Files
accounted/lib/supabase/__tests__/middleware.test.ts
T
Mattsson 1c9d378df8 feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts (#1387)
* feat(auth): enforce session idle and absolute timeouts

Hosted browser sessions now carry an HMAC-signed, HttpOnly cookie holding
session start, last activity and sign-in method, bound to the Supabase
session. Middleware enforces a 30 min idle and 12 h absolute limit
(reason-coded redirects to /login), a heartbeat route advances idle
activity from real user input, and a client controller warns 2 minutes
before expiry. BankID users are routed back to BankID on re-auth via a
short-lived method hint. API-key and MCP bearer surfaces are exempt;
self-hosted installs default off and can opt in via env vars.

Fixes #362

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): derive session-timeout signing key via HKDF

The HMAC key is now HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, so
the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback never uses the privileged
credential directly as a signing key. Addresses the security review
finding on PR #1387.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): back signature bytes with a plain ArrayBuffer

crypto.subtle.verify requires a BufferSource; Uint8Array.from is typed
over ArrayBufferLike, which the Vercel TypeScript build rejects. Decode
base64url into a Uint8Array constructed over a fresh ArrayBuffer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): address session-timeout review findings

- signSessionTimeoutState returns null on signing failure instead of
  throwing, so a missing secret degrades the timeout feature in line
  with verifySessionTimeoutState rather than crashing authenticated
  requests; middleware and heartbeat skip the cookie write when null
- heartbeat initializes a fresh signed state for a missing or
  session-mismatched cookie, mirroring middleware, instead of
  returning SESSION_EXPIRED during normal initialization
- sessionStateMatchesUser treats an unresolved current session id as
  a mismatch for session-bound state so another session's cookie is
  never accepted on the userId fallback alone
- drop aria-live from the countdown DialogDescription so screen
  readers are not interrupted every second

