose these routes to untrusted callers before Phase 3
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(`docs/09-build-plan.md`) lands.
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2. **The CL0UD/N0D/AUD0/ST0RE platform clients are real code, but mock-only.** `src/clients/{cl0ud,n0d,aud0,st0re,st0re-lakehouse}-client.ts` are genuine, typechecked TypeScript with real tests — but every one of them runs against an in-memory mock today. **Corrected this pass:** `CL0UD_URL`/`N0D_URL`/`AUD0_URL`/`ST0RE_URL` are never read via `process.env` anywhere in this repo — verified by grepping the whole tree; the only hits are a code comment and a `TODO`/`it.todo` in `tests/p0/iceberg-write-service.test.ts` describing `ST0RE_URL` as future work, not an actual read. Every client only accepts an optional constructor `baseUrl` (`st0reBaseUrl`, `cl0udBaseUrl`, `n0dBaseUrl`, `aud0BaseUrl`), and every service that instantiates one (`src/services/*.ts`) is called from its route handler with no options, so all of them resolve to the in-memory mock today. Read this as "real code, mock-only, not live-verified, no env wiring at all yet" wherever it comes up — not "integrated" or "connected."
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3. **0pt's data-quality/QA enforcement code does not exist in this repo.** `src/services/quality-check-service.ts`, `src/services/quality-report-service.ts`, `src/types/quality-check.ts`, `src/types/quality-report.ts`, `src/data-platform/services/catalog-service.ts`, `sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql`, and `sql/003_*.sql` were at one point described, in `docs/ICEBERG_WRITE_BOUNDARY.md`, `docs/11-lakehouse-write-plan.md`, and `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md`, as if they were already built and tested. `git log --all` for every one of those paths returns zero commits, on any branch, ever — they have never existed in this repository; the `sql/` directory today holds only `001_init.sql` and `004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql`. 0pt's QA/quality-check stage is **spec/target only** right now. **Corrected as of this pass:** all three of the docs above, plus `docs/12-edge-capability-api.md`, now consistently state this — each carries its own "fabricated, not built" callout, and `docs/P0_DATASET_QUALITY_FLOW.md` (added by an earlier parallel pass) is the explicit, clearly-labeled target-spec doc for what this stage should look like once built. Treat any *other* doc that asserts the QA stage already exists as wrong until it actually lands.
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4. **Two diverged git remotes both claim to be "the 0pt repo."** `origin` in this checkout is `github.com/sax3l/0pt`. A separate Gitea remote, `git.siax.io/sax3l/0pt`, shares at least part of the same history — `services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py` is byte-for-byte identical between GitHub's current `main` and a Gitea post-fix PR branch — but Gitea's `main` independently accumulated three 2026-07-13 commits adding a real WAF-bypass/proxy-rotation/fake-identity scraper stack (`services/scrapers/*`, since removed via a Gitea PR) that never touched GitHub's `main`. Which remote is authoritative, which is deployed to `0pt.app`, and whether the two should be kept in sync is **unresolved — Simon's decision**, not something this pass or any doc should silently assume.
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5. **0pt is registered as API-only in the platform's six-surface capability model, not "api/cli/mcp/ui/job/sdk" across the board.** 14 `0pt.*` capabilities are registered in `cl0ud`'s `packages/capability-registry/src/registry.ts` today (verified by name: `query_source`, `document_ocr`, `write_external_record`, `lakehouse_mapping_manage`, `lakehouse_write`, `source_rate_policy_manage`, `screen_sanctions`, `estimate_compute`, `vehicle_lookup`, `catalog_list`, `source_registry_list`, `order_create`, `order_payment`, `write_iceberg_table`). None has `cliEnabled`/`mcpEnabled` true. Surfaces, checked per-entry: 11 have `['api']` only, `lakehouse_write` and `write_iceberg_table` have `['api', 'job']`, and `write_external_record` has `['job']` only (no `api` surface at all) — so it is not quite "api everywhere plus job for the two heaviest," one capability is job-only. If any doc anywhere describes a live `siax 0pt ...` CLI or an 0pt MCP tool, it is describing a target, not current reality.
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6. **No evidence a "t_0pt" dedicated-node N0D auth pattern is built.** `sax3l/n0d` was searched in full (all branches, all commits, all files) — zero references to `t_0pt` exist anywhere in that repo. Treat any claim that this is already built/tested as unconfirmed.
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1. **Database** — Vercel → Storage → Postgres (sets `POSTGRES_URL`) → durable persistence (schema in [`sql/001_init.sql`](sql/001_init.sql)).
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2. **Stripe + Resend** keys → payments + email.
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3. **VPS** for the engine → set `ENGINE_URL`.
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4. **`AUTH_SECRET` + `DEV_LOGIN_KEY`** → login (full OAuth via Auth.js lands with the DB).
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© 2026 SIAX Technology AB. Not affiliated with Protosell.
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@@ -144,6 +144,37 @@ in the desired priority, and the rank dict is currently dead code (documentation
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in-memory dicts (`_ORDERS`, `_JOBS`) that reset on every restart. The schema exists; the wiring from
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pipeline output → Postgres rows does not yet.
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### Network-layer provenance: `1p` (not yet in use)
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`bridge_provenance` answers *which source a field came from*. It does not answer *what
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actually happened on the wire* — which policy authorized the fetch, whether `robots.txt` was
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read and what it said, or whether the bytes we parsed were the page or a bot wall served with
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HTTP 200. **[`1p`](https://git.siax.io/sax3l/1p)**, the SIAX egress measurement point, closes
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that gap and extends the provenance chain all the way down to the network layer.
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1p owns four things: a per-destination policy as code (default DENY; rate, robots/ToS stance,
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allowed methods), a single egress choke point, block detection, and one provenance record per
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fetch written to AUD0. Everything else is composed (AUD0, ST0RE, CL0UD).
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Why this matters for 0pt specifically — three facts that are hard to assert without it:
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| Claim 0pt makes | What 1p adds |
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|---|---|
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| "acquired from an authorized public page, respecting `robots.txt`" | The record carries the robots decision **plus a sha256 of the `robots.txt` it was taken from**. A policy that says `respect` and cannot read robots denies the fetch — silence is not permission. |
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| "these are the bytes we parsed" | `body_sha256` per fetch, so a delivered field can be tied back to the exact response at the exact time. |
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| "level 1/2/3 corroboration from independent sources" | Responses are classified `ok` / `rate_limited` / `forbidden` / `captcha` / `blocked_soft` / `error`. `blocked_soft` is the expensive one: **HTTP 200 whose body is a block page**. Without it, a bot wall gets parsed and scored as corroborating data. |
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**It is a measurement point, not a bypass.** This is consistent with, not an exception to,
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the prohibitions above and in `CLAUDE.md` §1: 1p exists to *detect* blocking and *prove*
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provenance, never to evade. Its purchased-residential egress pool is an interface with a stub
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that throws — wiring it up would be a separate, explicit decision. Block detection also
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alarms on a rising *trend*, never on single events, and deliberately excludes `error`
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(their 5xx, our timeouts) from the blocking measure.
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**Status: not in use.** 1p is Phase 0 — code, contracts, tests; not deployed, no credentials
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set. No 0pt worker routes through it today, and `bridge_provenance` remains the only
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provenance 0pt writes. Adopting it is a later, separate step.
