02f94ef631
* fix: add 15s timeout to accounting provider HTTP clients Node's built-in fetch has no default timeout, so a stalled provider could hold a serverless worker open for many minutes — worse with withRetry (6x on Fortnox, 3x on others) and getPaginated stacking across pages. Wrap each fetch() in the Fortnox, Visma, Bokio, Briox, and Björn Lundén clients with signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000), and treat TimeoutError/AbortError as retryable so a single stalled attempt retries cleanly instead of hanging the request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add timeouts to OAuth token endpoints Wrap every OAuth2 token exchange, refresh, and revoke POST in an AbortController via a new fetchWithTimeout helper. Without this, a hung provider endpoint holds the request thread indefinitely — worst case being Skatteverket, where refreshAccessToken sits on the hot path of every bookkeeping action and exchangeCodeForTokens races the 5-minute BankID auth-code TTL. On timeout, the Skatteverket OAuth callback now redirects to /reports?tab=vat-declaration with a Swedish retry message instead of leaving the user stranded on the callback URL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: close RLS escalation on membership and settings tables Any authenticated user who was a member (including viewer) could issue a direct PostgREST PATCH against company_members and promote themselves to owner, bypassing the app-layer requireWritePermission guard entirely. Reproduced on prod, then verified the fix on staging. Tighten INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies on company_members, team_members, api_keys, company_invitations, team_invitations, companies, teams, and company_settings to require the caller to hold role IN ('owner','admin') in the target company/team. Role check is wrapped in SECURITY DEFINER helpers (user_is_company_admin, user_is_team_admin, user_role_in_company) to avoid RLS recursion when a policy on company_members references company_members in its subquery. Add a BEFORE UPDATE trigger on company_members that rejects any role change unless the caller already holds role='owner', so admins cannot mint further owners even though they can otherwise write. Legitimate write paths are unaffected: company creation goes through the create_company_with_owner SECURITY DEFINER RPC, invite acceptance uses the service role, and team->company membership syncs via SECURITY DEFINER triggers. All bypass RLS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): resolve duplicate schema_migrations version 20260421160000 Two migration files shared timestamp 20260421160000 on main (booking_template_usage.sql and opening_balances_rpc.sql), causing supabase_migrations.schema_migrations PK collisions on any fresh CI run: duplicate key value violates unique constraint "schema_migrations_pkey" Key (version)=(20260421160000) already exists. Bump opening_balances_rpc.sql to 20260421160500. booking_template_usage keeps 20260421160000 because its table already exists on prod; the renamed file has an idempotent CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION body and has not yet been deployed to prod, so moving its version is free. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): make booking_template_usage migration idempotent The table already exists on prod (applied out-of-band) but prod's schema_migrations does not track version 20260421160000, so the next PR-driven deploy would re-run this migration and fail on `CREATE TABLE public.booking_template_usage` with a duplicate-relation error. Add IF NOT EXISTS to CREATE TABLE and CREATE INDEX, and DROP POLICY IF EXISTS before each CREATE POLICY. No functional change on fresh databases; prod just silently no-ops the table/index creates and re-declares policies without dropping-then-missing them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: implement isTimeoutError utility and enforce role restrictions on company_members insert * fix: implement fallback for user_id in commit_journal_entry function when auth.uid() is NULL --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
55 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
55 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Thin `fetch` wrapper that aborts after a deadline.
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*
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* Used by OAuth token endpoints where a hung provider would otherwise hold
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* the request thread indefinitely. The Skatteverket callback handler also
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* relies on `TimeoutError` to distinguish a hung token exchange (where the
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* 5-minute BankID auth code may expire mid-call) from other failures.
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*/
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export class TimeoutError extends Error {
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readonly name = 'TimeoutError'
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}
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export function isTimeoutError(error: unknown): boolean {
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return (
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error instanceof Error &&
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(error.name === 'TimeoutError' || error.name === 'AbortError')
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)
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}
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export const OAUTH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000
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export const OAUTH_REVOKE_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000
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export const SKATTEVERKET_EXCHANGE_TIMEOUT_MS = 8_000
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interface FetchWithTimeoutOptions {
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timeoutMs: number
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description: string
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}
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export async function fetchWithTimeout(
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input: RequestInfo | URL,
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init: RequestInit,
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options: FetchWithTimeoutOptions,
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): Promise<Response> {
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const { timeoutMs, description } = options
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const timeoutSignal = AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs)
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const signal = init.signal
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? AbortSignal.any([init.signal, timeoutSignal])
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: timeoutSignal
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try {
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return await fetch(input, { ...init, signal })
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} catch (err) {
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if (
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timeoutSignal.aborted &&
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err instanceof Error &&
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(err.name === 'TimeoutError' || err.name === 'AbortError')
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) {
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throw new TimeoutError(`${description} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`)
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}
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throw err
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}
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}
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