Files
accounted/lib/supabase/__tests__/middleware.test.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 52bfd7a399 perf(auth): skip the MFA factor lookup once the session is at AAL2 (#1933)
The enforced-MFA branch of the proxy called supabase.auth.mfa.listFactors()
on every page, RSC and prefetch request for every MFA-verified user with a
company. auth-js implements listFactors() as a getUser() network round
trip, so hosted page requests paid two Supabase Auth calls in sequence.

At AAL2 a verified factor exists by construction (the session got there by
verifying a challenge on one), so the lookup only runs on the aal1/aal1
path (users mid-enrolment), where it still gates exactly as before. The one
case deferred is a user who unenrols their last factor mid-session: the
JWT keeps aal2 until the next refresh, so the enrolment bounce lands on the
refresh instead of the next click.

Tests: aal1/aal1 still asks for the factor list and bounces to /mfa/enroll;
at aal2 listFactors is never called (even with a factor list that would
read as empty) on page, RSC and prefetch requests; the step-up bounce and
the no-company skip are unchanged.

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 14:15:22 +02:00

676 lines
25 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
/**
* Middleware redirect-destination tests.
*
* Focus: every auth bounce must (a) remember where the user was heading,
* (b) reject an off-origin destination, and (c) not leak the original query
* string onto the auth page. MFA enforcement conditions must be unchanged.
*/
const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
user: null as null | { id: string; app_metadata?: Record<string, unknown> },
sessionId: 'session-1' as string | null,
authError: null as unknown,
aal: null as null | { currentLevel: string; nextLevel: string },
factors: null as null | { totp: Array<{ id: string; status: string }> },
listFactors: vi.fn(async () => ({ data: state.factors })),
company: {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null as unknown,
} as {
data: Array<{
company_id: string | null
locale: string | null
used_fallback: boolean
}>
error: unknown
},
signOut: vi.fn(async () => ({ error: null })),
// Row returned for user_preferences reads (the auto_logout mint lookup).
userPreferences: null as null | { auto_logout: boolean },
userPreferencesError: null as unknown,
}))
vi.mock('@supabase/ssr', () => ({
createServerClient: vi.fn(() => ({
auth: {
getUser: vi.fn(async () => ({
data: { user: state.user },
error: state.authError,
})),
getClaims: vi.fn(async () => ({
data: { claims: state.sessionId ? { session_id: state.sessionId } : {} },
})),
signOut: state.signOut,
mfa: {
getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel: vi.fn(async () => ({ data: state.aal })),
listFactors: (...args: unknown[]) => state.listFactors(...args),
},
},
rpc: vi.fn(async () => state.company),
from: vi.fn((table: string) => {
const chain: Record<string, unknown> = {}
const self = new Proxy(chain, {
get: (_t, prop) => {
if (prop === 'then') return undefined
if (prop === 'maybeSingle' || prop === 'single') {
return async () => ({
data:
table === 'user_preferences' && !state.userPreferencesError
? state.userPreferences
: null,
error:
table === 'user_preferences' ? state.userPreferencesError : null,
})
}
return () => self
},
})
return self
}),
})),
}))
const logState = vi.hoisted(() => ({ info: vi.fn() }))
vi.mock('@/lib/logger', () => {
const logger = {
info: (...args: unknown[]) => logState.info(...args),
warn: vi.fn(),
error: vi.fn(),
debug: vi.fn(),
child: () => logger,
}
return { createLogger: () => logger }
})
import { updateSession } from '../middleware'
import {
createSessionTimeoutState,
signSessionTimeoutState,
verifySessionTimeoutState,
} from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout'
import { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE } from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout-shared'
const ORIGIN = 'http://localhost:3000'
const SIGNED_IN = { id: 'user-1', app_metadata: {} }
function locationOf(response: Response) {
return response.headers.get('location')
}
function run(path: string, init?: RequestInit) {
return updateSession(new NextRequest(`${ORIGIN}${path}`, init))
}
describe('updateSession redirect destinations', () => {
const envBackup = {
require: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA,
selfHosted: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED,
signingSecret: process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET,
idleTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
absoluteTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
warning: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
logState.info.mockClear()
state.listFactors.mockClear()
state.user = null
state.sessionId = 'session-1'
state.authError = null
state.aal = null
state.factors = null
state.company = {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null,
}
state.userPreferences = null
state.userPreferencesError = null
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = 'middleware-test-secret'
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
})
afterEach(() => {
if (envBackup.require === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = envBackup.require
if (envBackup.selfHosted === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = envBackup.selfHosted
if (envBackup.signingSecret === undefined) delete process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET
else process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = envBackup.signingSecret
if (envBackup.idleTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.idleTimeout
if (envBackup.absoluteTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.absoluteTimeout
if (envBackup.warning === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = envBackup.warning
})
describe('session timeout enforcement', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = '30000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = '60000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = '10000'
})
async function signedCookie(args?: {
startedAt?: number
lastActivityAt?: number
method?: 'password' | 'bankid'
userId?: string
sessionId?: string | null
autoLogout?: boolean
legacy?: boolean
}) {
const stateValue = {
...createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: args?.userId ?? 'user-1',
sessionId: args?.sessionId === undefined ? 'session-1' : args.sessionId,
method: args?.method ?? 'password',
// Default the opt-in to true: these tests exercise enforcement.