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## `sources.yaml` (machine-readable registry)
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Single registry that drives the router, the `/sources` API, and the (still-to-be-built) public sourcing-map
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@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
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# 0PT — Arkitektur
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**Kategori:** PLATTFORM **Underkategori:** Data OS **Status:** under utveckling (deployad frontend i drift, capability-lagret ej produktionsklart)
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**Senast verifierad mot kod:** 2026-08-07 (commit `6531384`, main)
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> **Läsanvisning.** Detta dokument beskriver vad koden i repot **gör**, inte vad
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> `README.md`, `CLAUDE.md` eller `docs/01–11` säger att den borde göra. Där de
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> avviker står avvikelsen utskriven — se §7. Påståenden märkta *(live-verifierat
|
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> 2026-08-07)* är kontrollerade mot den körande instansen på `https://0pt.app`.
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> Allt annat är läst ur källkoden. Där något inte gick att belägga står **OKÄNT**.
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---
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## 1. Syfte
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0pt är SIAX Clouds **Data OS**: plattformen som skaffar, strukturerar, härleder
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och levererar företags-, kontakt- och fordonsdata för Norden/Europa, med
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||||
proveniens (källa, färskhet, konfidens) per fält.
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Repot innehåller i praktiken **två separata system** i samma träd:
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| Plan | Var | Vad koden faktiskt är |
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|---|---|---|
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| **Webbkonsol + edge-API** | repo-roten (`app/`, `lib/`, `components/`) | Next.js 16.0.10 App Router. 20 sidor (svensk UI-copy), 28 API-routehandlers. Marknadsföring, katalog, orderflöde, kund-/adminportal. |
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| **Capability-lager** | `src/` + `app/api/0pt/*` | TypeScript-tjänster för `0pt.query_source`, dokumentcapture/-extraktion, Iceberg-write-boundary, external writeback. **All state ligger i `Map`-objekt i minnet** (`src/services/*.ts`), inte i databas. |
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| **Data-engine** | `services/api/` | FastAPI-orkestrator, 12 endpoints, 162 rader. Workers (`adaptive_router`, `pipeline`, `queue`, `resolve`, `run`). |
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| **Skrapmotor** | `services/scrapers/` | Python. `engine.py`, `engine_v2.py`, `waf_bypass.py`, ClickHouse-pipeline. |
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### Vad 0pt uttryckligen INTE gör
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|
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- **Ingen egen IdP.** Bearer-tokens verifieras mot Zitadel (`src/auth/zitadel.ts`),
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utfärdas aldrig här. Cookie-sessionen i `lib/auth.ts` är ett HMAC-scaffold med
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dev-login bakom `DEV_LOGIN_KEY`, uttryckligen inte produktionsauth.
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- **Ingen BigQuery.** Ingen referens till BQ finns i koden (verifierat med grep).
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- **Ingen egen policymotor.** Beslut delegeras till CL0UD (`src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts`).
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- **Ingen tung batch i webblagret.** Långa jobb ska gå till engine/N0D.
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### Uttryckligt förbud som koden BRYTER MOT
|
||||
|
||||
`CLAUDE.md` §1 och `README.md` säger båda att bypass av WAF/botskydd,
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||||
proxyrotation och stealth-browsers är **exkluderade by design**. Det stämmer inte:
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||||
`services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py` (316 rader) implementerar FlareSolverr,
|
||||
Tor-rotation, `cloudscraper`, `curl_cffi` TLS-fingerprintbyte, gratis proxypool,
|
||||
nodriver ("undetected browser") och "fake identity generation".
|
||||
`services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` startar `flaresolverr` och
|
||||
`tor-proxy` som tjänster. Commit `4a164c5` (Simon Axelsson, 2026-07-13) heter
|
||||
ordagrant *"refactor: remove compliance restrictions"*. Se §7 lucka **S9**.
|
||||
|
||||
---
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||||
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||||
## 2. Plats i estatet
|
||||
|
||||
### Beroenden uppåt (0pt anropar)
|
||||
|
||||
| Beroende | Klient | Env-var | Beteende när env saknas |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Zitadel (IdP) | `src/auth/zitadel.ts` | `ZITADEL_ISSUER` (default `https://id-customers.siax.io`) | Använder default-issuern; JWKS hämtas via OIDC-discovery, fallback `<issuer>/oauth/v2/keys` |
|
||||
| CL0UD (policy) | `src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts` | `CL0UD_URL` | **Fail-open** — returnerar alltid `allow` utan nätanrop (§7 S5) |
|
||||
| AUD0 (audit) | `src/clients/aud0-client.ts` | `AUD0_URL` | **No-op** — inga auditevent skrivs (§7 S6) |
|
||||
| ST0RE (artefakter/lakehouse) | `src/clients/st0re-client.ts`, `st0re-lakehouse-client.ts` | `ST0RE_URL` | Returnerar deterministisk mockartefakt |
|
||||
| N0D (jobb) | `src/clients/n0d-client.ts` | `N0D_URL` | Returnerar deterministiskt mockjobb |
|
||||
| Egen data-engine | `lib/engine.ts` | `ENGINE_URL`, `INTERNAL_TOKEN` | `engineFetch` returnerar `null`, edge räknar lokalt |
|
||||
| Stripe | `lib/stripe.ts` | `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`, `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` | Betalroutes svarar `501` |
|
||||
| Azure Document Intelligence | `src/adapters/document-intelligence-adapter.ts` | `DOC_INTELLIGENCE_*` | Extraktion svarar "not configured" |
|
||||
| Cloudflare R2 | `app/api/uploads/route.ts` | `R2_ENDPOINT`, `R2_BUCKET`, `R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID` | `501`, fallback `OPT_LOCAL_BLOB_DIR` |
|
||||
| OpenSanctions (extern, publik) | `app/api/screen/route.ts` | — | Anropas direkt utan nyckel |
|
||||
| Odoo | `src/adapters/odoo-bills-adapter.ts` | `ODOO_BASE_URL` | Adapter inaktiv |
|
||||
|
||||
Mönstret är genomgående: **saknad env ⇒ tyst degradering, inte fel.** Det är
|
||||
bekvämt lokalt och farligt i produktion (§7 S5, S6).
|
||||
|
||||
### Beroenden nedåt (vem konsumerar 0pt)
|
||||
|
||||
Enligt `CLAUDE.md` matar 0pt interna produkter (Protosell/FiveCRM, VehIQ). **Inga
|
||||
sådana anrop finns i det här repot** — ingen inkommande integration är verifierad
|
||||
här. Betrakta konsumentlistan som odokumenterad tills motparten visats.
|
||||
|
||||
### Vad 0pt inte får bero på
|
||||
|
||||
- **BigQuery** — hård estate-regel. Ej överträdd.
|
||||
- **Hogia** — skrivning förbjuden. Ingen referens finns.
|
||||
- **Protosell-tenantdata** — tenantisolering, se §7 S2.
|
||||
- Nya SaaS-beroenden utan dokumenterat skäl (`CLAUDE.md` §4, "one tool per job").
