Files
accounted/extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/api-client.ts
T
Mattsson 65c6d4c178 Fix/07 27 (#1271)
* fix(enable-banking): keep bank account mappings across reconnects and surface dead sessions

A PSD2 reconnect silently moved the user's ledger mapping. Account identity
came from the provider's account uid, which does not survive a
re-authorization at every ASPSP, and a fresh connect to an already-connected
bank mints a new bank_connections row regardless. Both paths looked like "an
account we have never seen", so the allocator handed out the next free 19xx
slot and a 1930/1940/1941 mapping came back as 1942-1946 on every consent
renewal, roughly quarterly per connection.

Match on the IBAN instead. resolvePsd2LedgerAccount() finds the existing
cash_accounts row by normalized IBAN before allocating, and upsertFromPsd2
promotes that row in place rather than inserting a second one, so it keeps its
id and its linked transactions and is re-pointed at the connection that just
authorized. The previous holder's connection status is deliberately ignored:
one IBAN is one physical account, and the old row often still reads 'active'
because the bank killed the session without telling us.

The allocator also stopped treating a 19xx number as free just because no
cash_accounts row holds it. A chart imported from SIE carries the company's
real bank accounts by name with no PSD2 row behind them, which is how a SEK
company account got proposed as an unrelated brokerage account. Overflow now
skips chart-occupied numbers, falling back only when nothing unnamed is left.

Dead connections kept rendering as "Aktiv": status only ever changed when a
transaction fetch failed, so a session killed bank-side stayed healthy-looking
with a stale last_synced_at while the user read old balances as current. Add
probeSessionHealth() and run it in the daily cron over every connection that
run did not prove alive, including the ones the loop skips silently
(capability gate, all accounts deselected) and the ones parked in
pending_selection that the cron never looked at. It acts only on a definite
dead answer; anything ambiguous leaves the row alone, since a wrong flip costs
a full BankID re-authorization. The all-accounts-deselected branch is
reclassified 'synced' to 'skipped' for the same reason: it never contacts the
bank, so it must not count as proof of life. The settings row warns when an
active connection has not synced in three days or has never synced.

Which company a connection belongs to was invisible. Everything was already
scoped to ctx.companyId, so there was no cross-tenant leak, but a bank
authorized while the wrong company was active looked identical to the right
one. Name the company on the connect surface and in the account picker, and
say where the connection went when the callback lands under a different active
company. Warn (bypassably) before authorizing a bank where the same user
already holds live connections in other companies: several ASPSPs allow one
active AIS session per login, so the new authorization can kill the others.

The history start date already defaulted to the fiscal-year start; the card
above it recommended a mid-year date and contradicted the selected option. It
now states the fact and offers the shortcut without presenting it as advice.

Not addressed: sharing one PSD2 session across companies. company_id is the
tenancy anchor on bank_connections and cash_accounts hangs off
(company_id, bank_connection_id), so that needs the session to become its own
entity. See DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(supplier-invoices): show the posted line description in the voucher preview

The "Verifikation som bokförs" preview built its expense debit lines with
description set to the raw account number, so the BESKRIVNING column showed
"5615" or "6990" where the posted verifikat actually says "Leverantörsfaktura
123, ACME AB". A hardcoded 11-entry ACCOUNT_LABELS map masked this for
2440/2641/26xx, which is why the column read as a mix of friendly labels and
bare account numbers, neither of which was the posted text.

The preview now renders exactly the line_description the engine writes: the
shared invoice-level text on expense lines and 2440, "Ingående moms {rate}%
{desc}" on 2641, and the reverse-charge pair taken straight from
generateReverseChargeLines instead of being re-derived locally.
buildSupplierDescription moves into its own dependency-free module so the
client-side preview can call it without pulling the journal engine (and its
Supabase server client) into the browser bundle. The account name stays
reachable on the AccountNumber hover card.

Picked option A from the issue, keeping the fixed invoice-level description
rather than propagating each item's own text: the customer-invoice side
already writes invoice-level descriptions, so per-item text would create an
inconsistency between the two invoice sides rather than remove one, and it
would need an aggregation-collision policy in the journal engine. Rationale
recorded in DECISIONS.md.

Refs #1258

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bookkeeping): restore the copy icon on verifikat rows

The row-language rewrite in #1123 reused the copy icon's slot for the new
expand toggle, removing the zero-click copy affordance from the bookkeeping
list without mentioning it. The leftover orphaned copy_voucher_tooltip key
in both message files is what identifies it as collateral rather than a
product decision.

Restore a copy icon in the row's right-edge action cell, reusing that key
for aria-label and title. stopPropagation keeps the click off the row's
expand toggle. The icon is hover-revealed on md+ and always visible below
it: #1123 collapsed the desktop table and the mobile card into one
responsive table, so hover-only would leave touch users with nothing.

Copy is no longer gated on posted. The copy_from handler and the GET
journal-entries route never looked at status, so copying a draft already
worked end-to-end and only the detail-page button hid it; the two list
surfaces were already ungated. Both list affordances now respect canWrite,
which previously dropped read-only users into a dialog they could not
submit.

The repo does not render components in tests, which is why #1123 removed
this silently. Pin the source shape instead, the same way the copy-invoice
query is pinned.