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 09:59:42 +02:00

454 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest'
import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
/**
* Middleware redirect-destination tests.
*
* Focus: every auth bounce must (a) remember where the user was heading,
* (b) reject an off-origin destination, and (c) not leak the original query
* string onto the auth page. MFA enforcement conditions must be unchanged.
*/
const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({
user: null as null | { id: string; app_metadata?: Record<string, unknown> },
sessionId: 'session-1' as string | null,
authError: null as unknown,
aal: null as null | { currentLevel: string; nextLevel: string },
factors: null as null | { totp: Array<{ id: string; status: string }> },
company: {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null as unknown,
} as {
data: Array<{
company_id: string | null
locale: string | null
used_fallback: boolean
}>
error: unknown
},
signOut: vi.fn(async () => ({ error: null })),
}))
vi.mock('@supabase/ssr', () => ({
createServerClient: vi.fn(() => ({
auth: {
getUser: vi.fn(async () => ({
data: { user: state.user },
error: state.authError,
})),
getClaims: vi.fn(async () => ({
data: { claims: state.sessionId ? { session_id: state.sessionId } : {} },
})),
signOut: state.signOut,
mfa: {
getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel: vi.fn(async () => ({ data: state.aal })),
listFactors: vi.fn(async () => ({ data: state.factors })),
},
},
rpc: vi.fn(async () => state.company),
from: vi.fn(() => {
const chain: Record<string, unknown> = {}
const self = new Proxy(chain, {
get: (_t, prop) => {
if (prop === 'then') return undefined
if (prop === 'maybeSingle' || prop === 'single') {
return async () => ({ data: null, error: null })
}
return () => self
},
})
return self
}),
})),
}))
import { updateSession } from '../middleware'
import {
createSessionTimeoutState,
signSessionTimeoutState,
verifySessionTimeoutState,
} from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout'
import { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE } from '@/lib/auth/session-timeout-shared'
const ORIGIN = 'http://localhost:3000'
const SIGNED_IN = { id: 'user-1', app_metadata: {} }
function locationOf(response: Response) {
return response.headers.get('location')
}
function run(path: string, init?: RequestInit) {
return updateSession(new NextRequest(`${ORIGIN}${path}`, init))
}
describe('updateSession redirect destinations', () => {
const envBackup = {
require: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA,
selfHosted: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED,
signingSecret: process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET,
idleTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
absoluteTimeout: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
warning: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
state.user = null
state.sessionId = 'session-1'
state.authError = null
state.aal = null
state.factors = null
state.company = {
data: [{ company_id: 'company-1', locale: 'sv', used_fallback: false }],
error: null,
}
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = 'middleware-test-secret'
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
})
afterEach(() => {
if (envBackup.require === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = envBackup.require
if (envBackup.selfHosted === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = envBackup.selfHosted
if (envBackup.signingSecret === undefined) delete process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET
else process.env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET = envBackup.signingSecret
if (envBackup.idleTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.idleTimeout
if (envBackup.absoluteTimeout === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = envBackup.absoluteTimeout
if (envBackup.warning === undefined) delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS
else process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = envBackup.warning
})
describe('session timeout enforcement', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = '30000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = '60000'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS = '10000'
})
async function signedCookie(args?: {
startedAt?: number
lastActivityAt?: number
method?: 'password' | 'bankid'
userId?: string
sessionId?: string | null
}) {
const stateValue = {
...createSessionTimeoutState({
userId: args?.userId ?? 'user-1',
sessionId: args?.sessionId === undefined ? 'session-1' : args.sessionId,
method: args?.method ?? 'password',
now: args?.startedAt ?? Date.now(),
}),
...(args?.lastActivityAt === undefined
? {}
: { lastActivityAt: args.lastActivityAt }),
}
const signed = await signSessionTimeoutState(stateValue)
if (!signed) throw new Error('test signing secret missing')
return signed
}
it('initializes a signed, session-bound cookie for an existing session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: 'gnubok-auth-method=bankid' },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const encoded = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
expect(encoded).toBeTruthy()
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(encoded)).resolves.toMatchObject({
userId: 'user-1',
sessionId: 'session-1',
method: 'bankid',
})
expect(response.cookies.get('gnubok-auth-method')?.value).toBe('')
})
it('rejects a tampered cookie and revokes only the current session', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=tampered.value` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('absolute')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
expect(response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value).toBe('')
})
it('redirects an idle session with its original method and deep link', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 40_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
method: 'bankid',
})
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('reason')).toBe('idle')
expect(url.searchParams.get('method')).toBe('bankid')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect(state.signOut).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ scope: 'local' })
})
it('gives absolute expiry precedence and returns structured API errors', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({
startedAt: now - 60_000,
lastActivityAt: now - 30_000,
})
const response = await run('/api/invoices', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(401)
expect(response.headers.get('x-session-timeout-reason')).toBe('absolute')
await expect(response.json()).resolves.toMatchObject({
error: { code: 'SESSION_EXPIRED', reason: 'absolute' },
})
})
