Files
accounted/lib/entitlements/keys.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5 aabddb592f feat(billing): multi-user paywall: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy (#2099)
* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy

Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the
eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status
column, no enforcement cron:

- entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works
- grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone
  in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed
- frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows
  untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell

Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin
untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated
query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP
company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a
new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies.

Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds
multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team
agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20
days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at
grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

* fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review

- Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting
  it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one
  froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other
  stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete.
- New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration
  20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState:
  capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so
  user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch
  refusal, wrong switcher locks).
- Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill +
  teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by
  design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and
  client user.
- Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user
  (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two).
- /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403).
- PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user
  rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy).
- Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips
  the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort.
- Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new
  RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

* fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws

CI round 1 on #2099:
- isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test
  suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from
  inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s.
  multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the
  same env reads, now inlined.
- getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client
  without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out.
- no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or()
  scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's
  timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

* fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3)

company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and
were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any
logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace
deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging)
requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is
present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the
grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member
reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 11:29:12 +02:00

179 lines
8.7 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Capability keys: the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
*
* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
*/
export const CAPABILITY = {
/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
ai: 'ai',
/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
/** Skatteverket filing/sync (VAT, AGI, skattekonto) via BankID. */
skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
email_send: 'email_send',
/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free: never hold a customer's data hostage). */
cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
migration: 'migration',
/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
/** Stripe Connect: auto payment links on invoices + payment/payout sync. */
stripe_payments: 'stripe_payments',
/** WooCommerce store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
woocommerce_sync: 'woocommerce_sync',
/** Shopify store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
shopify_sync: 'shopify_sync',
/**
* Multiple people working in one company. Without it only the OWNER can
* enter the company: every other membership goes dormant (never deleted)
* after a 20-day post-lapse grace window, and new invites are blocked.
* See lib/entitlements/multi-user.ts for the derived entitled/grace/frozen
* state; company_capability_config does NOT apply to this key (it gates
* member access, not a feature surface).
*/
multi_user: 'multi_user',
/**
* Invoice email from the company's own verified sending domain (Resend
* domain per company). Opt-in: granted manually per company, NOT part of
* PAID_CAPABILITIES, so it is never trial-seeded or written by the Stripe
* subscription sync. Without the grant the settings section is hidden and
* mail keeps leaving from the platform sender.
*/
custom_sender_domain: 'custom_sender_domain',
} as const
export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
/**
* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
* services only.
*
* KEPT FREE on purpose:
* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login:
* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
*
* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
* as an auth step: what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
* filing service, not the identity check.
*/
export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
CAPABILITY.ai,
CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
CAPABILITY.email_send,
CAPABILITY.stripe_payments,
CAPABILITY.woocommerce_sync,
CAPABILITY.shopify_sync,
// Founder decision (2026-09-01): multiple users per company is paid.
// Trial-seeded and Stripe-synced like the rest; enforcement is the
// owner-only dormancy rule in lib/entitlements/multi-user.ts.
CAPABILITY.multi_user,
] as const
/**
* Capabilities that a SELF-HOSTED instance cannot provide on its own because
* they run on services Accounted operates (the PSD2/AISP bank connection,
* the Skatteverket API client, the TIC lookup contract, the migration
* gateway). On hosted these follow the normal paywall (bank_sync and
* skatteverket are in PAID_CAPABILITIES; org_lookup and migration are free).
* On a self-host every other capability is always on, and exactly these fall
* through to the grant lookup: the hourly connector sync writes
* `source = 'connector'` grants for them from the instance's connector key
* (lib/connect/instance, arriving with the connector-keys stack PR #1748).
* A self-host serving an upstream from its OWN credentials holds that
* capability outright (see own-credentials.ts): only keyless-and-credential-
* less connector capabilities are withheld. Deliberately NOT part of
* PAID_CAPABILITIES and NOT seeded by the trial trigger: hosted companies
* never receive connector grants.
*/
export const CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
CAPABILITY.org_lookup,
CAPABILITY.migration,
] as const
export function isConnectorCapability(key: CapabilityKey): boolean {
return (CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES as readonly string[]).includes(key)
}
/**
* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). External-service WRITE tools
* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
* stay free: the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
*
* The document upload tools invoke AI (Bedrock document OCR via
* extractInvoiceFields), so they are gated on CAPABILITY.ai: the same paywall
* the HTTP inbox upload/attach/retry paths enforce. Without these entries a
* free-tier API key could trigger paid AI extraction. bank_sync gates only
* gnubok_connect_bank (the onboarding connect link); the sync itself is
* cron/HTTP only.
*/
export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
// Onboarding connect-link tools (issue #1814): gated like the links' targets.
gnubok_connect_bank: CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
gnubok_connect_skatteverket: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
// AI document OCR (Bedrock): the inbox's paid extraction, reachable via MCP.
gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/**
* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
* committed once the grant has expired, regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
*/
export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
} as const
/**
* Extension workspace → required capability, keyed by `sector/slug`. This is the
* page/nav twin of the API-route gates: an extension whose entire value is a
* paid service should not just 403 its writes but be hidden from the sidebar and
* blocked at the page so a non-payer never lands on a dead workspace.
*
* invoice-inbox is fully gated on `ai`: its reason to exist is the AI field
* extraction (extractInvoiceFields / gnubok_upload_document), already the paid
* chokepoint on every other surface (HTTP upload/attach/retry, the MCP tool).
* Both the sidebar item and the /e/[sector]/[slug] page read this map so the two
* surfaces can never drift apart.
*/
export const EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
'general/invoice-inbox': CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/** Which paid capability (if any) an extension workspace requires to be usable. */
export function requiredCapabilityForExtension(
sector: string,
slug: string,
): CapabilityKey | undefined {
return EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY[`${sector}/${slug}`]
}