Closes #1266

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(transactions): revalidate stale invoice match pointers before offering a match

potential_invoice_id / potential_supplier_invoice_id are written once, at bank
import, and never revisited. When one of several identical recurring invoices
was settled by a different transaction, every other transaction kept pointing
at the now fully paid invoice. The match dialog then measured the bank amount
against a 0 kr remaining balance and reported a "Beloppen skiljer sig ...
fakturan blir delbetald" partial payment, and the worklist offered the same
dead suggestion as a one-click confirm row.

Worse, the manual escape hatch was hidden exactly when it was needed:
TransactionInboxCard only shows "Matcha mot leverantörsfaktura" when no
suggestion exists, so a stale pointer left the user with no way at all to
reach the correct invoice.

Fixed by revalidating at read time rather than by clearing sibling pointers on
settle. Invoices are settled through many paths (both match routes, mark-paid,
MCP, bank reconciliation, SIE import), so write-time cleanup leaks the moment
one is missed, while the candidate lookup covers every route into the list.
The shared accept-lists in lib/invoices/matchable-statuses.ts mirror the CAS
guards the match routes already enforce.

  - listSuggestedMatches and the transactions page candidate fetch filter on
    status + remaining_amount, so a settled candidate yields no suggestion and
    the manual picker reappears on its own.
  - InvoiceMatchDialog blocks a settled target with a distinct message and a
    disabled confirm. Not advisory: both routes reject it outright with
    MATCH_INVOICE_ALREADY_PAID / MATCH_SI_ALREADY_PAID, so no override could
    succeed.
  - The supplier detail card now shows remaining_amount like the customer
    branch, instead of total. On a partially paid invoice it used to print
    "1 250 kr" directly beside "Differens: 1 250 kr".
  - match-supplier-invoice clears potential_supplier_invoice_id on the
    transaction it just matched, mirroring the customer route.

No bookkeeping was ever at risk: both routes already refused a settled target
before creating a voucher. The damage was confined to a misleading dialog and
a dead end.

createQueuedMockSupabase gains passive call recording (calls / findCall /
findCalls) because the proxy swallowed filter and update arguments, which made
the new assertions inexpressible.

Refs #1259, #1260

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(webhooks): dispatch on emit instead of waiting for the next cron tick (#1256)

* feat(webhooks): dispatch on emit instead of waiting for the next cron tick

The webhook dispatcher ran only on a per-minute cron, so the floor on
delivery latency was up to 60 seconds plus the request. An external consumer
that wanted to react as a transaction landed had only one alternative:
polling /api/events, which the 100 rpm per-key limit makes expensive and
which still cannot beat the tick interval.

Schedules one dispatch cycle as soon as deliveries are enqueued. The cron is
unchanged and remains the retry and sweep path; this only moves the first
attempt forward. Wired into the event-bus fanout plus the two routes that
enqueue a delivery directly: the :test verb, whose entire purpose is telling
someone whether their receiver works, and the manual delivery retry.

Three properties are load-bearing and covered by tests. The kick is never
awaited, because eventBus.emit is awaited at ~99 call sites including
journal_entry.committed and each delivery can burn a 10 s receiver timeout.
It coalesces per function instance, so a bulk booking that emits once per row
does not schedule one claim round trip per row. It claims 5 rows rather than
the cron's 50, because it runs on the tail of a user-facing request.

Double delivery is not a risk: claim_due_webhook_deliveries already claims
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED and flips rows to in_flight in the same statement, so
a kick racing the cron sees disjoint rows.

Does not close #1201, which asks for a realtime stream for API consumers.
This is the cheap half.

Refs #1201

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(webhooks): stop claiming the kick makes double delivery impossible

Adversarial review of the previous commit caught an overstatement in its own
comments. SKIP LOCKED keeps a kick and the cron from claiming the same row at
the same moment, but claim_due_webhook_deliveries autocommits before any POST
is issued, so from then on ownership is only status='in_flight' and a later
cycle's recoverStuckInFlight sweep can re-arm a row still queued behind an
earlier cycle's serial loop.

Delivery is at-least-once, which is what the public docs already tell
receivers ("the same delivery id may arrive more than once ... idempotency is
on you"). The comments contradicted that.

No behaviour change. The kick does not create this window: the cron claims 50
rows serially against the same 20 s stuck threshold, which is wider than what
a batch of 5 can open.

Refs #1201

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bokslut): add bokslut-flow depreciation (78xx) back to the bolagsskatt base (#1253)

* fix(bokslut): add bokslut-flow depreciation (78xx) back to the bolagsskatt base

sumPostedYearEndDispositions reconstructs resultat fore skatt for the tax
calculation, because generateIncomeStatement excludes every
source_type='year_end' entry. It summed class 88 and 7533 but not 78xx, so
planenlig avskrivning posted by the bokslut flow
(lib/bokslut/assets/depreciation-engine.ts) was dropped from the income
statement and never added back. The bolagsskatt base and the
periodiseringsfond 25 % cap were therefore computed on an overstated result:
tax too high by roughly 20.6 % of the depreciation.

Also exclude the period's final bokslutsverifikation from the fetch. It
carries source_type='year_end' as well and reverses every P&L account,
78xx/88xx/7533 included (verified against production closing entries), so
once the year is closed it would cancel the add-back this function exists to
produce. That hazard already applied to 88xx and 7533; the fix closes it for
all three rather than widening it.

Scope is deliberately the tax base only. Making the standalone
resultatrakning show bokslut entries is a separate, larger change: the same
exclusion is duplicated in the kpi_report_aggregates RPC, it moves displayed
profit for every company that ran the bokslut flow, and it means removing
the add-back at four call sites.

