* feat(billing): multi-user seat gate: multi_user capability, 20-day grace, owner-only dormancy Multiple people in one company becomes a paid capability (multi_user, the eighth PAID key). Derived at access time from capability_grants, no status column, no enforcement cron: - entitled: active grant (trial/stripe/team/manual/comp), everyone works - grace: newest grant expired < 20 days ago; countdown banner for everyone in companies with > 1 user; invites still allowed - frozen: only role=owner resolves; other memberships go dormant (rows untouched, paying reactivates instantly); invites 403 with paid-plan upsell Enforcement: new resolve_active_company_gated RPC (zero-arg RPC and RLS twin untouched: they also run on self-hosts, where the gate never bites), gated query fallback for service-role/API-key paths, setActiveCompany guard, MCP company-access check, invite route. Middleware routes all-frozen users to a new /paused page; the switcher greys locked companies. Migration 20260901081417 (applied to staging): trial trigger seeds multi_user, backfills for mid-trial companies, active Stripe subs, team agreements, and a grandfather grant (expires now, i.e. grace = deploy + 20 days) for existing unpaid multi-member companies. Daily cron mails owners at grace start and last day. Strings in sv+en; pg-real + unit tests included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): multi-user seat gate hardening from skeptic review - Stripe cancel now EXPIRES the multi_user stripe grant instead of deleting it: the 20-day grace window hangs on an expired row, so a deleted one froze churned payers' staff instantly with no banner and no mail. Other stripe grants keep the freeze-and-retain delete. - New SECURITY DEFINER company_multi_user_state() RPC (migration 20260901083726, applied to staging) and RPC-first getMultiUserState: capability_grants RLS hides team-scoped rows from non-team users, so user-client reads misread byra-covered companies as frozen (switch refusal, wrong switcher locks). - Byra-kind teams get a standing team-scoped multi_user grant (backfill + teams trigger): byra client companies have no company-scoped trial by design, so a grantless byra team would freeze every consultant and client user. - Comped/manual companies with active PAID-key grants extend to multi_user (a comped company must not read as paying while locking out user two). - /api/v1 gets the same dormancy gate as MCP (frozen non-owner -> 403). - PGRST202 on resolution fails OPEN (pre-migration DB has zero multi_user rows; the gated fallback would have frozen every non-owner mid-deploy). - Grace cron: covers team-scoped lapses (byra agreement ending) and skips the start mail for the hand-mailed grandfather cohort. - Tests updated/added across all touched surfaces; pg tests for the new RPC and byra trigger; trial-suppression pg test extended to 8 keys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): decouple seat-gate env check and fail open on gate read throws CI round 1 on #2099: - isMultiUserEnforced no longer imports has-capability: several route test suites partially mock that module and the vitest mock guard threw from inside the v1 seat gate, turning expected 4xx responses into 500s. multi_user is never a connector capability, so the bypass reduces to the same env reads, now inlined. - getMultiUserState wraps its resolution in a fail-open try/catch: a client without .rpc or a thrown network error must never lock users out. - no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 -> 393 with reasons: the seat gate's .or() scope filter (server-resolved UUIDs) and the Stripe cancel expiry update's timestamp .or(); all columns in both strings are literals. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP * fix(billing): membership-guard the multi-user entitlement RPCs (Superagent P3) company_multi_user_ok and company_multi_user_state are SECURITY DEFINER and were granted to authenticated with a caller-supplied company UUID: any logged-in user could probe an arbitrary company's billing state and grace deadline across tenants. Migration 20260901091752 (applied to staging) requires an auth.uid() membership in the target company when a JWT is present, keeps service-role/definer contexts unrestricted, and clamps the grace window to [0, 20] days. pg tests: stranger gets false/NULL, member reads normally, oversized p_grace_days cannot widen the probe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01L4tNt8wRG3a5iuU1JE2pnP --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
179 lines
8.7 KiB
TypeScript
179 lines
8.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Capability keys: the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
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* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
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* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
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* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
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*
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* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
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* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
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*/
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export const CAPABILITY = {
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/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
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ai: 'ai',
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/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
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bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
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/** Skatteverket filing/sync (VAT, AGI, skattekonto) via BankID. */
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skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
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/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
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email_send: 'email_send',
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/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
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org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
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/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
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vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
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/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
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currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
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/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free: never hold a customer's data hostage). */
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cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
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/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
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migration: 'migration',
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/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
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bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
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/** Stripe Connect: auto payment links on invoices + payment/payout sync. */
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stripe_payments: 'stripe_payments',
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/** WooCommerce store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
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woocommerce_sync: 'woocommerce_sync',
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/** Shopify store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
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shopify_sync: 'shopify_sync',
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/**
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* Multiple people working in one company. Without it only the OWNER can
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* enter the company: every other membership goes dormant (never deleted)
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* after a 20-day post-lapse grace window, and new invites are blocked.
