Files
accounted/lib/entitlements/keys.ts
T
Mattsson c187fabf92 feat(shopify): Shopify order/refund feed into the transactions inbox (#1474)
* feat(shopify): Shopify order/refund feed into the transactions inbox

New extensions/general/shopify feed extension, modeled on the WooCommerce
feed: connect a Shopify store with Dev Dashboard custom-app client
credentials (client credentials grant, ~24h tokens, never stored), then a
nightly cron + manual sync imports paid orders and refunds via the GraphQL
Admin API (pinned 2026-07) into the transactions inbox on clearing account
1584. Feed-only: nothing auto-books. Zero PII fields are queried, keeping
the app outside Shopify's protected customer data program.

- shopify_connections migration (RLS, revoke-never-delete, encrypted
  client id/secret) + shopify_sync capability and bank_sync-mirrored
  backfill
- frozen external_id scheme shopify_{shop_domain}_order|refund_{id},
  scoped on the shop domain so reconnects never re-import
- cursor sync on updated_at windows with 24h overlap, lock-date drop at
  map time, ingest-failure cursor floor, deadline stop-and-resume,
  revoked-credential flip
- /import card + settings panel, sv/en i18n, cron 03:15 in vercel.json +
  regenerated Docker crontabs, logo, events, panel registry
- 65 unit tests + pg-real RLS test; extensions.schema.json enum also
  gains the missing stripe entry (pre-existing drift)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(shopify): review findings from PR 1474

- token exchange: a 429 that survives every retry is throttling, not a
  credential failure; stop remapping retryable 4xx to 401 so sustained
  throttling can no longer flip the connection to revoked and delete the
  stored credentials (CodeRabbit critical)
- order sync: advance a scanned-through watermark (run start, capped by
  the failure floor) after a fully-listed window, so empty first runs and
  quiet stores rotate to the back of the cron's oldest-first selection
  instead of permanently occupying the 50-connection batch (CodeRabbit
  major, starvation)
- add handler-level tests for the orders cron route (auth 401, disabled
  503, unconfigured no-op, query failure, capability skip, happy path,
  per-connection failure isolation, revoked marking)
- add 401 tests for /sync, /transaction-sync and /disconnect; pin the
  cursor floor rule with a two-order page; stub the encryption key via
  vi.stubEnv
- note in the panel description (sv/en) that orders can mix VAT rates and
  must be split at booking (Swedish review advisory)
- DECISIONS.md: wrap underscore identifiers in backticks (MD037)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 12:44:08 +02:00

127 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Capability keys: the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
*
* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
*/
export const CAPABILITY = {
/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
ai: 'ai',
/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
/** Skatteverket filing/sync (VAT, AGI, skattekonto) via BankID. */
skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
email_send: 'email_send',
/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free: never hold a customer's data hostage). */
cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
migration: 'migration',
/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
/** Stripe Connect: auto payment links on invoices + payment/payout sync. */
stripe_payments: 'stripe_payments',
/** WooCommerce store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
woocommerce_sync: 'woocommerce_sync',
/** Shopify store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
shopify_sync: 'shopify_sync',
} as const
export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
/**
* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
* services only.
*
* KEPT FREE on purpose:
* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login:
* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
*
* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
* as an auth step: what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
* filing service, not the identity check.
*/
export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
CAPABILITY.ai,
CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
CAPABILITY.email_send,
CAPABILITY.stripe_payments,
CAPABILITY.woocommerce_sync,
CAPABILITY.shopify_sync,
] as const
/**
* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). External-service WRITE tools
* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
* stay free: the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
*
* The document upload tools invoke AI (Bedrock document OCR via
* extractInvoiceFields), so they are gated on CAPABILITY.ai: the same paywall
* the HTTP inbox upload/attach/retry paths enforce. Without these entries a
* free-tier API key could trigger paid AI extraction. bank_sync has no MCP
* tool (bank sync is cron/HTTP only).
*/
export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
// AI document OCR (Bedrock): the inbox's paid extraction, reachable via MCP.
gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/**
* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
* committed once the grant has expired, regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
*/
export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
} as const
/**
* Extension workspace → required capability, keyed by `sector/slug`. This is the
* page/nav twin of the API-route gates: an extension whose entire value is a
* paid service should not just 403 its writes but be hidden from the sidebar and
* blocked at the page so a non-payer never lands on a dead workspace.
*
* invoice-inbox is fully gated on `ai`: its reason to exist is the AI field
* extraction (extractInvoiceFields / gnubok_upload_document), already the paid
* chokepoint on every other surface (HTTP upload/attach/retry, the MCP tool).
* Both the sidebar item and the /e/[sector]/[slug] page read this map so the two
* surfaces can never drift apart.
*/
export const EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
'general/invoice-inbox': CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/** Which paid capability (if any) an extension workspace requires to be usable. */
export function requiredCapabilityForExtension(
sector: string,
slug: string,
): CapabilityKey | undefined {
return EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY[`${sector}/${slug}`]
}