Refs #1051

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(bokslut): scope the closing-entry lookup to the company and fail loudly

Review (CodeRabbit + the compliance swarm, ASVS V8.2.1) flagged the new
fiscal_periods read in sumPostedYearEndDispositions on two counts, both fair.

It filtered only on the period id while every sibling query in the same
function carries the tenant scope. Primary key or not, service-role paths
have no RLS to fall back on and the repo's rule is to filter company_id
explicitly, so it now does.

It also discarded the query error. That mattered more than it looks: a failed
read fell through to closingEntryId = null, which silently re-admits the
closing verifikat's 78xx/88xx reversals and understates the tax base, i.e.
exactly the failure this lookup was added to prevent. It now throws, and the
surrounding catch turns it into the existing 'Failed to read posted
dispositions' error. A wrong bolagsskatt is worse than a loud failure.

Two regression tests: the lookup carries both eq filters, and a lookup
failure propagates instead of degrading to a wrong number.

Refs #1051

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket (#1254)

* fix(storage): drop the client-side DELETE policy on the documents bucket

20240101000024 documents this bucket as WORM: "No UPDATE or DELETE policies".
That described the repo, not production. Production carries a
users_delete_own_documents policy that exists in no migration file:

  FOR DELETE TO authenticated
  USING (bucket_id = 'documents'
         AND (storage.foldername(name))[2] = auth.uid()::text)

Under it, the uploading user can delete the storage bytes of any document
they uploaded under the legacy documents/{userId}/... layout, using nothing
but their normal browser token. That includes documents linked to a posted
verifikat, which are rakenskapsinformation under the BFL 7 kap 2 § seven-year
retention duty. deleteDocument()'s linked-check and the
block_document_deletion() trigger both guard the document_attachments ROW,
not the object: the row survives, still pointing at a file that is gone.

Reproduced against a local replay of the full migration stream: with the
policy present the uploader's own DELETE removes the object; with it dropped
the same statement matches zero rows. Company-scoped keys were never exposed
(their second path segment is the company id, not auth.uid()), so this only
ever reached the legacy layout, which is where most documents still live.

Safe because every in-app remove() on this bucket already runs on the service
role, covered by service_role_all_documents.

Deliberately narrow: users_read_own_documents and users_upload_own_documents
stay. The Phase B backfill from 20260726092000 has not run, so dropping the
legacy SELECT policy now would make existing documents unreadable. That is
Phase C.

The pg-real test asserts no DELETE and no UPDATE policy over the bucket under
ANY name: the hole arrived under a name this repo never used, so pinning a
name would not have caught it.

Refs #1208

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(storage): make the WORM ratchet see FOR ALL and WITH CHECK policies

Review caught two blind spots in the ratchet, both fair. It matched only
polcmd 'd' and 'w', but polcmd '*' (FOR ALL) grants DELETE and UPDATE just as
effectively, and FOR ALL is the shape the one legitimate policy on this table
already uses, so a hostile one would look unremarkable in the catalogue. It
also read only polqual, so an UPDATE policy carrying its bucket restriction in
WITH CHECK was invisible.

Both assertions now run through one helper that covers d/w/*, concatenates
USING and WITH CHECK, and filters by grantee so service_role_all_documents
(how the application does its authorized deletes) is excluded while every
client-reachable role is not. A policy granted to PUBLIC has an empty
polroles, which is the most permissive case there is, so it is treated as
client-reachable rather than as "no roles".

Matching on the substring rather than the exact `bucket_id = 'documents'`
shape pg_get_expr emits today: a policy written as bucket_id::text or with the
comparison reversed would slip past a stricter match, and for a WORM ratchet a
false alarm is cheap while a silent hole is not.

Adds a probe case that creates a FOR ALL policy and asserts the helper sees
it, so the main assertion cannot pass vacuously. That case earned its keep
immediately: it caught that node-postgres hands back a raw string for a name[]
column, so the role filter needed rolname::text to work at all.

Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the
original prod FOR DELETE policy present, red with a FOR ALL probe, green
without either. Full pg-real suite 933 passed.

Refs #1208

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(storage): catch a destructive policy that names no bucket at all

Adversarial review of the previous commit found the ratchet still failed
open, and reproduced it: a policy with no bucket_id predicate covers EVERY
bucket, documents included, so gating on the bucket name discarded exactly
the widest hole. The concrete shape is Supabase's own stock "Enable delete for
users based on user_id" template, USING (auth.uid() = owner), which is the
single most likely form of a future dashboard edit.

A destructive policy is now in scope unless it provably cannot reach this
bucket, i.e. only a bucket_id predicate naming some other bucket exempts it.

The behavioural assertions had the matching blind spot: fixtures were seeded
without an owner, so an owner-based policy matched NULL and the DELETE
reported 0 rows for the wrong reason. Objects now carry an owner the way
storage-api stamps them in production, so those tests fail loudly instead of
passing by accident.

Two probes pin both directions: a bucketless policy must be reported (and is
shown to really permit the delete), and a policy scoped to another bucket must
not be, so the ratchet cannot start crying wolf on receipts or sie-files and
get switched off.

Verified against a local replay of the full migration stream: red with the
stock bucketless template installed, green without it. Full pg-real suite 935
passed.

