The documents bucket SELECT policy only covers the uploader's own folder
(documents/{uid}/...), but document_attachments rows are company-scoped.
Every surface that touched storage with the user-bound client therefore
failed for attachments uploaded by another member of the same company
(colleague uploads, email-inbox ingest attributed to the company creator):
- GET /api/documents/:id 500ed with "Failed to create download URL", so
viewing a bilaga on a verifikat or supplier invoice was broken for
every member except the uploader (support case: Odin Aero, where all
40 documents live in the owner's folder and the second member could
open none of them).
- GET /api/documents/:id/integrity 500ed the same way.
- POST /api/documents/:id/verify failed the storage download.
- invoice-inbox retry-extraction could not download the attachment.
- cloud-backup user-triggered syncs silently dropped colleague-uploaded
documents from the Drive archive (manifest rows flipped to 'error').
Fix: authorize on the user client (RLS + explicit company filter, plus
the membership check where present), then do the storage read with the
service-role client. This is the pattern the inline proxy route and the
v1 download route already use; these five call sites were left behind.
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
106 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
106 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { ensureInitialized } from '@/lib/init'
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import { withRouteContext } from '@/lib/api/with-route-context'
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import { createServiceClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { deleteDocument } from '@/lib/core/documents/document-service'
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import { eventBus } from '@/lib/events'
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import { getErrorMessage as getUserErrorMessage } from '@/lib/errors/get-error-message'
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ensureInitialized()
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/**
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* GET /api/documents/:id
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* Fetch document metadata + signed download URL (60 min expiry)
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*/
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export const GET = withRouteContext<{ params: Promise<{ id: string }> }>(
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'document.get',
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async (_request, { supabase, companyId, user }, { params }) => {
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const { id } = await params
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// Fetch document record
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const { data: doc, error: docError } = await supabase
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.from('document_attachments')
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.select('*')
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.eq('id', id)
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.eq('company_id', companyId)
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.single()
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if (docError || !doc) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Document not found' }, { status: 404 })
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}
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// Sign the download URL (60 minutes) and persist the access event in
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// parallel: both depend only on the row fetch and are independent of
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// each other. The emit stays awaited (event-log-handler's insert must
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// not race Vercel function suspension) and never rejects (the bus
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// settles handlers via Promise.allSettled), so it cannot fail this
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// Promise.all.
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//
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// Sign with the service-role client: the storage SELECT policy only
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// covers the uploader's own folder (documents/{uid}/...), while
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// document_attachments rows are company-scoped. Signing with the
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// user-bound client fails for every attachment uploaded by another
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// member of the same company. The row fetch above (RLS + explicit
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// company filter) is the authorization, mirroring the inline proxy
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// route.
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const serviceClient = createServiceClient()
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const [signResult] = await Promise.all([
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serviceClient.storage.from('documents').createSignedUrl(doc.storage_path, 3600),
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eventBus.emit({
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type: 'document.accessed',
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payload: {
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document: { id: doc.id, file_name: doc.file_name },
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userId: user.id,
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companyId,
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},
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}),
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])
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const { data: signedUrl, error: signError } = signResult
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if (signError) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: `Failed to create download URL: ${getUserErrorMessage(signError)}` },
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{ status: 500 }
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)
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}
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return NextResponse.json({
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data: {
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...doc,
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download_url: signedUrl.signedUrl,
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},
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})
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}
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)
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/**
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* DELETE /api/documents/:id
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* Remove an uploaded document. Only permitted when the document is not yet
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* linked to a journal entry: once linked, it is räkenskapsinformation under
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* BFL 7 kap 2§ and must be retained for 7 years. For linked docs the caller
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* should use POST /api/documents/:id/versions to supersede via a new version.
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*/
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export const DELETE = withRouteContext<{ params: Promise<{ id: string }> }>(
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'document.delete',
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async (_request, { supabase, companyId }, { params }) => {
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const { id } = await params
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try {
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const result = await deleteDocument(supabase, companyId, id)
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if (!result.ok) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: result.message }, { status: result.status })
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}
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return NextResponse.json({ data: { id: result.document.id, deleted: true } })
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} catch (error) {
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console.error('[documents/DELETE] Failed to delete document:', error)
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: error instanceof Error ? getUserErrorMessage(error) : 'Failed to delete document' },
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{ status: 500 }
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)
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}
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},
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{ requireWrite: true }
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)
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