* fix(mcp): grace window + idempotent refresh-token replay for OAuth (#710) OAuth refresh rotated BOTH the refresh token and the access key in one zero-grace CAS. Claude Code's MCP OAuth client fails to persist the rotated refresh token (or fires concurrent refreshes), re-presents the stale one, the CAS matches 0 rows, and the grant dies with invalid_grant — forcing a full re-authorization roughly every 60s in a loop. Regression from #392. Keep rotation (RFC 9700 §4.14.2 requires it for public clients) but add a bounded grace window with idempotent replay, atomic in one SECURITY DEFINER RPC: - Migration adds previous_key_hash / previous_refresh_token_hash (+ *_expires_at) shadow columns. validate_and_increment_api_key accepts the current OR an unexpired previous key_hash, with the rate-limit increment keyed off the resolved row id. - New rotate_mcp_refresh_token RPC: rotated | replayed | reuse_revoked | revoked | invalid. In-grace replay re-issues a fresh pair and slides the window so an actively-refreshing client that cannot persist the rotated token keeps working; reuse after the window revokes the grant family (RFC 9700 4.14.2 reuse detection preserved). - The refresh grant now calls the one RPC, closing the old SELECT-then-CAS TOCTOU gap. All previous_* columns default NULL, so existing keys are unaffected and the RPC return shape is unchanged (callers untouched). Tests: rewired the token-route unit tests to the RPC and replaced the test that codified the bug with a #710 regression (in-grace replay returns 200, not 400); added tests/pg/mcp-oauth-rotation-grace.pg.test.ts (grace accept/expire, revoke-never-graced, rotate->demote, idempotent replay, reuse-after-grace->revoke). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: retrigger checks for #714 No code change — re-running CI. The Supabase Preview check fails on a pre-existing main-branch migration-history drift ("Remote migration versions not found in local migrations directory"), not this PR; pg-real (full migration replay) passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
251 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
251 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { decryptAuthCode, verifyPkce, hashAuthCode } from '@/lib/auth/oauth-codes'
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import {
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generateApiKey,
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generateRefreshToken,
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hashRefreshToken,
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createServiceClientNoCookies,
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validateScopes,
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DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES,
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type ApiKeyScope,
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} from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
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import { requireCompanyId } from '@/lib/company/context'
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const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 3600
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// Grace window (seconds) during which a just-superseded access token and refresh
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// token stay valid after a rotation. Lets a client that cannot reliably persist
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// the rotated refresh token — or that fires concurrent refreshes — recover via
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// idempotent replay instead of being forced into a re-auth loop (issue #710).
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// Reuse of a previous refresh token AFTER this window revokes the grant.
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const REFRESH_GRACE_SECONDS = 120
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/**
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* OAuth 2.0 Token Endpoint.
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*
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* Supports two grant types:
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* - authorization_code: exchange a PKCE-protected auth code for a fresh
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* api_key (access_token) plus a refresh_token.
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* - refresh_token: rotate the refresh_token and return the same api_key
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* with a fresh expires_in. The api_key itself does not expire
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* server-side; expires_in is a hint so clients refresh on a cadence.
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*/
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export async function POST(request: Request) {
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let params: URLSearchParams
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const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') || ''
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if (contentType.includes('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {
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const text = await request.text()
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params = new URLSearchParams(text)
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} else if (contentType.includes('application/json')) {
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const json = await request.json()
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params = new URLSearchParams(json as Record<string, string>)
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} else {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'unsupported_content_type' }, { status: 400 })
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}
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const grantType = params.get('grant_type')
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if (grantType === 'authorization_code') {
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return handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(params)
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}
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if (grantType === 'refresh_token') {
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return handleRefreshTokenGrant(params)
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}
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return NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: 'unsupported_grant_type',
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error_description: 'Only authorization_code and refresh_token are supported',
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},
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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async function handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(params: URLSearchParams) {
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const code = params.get('code')
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const codeVerifier = params.get('code_verifier')
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const redirectUri = params.get('redirect_uri')
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if (!code) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'Missing code parameter' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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const payload = decryptAuthCode(code)
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if (!payload) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Invalid or expired authorization code' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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if (redirectUri && redirectUri !== payload.redirectUri) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'redirect_uri mismatch' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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if (!codeVerifier) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'code_verifier is required' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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if (!verifyPkce(codeVerifier, payload.codeChallenge)) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'PKCE verification failed' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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const codeHash = hashAuthCode(code)
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const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
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const { error: replayError } = await supabase
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.from('oauth_used_codes')
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.insert({ code_hash: codeHash })
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if (replayError) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Authorization code already used' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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// Clean up expired codes (non-blocking, best-effort)
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supabase
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.from('oauth_used_codes')
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.delete()
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.lt('created_at', new Date(Date.now() - 10 * 60 * 1000).toISOString())
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.then(() => {})
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const companyId = await requireCompanyId(supabase, payload.userId)
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const { key, hash, prefix } = generateApiKey()
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const refresh = generateRefreshToken()
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// Use the scopes the user consented to during /authorize. Re-validate
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// every value against API_KEY_SCOPES even though /authorize already did
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// — the auth code is AEAD-encrypted but we treat the boundary as
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// hostile by default (V9.2.1, defense-in-depth).