Refs #1208

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(kontoplan): make a deactivated account reachable again (#1262)

is_active=false read as "does not exist" on every read path but as "exists"
on the (company_id, account_number) unique constraint, so a deactivated
account vanished from the kontoplan with no way back and re-creating it
answered "Kontonummer X finns redan i din kontoplan."

The write side was already correct: POST /accounts/activate has a
toReactivate branch and PUT /accounts/[number] accepts is_active:true.
Both were simply unreachable, so this opens routes to them rather than
relaxing the read filters, which are load-bearing for
AccountsNotInChartError.

- Kontoplan gets a "Visa inaktiva" filter; inactive rows carry an "Inaktiv"
  chip and the existing per-row switch reactivates them in one click.
- Deactivating an account that has posted lines now warns first, using the
  usage count already loaded for the Verifikat column.
- POST /accounts distinguishes the two collisions and returns the new
  ACCOUNT_EXISTS_INACTIVE code; AddAccountDialog offers "Aktivera kontot
  istallet" rather than a dead-end 409. The stored account is left exactly
  as it was; values typed into the failed create form are not applied.
- bas-lookup consults the company's own chart before the static BAS
  reference, so a deactivated custom account reads as known and
  "Aktivera och bokfor" is no longer disabled for it. New in_chart /
  is_active fields let callers tell "will be added" from "will be revived".
- BAS-katalog stops showing "Aktiverat" for an account the company holds
  but has deactivated; it falls through to a relabelled Aktivera button,
  and the per-class counts follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(supplier-invoices): flag foreign 0 % lines with reverse charge switched off (#1255)

* fix(supplier-invoices): flag foreign 0 % lines with reverse charge switched off

A foreign supplier charging no Swedish VAT is normally omvand
skattskyldighet. With the reverse-charge switch off,
createSupplierInvoiceRegistrationEntry emits neither the 26x4 output leg nor
the 44xx/45xx basis lines, so ruta 20-24, 30-32 and 48 all stay empty and the
momsdeklaration takes a shape Skatteverket rejects. For a fully deductible
purchase the net moms att betala is unchanged, which is exactly why this goes
unnoticed. The form already auto-ticks reverse charge for eu_business but not
for non_eu_business, so that path slips through silently.

Adds a pure helper plus a non-blocking banner cloned from the existing
rc_account_warning block. Deliberately silent for swedish_business, where 0 %
is a genuine exemption that belongs in no ruta at all, and phrased as a
question rather than an assertion: a non-EU goods purchase cleared at customs
is legitimately 0 % without reverse charge, and pushing that user into
ticking the switch would manufacture a new wrong verifikat.

Does not add the exempt/import/other picker the issue proposes:
supplier_invoices.vat_treatment is metadata that no booking or ruta mapping
reads, and the codebase cannot book import VAT at all, so an import option
would imply ruta 50/60 were handled when they are not.

Refs #1042

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(supplier-invoices): name the local-VAT case in the foreign 0 % hint

Review flagged that the most common foreign document a Swedish small company
sees is an invoice carrying the supplier's OWN local VAT, booked at 0 %
Swedish VAT with reverse charge correctly off. The banner fires there, and
the previous copy only offered "momsfri av annat skal, till exempel en
varuimport" as the way out, which does not describe that invoice at all: it
is not VAT-free, it carries foreign VAT.

Names both legitimate cases explicitly and says 0 % is correct in them, so
the hint cannot read as an instruction to tick reverse charge on a purchase
where that would produce a wrong verifikat. Title also narrowed to "utan
svensk moms" for the same reason.

Refs #1042

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sandbox): call the sandbox assistant Assistenten, not Anna (#1244)

A named persona earns its name once someone has been through onboarding and
chosen it: it is their assistant and they named it. Nobody in the sandbox chose
anything, so a first name reads as a character the product invented and implies
a relationship the visitor never opted into.

Both halves move together, which is the point. profile_summary is the agent's
own self-description inside the system prompt, so leaving it as "Du är Anna"
would have the header say one thing while the assistant introduces itself as
another in its first sentence. Nothing else in the stack checks that pairing,
so a test now does.

Scope: this changes the seed, so new sandbox companies get the new name. The
483 sandbox profiles already seeded keep 'Anna' (the seeder returns early once a
profile exists, and its caller only runs while verified_at is null). Backfilling
those is a production write on demo data and is being raised separately rather
than smuggled into a code change.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(reports): show the last posted voucher per series in report headers

Adds a "Senaste bokforda verifikat: A 214, B 37" line to the balans- and
resultatrapport, so a printed or exported report answers which vouchers are
actually in it rather than only which dates it spans (#1267).

Reads MAX(voucher_number) over posted entries, never
voucher_sequences.last_number. The sequence counter is an allocation
high-water mark that drifts from the books in both directions:
next_voucher_number burns a number when the follow-up insert fails,
delete_last_voucher decrements by one instead of resetting to the new MAX,
and pre-RPC SIE imports left it behind. Since the point of the line is
avstamning, an allocated number would send a reconciler chasing a gap that
does not exist, so the label says plainly that the number is the posted one.

Scoped to the report own date range, so a Q1 report printed in November says
something true about Q1. The balansrapport keeps the fiscal-year start as its
lower bound because it accumulates. Skipped on a dimension-filtered
resultatrapport: that report already discloses it is partial, and an
unfiltered voucher range beside a filtered result invites the wrong
conclusion.