autoLogout: args?.autoLogout ?? true,
now: args?.startedAt ?? Date.now(),
}),
...(args?.lastActivityAt === undefined
? {}
: { lastActivityAt: args.lastActivityAt }),
}
if (args?.legacy) {
// Pre-toggle cookies carry no auto_logout snapshot.
delete (stateValue as { autoLogout?: boolean }).autoLogout
}
const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(stateValue)
if (!signed) throw new Error('test signing secret missing')
return signed
}
it('initializes a signed, session-bound cookie for an existing session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: 'gnubok-auth-method=bankid' },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
expect(encoded).toBeTruthy()
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'bankid',
})
expect(response.cookies.get('gnubok-auth-method')?.value).toBe('')
})
it('rejects a tampered cookie and revokes only the current session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=tampered.value` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('absolute')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value).toBe('')
})
it('redirects an idle session with its original method and deep link', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 40_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
method: 'bankid',
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('idle')
expect(url.searchParams.get('method')).toBe('bankid')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
})
it('gives absolute expiry precedence and returns structured API errors', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 60_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
})
const response = await run('/api/invoices', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(401)
expect(response.headers.get('x-session-timeout-reason')).toBe('absolute')
await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
error: { code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED', reason: 'absolute' },
})
})
it('does not let a forged Authorization header bypass normal APIs', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({ lastActivityAt: now - 30_000, startedAt: now - 40_000 })
const headers = {
authorization: 'Bearer forged',
cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}`,
}
expect((await run('/api/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(401)
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
})
it('mints the cookie with the auto_logout opt-out default for new sessions', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
autoLogout: false,
})
})
it('snapshots an opted-in preference at mint time', async () => {
state.userPreferences = { auto_logout: true }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
autoLogout: true,
})
})
it('persists no snapshot when the preference read fails', async () => {
state.userPreferencesError = { message: 'connection reset' }
const errorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {})
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
// Unknown preference: nothing minted, nobody logged out; the next
// request retries the read.
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)).toBeUndefined()
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
errorSpy.mockRestore()
})
it('never logs out a session that has not opted in', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
// Far past both limits: without the opt-in the session must survive.
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 600_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 600_000,
autoLogout: false,
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('upgrades a pre-toggle cookie in place instead of treating it as forged', async () => {
state.userPreferences = { auto_logout: true }
const startedAt = Date.now() - 5_000
const encoded = await signedCookie({ startedAt, legacy: true })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
const upgraded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
// Timers survive the upgrade: only the opt-in snapshot is added.
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(upgraded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
startedAt,
autoLogout: true,
})
})
it('starts a new timeout window when the Supabase session changes', async () => {
const encoded = await signedCookie({ sessionId: 'old-session' })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const renewed = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(renewed)).resolves.toMatchObject({
sessionId: 'session-1',
})
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── Public agent-discovery + docs surfaces ────────────────────────────
describe('anonymous access to agent-discovery and docs surfaces', () => {
it.each(['/llms.txt', '/llms-full.txt', '/docs/api', '/docs/api.md', '/docs/api/reference.md', '/docs/api/cookbook/quickstart.md'])(
'serves %s without a login bounce',
async (path) => {
const response = await run(path)
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBeNull()
},
)
it('does not treat a /docs prefix on another route as public', async () => {
// /docsy-dashboard must still bounce: only /docs and /docs/* are public.
const response = await run('/docsy-dashboard')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/login')
})
it('serves docs to a signed-in user without redirecting away', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const response = await run('/docs/api')
expect(response.status).not.toBe(307)
})
})
// ── Site 1: protected-route bounce ────────────────────────────────────
describe('protected route bounce to /login', () => {
it('preserves the deep link the anonymous user was heading for', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/tax')
})
it('does not leak the original query string onto /login', async () => {
// The Stripe Checkout return: /settings/billing?success=1. Overwriting
// only the pathname used to carry ?success=1 onto /login.
const response = await run('/settings/billing?success=1')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('success')).toBeNull()
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['next'])
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/billing?success=1')
})
it('keeps ?org_number= on a logged-out /onboarding link', async () => {
const response = await run('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
})
it('sends no destination parameter when the target is the dashboard root', async () => {
const response = await run('/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/login`)
})
it('drops a request path that normalises to a protocol-relative URL', async () => {
// /..//evil.com normalises to the pathname //evil.com. Reflecting that
// back as ?next= would hand the login page an off-origin destination.