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. API-yta
|
||||
|
||||
Risknivå = SIAX L0–L5-taxonomin, bedömd av mig utifrån vad handlern gör.
|
||||
"Kräver godkännande" = huruvida koden **faktiskt** kräver auth/godkännande idag.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 `/api/0pt/*` — capability-lagret (bakom `middleware.ts`-matchern)
|
||||
|
||||
| Operation | Metod/sökväg | Risknivå | Kräver godkännande |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Capability-index | `GET /api/0pt` | L0 | Nej — *(live-verifierat: 200 anonymt)* |
|
||||
| Registrera dataset↔Iceberg-mappning | `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` | L3 | Nej i kod; `tenant_id` läses ur body |
|
||||
| Lista mappningar | `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` | L2 | Nej; `tenant_id` ur query |
|
||||
| Hämta mappning | `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}` | L2 | Nej |
|
||||
| Utför Iceberg-write | `POST /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings/{mappingId}/writes` | **L4** | Nej i kod (CL0UD fail-open, §7 S5) |
|
||||
| Registrera rate-policy | `POST /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` | L2 | Nej |
|
||||
| Lista/hämta rate-policy | `GET /api/0pt/sources/rate-policies[/{id}]` | L1 | Nej |
|
||||
| Kör källfråga | `POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` | **L4** | Nej; `connection_config` tas ur body (§7 S10) |
|
||||
| Ta emot dokument | `POST /api/0pt/documents/capture` | L3 (PII) | Nej |
|
||||
| Lista dokument | `GET /api/0pt/documents/capture` | L3 (PII) | Nej |
|
||||
| Extrahera dokument | `POST /api/0pt/documents/{documentId}/extraction` | L3 (PII) | Nej |
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Övriga API-routes — **helt utanför middleware-matchern**
|
||||
|
||||
`middleware.ts` har `matcher: ['/api/0pt/:path*']`. Allt nedan har därför
|
||||
**noll autentisering i koden**.
|
||||
|
||||
| Operation | Metod/sökväg | Risknivå | Kräver godkännande |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Liveness | `GET /api/health` | L0 | Nej (avsiktligt) |
|
||||
| Prisestimat | `POST /api/estimates` | L1 | Nej |
|
||||
| Katalog / källor / fordon | `GET /api/{catalog,sources,vehicles}` | L1 | Nej |
|
||||
| Sanktions-/PEP-screening | `GET /api/screen?q=` | L2 | Nej — proxar mot OpenSanctions |
|
||||
| AI-parsning av fritext | `POST /api/ai/parse` | L2 | Nej |
|
||||
| Skapa order | `POST /api/orders` | L2 | Nej |
|
||||
| **Lista alla ordrar** | `GET /api/orders` | **L3** | **Nej** — ingen org-scoping *(live: 200, `[]`)* |
|
||||
| Läs/ändra order | `GET,PATCH /api/orders/{id}` | L3 | Nej |
|
||||
| **Adminmetrik (orderpipeline, belopp)** | `GET /api/admin/metrics` | **L3** | **Nej** *(live-verifierat: 200 anonymt)* |
|
||||
| Deposition (Stripe checkout) | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/deposit` | **L4** | Nej |
|
||||
| **Frigör escrow-slutbetalning** | `POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` | **L4** | **Nej** — sätter dessutom status `delivered` (§7 S4) |
|
||||
| Stripe-webhook | `POST /api/webhooks/stripe` | L3 | Signaturkontroll via `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET` |
|
||||
| Prenumerationer | `GET,POST /api/subscriptions` | L2 | Nej |
|
||||
| Filuppladdning | `GET,POST /api/uploads` | L3 | Nej (`501` utan R2) |
|
||||
| Ta emot kund-DB-grant | `POST /api/connections/db-grant` | **L4** | Nej (`501` utan `GRANT_ENC_KEY`; §7 S7) |
|
||||
| Dev-login | `POST /api/auth/login` | L2 | Ja — kräver `AUTH_SECRET` + matchande `DEV_LOGIN_KEY` |
|
||||
| Logout / me | `POST /api/auth/logout`, `GET /api/auth/me` | L1 | Cookiebaserat |
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 FastAPI-engine (`services/api/orchestrator/main.py`)
|
||||
|
||||
12 endpoints: `GET /health`, `/sources`, `/sources/{market}`, `/vehicles/{plate}`,
|
||||
`/screen`, `POST /estimates`, `POST /orders`, `GET /orders`, `GET /orders/{oid}`,
|
||||
`PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run`, `GET /orders/{oid}/status`.
|
||||
**Ingen autentisering alls** — grep efter `Depends`, `auth`, `token`,
|
||||
`X-Internal-Token` i filen ger noll träffar, trots att `lib/engine.ts` skickar
|
||||
`X-Internal-Token`. Se §7 S8.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Datamodell
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 Postgres-schema (DDL finns, används inte av `/api/0pt/*`)
|
||||
|
||||
`sql/001_init.sql` definierar 13 tabeller:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dataentiteter:** `dim_source`, `dim_company`, `dim_contact`, `dim_ubo`,
|
||||
`dim_vehicle`, `fact_financials`
|
||||
- **Proveniens:** `bridge_provenance` (`entity_type`, `entity_key`, `field_name`,
|
||||
`source_id`, `freshness`, `confidence`, `level` 0–3, `agreed_sources`) — unikt
|
||||
index per fält. Detta är produktens kärnsignatur.
|
||||
- **Plattform:** `orgs`, `users`, `orders`, `jobs`, `deliveries`, `subscriptions`,
|
||||
`files`, `db_grants`, `payments`, `audit_log`
|
||||
- Kräver `pgvector` + `pgcrypto`. Belopp i **öre** (integer).
|
||||
|
||||
`sql/004_iceberg_write_boundary.sql` + `005_..._gap_closure.sql` lägger till
|
||||
`opt_dataset_iceberg_mappings` och `opt_source_rate_policies`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Migrationskedjan har hål:** `sql/002_*` och `sql/003_*` **saknas i repot** men
|
||||
refereras av tre filer (`app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts:14`,
|
||||
`src/services/source-service.ts:8`, `docs/P0_QUERY_SOURCE_FLOW.md:98`) som
|
||||
"`sql/002_p0_dataset_quality.sql` definierar redan `opt_sources`". Tabellen
|
||||
`opt_sources` har alltså ingen migration här. Det finns heller ingen
|
||||
migrationsrunner — SQL:en appliceras manuellt. **OKÄNT** var/om den körts.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 Var data faktiskt ligger
|
||||
|
||||
| Data | Faktisk lagring i kod |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Ordrar, jobb, betalningar | `lib/orders-store.ts`: Postgres **om** `getSql()` ger en klient, annars `const mem = new Map()` per instans |
|
||||
| Sources, datasets, mappningar, rate-policies, dokument, extraktioner, writebacks | `Map` i minnet, en per tjänsteinstans (`src/services/*.ts`, 10 st) |
|
||||
| Dokumentbytes | R2 om konfigurerat, annars `LocalBlobStore` mot `OPT_LOCAL_BLOB_DIR` |
|
||||
| Auditspår | AUD0 om `AUD0_URL` satt, annars ingenstans |
|
||||
|
||||
Två konsekvenser, båda dokumenterade i koden själv:
|
||||
1. **Ingen delad state mellan routemoduler.** Varje route-fil instansierar sin
|
||||
egen tjänst, så en källa registrerad via `POST /api/0pt/sources` är inte
|
||||
synlig för `POST /api/0pt/sources/{id}/query`. Detta står utskrivet i
|
||||
route-filens egen kommentar.