Populated in both engines, so the JSON, PDF and XLSX routes all inherit it
without signature changes. Best-effort: a header nicety never breaks a
report. The pure formatter lives in its own module so the client view does
not pull the Supabase query path into the browser bundle. No new i18n keys;
both report views and the PDF template are hard-coded Swedish per the
"stays Swedish" report surfaces in .claude/rules/i18n.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(customers): stop rendering personnummer ciphertext, make unreadable rows editable, add a reveal path (#1263)

customers.personal_number holds AES-256-GCM ciphertext (20260726110000).
Three defects compounded into one broken surface for private customers.

The list queried Supabase from the browser with select('*') and rendered the
raw value, 76-82 chars of hex, into the nowrap identifier cell. It now reads
GET /api/customers, which already masks every row, so the ciphertext never
leaves the server. Searching by personnummer works again: the client filter
had been matching against ciphertext and could never hit.

A row whose value cannot be decrypted renders as the placeholder
'********-????'. None of the three mask checks recognised it, each having its
own '-1234'-only copy, so such a customer could not be edited in ANY field:
name and address edits 400'd on a personnummer the user had no way to
correct. All three now share one pattern from the new crypto-free
lib/customers/mask-personal-number.ts, which the client form can import.
Typing a fresh personnummer overwrites the unreadable value, which is the
only repair possible: the rejected writes failed whole INSERTs, so there is
nothing to backfill.

The value was write-only by construction. GET
/api/customers/{id}/personal-number is the deliberate drill-in, mirroring the
employee convention, gated on the write role because .compliance/ropa.yaml
listed no_full_value_read_endpoint as a safeguard for this column; that entry
is rewritten rather than left stale, and reveals log actor and customer id
but never the value.

Also: arcim-migration wrote the identity number as plaintext, which aborts
any import containing a Privatperson with 23514 since the constraint flip;
and the customer embeds on /api/invoices shipped ciphertext to the browser on
every invoice read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: enhance ruta 05 handling for dynamic revenue accounts

- Introduced `fetchDynamicRuta05Accounts` to fetch company-specific revenue accounts marked with a VAT rate, addressing issue #1261.
- Updated VAT declaration logic to include these dynamic accounts in ruta 05 calculations, ensuring accurate reporting for user-added accounts.
- Modified `ACCOUNT_RUTA` to include account 3000 for completeness in ruta 05.
- Enhanced tests to validate the inclusion of user-added revenue accounts in ruta 05 and ensure correct VAT calculations.
- Seeded default VAT rates for BAS revenue accounts to ensure proper classification in the VAT declaration.

* fix: enhance data handling and masking in customer and invoice APIs

* fix(vat): resolve the 3000 gruppkonto's rate for the ruta 05 base split

3000 "Forsaljning inom Sverige" is mapped to ruta05 by ACCOUNT_RUTA, so a
balance on it is filed in the right box already. What was missing is the
rate split: unlike 3001/3002/3003 the account number carries no sats, and
fetchDynamicRuta05Accounts skipped it because it is in ACCOUNT_TO_BOX. A
company posting to the gruppkonto therefore got a ruta 05 total that
breakdown.invoices.base25/12/6 did not add up to.

Surface those rates separately as staticRateByAccount: rate-only on
purpose, because the static map already sums the account and adding it to
the dynamic account list would double the filed figure. A test pins that
single-count property.

Also add 3000 to the MCP server's RUTA_05_ACCOUNTS, which is the display
list behind report.rutor.ruta05: without it a 3000 balance appeared in the
filed projection but not in the report the agent reads back.

The comment claiming SALES_OUTPUT_VAT_SHORTFALL reads base25/12/6 was
wrong and is corrected. That check derives its expected base from the
output-VAT rutor (ruta10/0.25 + ruta11/0.12 + ruta12/0.06); nothing reads
the per-rate bases, which are reporting metadata. So the incomplete split
never affected a filed return or a warning, only the breakdown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <149234542+jakobwennberg@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-28 19:50:16 +02:00

