Files
accounted/lib/entitlements/keys.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Fable 5 0040cadacc feat(invoicing): opt-in invoice email from the company's own sending domain (#1802)
* feat(invoicing): opt-in invoice email from the company's own sending domain

Companies holding the custom_sender_domain capability grant can register
their own domain (Resend sending-only profile), publish DKIM/SPF, and once
verified every invoice email (send, reminders, recurring, payment
confirmation, MCP/v1 sends) leaves as "<name> <faktura@their-domain>"
instead of the platform sender. Reply-To is unchanged.

- New table company_sending_domains (RLS: members read, owner/admin write;
  audit trigger), types, archive-export classification.
- New capability key custom_sender_domain: manually granted per company,
  deliberately outside PAID_CAPABILITIES (never trial-seeded, never written
  by the Stripe sync). Without the grant the settings section is hidden and
  nothing changes.
- Email extension: sending-domain routes (GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE, verify),
  Resend domain lifecycle without orphan adoption, domain.updated handling
  on the delivery webhook, explicit From support in the Resend adapter.
- Core resolveInvoiceSender(): verified + enabled + entitled, else the
  platform sender; never throws.
- Settings -> Invoicing: "Avsändare vid fakturautskick" section (sv/en).
- Unit tests for the resolver, domain helpers, routes, From header; pg-real
  test for RLS and constraints.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(invoicing): harden sending-domain writes, sender fallback, review findings

Skeptic refutations:
- Tenant JWTs could insert/update company_sending_domains with status =
  'verified' and an arbitrary domain through PostgREST (RLS only checked
  membership), then send invoice mail as that domain. New migration
  20260822130000 adds a BEFORE trigger: tenants may only open a pending
  claim and edit sender_local_part/sender_name/enabled; domain and
  verification state are service-role only. claim/verify helpers now take
  a service-role writer for those columns; the route's RLS client still
  does the insert.
- A company domain Resend later rejects made every invoice send fail: the
  Resend adapter retries once as the platform sender when an explicit
  company From is rejected (nothing was sent, so no double send).

Review findings:
- domain.updated webhook: discriminated outcome; DB errors answer 500 so
  Svix retries, unknown domains are acknowledged.
- Display names are RFC 5322-quoted only when they carry specials.
- Sender local part is a strict dot-atom (no trailing/consecutive dots),
  in code and in the CHECK constraint; resend_domain_id index is UNIQUE.
- IME composition guard on the claim input; event bus reset in tests;
  settings section skips its request for non-admins.

Deferred (needs a product call): persisting the effective From address in
the invoice delivery log touches the hardened evidence triggers; recorded
in DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(invoicing): bind sending-domain verification to the claimed domain; fix pg test

Skeptic re-check found a TOCTOU: during the claim's Resend round-trip a
tenant could delete and re-insert its pending row under the same id with a
reserved domain, and the service-role writer updated by id alone. Now:
- the claim's verification-state write filters on (id, company_id, domain,
  resend_domain_id IS NULL) and rolls back on zero rows;
- verify and the domain.updated webhook compare Resend's domain name with
  the row before writing verified;
- resolveInvoiceSender refuses reserved platform domains and non-hostnames
  at send time (reserved-domain logic moved to lib/email/domain-name.ts and
  shared with the claim validator).

pg-real: the case-insensitive uniqueness assertion now expects the
domain_shape CHECK (lowercase enforced) for an uppercase variant and the
unique index for a same-case duplicate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 00:07:30 +02:00