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBeNull()
})
})
// ── Site 4: authenticated user on an auth page ────────────────────────
describe('authenticated user landing on /login or /register', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
})
it('honours ?next= instead of discarding the query string', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('honours ?next= on /register too', async () => {
const response = await run('/register?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('falls back to the dashboard when there is no destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an absolute URL as the destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.com%2Fx')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects a protocol-relative destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2F%2Fevil.com')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an encoded traversal that normalises off-origin', async () => {
// /..//evil.com and /%2e%2e//evil.com both normalise to //evil.com.
for (const hostile of ['%2F..%2F%2Fevil.com', '%2F%252e%252e%2F%2Fevil.com']) {
const response = await run(`/login?next=${hostile}`)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
}
})
it('still bounces /auth and /sandbox to the dashboard, query and all', async () => {
expect(locationOf(await run('/sandbox?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
expect(locationOf(await run('/auth/callback?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
})
// ── Sites 2 and 3: MFA step-up and forced enrollment ──────────────────
describe('MFA step-up bounce to /mfa/verify', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['returnTo'])
})
it('still fires the step-up when the request carries its own returnTo', async () => {
// A crafted ?returnTo= must never be mistaken for a completed step-up.
const response = await run('/settings/tax?returnTo=%2Fanywhere')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
it('does not reflect a request path that normalises off-origin', async () => {
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBeNull()
})
})
describe('forced enrollment bounce to /mfa/enroll', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal1' }
state.factors = { totp: [] }
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/invoices/new')
})
it('still forces enrollment (the gate itself is unchanged)', async () => {
state.factors = { totp: [{ id: 'f1', status: 'verified' }] }
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('skips enrollment for a user with no company, as before', async () => {
state.company = { data: [{ company_id: null, locale: null, used_fallback: false }], error: null }
const response = await run('/select-company')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('still asks for the factor list at aal1/aal1 before bouncing', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(state.listFactors).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
it('never calls listFactors once the session is at aal2 (a verified factor is implied)', async () => {
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal2', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
// Even a factor list that would read as "none" must not matter here:
// the call is skipped, not just its result ignored.
state.factors = { totp: [] }
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('does not spend an MFA lookup on RSC and prefetch requests at aal2 either', async () => {
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal2', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
await run('/invoices', { headers: { rsc: '1' } })
await run('/invoices', { headers: { 'next-router-prefetch': '1', rsc: '1' } })
expect(state.listFactors).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── MFA semantics that must not change ────────────────────────────────
describe('per-request timing header and log line', () => {
const TIMING_RE =
/^mw-auth;dur=\d+, mw-session;dur=\d+, mw-company;dur=\d+, mw-mfa;dur=\d+, mw-total;dur=\d+$/
function lastLog() {
expect(logState.info).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
const [msg, ctx] = logState.info.mock.calls[0] as [string, Record<string, unknown>]
expect(msg).toBe('proxy completed')
return ctx
}
it('page responses carry Server-Timing and log kind=page with the route', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const res = await run('/invoices')
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(res.headers.get('x-proxy-timing')).toBeNull()
const ctx = lastLog()
expect(ctx.kind).toBe('page')
expect(ctx.route).toBe('/invoices')
expect(ctx.status).toBe(200)
expect(typeof ctx.totalMs).toBe('number')
expect(typeof ctx.authMs).toBe('number')
expect(typeof ctx.companyMs).toBe('number')
})
it('classifies prefetch and RSC requests from the app-router headers', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
await run('/invoices', { headers: { 'next-router-prefetch': '1', rsc: '1' } })
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('prefetch')
logState.info.mockClear()
await run('/invoices', { headers: { rsc: '1' } })
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('rsc')
})
it('/api responses use X-Proxy-Timing and leave Server-Timing to the route wrapper', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
const res = await run('/api/settings')
expect(res.headers.get('x-proxy-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toBeNull()
expect(lastLog().kind).toBe('api')
})
it('redirect responses also carry the header and log their status', async () => {
const res = await run('/invoices')
expect(res.status).toBe(307)
expect(res.headers.get('server-timing')).toMatch(TIMING_RE)
expect(lastLog().status).toBe(307)
})
it('never logs a token-carrying path or a raw entity id', async () => {
const res = await run('/invite/9f8e7d6c5b4a3928171605f4e3d2c1b0')
expect(res.status).toBe(200)
expect(lastLog().route).toBe('/invite/*')
logState.info.mockClear()
state.user = SIGNED_IN
await run('/invoices/6f1c2a3e-1234-4bcd-9abc-0123456789ab')
expect(lastLog().route).toBe('/invoices/:id')
})
})
describe('MFA-disabled and self-hosted paths are unchanged', () => {
it('does not redirect when NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA is unset', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect on self-hosted even with MFA required', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = 'true'
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
state.factors = { totp: [] }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect BankID-linked users, who are already 2FA', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = { id: 'user-1', app_metadata: { bankid_linked: true } }
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
})
})