|
||||
2. **Ingen durabilitet.** *(live-verifierat 2026-08-07: `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings`
|
||||
och `/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` svarar `[]`, och `GET /api/health` på
|
||||
0pt.app rapporterar `"db":"not_configured"`.)* Produktionsinstansen har alltså
|
||||
**ingen databas** — all state försvinner vid varje kallstart.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Persondata
|
||||
|
||||
- `dim_contact`: namn, roll, e-post, telefon, LinkedIn — persondata under GDPR.
|
||||
- `dim_ubo`: verklig huvudman — persondata, potentiellt känslig.
|
||||
- `db_grants.conn_encrypted`: kunds DB-anslutningssträng (se §7 S7).
|
||||
- Dokumentcapture (`app/api/0pt/documents/capture`) tar emot godtyckliga
|
||||
dokument, inkl. fakturor/mailbilagor via Graph-adaptern — persondata.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Retention
|
||||
|
||||
**Ingen retention är implementerad.** `CLAUDE.md` §5 utlovar "deletion-after-job";
|
||||
inget sådant jobb, ingen TTL, ingen `DELETE`-väg och ingen radering finns i koden.
|
||||
`audit_log`-tabellen finns men skrivs aldrig av TypeScript-lagret.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Deploy
|
||||
|
||||
| Fält | Verifierat läge |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| **Nod** | Ingen SIAX-nod. *(live-verifierat 2026-08-07: `https://0pt.app/api/health` → `Server: Vercel`, `X-Vercel-Id: arn1::iad1::…`)* Frontenden körs alltså på **Vercel**, inte på flottan. |
|
||||
| **Coolify-app** | Ingen verifierad. `Dockerfile` är skriven för Coolify (node:24-alpine, multistage, `HEALTHCHECK` mot `/api/health`, kör som `node`-användare) men **OKÄNT** om någon Coolify-app pekar på repot. |
|
||||
| **Domän** | `0pt.app` (live). Docs nämner även `api.0pt.app`, `data.0pt.app`, `dash.0pt.app` via Caddy — **ej verifierade**. |
|
||||
| **Bygg** | `next build` via pnpm@9. `next.config.mjs` sätter `typescript.ignoreBuildErrors: true` — bygget typkontrollerar alltså **inte** `app/`, `components/`, `lib/` eller `middleware.ts`. |
|
||||
| **Engine-deploy** | `infra/docker-compose.yml` (postgres, redis, api, worker, nocodb, metabase, caddy) och `services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` (clickhouse, trino, flaresolverr, tor-proxy, superset, postgres). **Ingen av dem är verifierad som körande.** |
|
||||
| **Hemligheter** | Rena miljövariabler (`.env.example` listar 20+). **Infisical är inte inkopplat** — ingen referens till Infisical/vault finns i repot. Vercel-projektets env är källan för webblagret. |
|
||||
| **CI** | `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`. `quality`-jobb: typecheck (blockerande, endast `src/` + `tests/`), vitest (blockerande, 17 testfiler), eslint (rådgivande), `next build` (blockerande). `security`-jobb: Trivy `--exit-code 0` (rådgivande). Kör på `ubuntu-latest`. |
|
||||
|
||||
> **Konflikt att fatta beslut om:** estate-projektet *GCP/Vercel-exit* säger att
|
||||
> flottan ska bort från Vercel. 0pt:s enda körande instans ligger på Vercel. Se §8.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Drift
|
||||
|
||||
### Hälsokontroll
|
||||
`GET /api/health` → `{ok, service:"0pt-web", db, queue, ts}`. Den svarar **alltid
|
||||
`ok:true`** oavsett om databasen finns — den rapporterar bara `"not_configured"`
|
||||
i ett fält. En uptime-monitor som tittar på HTTP 200 kommer därför visa grönt
|
||||
för en instans utan databas, vilket är exakt vad som gäller idag. Engine har ett
|
||||
separat `GET /health`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Loggar
|
||||
Ingen strukturerad loggning. `console.warn` i `src/auth/context.ts` är den enda
|
||||
avsiktliga loggpunkten. Ingen korrelation-id-propagering till logg (ett
|
||||
`requestId` skapas i `readRequestContext` men loggas aldrig). Ingen
|
||||
Sentry/GlitchTip/OTel-koppling.
|
||||
|
||||
### Backup + senast testad restore
|
||||
**Ingen backup.** Det finns ingen databas i produktion att säkerhetskopiera
|
||||
(§4.2), inget backupskript, ingen dumproutine. **Restore har aldrig testats.**
|
||||
Om/när Postgres provisioneras måste detta lösas separat — jfr estate-blockeraren
|
||||
"ingen offsite backup".
|
||||
|
||||
### Kända fällor
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`pnpm install` kräver `--ignore-workspace`.** `pnpm-workspace.yaml` är en
|
||||
v0-exportartefakt med bara `allowBuilds:` och inget `packages:`-fält, vilket
|
||||
får pnpm att avbryta. `Dockerfile` skickar flaggan; **`.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`
|
||||
gör det inte** — CI:s `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` kan alltså falla på
|
||||
samma sak som Dockerfilen redan fått ett workaround för. Ej verifierat vilken
|
||||
pnpm-version som räddar CI idag.
|
||||
2. **Node-versionsglapp:** CI kör Node 22, Dockerfile bygger på Node 24.
|
||||
3. **In-memory-state** (§4.2) gör att varje kallstart och varje ny Vercel-lambda
|
||||
nollställer capability-lagret. Testresultat i CI säger ingenting om detta.
|
||||
4. `next.config.mjs` sätter `images.unoptimized: true` — inte en bugg, men
|
||||
förklarar varför bildoptimering saknas.
|
||||
5. `services/scrapers/output/*.json` innehåller committad skrapdata (brreg-sidor)
|
||||
i repot.
|
||||
6. `__pycache__/*.pyc` är committade i `services/`.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Säkerhet
|
||||
|
||||
### Vad som faktiskt finns
|
||||
|
||||
- **Riktig kryptografisk tokenverifiering.** `src/auth/zitadel.ts` gör äkta
|
||||
JWKS-baserad `jwtVerify` med issuer-kontroll och `exp`/`nbf` via `jose`.
|
||||
Tenanthärledning har dokumenterad precedens
|
||||
(`urn:zitadel:iam:org:id` → `urn:zitadel:iam:user:resourceowner:id` →
|
||||
`tenant_id` → `tenant`), och ett token utan tenantclaim underkänns.
|
||||
- **Fail-closed default i koden.** `authEnforced()` returnerar `true` för allt
|
||||
utom literalen `"false"`, och `assertAuthConfigSafe()` kastar vid
|
||||
`NODE_ENV=production` + auth av. Designen är korrekt.
|
||||
- **Stripe-webhooken** verifierar signatur mot `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`.
|
||||
- `SECURITY.md` finns med rapporteringsväg (`security@siax.io`).
