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Mattsson 1c9d378df8 feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts (#1387)
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts

Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding
session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase
session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit
(reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle
activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes
before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a
short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt;
self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars.

Fixes #362

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF

The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so
the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged
credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review
finding on PR #1387.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer

crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed
over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode
base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings

- signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of
  throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line
  with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated
  requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null
- heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or
  session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of
  returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization
- sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as
  a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is
  never accepted on the userId fallback alone
- drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen
  readers are not interrupted every second

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 09:59:42 +02:00

107 lines
5.0 KiB
Docker

# ── Stage 1: Base ──
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:968df39aedcea65eeb078fb336ed7191baf48f972b4479711397108be0966920 AS base
# `apk upgrade` patches OS packages (e.g. libssl3/libcrypto3) that have fixes
# published after the pinned base digest was built, so the Trivy image scan in
# CI doesn't fail on fixable Alpine CVEs. The digest stays pinned for a
# reproducible starting point; only security patches float on top.
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && apk add --no-cache libc6-compat
# ── Stage 2: Dependencies ──
FROM base AS deps
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci
# ── Stage 3: Builder ──
FROM base AS builder
WORKDIR /app
ARG EXTENSIONS_PRESET=self-hosted
COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
# Apply extension preset (must happen before build: prebuild hook
# runs setup:extensions which reads extensions.config.json)
COPY docker/extensions.${EXTENSIONS_PRESET}.json ./extensions.config.json
# Build with placeholder sentinel values for NEXT_PUBLIC_* vars.
# These get replaced at runtime by docker-entrypoint.sh so the image
# is generic and reusable across different Supabase projects.
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL__
# Realtime WebSocket origin for the CSP. Must be its own sentinel: the CSP is
# baked into the build output, so the entrypoint cannot derive wss:// from the
# already-substituted https URL after the fact (issue #893).
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_WS_URL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_WS_URL__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=__NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=__NEXT_PUBLIC_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA=__NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS__
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS=__NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS__
# Keep the branding placeholder intact through prebuild's inject script so
# docker-entrypoint.sh can substitute the runtime value into public/sw.js.
ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_BRANDING_APP_NAME=__NEXT_PUBLIC_BRANDING_APP_NAME__
ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
RUN npm run build
# ── Stage 4: Runner ──
FROM node:22-alpine@sha256:968df39aedcea65eeb078fb336ed7191baf48f972b4479711397108be0966920 AS runner
WORKDIR /app
# Patch OS packages (libssl3/libcrypto3, …) with fixes published after the
# pinned base digest, so CI's Trivy scan doesn't flag fixable Alpine CVEs. No
# su-exec or curl needed: the entrypoint runs unprivileged as nextjs and the
# healthcheck uses BusyBox wget. The runtime runs `node server.js` and never
# invokes npm, so we delete the base image's bundled npm CLI: its vendored deps
# (picomatch, tar, brace-expansion, ip-address) are the packages Trivy flags on
# this image: removing npm clears them at the source and shrinks the attack
# surface.
RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
rm -rf /usr/local/lib/node_modules/npm /usr/local/bin/npm /usr/local/bin/npx
ENV NODE_ENV=production
ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
RUN addgroup --system --gid 1001 nodejs && \
adduser --system --uid 1001 -G nodejs nextjs
# /app at runtime is split across the read-only image layer and tmpfs mounts:
# /app/server.js, /app/node_modules/, /app/package.json : image (read-only)
# /app/.next/ : tmpfs (writable)
# /app/public/ : tmpfs (writable)
# The entrypoint runs UNPRIVILEGED as nextjs: it copies the templates from
# /opt/gnubok-template/ into the nextjs-owned tmpfs mounts, substitutes the
# NEXT_PUBLIC_* placeholders, then drops the write bits. Because it never needs
# to chown or setuid, the container runs under docker-compose's `cap_drop: ALL`
# + `read_only: true` with no added capabilities.
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/server.js ./server.js
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/package.json ./package.json
# Baked-in templates for runtime population of the tmpfs mounts.
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone/.next /opt/gnubok-template/.next
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/static /opt/gnubok-template/.next/static
COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/public /opt/gnubok-template/public
# Pre-create the tmpfs mount points (empty in the image layer; the entrypoint
# fills them at startup). Owned by nextjs so the unprivileged entrypoint can
# write into the tmpfs mounted over them.
RUN mkdir -p /app/.next/cache /app/public && \
chown nextjs:nodejs /app /app/.next /app/.next/cache /app/public
COPY --chmod=755 --chown=nextjs:nodejs docker-entrypoint.sh ./docker-entrypoint.sh
USER nextjs
EXPOSE 3000
ENV PORT=3000
ENV HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0
ENTRYPOINT ["./docker-entrypoint.sh"]
CMD ["node", "server.js"]