1102 lines
36 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Enable Banking API integration for PSD2 bank connections
*
* Documentation: https://enablebanking.com/docs/api/reference/
*
* Flow:
* 1. POST /auth → { url, authorization_id }
* 2. User redirects to URL, authenticates with bank
* 3. Callback receives ?code=XXX&state=YYY
* 4. POST /sessions { code } → { session_id, accounts }
* 5. GET /accounts/{uid}/balances
* 6. GET /accounts/{uid}/transactions
*/
import { getAuthorizationHeader } from './jwt'
import { deriveTransactionLabel } from './transaction-label'
import { FALLBACK_DESCRIPTION } from '@/lib/transactions/external-id'
// Prefer _PRODUCTION variant; sandbox uses api.tilisy.com, production uses api.enablebanking.com
const ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL =
process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL_PRODUCTION ||
process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL ||
'https://api.enablebanking.com'
// Types
export interface ASPSP {
name: string
country: string
logo?: string
bic?: string
beta?: boolean
max_consent_validity?: number
// Enable Banking returns this field as `auth_methods` on the ASPSP object.
auth_methods?: AuthMethod[]
}
export interface AuthMethod {
name: string
title?: string
// How the SCA is performed. Mobile BankID at several Swedish banks is a
// DECOUPLED method; the visible default is often a REDIRECT method.
approach?: 'REDIRECT' | 'DECOUPLED' | 'EMBEDDED'
// When true, Enable Banking only uses this method if it is requested
// explicitly via auth_method (it is not the implicit default).
hidden_method?: boolean
psu_types?: ('personal' | 'business')[]
}
export interface AuthResponse {
url: string
authorization_id: string
}
export interface SessionResponse {
session_id: string
access: {
valid_until: string
}
accounts: AccountInfo[]
aspsp: {
name: string
country: string
}
psu_type: string
/**
* Lifecycle state of the PSD2 session as Enable Banking sees it. Present on
* GET /sessions/{id}; used by probeSessionHealth to detect a consent that
* died bank-side without us attempting a transaction fetch.
*/
status?: string
}
export interface AccountInfo {
uid: string
account_id?: {
iban?: string
bban?: string
other?: string
}
name?: string
product?: string
currency: string
identification_hash?: string
}
export interface Balance {
balance_amount: {
amount: string
currency: string
}
balance_type: string
reference_date?: string
last_change_date_time?: string
}
export interface BalanceResponse {
balances: Balance[]
}
export interface Transaction {
entry_reference?: string
transaction_id?: string
booking_date?: string
value_date?: string
transaction_amount: {
amount: string
currency: string
}
credit_debit_indicator?: 'CRDT' | 'DBIT' // CRDT = credit (income), DBIT = debit (expense)
creditor_name?: string
creditor_account?: {
iban?: string
bban?: string
}
creditor?: {
name?: string
}
debtor_name?: string
debtor_account?: {
iban?: string
bban?: string
}
debtor?: {
name?: string
}
remittance_information?: string[]
merchant_category_code?: string
bank_transaction_code?: string
proprietary_bank_transaction_code?: string
}
export interface TransactionsResponse {
transactions: Transaction[]
continuation_key?: string
}
/**
* Strategy for how Enable Banking fetches transactions from the upstream ASPSP.
* - 'default': fast path, may return only the most recent window even if date_from is older
* - 'longest': fetch the longest available history (up to PSD2 90-day max), slower
*
* When omitted, Enable Banking applies its default strategy.
*/
export type TransactionsFetchStrategy = 'default' | 'longest'
// Legacy types for backward compatibility
export interface Bank {
id: string
name: string
bic?: string
countries: string[]
logo_url?: string
}
export interface BankTransaction {
id: string
date: string
booking_date: string
amount: number
currency: string
description: string
counterparty_name?: string
counterparty_account?: string
reference?: string
merchant_category_code?: string
// ISO 20022 / proprietary transaction codes: carried through so the
// description fallback can derive a meaningful Swedish label when remittance
// text and a counterparty name are both absent. See deriveTransactionLabel.
bank_transaction_code?: string
proprietary_bank_transaction_code?: string
}
// Constants
const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000
const MAX_RETRIES = 2
const RETRY_DELAY_MS = 1000
const MAX_PAGINATION_PAGES = 100
const DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 500
/**
* Thrown by getAccountTransactions on a non-OK response. Carries the HTTP
* status and raw body so the pagination caller (getAllTransactions) can run the
* same first-page strategy/window fallbacks as getAllTransactionsWithRaw. The
* message is identical to the previous plain Error for back-compat.
*/
class TransactionsFetchError extends Error {
constructor(
readonly status: number,
readonly body: string
) {
super(`Failed to get transactions (${status}): ${body}`)
this.name = 'TransactionsFetchError'
}
}
/**
* Normalized signatures (uppercase, non-alphanumerics stripped) of the
* responses Enable Banking (or the upstream ASPSP via Enable Banking's
* envelope) returns when the PSD2 session can no longer be used: the consent
* was closed, expired, or invalidated bank-side. Spelling and casing vary by
* bank (CLOSED_SESSION, EXPIRED_SESSION, SESSION_EXPIRED / session_expired,
* INVALID_SESSION, SESSION_NOT_FOUND, WRONG_SESSION_STATUS, and the plain
* "Session is closed" message), so we match the whole family. A dead session
* is unrecoverable by retrying: the user must re-authorize.
*/
const SESSION_DEAD_NEEDLES = [
'CLOSEDSESSION', // CLOSED_SESSION
'SESSIONCLOSED', // "session closed"
'SESSIONISCLOSED', // "Session is closed"
'SESSIONEXPIRED', // SESSION_EXPIRED / session_expired
'EXPIREDSESSION', // EXPIRED_SESSION
'INVALIDSESSION', // INVALID_SESSION
'SESSIONNOTFOUND', // SESSION_NOT_FOUND
'WRONGSESSIONSTATUS', // WRONG_SESSION_STATUS
] as const
/**
* Whether a failed transactions response signals a dead PSD2 session (vs. a
* transient error or a config-level auth failure). Only 401/403 with a