|
||||
|
||||
### KÄNDA LUCKOR
|
||||
|
||||
**S1 — `/api/0pt/*` svarar anonymt i produktion, trots "fail-closed". 🔴**
|
||||
*(live-verifierat 2026-08-07)* `GET https://0pt.app/api/0pt` returnerar **200**
|
||||
utan `Authorization`-header. Samma sak med ett medvetet ogiltigt token
|
||||
(`Bearer aaa.bbb.ccc`) → **200**. `GET /api/0pt/lakehouse/mappings` och
|
||||
`/api/0pt/sources/rate-policies` returnerar **200 + `[]`** anonymt. Eftersom
|
||||
lakehouse-routen bara finns i nyare kod är deployen **inte** gammal — middlewaren
|
||||
kör helt enkelt inte. `README.md` rad 49–52 och merge-commit `6531384`
|
||||
("make the AUTH_ENFORCE default fail-closed — 0pt.app was answering anonymously")
|
||||
påstår motsatsen. **Orsaken är OKÄND.** Ej uteslutna hypoteser, ingen verifierad:
|
||||
(a) `middleware.ts` plockas inte upp av Next 16 i den här filplaceringen när ett
|
||||
`src/`-träd finns, (b) Vercel-projektet har ingen middleware i sin
|
||||
build-output, (c) något annat. **Detta måste rotorsaksanalyseras innan repot
|
||||
beskrivs som skyddat någonstans.**
|
||||
|
||||
**S2 — Ingen handler läser den verifierade tenanten. 🔴**
|
||||
`middleware.ts:56-57` sätter `x-0pt-verified-sub` / `x-0pt-verified-tenant` på
|
||||
den vidarebefordrade requesten. En grep över hela repot visar att **ingen fil
|
||||
utanför `middleware.ts` läser de headrarna**. Samtliga `/api/0pt/*`-handlers tar
|
||||
i stället `tenant_id` från request-body eller querysträng
|
||||
(`app/api/0pt/sources/[sourceId]/query/route.ts:49`,
|
||||
`documents/capture/route.ts:27`, `lakehouse/mappings/route.ts:27,49`,
|
||||
`sources/rate-policies/route.ts:26`, m.fl.). Även med fungerande middleware kan
|
||||
alltså en innehavare av ett giltigt token för tenant A skicka
|
||||
`{"tenant_id": "t_b"}` och arbeta i tenant B. Middlewarens 403 vid
|
||||
`X-Tenant-Id`-konflikt hjälper inte — den kontrollerar bara *headern*, inte
|
||||
*bodyn*. **Tenantisolering är inte implementerad.**
|
||||
|
||||
**S3 — Hela det icke-`/api/0pt`-prefixade API:t saknar auth.**
|
||||
Matchern täcker bara `/api/0pt/:path*`. Ordrar, adminmetrik, betalningar,
|
||||
prenumerationer, uppladdningar, AI-parsning och DB-grants är oskyddade i koden.
|
||||
*(live-verifierat: `GET /api/admin/metrics` och `GET /api/orders` svarar 200
|
||||
anonymt.)* De är tomma idag enbart för att produktionsinstansen saknar databas.
|
||||
|
||||
**S4 — Anonym anropare kan trigga escrow-slutbetalning och flagga leverans.**
|
||||
`POST /api/payments/{order_id}/release` kräver ingen identitet. Den skapar en
|
||||
Stripe-checkout på `order.balance_ore` och kör därefter
|
||||
`setStatus(order_id, "delivered")` **oavsett om betalningen genomförs**.
|
||||
Statusövergången sker alltså på begäran, inte på betalning. (Skyddas i praktiken
|
||||
idag bara av att `getOrder` inte hittar något utan databas.)
|
||||
|
||||
**S5 — CL0UD-policyklienten är fail-open utan produktionsspärr.**
|
||||
`src/clients/cl0ud-client.ts:45` — saknas `CL0UD_URL` returneras alltid
|
||||
`{decision: "allow"}` utan nätanrop. Till skillnad från auth finns **ingen**
|
||||
`assertAuthConfigSafe`-motsvarighet, ingen `NODE_ENV`-kontroll och ingen varning.
|
||||
En produktionsdeploy som tappar variabeln godkänner tyst varje
|
||||
sidoeffektsbärande capability, inklusive Iceberg-writes (L4).
|
||||
|
||||
**S6 — AUD0-audit är no-op utan produktionsspärr.**
|
||||
`src/clients/aud0-client.ts` — saknas `AUD0_URL` skrivs inga auditevent och inga
|
||||
lineage-event, tyst. Kombinerat med S5 innebär det: inga beslut fattas, inga
|
||||
spår lämnas. `sql/001_init.sql` har en `audit_log`-tabell som TypeScript-lagret
|
||||
aldrig skriver till.
|
||||
|
||||
**S7 — `db-grant`-routen påstår kryptering som inte finns.**
|
||||
`app/api/connections/db-grant/route.ts` kommenterar att anslutningssträngen
|
||||
"lagras KRYPTERAT (AES-GCM via `GRANT_ENC_KEY`), aldrig i klartext". Koden gör
|
||||
ingenting av detta: utan `GRANT_ENC_KEY` returneras `501`, och **med** nyckeln
|
||||
returneras ett slumpat `grant_id` — ingen validering av read-only, ingen
|
||||
kryptering, ingen lagring, ingen audit. Kommentaren beskriver en oimplementerad
|
||||
funktion i presens.
|
||||
|
||||
**S8 — FastAPI-engine har ingen autentisering.**
|
||||
`services/api/orchestrator/main.py` (12 endpoints, inkl. `POST /orders`,
|
||||
`PATCH /orders/{oid}`, `POST /orders/{oid}/run`) saknar varje form av
|
||||
auth-dependency. `lib/engine.ts` skickar `X-Internal-Token`, men servern läser
|
||||
den aldrig. Var engine än exponeras är den öppen för alla som når porten.
|
||||
|
||||
**S9 — Compliance-koden motsäger produktlöftet. 🔴**
|
||||
`services/scrapers/waf_bypass.py` implementerar FlareSolverr, Tor-rotation,
|
||||
cloudscraper, TLS-fingerprintbyte, gratis proxypool, "undetected browser"
|
||||
(nodriver) och "fake identity generation".
|
||||
`services/infra/docker-compose.data-stack.yml` startar `flaresolverr` och
|
||||
`tor-proxy`. `services/api/workers/adaptive_router.py` inleds med
|
||||
`"""Adaptive router — all methods, no compliance restrictions."""`.
|
||||
Detta står i direkt konflikt med `CLAUDE.md` §1, `README.md` ("Bypass/stealth/
|
||||
proxy-rotation/fake-account paths are excluded by design") och med hela den
|
||||
juridiska positionering som säljs på `0pt.app`. Det är samtidigt en
|
||||
**affärsrisk**: att marknadsföra laglig sourcing medan bypass-kod ligger i repot
|
||||
är svårt att försvara vid en granskning.
|
||||
|
||||
**S10 — Godtycklig anslutningskonfiguration från request-body.**
|
||||
`POST /api/0pt/sources/{sourceId}/query` tar `connection_config` direkt ur bodyn
|
||||
och skickar den till adapterbygget (`src/services/source-query-service.ts:95`).
|
||||
Utan fungerande auth (S1) innebär det att en anonym anropare kan få tjänsten att
|
||||
öppna utgående anslutningar mot en angiven värd — SSRF-liknande primitiv, och en
|
||||
väg att låta 0pt-instansen agera proxy.