135 lines
6.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Capability keys: the single namespace behind the SaaS paywall AND the
* per-tenant modularity / marketplace vision. Each key names one gateable
* feature; a company "has" it when an unexpired capability_grant exists
* (entitlement) and it isn't explicitly disabled (enablement).
*
* These keys are a STABLE CONTRACT: grant rows, the future marketplace catalog,
* and per-tenant module toggles all reference them. Add keys; never rename one.
*/
export const CAPABILITY = {
/** AI assistant chat, onboarding composer, and document field extraction (Anthropic/Bedrock). */
ai: 'ai',
/** Bank sync / PSD2 (Enable Banking). Freeze-and-retain: tokens are NOT revoked on downgrade. */
bank_sync: 'bank_sync',
/** Skatteverket filing/sync (VAT, AGI, skattekonto) via BankID. */
skatteverket: 'skatteverket',
/** Outbound transactional email: invoices, reminders, payslips (Resend). Auth/account email is never gated. */
email_send: 'email_send',
/** Org-number lookup / enrichment (TIC). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
org_lookup: 'org_lookup',
/** EU VAT-number validation (VIES). NOT gated: identity/lookup is always free. */
vat_validation: 'vat_validation',
/** Riksbanken FX auto-fetch. NOT gated at launch (kept free); manual rate entry is always allowed. */
currency_rates: 'currency_rates',
/** Cloud backup to Google Drive. NOT gated at launch (kept free: never hold a customer's data hostage). */
cloud_backup: 'cloud_backup',
/** Migration import from other systems (Fortnox/Visma/Bokio/BL/Briox). Kept open so new payers can migrate IN. */
migration: 'migration',
/** Bolagsverket iXBRL årsredovisning filing. Reserved (extension not yet enabled). */
bolagsverket: 'bolagsverket',
/** Stripe Connect: auto payment links on invoices + payment/payout sync. */
stripe_payments: 'stripe_payments',
/** WooCommerce store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
woocommerce_sync: 'woocommerce_sync',
/** Shopify store sync: orders/refunds imported as a transaction feed. */
shopify_sync: 'shopify_sync',
/**
* Invoice email from the company's own verified sending domain (Resend
* domain per company). Opt-in: granted manually per company, NOT part of
* PAID_CAPABILITIES, so it is never trial-seeded or written by the Stripe
* subscription sync. Without the grant the settings section is hidden and
* mail keeps leaving from the platform sender.
*/
custom_sender_domain: 'custom_sender_domain',
} as const
export type CapabilityKey = (typeof CAPABILITY)[keyof typeof CAPABILITY]
/**
* The set actually withheld from non-payers (manual tier) at the 2026-07-07
* cutover. Founder decision (2026-06-28): gate the high-value recurring external
* services only.
*
* KEPT FREE on purpose:
* - identity & lookup: TIC org_lookup, VIES vat_validation, BankID login:
* they aid onboarding/data quality; gating them is friction in the wrong place.
* - currency_rates (FX auto-fetch) and cloud_backup.
* Internal bookkeeping is always fully usable on the manual tier.
*
* NOTE: bank_sync and skatteverket stay PAID even though their flows use BankID
* as an auth step: what's charged for is the bank data sync and the VAT/AGI
* filing service, not the identity check.
*/
export const PAID_CAPABILITIES: readonly CapabilityKey[] = [
CAPABILITY.ai,
CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
CAPABILITY.email_send,
CAPABILITY.stripe_payments,
CAPABILITY.woocommerce_sync,
CAPABILITY.shopify_sync,
] as const
/**
* Paid MCP tools → required capability. The MCP/agent path is a paid chokepoint
* just like the HTTP routes, so the dispatcher gates these the same way it gates
* API-key scope (see mcp-server `tools/call`). External-service WRITE tools
* appear here: send_invoice (email) and the two Skatteverket submissions. The
* read/local SKV tools (generate_agi, vat_declaration_validate/status, agi_status)
* stay free: the §4 carve-out forbids blocking a statutory filing obligation.
*
* The document upload tools invoke AI (Bedrock document OCR via
* extractInvoiceFields), so they are gated on CAPABILITY.ai: the same paywall
* the HTTP inbox upload/attach/retry paths enforce. Without these entries a
* free-tier API key could trigger paid AI extraction. bank_sync has no MCP
* tool (bank sync is cron/HTTP only).
*/
export const MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
// AI document OCR (Bedrock): the inbox's paid extraction, reachable via MCP.
gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/**
* Paid pending-operation types → required capability. Keyed by
* `pending_operations.operation_type`. This is the commit-time twin of
* MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP: it gates the actual external-service call inside
* commitPendingOperation, so an operation staged during the trial cannot be
* committed once the grant has expired, regardless of caller (MCP approve tool
* or the UI approval path). Keep the values in sync with MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP.
*/
export const PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
} as const
/**
* Extension workspace → required capability, keyed by `sector/slug`. This is the
* page/nav twin of the API-route gates: an extension whose entire value is a
* paid service should not just 403 its writes but be hidden from the sidebar and
* blocked at the page so a non-payer never lands on a dead workspace.
*
* invoice-inbox is fully gated on `ai`: its reason to exist is the AI field
* extraction (extractInvoiceFields / gnubok_upload_document), already the paid
* chokepoint on every other surface (HTTP upload/attach/retry, the MCP tool).
* Both the sidebar item and the /e/[sector]/[slug] page read this map so the two
* surfaces can never drift apart.
*/
export const EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY: Readonly<Partial<Record<string, CapabilityKey>>> = {
'general/invoice-inbox': CAPABILITY.ai,
} as const
/** Which paid capability (if any) an extension workspace requires to be usable. */
export function requiredCapabilityForExtension(
sector: string,
slug: string,
): CapabilityKey | undefined {
return EXTENSION_REQUIRED_CAPABILITY[`${sector}/${slug}`]
}