* session-expiry signal in the body counts: a bare 401 "Unauthorized" is an
* app-credential problem, not a closed consent, and must NOT be misread as
* "reconnect the bank". The match is deterministic: normalize the body and
* test for any known session-dead needle.
*/
export function isSessionExpiredResponse(status: number, body: string): boolean {
if (status !== 401 && status !== 403) return false
const normalized = body.toUpperCase().replace(/[^A-Z0-9]/g, '')
return SESSION_DEAD_NEEDLES.some(needle => normalized.includes(needle))
}
/**
* User-facing (Swedish) messages persisted to bank_connections.error_message
* and returned to the settings UI. error_message is a literal string in the
* DB, not an i18n key, matching the extension's other user-facing strings.
* Raw Enable Banking error bodies are English JSON envelopes and must never
* land here: they belong in server logs only.
*/
export const REAUTH_REQUIRED_MESSAGE =
'Bankanslutningen har löpt ut. Förnya anslutningen för att fortsätta synka.'
export const SYNC_FAILED_MESSAGE =
'Banksynkningen misslyckades. Försök igen, eller förnya anslutningen om felet kvarstår.'
/**
* Thrown when a transactions fetch fails because the PSD2 session is dead
* (closed/expired/invalid). Distinct from TransactionsFetchError so the sync
* handler can flip the connection to 'expired' and prompt re-authorization
* instead of surfacing a raw error the user can't act on. Carries the status
* and raw body for logging. See isSessionExpiredResponse for the codes covered.
*/
export class SessionExpiredError extends Error {
constructor(
readonly status: number,
readonly body: string
) {
super(`Bank session expired (${status}): ${body}`)
this.name = 'SessionExpiredError'
}
}
// API Helper
async function authenticatedFetch(
endpoint: string,
options: RequestInit = {}
): Promise<Response> {
const url = `${ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL}${endpoint}`
const controller = new AbortController()
const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS)
try {
const response = await fetch(url, {
...options,
signal: controller.signal,
headers: {
'Authorization': getAuthorizationHeader(),
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
...options.headers,
},
})
return response
} finally {
clearTimeout(timeout)
}
}
/**
* Retry wrapper for idempotent read operations.
* Retries on 429, 502, 503, 504, and AbortError (timeout).
*/
async function authenticatedFetchWithRetry(
endpoint: string,
options: RequestInit = {}
): Promise<Response> {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= MAX_RETRIES; attempt++) {
try {
const response = await authenticatedFetch(endpoint, options)
if (attempt < MAX_RETRIES && [429, 502, 503, 504].includes(response.status)) {
// A 429 caused by a DAILY quota cannot clear within the retry window:
// PSD2 unattended consents allow only a handful of balance calls per
// day (observed body: "Consent daily limit 4 is exceeded"), so
// retrying just burns time and duplicates the failure in logs. Read
// the body from a clone so the returned response stays consumable.
if (response.status === 429) {
const body = await response.clone().text().catch(() => '')
if (/daily limit/i.test(body)) {
console.warn(`[enable-banking] 429 daily quota exhausted for ${endpoint}: not retrying`, {
status: response.status,
body,
})
return response
}
}
console.warn(`[enable-banking] Retrying ${endpoint} (attempt ${attempt + 1}/${MAX_RETRIES})`, {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
})
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1)))
continue
}
return response
} catch (error: unknown) {
const isAbort = error instanceof Error && error.name === 'AbortError'
if (attempt < MAX_RETRIES && isAbort) {
console.warn(`[enable-banking] Request timeout, retrying ${endpoint} (attempt ${attempt + 1}/${MAX_RETRIES})`)
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, RETRY_DELAY_MS * (attempt + 1)))
continue
}
console.error(`[enable-banking] Request failed for ${endpoint}`, {
attempt,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
name: error instanceof Error ? error.name : undefined,
isTimeout: isAbort,
})
throw error
}
}
// Unreachable, but satisfies TypeScript
throw new Error('Max retries exceeded')
}
// API Functions
/**
* Get list of supported banks (ASPSPs) for a country
*/
export async function getASPSPs(country: string = 'SE', psuType?: 'personal' | 'business'): Promise<ASPSP[]> {
const resolvedPsuType = psuType || process.env.ENABLE_BANKING_PSU_TYPE || 'business'
const isSandbox = ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL.includes('tilisy')
const params = new URLSearchParams({
country,
sandbox: String(isSandbox),
psu_type: resolvedPsuType,
})
const response = await authenticatedFetchWithRetry(`/aspsps?${params.toString()}`)
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] getASPSPs failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
country,
psuType: resolvedPsuType,
sandbox: isSandbox,
apiUrl: ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to fetch banks (${response.status})`)
}
const data = await response.json()
return data.aspsps || []
}
/**
* Resolve the auth_method we should request for a given bank, or undefined to
* let Enable Banking use the ASPSP's visible default.
*
* Why: several Swedish ASPSPs (notably Handelsbanken) expose Mobile BankID only
* as a DECOUPLED method flagged hidden_method=true. When we send no auth_method,
* Enable Banking falls back to the visible REDIRECT method, which for
* Handelsbanken *corporate* PSUs does not support Mobile BankID, so the consent
* fails right after the user approves in the BankID app ("fel efter BankID").
* Pinning the decoupled (Mobile BankID) method makes the flow work for both
* business and personal PSUs. We return undefined when the bank exposes no
* decoupled method or the lookup fails, so banks that already work are untouched.
*/
export async function getPreferredAuthMethod(
aspspName: string,
country: string,
psuType: 'personal' | 'business'
): Promise<string | undefined> {
try {
const aspsps = await getASPSPs(country, psuType)