|
||||
|
||||
**S11 — Typkontrollen täcker inte auth-koden.**
|
||||
`next.config.mjs` sätter `typescript.ignoreBuildErrors: true`, och
|
||||
`tsconfig.check.json` inkluderar endast `src/**/*.ts` + `tests/**/*.ts`.
|
||||
**`middleware.ts` ligger i roten och typkontrolleras därför i praktiken inte i
|
||||
CI** — trots att det är hela authseamen. `eslint` är dessutom rådgivande
|
||||
(`continue-on-error: true`).
|
||||
|
||||
**S12 — Sessions-scaffoldet är svagt.**
|
||||
`lib/auth.ts` signerar `{email, iat}` med HMAC-SHA256 mot `AUTH_SECRET`, utan
|
||||
`exp`-kontroll vid verifiering (bara cookiens `maxAge`), utan rotation och utan
|
||||
bindning till en användarpost. Kommentaren erkänner att det är ett scaffold; det
|
||||
är ändå den mekanism `GET /api/auth/me` litar på.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Öppna frågor
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Varför kör inte middlewaren i produktion (S1)?** Måste rotorsaksanalyseras.
|
||||
Ingen dokumentation får påstå att `/api/0pt/*` är skyddat innan en anonym
|
||||
request faktiskt får 401 från `0pt.app`.
|
||||
2. **Ska `waf_bypass.py`, FlareSolverr och tor-proxy raderas (S9)?**
|
||||
`CLAUDE.md` säger uttryckligen "remove or disable it". Commit `4a164c5` gick
|
||||
åt motsatt håll. Detta är ett Simon-beslut med både juridisk och
|
||||
marknadsföringsmässig innebörd — inte något en session ska avgöra ensidigt.
|
||||
3. **Vercel eller flottan?** 0pt:s enda körande instans ligger på Vercel medan
|
||||
estate-projektet *GCP/Vercel-exit* pekar bort därifrån. `Dockerfile` är redan
|
||||
Coolify-anpassad men ingen nod är tilldelad. `siax.config.json` i det här
|
||||
repot deklarerar därför `target: "vercel"`, `node: null` — det är dagens
|
||||
sanning, inte målbilden.
|
||||
4. **Ska capability-lagret vara i drift alls?** Det är exponerat publikt men helt
|
||||
in-memory och utan delad state mellan routemoduler (§4.2). Antingen backas det
|
||||
av Postgres, eller så bör routes stängas tills dess.
|
||||
5. **Var är `sql/002_*` och `sql/003_*`?** Tre filer refererar dem. Fanns de
|
||||
någonsin, eller är referenserna aspirationella? `opt_sources` har ingen
|
||||
migration här.
|
||||
6. **Ingen databas i produktion.** Är `0pt.app` avsedd att vara en publik
|
||||
marknadsföringssajt tills vidare, eller är det ett driftfel att
|
||||
`POSTGRES_URL` aldrig satts? Ordrar som skapas idag försvinner.
|
||||
7. **`package.json` heter fortfarande `"my-v0-project"`** — v0-exportartefakt.
|
||||
Byte påverkar inget bygge men bör göras för spårbarhet.
|
||||
8. **Designsystem:** repot har ett eget dokumenterat mono/editorial-system
|
||||
(`docs/05-design-system.md`) + shadcn/ui och konsumerar **inte** `@siax/ui`.
|
||||
Ska 0pt konvergera mot estate-standarden eller är avvikelsen medveten?
|
||||
`siax.config.json` sätter därför `designSystem: null` snarare än att påstå
|
||||
något osant.
|
||||
9. **Tenantmodell:** är en 0pt-tenant 1:1 med en Zitadel-org? Koden antar det i
|
||||
`deriveTenantId` men det är inte bekräftat mot CL0UD:s tenantregister.
|
||||
10. **Infisical:** hemligheter ligger i Vercel-env, inte i credential-SSOT.
|
||||
Behöver bootstrappas.
|
||||
11. **`GET /api/screen`** proxar mot OpenSanctions utan avtal — kommentaren i
|
||||
koden säger själv "VERIFY commercial terms before production volume".
|
||||
12. **Konsumentledet är odokumenterat.** `CLAUDE.md` säger att 0pt matar
|
||||
Protosell/FiveCRM och VehIQ. Inget i repot visar en sådan integration.
|
||||
+17
-10
@@ -2,23 +2,30 @@
|
||||
* `middleware.ts` -- Next.js request middleware = 0pt's framework-level auth
|
||||
* seam (the Next analog of a Fastify `onRequest` hook).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Wave 2 hardening: this runs the flag-gated Zitadel verification
|
||||
* (src/auth/context.ts -> src/auth/zitadel.ts) in front of every 0pt
|
||||
* capability route (/api/0pt/*). It does NOT touch the v0-generated UI routes
|
||||
* or the unrelated payment/order APIs.
|
||||
* This runs the Zitadel verification (src/auth/context.ts ->
|
||||
* src/auth/zitadel.ts) in front of every 0pt capability route (/api/0pt/*).
|
||||
* It does NOT touch the v0-generated UI routes or the unrelated
|
||||
* payment/order APIs (see the matcher below and the note in the PR that
|
||||
* introduced the fail-closed default).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE != "true" (default): never rejects; if a verified token is
|
||||
* present the verified principal is forwarded to the handler as
|
||||
* `x-0pt-verified-sub` / `x-0pt-verified-tenant` request headers.
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE == "true": a valid verified token is required; 401 on
|
||||
* missing/invalid, 403 when X-Tenant-Id disagrees with the token tenant.
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE unset, or anything except "false" (DEFAULT, enforced):
|
||||
* a valid verified token is required; 401 on missing/invalid, 403 when
|
||||
* X-Tenant-Id disagrees with the token tenant. On success the verified
|
||||
* principal is forwarded to the handler as `x-0pt-verified-sub` /
|
||||
* `x-0pt-verified-tenant` request headers.
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE == "false" (explicit local-dev escape hatch): never rejects.
|
||||
* REFUSED in production -- `assertAuthConfigSafe()` below throws at module
|
||||
* load, so a production instance cannot boot with auth switched off.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Health/metrics are exempt (they are also outside the matcher below, but the
|
||||
* exemption is kept explicit for robustness).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { NextResponse, type NextRequest } from 'next/server';
|
||||
import { resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
|
||||
import { assertAuthConfigSafe, resolveAuthContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
|
||||
|
||||
// STARTUP GATE: fail to boot rather than serve /api/0pt/* openly in production.