it('does not let a forged Authorization header bypass normal APIs', async () => {
const now = Date.now()
const encoded = await signedCookie({ lastActivityAt: now - 30_000, startedAt: now - 40_000 })
const headers = {
authorization: 'Bearer forged',
cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}`,
}
expect((await run('/api/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(401)
expect((await run('/api/v1/companies/c1/invoices', { headers })).status).toBe(200)
})
it('starts a new timeout window when the Supabase session changes', async () => {
const encoded = await signedCookie({ sessionId: 'old-session' })
const response = await run('/settings/tax', {
headers: { cookie: `${SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE}=${encoded}` },
})
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
const renewed = response.cookies.get(SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE)?.value
await expect(verifySessionTimeoutState(renewed)).resolves.toMatchObject({
sessionId: 'session-1',
})
expect(state.signOut).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
// ── Site 1: protected-route bounce ────────────────────────────────────
describe('protected route bounce to /login', () => {
it('preserves the deep link the anonymous user was heading for', async () => {
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/tax')
})
it('does not leak the original query string onto /login', async () => {
// The Stripe Checkout return: /settings/billing?success=1. Overwriting
// only the pathname used to carry ?success=1 onto /login.
const response = await run('/settings/billing?success=1')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('success')).toBeNull()
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['next'])
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/settings/billing?success=1')
})
it('keeps ?org_number= on a logged-out /onboarding link', async () => {
const response = await run('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBe('/onboarding?org_number=5566778899')
})
it('sends no destination parameter when the target is the dashboard root', async () => {
const response = await run('/')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/login`)
})
it('drops a request path that normalises to a protocol-relative URL', async () => {
// /..//evil.com normalises to the pathname //evil.com. Reflecting that
// back as ?next= would hand the login page an off-origin destination.
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/login')
expect(url.searchParams.get('next')).toBeNull()
})
})
// ── Site 4: authenticated user on an auth page ────────────────────────
describe('authenticated user landing on /login or /register', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
})
it('honours ?next= instead of discarding the query string', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('honours ?next= on /register too', async () => {
const response = await run('/register?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/settings/tax`)
})
it('falls back to the dashboard when there is no destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an absolute URL as the destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.com%2Fx')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects a protocol-relative destination', async () => {
const response = await run('/login?next=%2F%2Fevil.com')
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
it('rejects an encoded traversal that normalises off-origin', async () => {
// /..//evil.com and /%2e%2e//evil.com both normalise to //evil.com.
for (const hostile of ['%2F..%2F%2Fevil.com', '%2F%252e%252e%2F%2Fevil.com']) {
const response = await run(`/login?next=${hostile}`)
expect(locationOf(response)).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
}
})
it('still bounces /auth and /sandbox to the dashboard, query and all', async () => {
expect(locationOf(await run('/sandbox?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
expect(locationOf(await run('/auth/callback?next=%2Fsettings%2Ftax'))).toBe(`${ORIGIN}/`)
})
})
// ── Sites 2 and 3: MFA step-up and forced enrollment ──────────────────
describe('MFA step-up bounce to /mfa/verify', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/reports/vat?period=2026-01')
expect([...url.searchParams.keys()]).toEqual(['returnTo'])
})
it('still fires the step-up when the request carries its own returnTo', async () => {
// A crafted ?returnTo= must never be mistaken for a completed step-up.
const response = await run('/settings/tax?returnTo=%2Fanywhere')
expect(new URL(locationOf(response)!).pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
})
it('does not reflect a request path that normalises off-origin', async () => {
const response = await run('/..//evil.com')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/verify')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBeNull()
})
})
describe('forced enrollment bounce to /mfa/enroll', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal1' }
state.factors = { totp: [] }
})
it('preserves the destination as ?returnTo=', async () => {
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
const url = new URL(locationOf(response)!)
expect(url.pathname).toBe('/mfa/enroll')
expect(url.searchParams.get('returnTo')).toBe('/invoices/new')
})
it('still forces enrollment (the gate itself is unchanged)', async () => {
state.factors = { totp: [{ id: 'f1', status: 'verified' }] }
const response = await run('/invoices/new')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('skips enrollment for a user with no company, as before', async () => {
state.company = { data: [{ company_id: null, locale: null, used_fallback: false }], error: null }
const response = await run('/select-company')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
})
// ── MFA semantics that must not change ────────────────────────────────
describe('MFA-disabled and self-hosted paths are unchanged', () => {
it('does not redirect when NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA is unset', async () => {
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect on self-hosted even with MFA required', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED = 'true'
state.user = SIGNED_IN
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
state.factors = { totp: [] }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
it('does not redirect BankID-linked users, who are already 2FA', async () => {
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_REQUIRE_MFA = 'true'
state.user = { id: 'user-1', app_metadata: { bankid_linked: true } }
state.aal = { currentLevel: 'aal1', nextLevel: 'aal2' }
const response = await run('/settings/tax')
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
})
})
})