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let grantedScopes: ApiKeyScope[]
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if (payload.scopes && Array.isArray(payload.scopes) && payload.scopes.length > 0) {
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const revalidated = validateScopes(payload.scopes)
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if (!revalidated) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Authorization code carried no valid scopes' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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grantedScopes = revalidated
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} else {
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// Code minted with no scope (Claude's existing flow). Fall back to the
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// read-only OAuth defaults — destructive scopes must be requested
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// explicitly (GDPR Art. 25(2)).
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grantedScopes = DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES
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}
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const { error: insertError } = await supabase
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.from('api_keys')
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.insert({
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user_id: payload.userId,
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company_id: companyId,
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key_hash: hash,
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key_prefix: prefix,
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name: 'MCP-klient (OAuth)',
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scopes: grantedScopes,
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refresh_token_hash: refresh.hash,
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})
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if (insertError) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'server_error', error_description: 'Failed to create API key' },
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{ status: 500 }
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)
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}
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return NextResponse.json({
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access_token: key,
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
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refresh_token: refresh.token,
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scope: grantedScopes.join(' '),
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})
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}
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async function handleRefreshTokenGrant(params: URLSearchParams) {
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const refreshToken = params.get('refresh_token')
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if (!refreshToken) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'refresh_token is required' },
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
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const presentedHash = hashRefreshToken(refreshToken)
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// Pre-generate the candidate credentials; the RPC decides whether to use them
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// (rotate / idempotent replay) or ignore them (reuse / revoked / invalid).
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// Doing lookup + rotate + demote in ONE SECURITY DEFINER RPC closes the
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// TOCTOU gap the old SELECT-then-CAS had, and lets a just-superseded refresh
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// token stay valid for a grace window so a client that cannot persist the
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// rotated token — or fires concurrent refreshes — recovers instead of being
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// forced into a re-auth loop (issue #710). Reuse AFTER the grace window
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// revokes the grant (RFC 9700 §4.14.2 reuse detection).
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const rotated = generateRefreshToken()
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const { key: newKey, hash: newKeyHash, prefix: newKeyPrefix } = generateApiKey()
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const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('rotate_mcp_refresh_token', {
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p_presented_hash: presentedHash,
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p_new_refresh_hash: rotated.hash,
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p_new_key_hash: newKeyHash,
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p_new_key_prefix: newKeyPrefix,
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p_grace_seconds: REFRESH_GRACE_SECONDS,
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})
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if (error) {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: 'server_error', error_description: 'Failed to rotate refresh token' },
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{ status: 500 }
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)
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}
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const result = (Array.isArray(data) ? data[0] : data) as
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| { outcome: string; scopes: string[] | null }
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| undefined
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const outcome = result?.outcome
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// 'rotated' (normal) and 'replayed' (idempotent in-grace retry/concurrent)
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// both succeed and return the freshly minted pair. Everything else maps to
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// invalid_grant; for 'reuse_revoked' the grant was already revoked in the RPC.
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if (outcome !== 'rotated' && outcome !== 'replayed') {
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return NextResponse.json(
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{
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error: 'invalid_grant',
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error_description:
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outcome === 'revoked' ? 'Refresh token revoked' : 'Invalid or expired refresh token',
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},
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{ status: 400 }
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)
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}
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// Carry the granular scopes the key was minted with (read-only OAuth defaults
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// for legacy keys with null scopes) so clients don't re-authorize on refresh.
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const persistedScopes = validateScopes(result?.scopes ?? null) ?? DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES
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return NextResponse.json({
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access_token: newKey,
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token_type: 'Bearer',
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expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
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refresh_token: rotated.token,
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scope: persistedScopes.join(' '),
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})
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}
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