|
||||
assertAuthConfigSafe();
|
||||
|
||||
// Only guard the 0pt capability surface. The matcher keeps this middleware off
|
||||
// the UI, auth, and payment routes entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"$schema": "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
|
||||
"extends": [
|
||||
"config:recommended"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "0PT",
|
||||
"category": "PLATTFORM",
|
||||
"subcategory": "Data OS",
|
||||
"owner": "SIAX Technology AB",
|
||||
"packageName": "@siax/0pt",
|
||||
"capabilityPrefix": "0pt",
|
||||
"deploy": {
|
||||
"target": "vercel",
|
||||
"node": null,
|
||||
"domain": "0pt.app",
|
||||
"healthPath": "/api/health"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consumes": ["CL0UD", "AUD0", "ST0RE", "N0D"],
|
||||
"decoupled": false,
|
||||
"designSystem": null
|
||||
}
|
||||
+92
-26
@@ -3,26 +3,31 @@
|
||||
* seam the framework layer (Next.js middleware.ts) calls.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ==========================================================================
|
||||
* WAVE 2 HARDENING STATUS
|
||||
* AUTH DEFAULT: FAIL-CLOSED
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 0pt now performs REAL, cryptographic Zitadel (OIDC) Bearer-token
|
||||
* verification (src/auth/zitadel.ts), gated behind the AUTH_ENFORCE env flag
|
||||
* so it can ship to the deployed console WITHOUT breaking existing callers:
|
||||
* 0pt performs REAL, cryptographic Zitadel (OIDC) Bearer-token verification
|
||||
* (src/auth/zitadel.ts). Enforcement is controlled by AUTH_ENFORCE, and the
|
||||
* DEFAULT IS ENFORCED -- an absent, empty, or misspelled value authenticates:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE != "true" (DEFAULT, non-breaking):
|
||||
* Preserves the historical behavior (no token was ever required; tenant
|
||||
* came from the X-Tenant-Id header / request body). ADDITIONALLY, if a
|
||||
* Bearer token is present and JWT-shaped, we ATTEMPT `verifyBearer` and
|
||||
* attach the verified principal to the resolved context -- but we NEVER
|
||||
* reject on failure in this mode (a warning is logged). This lets tokens
|
||||
* start flowing and being verified with zero caller migration.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE == "true" (enforced):
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE unset, or any value except "false" (DEFAULT, enforced):
|
||||
* REQUIRES a valid, verified token on every non-exempt route. The tenant
|
||||
* is derived from the TOKEN (not the X-Tenant-Id header). Missing/invalid
|
||||
* token -> 401 (OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED). If an X-Tenant-Id header is present
|
||||
* and disagrees with the token's tenant -> 403 (OPT_ACCESS_DENIED).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* AUTH_ENFORCE == "false" (explicit local-development escape hatch):
|
||||
* No token is required; the tenant comes from the X-Tenant-Id header /
|
||||
* request body. A present, JWT-shaped Bearer token is still best-effort
|
||||
* verified and attached, but never rejected. This mode is REFUSED in
|
||||
* production: {@link assertAuthConfigSafe} throws when NODE_ENV=production,
|
||||
* so an instance that loses (or mis-sets) the variable cannot serve
|
||||
* openly -- it fails to start, and fails the request, instead.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* WHY THE INVERSION: the predicate previously read `AUTH_ENFORCE === 'true'`,
|
||||
* so every fresh container, local run, DR restore, or redeploy that dropped
|
||||
* the variable ran with NO authentication at all, and `.env.example` shipped
|
||||
* `AUTH_ENFORCE=false`. Absence now means enforced.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This module is framework-neutral: it takes a minimal header-lookup (the Web
|
||||
* `Headers` interface satisfies it, as does Next's `NextRequest.headers`) and
|
||||
* returns a decision object. It does NOT import next/*, so it is fully
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +43,7 @@ export interface HeaderLookup {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface OptRequestContext {
|
||||
/** Tenant id: from the token in enforce mode, else from X-Tenant-Id header. */
|
||||
/** Tenant id: from the token when enforced, else from the X-Tenant-Id header. */
|
||||
tenantId: string;
|
||||
/** Actor id: from X-Actor-Id header, falling back to the token subject. */
|
||||
actorId: string;
|
||||
@@ -61,9 +66,57 @@ export type AuthDecision =
|
||||
ctx: OptRequestContext;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/** True when hard auth enforcement is switched on (AUTH_ENFORCE=="true"). */
|
||||
export function authEnforced(): boolean {
|
||||
return process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE === 'true';
|
||||
/** Name of the environment variable that can switch enforcement off. */
|
||||
export const AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR = 'AUTH_ENFORCE';
|
||||
|
||||
/** The only two environment values this module reads; injectable for tests. */
|
||||
export interface AuthEnvView {
|
||||
AUTH_ENFORCE?: string;
|
||||
NODE_ENV?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Snapshot the auth-relevant environment. `process.env.NODE_ENV` is written
|
||||
* literally so bundlers (Next's edge compiler) inline it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function currentEnv(): AuthEnvView {
|
||||
return { AUTH_ENFORCE: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE, NODE_ENV: process.env.NODE_ENV };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* True unless enforcement was EXPLICITLY disabled with AUTH_ENFORCE="false".
|
||||
*
|
||||
* FAIL-CLOSED: unset, empty, "flase", "0", or any other value => ENFORCED.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function authEnforced(env: AuthEnvView = currentEnv()): boolean {
|
||||
return env.AUTH_ENFORCE?.trim().toLowerCase() !== 'false';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Thrown when the process is configured to run without auth in production. */
|
||||
export class AuthMisconfigurationError extends Error {
|
||||
constructor(message: string) {
|
||||
super(message);
|
||||
this.name = 'AuthMisconfigurationError';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Refuse to run open in production. Throws {@link AuthMisconfigurationError}
|
||||
* when NODE_ENV=production and enforcement resolved to OFF.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Called at module scope by middleware.ts (startup) AND on the env-driven
|
||||
* request path below, so a misconfigured production instance can neither boot
|
||||
* nor serve a single unauthenticated request.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function assertAuthConfigSafe(env: AuthEnvView = currentEnv()): void {
|
||||
if (env.NODE_ENV === 'production' && !authEnforced(env)) {
|
||||
throw new AuthMisconfigurationError(
|
||||
`0pt refuses to run with authentication disabled in production: ` +
|
||||
`${AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR} is explicitly set to "${env.AUTH_ENFORCE}" while NODE_ENV=production. ` +
|
||||
`Unset ${AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR} (absent = enforced) or set ${AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR}=true. ` +
|
||||
`${AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR}=false is a local-development escape hatch only.`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function firstHeader(headers: HeaderLookup, name: string): string | undefined {
|
||||
@@ -111,23 +164,34 @@ export interface ResolveAuthOptions {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Resolve and (in enforce mode) enforce the request auth context. Returns an
|
||||
* {@link AuthDecision}; the caller (middleware) turns a `!ok` decision into an
|
||||
* HTTP response and an `ok` decision into forwarded principal headers.
|
||||
* Resolve and (when enforced -- the default) enforce the request auth context.
|
||||
* Returns an {@link AuthDecision}; the caller (middleware) turns a `!ok`
|
||||
* decision into an HTTP response and an `ok` decision into forwarded principal
|
||||
* headers.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Throws {@link AuthMisconfigurationError} when the enforcement decision comes
|
||||
* from the environment and that environment is "production with auth off".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function resolveAuthContext(
|
||||
headers: HeaderLookup,
|
||||
opts: ResolveAuthOptions = {},
|
||||
): Promise<AuthDecision> {
|
||||
const verify = opts.verify ?? verifyBearer;
|
||||
const enforce = opts.enforce ?? authEnforced();
|
||||
let enforce: boolean;
|
||||
if (opts.enforce !== undefined) {
|
||||
enforce = opts.enforce;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Never serve openly in production, even if the startup check was bypassed.