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* See lib/entitlements/multi-user.ts for the derived entitled/grace/frozen
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* state; company_capability_config does NOT apply to this key (it gates
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* member access, not a feature surface).
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*/
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multi_user: 'multi_user',
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/**
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* Invoice email from the company's own verified sending domain (Resend
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* domain per company). Opt-in: granted manually per company, NOT part of
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* PAID_CAPABILITIES, so it is never trial-seeded or written by the Stripe
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* subscription sync. Without the grant the settings section is hidden and
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* mail keeps leaving from the platform sender.
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*/
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custom_sender_domain: 'custom_sender_domain',
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} as const
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export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
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/**
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* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
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* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
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* services only.
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*
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* KEPT FREE on purpose:
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* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login:
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* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
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* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
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* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
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*
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* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
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* as an auth step: what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
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* filing service, not the identity check.
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*/
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export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
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CAPABILITY.ai,
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CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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CAPABILITY.email_send,
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CAPABILITY.stripe_payments,
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CAPABILITY.woocommerce_sync,
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CAPABILITY.shopify_sync,
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// Founder decision (2026-09-01): multiple users per company is paid.
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// Trial-seeded and Stripe-synced like the rest; enforcement is the
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// owner-only dormancy rule in lib/entitlements/multi-user.ts.
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CAPABILITY.multi_user,
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] as const
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/**
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* Capabilities that a SELF-HOSTED instance cannot provide on its own because
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* they run on services Accounted operates (the PSD2/AISP bank connection,
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* the Skatteverket API client, the TIC lookup contract, the migration
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* gateway). On hosted these follow the normal paywall (bank_sync and
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* skatteverket are in PAID_CAPABILITIES; org_lookup and migration are free).
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* On a self-host every other capability is always on, and exactly these fall
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* through to the grant lookup: the hourly connector sync writes
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* `source = 'connector'` grants for them from the instance's connector key
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* (lib/connect/instance, arriving with the connector-keys stack PR #1748).
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* A self-host serving an upstream from its OWN credentials holds that
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* capability outright (see own-credentials.ts): only keyless-and-credential-
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* less connector capabilities are withheld. Deliberately NOT part of
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* PAID_CAPABILITIES and NOT seeded by the trial trigger: hosted companies
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* never receive connector grants.
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*/
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export const CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
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CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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CAPABILITY.org_lookup,
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CAPABILITY.migration,
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] as const
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export function isConnectorCapability(key: CapabilityKey): boolean {
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return (CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES as readonly string[]).includes(key)
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}
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/**
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* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
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* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
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* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). External-service WRITE tools
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* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
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* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
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* stay free: the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
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*
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* The document upload tools invoke AI (Bedrock document OCR via
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* extractInvoiceFields), so they are gated on CAPABILITY.ai: the same paywall
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* the HTTP inbox upload/attach/retry paths enforce. Without these entries a
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* free-tier API key could trigger paid AI extraction. bank_sync gates only
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* gnubok_connect_bank (the onboarding connect link); the sync itself is
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* cron/HTTP only.
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*/
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export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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// Onboarding connect-link tools (issue #1814): gated like the links' targets.
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gnubok_connect_bank: CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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gnubok_connect_skatteverket: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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// AI document OCR (Bedrock): the inbox's paid extraction, reachable via MCP.
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gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
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gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
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gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
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} as const
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/**
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* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
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* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
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* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
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* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
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* committed once the grant has expired, regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
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* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
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*/
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export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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} as const
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/**
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* Extension workspace → required capability, keyed by `sector/slug`. This is the
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* page/nav twin of the API-route gates: an extension whose entire value is a
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* paid service should not just 403 its writes but be hidden from the sidebar and
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* blocked at the page so a non-payer never lands on a dead workspace.
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*
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* invoice-inbox is fully gated on `ai`: its reason to exist is the AI field
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* extraction (extractInvoiceFields / gnubok_upload_document), already the paid
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* chokepoint on every other surface (HTTP upload/attach/retry, the MCP tool).
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* Both the sidebar item and the /e/[sector]/[slug] page read this map so the two
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* surfaces can never drift apart.
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*/
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export const EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
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'general/invoice-inbox': CAPABILITY.ai,
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} as const
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/** Which paid capability (if any) an extension workspace requires to be usable. */
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export function requiredCapabilityForExtension(
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sector: string,
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slug: string,
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): CapabilityKey | undefined {
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return EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY[`${sector}/${slug}`]
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}
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