|
||||
assertAuthConfigSafe();
|
||||
enforce = authEnforced();
|
||||
}
|
||||
const logger: AuthLogger = opts.logger ?? {
|
||||
warn: (o, m) => console.warn(m ?? 'auth warning', o),
|
||||
};
|
||||
const ctx = readRequestContext(headers);
|
||||
|
||||
if (enforce) {
|
||||
// --- ENFORCED: a valid verified token is mandatory ----------------------
|
||||
// --- ENFORCED (DEFAULT): a valid verified token is mandatory ------------
|
||||
if (!ctx.bearerToken) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
ok: false,
|
||||
@@ -168,19 +232,21 @@ export async function resolveAuthContext(
|
||||
return { ok: true, ctx };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- NON-ENFORCE (default): never reject, best-effort verify --------------
|
||||
// --- EXPLICIT OPT-OUT (AUTH_ENFORCE=false, non-production only) -----------
|
||||
// Never rejects; a present token is best-effort verified so tokens can start
|
||||
// flowing in local development.
|
||||
if (ctx.bearerToken && looksLikeJwt(ctx.bearerToken)) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const principal = await verify(ctx.bearerToken);
|
||||
ctx.principal = principal;
|
||||
// Do NOT overwrite the header/body tenant in non-enforce mode; only
|
||||
// fill it in when the caller supplied none, to stay non-breaking.
|
||||
// Do NOT overwrite the header/body tenant in this mode; only fill it in
|
||||
// when the caller supplied none.
|
||||
if (!ctx.tenantId) ctx.tenantId = principal.tenantId;
|
||||
if (!ctx.actorId) ctx.actorId = principal.sub;
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
logger.warn(
|
||||
{ err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) },
|
||||
'0pt: bearer verification failed (AUTH_ENFORCE off, ignoring)',
|
||||
`0pt: bearer verification failed (${AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR}=false, ignoring)`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,24 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Unit tests for src/auth/context.ts `resolveAuthContext` -- the flag-gated
|
||||
* auth seam. Verification is injected (opts.verify) so these tests are pure
|
||||
* and network-free; they exercise the decision logic in both AUTH_ENFORCE
|
||||
* modes.
|
||||
* Unit tests for src/auth/context.ts -- the auth seam. Verification is
|
||||
* injected (opts.verify) so these tests are pure and network-free.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Three groups:
|
||||
* 1. the ENV DEFAULT (the fail-closed contract: absent AUTH_ENFORCE means
|
||||
* an unauthenticated request is REJECTED, and production refuses to run
|
||||
* with auth switched off),
|
||||
* 2. enforced-mode decision logic,
|
||||
* 3. the explicit `AUTH_ENFORCE=false` local-development escape hatch.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||
import { resolveAuthContext, type OptRequestContext } from '@/src/auth/context';
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
|
||||
import {
|
||||
resolveAuthContext,
|
||||
authEnforced,
|
||||
assertAuthConfigSafe,
|
||||
AuthMisconfigurationError,
|
||||
AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR,
|
||||
type OptRequestContext,
|
||||
} from '@/src/auth/context';
|
||||
import type { VerifiedPrincipal } from '@/src/auth/zitadel';
|
||||
|
||||
const principal: VerifiedPrincipal = {
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +36,77 @@ function h(init: Record<string, string>): Headers {
|
||||
return new Headers(init);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resolveAuthContext -- enforce mode', () => {
|
||||
describe('auth default -- fail-closed (no AUTH_ENFORCE in the environment)', () => {
|
||||
const saved = { auth: process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE, node: process.env.NODE_ENV };
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(() => {
|
||||
if (saved.auth === undefined) delete process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE;
|
||||
else process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = saved.auth;
|
||||
if (saved.node === undefined) delete process.env.NODE_ENV;
|
||||
else process.env.NODE_ENV = saved.node;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('REGRESSION: with the variable unset, an unauthenticated request is REJECTED (401)', async () => {
|
||||
// No `enforce` option -> the decision comes from the environment, which is
|
||||
// exactly the fresh-container / DR-restore / dropped-env-var case.
|
||||
const d = await resolveAuthContext(h({ 'x-tenant-id': 'tenant_attacker' }), { verify: okVerify });
|
||||
expect(d.ok).toBe(false);
|
||||
if (!d.ok) {
|
||||
expect(d.status).toBe(401);
|
||||
expect(d.code).toBe('OPT_UNAUTHENTICATED');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('with the variable unset, an invalid token is REJECTED (401) rather than ignored', async () => {
|
||||
const d = await resolveAuthContext(h({ authorization: 'Bearer bad.tok.en' }), { verify: failVerify });
|
||||
expect(d.ok).toBe(false);
|
||||
if (!d.ok) expect(d.status).toBe(401);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('authEnforced() is true when the variable is absent, empty, or misspelled', () => {
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({})).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: '' })).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: 'flase' })).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: '0' })).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: 'no' })).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: 'true' })).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('only the literal string "false" opts out', () => {
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: 'false' })).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: 'FALSE' })).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(authEnforced({ AUTH_ENFORCE: ' false ' })).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('assertAuthConfigSafe throws in production when enforcement is off, naming the variable', () => {
|
||||
expect(() => assertAuthConfigSafe({ NODE_ENV: 'production', AUTH_ENFORCE: 'false' })).toThrow(
|
||||
AuthMisconfigurationError,
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(() => assertAuthConfigSafe({ NODE_ENV: 'production', AUTH_ENFORCE: 'false' })).toThrow(
|
||||
new RegExp(AUTH_ENFORCE_VAR),
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('assertAuthConfigSafe is silent when production enforces, or when off outside production', () => {
|
||||
expect(() => assertAuthConfigSafe({ NODE_ENV: 'production' })).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(() => assertAuthConfigSafe({ NODE_ENV: 'production', AUTH_ENFORCE: 'true' })).not.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(() => assertAuthConfigSafe({ NODE_ENV: 'development', AUTH_ENFORCE: 'false' })).not.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('a production process with AUTH_ENFORCE=false cannot serve a request at all (throws)', async () => {
|
||||
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
|
||||
process.env.AUTH_ENFORCE = 'false';
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
resolveAuthContext(h({ 'x-tenant-id': 'tenant_attacker' }), { verify: okVerify }),
|
||||
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(AuthMisconfigurationError);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resolveAuthContext -- enforced mode (the default)', () => {
|
||||
it('401s when no bearer token is present', async () => {
|
||||
const d = await resolveAuthContext(h({ 'x-tenant-id': 'tenant_x' }), { enforce: true, verify: okVerify });
|
||||
expect(d.ok).toBe(false);
|
||||
@@ -78,7 +160,7 @@ describe('resolveAuthContext -- enforce mode', () => {
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('resolveAuthContext -- non-enforce (default) mode', () => {
|
||||
describe('resolveAuthContext -- explicit AUTH_ENFORCE=false escape hatch (local dev only)', () => {
|
||||
it('never rejects when no token is present', async () => {
|
||||
const d = await resolveAuthContext(h({ 'x-tenant-id': 'tenant_header' }), {
|
||||
enforce: false,
|
||||
@@ -111,7 +193,7 @@ describe('resolveAuthContext -- non-enforce (default) mode', () => {
|
||||
expect(d.ok).toBe(true);
|
||||
if (d.ok) {
|
||||
expect(d.ctx.principal).toEqual(principal);
|
||||
// non-breaking: caller-supplied header tenant is preserved
|
||||
// the caller-supplied header tenant is preserved in this mode
|
||||
expect(d.ctx.tenantId).toBe('tenant_header');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user