const aspsp = aspsps.find((a) => a.name === aspspName)
const decoupled = aspsp?.auth_methods?.find((m) => m.approach === 'DECOUPLED')
return decoupled?.name
} catch (error) {
console.error('[enable-banking] getPreferredAuthMethod failed; using ASPSP default', {
aspspName,
country,
psuType,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
})
return undefined
}
}
/**
* Get list of supported banks (legacy format for backward compatibility)
*/
export async function getSupportedBanks(): Promise<Bank[]> {
try {
const aspsps = await getASPSPs('SE')
return aspsps.map((aspsp) => ({
id: `${aspsp.name.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '-')}-se`,
name: aspsp.name,
bic: aspsp.bic,
countries: [aspsp.country],
logo_url: aspsp.logo,
}))
} catch (error) {
console.error('Error fetching banks:', error)
// Return fallback list
return [
{ id: 'nordea-se', name: 'Nordea', bic: 'NDEASESS', countries: ['SE'] },
{ id: 'seb-se', name: 'SEB', bic: 'ESSESESS', countries: ['SE'] },
{ id: 'swedbank-se', name: 'Swedbank', bic: 'SWEDSESS', countries: ['SE'] },
{ id: 'handelsbanken-se', name: 'Handelsbanken', bic: 'HANDSESS', countries: ['SE'] },
]
}
}
/**
* Start bank authorization flow
*
* @param aspspName - The name of the ASPSP (bank) exactly as returned from /aspsps
* @param aspspCountry - The country code (e.g., 'SE')
* @param redirectUrl - URL to redirect user after bank authorization
* @param state - State parameter returned in callback (e.g., user ID)
* @param psuType - Type of user: 'personal' or 'business'
* @param authMethod - Optional Enable Banking auth_method name. When omitted,
* Enable Banking uses the ASPSP's visible default method. See
* getPreferredAuthMethod for why we pin Mobile BankID at some banks.
*/
export async function startAuthorization(
aspspName: string,
aspspCountry: string,
redirectUrl: string,
state: string,
psuType: 'personal' | 'business' = 'personal',
authMethod?: string
): Promise<AuthResponse> {
// Calculate consent validity (90 days)
const validUntil = new Date()
validUntil.setDate(validUntil.getDate() + 90)
const requestBody: {
access: { valid_until: string }
aspsp: { name: string; country: string }
state: string
redirect_url: string
psu_type: 'personal' | 'business'
auth_method?: string
} = {
access: {
valid_until: validUntil.toISOString()
},
aspsp: {
name: aspspName,
country: aspspCountry
},
state,
redirect_url: redirectUrl,
psu_type: psuType
}
if (authMethod) {
requestBody.auth_method = authMethod
}
const response = await authenticatedFetch('/auth', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify(requestBody)
})
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] startAuthorization failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
aspspName,
aspspCountry,
psuType,
redirectUrl,
apiUrl: ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL,
requestBody: JSON.stringify(requestBody),
})
throw new Error(`Failed to start bank connection (${response.status}): ${body}`)
}
return response.json()
}
/**
* Create a session after user completes bank authorization
*
* @param code - The authorization code from callback
*/
export async function createSession(code: string): Promise<SessionResponse> {
const response = await authenticatedFetch('/sessions', {
method: 'POST',
body: JSON.stringify({ code })
})
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] createSession failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
hasCode: !!code,
codeLength: code?.length,
apiUrl: ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to create bank session (${response.status}): ${body}`)
}
return response.json()
}
/**
* Get session details
*
* @param sessionId - The session ID
*/
export async function getSession(sessionId: string): Promise<SessionResponse> {
const response = await authenticatedFetchWithRetry(`/sessions/${sessionId}`)
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] getSession failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
sessionId,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to get session (${response.status}): ${body}`)
}
return response.json()
}
/**
* Session lifecycle values that mean the consent can no longer be used. Kept
* deliberately narrow: an unrecognized status resolves to 'unknown' and leaves
* the stored connection state untouched, because wrongly flipping a live
* connection to 'expired' costs the user a full BankID re-authorization.
*/
const SESSION_DEAD_STATUSES = new Set([
'CANCELLED',
'CLOSED',
'EXPIRED',
'INVALID',
'REJECTED',
'REVOKED',
])
/**
* Session lifecycle values that mean the consent is usable. Anything outside
* both sets (including a response carrying no status at all) is 'unknown':
* claiming 'alive' for a value we do not recognize would be asserting more
* than the probe actually established.
*/
const SESSION_ALIVE_STATUSES = new Set(['AUTHORIZED', 'VALID', 'ACTIVE'])
export type SessionHealth = 'alive' | 'dead' | 'unknown'
/**
* Ask Enable Banking whether a PSD2 session is still usable, without fetching
* any account data.
*
* Until this existed, a connection only ever learned its session was dead by
* TRYING to sync: a bank that invalidates a consent server-side (several
* ASPSPs drop the previous session when the same PSU authorizes again) left
* the row sitting at status 'active' with a stale last_synced_at, so the UI
* kept presenting old balances as current. Never throws: probing is a
* best-effort health signal, and 'unknown' is always a safe answer.
*/
export async function probeSessionHealth(sessionId: string): Promise<SessionHealth> {
try {
const response = await authenticatedFetchWithRetry(`/sessions/${sessionId}`)
const body = await response.text()
if (!response.ok) {
if (isSessionExpiredResponse(response.status, body)) return 'dead'
// The session record itself is gone: nothing left to sync with.
if (response.status === 404) return 'dead'
return 'unknown'
}
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as SessionResponse
const status = typeof parsed.status === 'string' ? parsed.status.toUpperCase() : null
if (status && SESSION_DEAD_STATUSES.has(status)) return 'dead'
if (status && SESSION_ALIVE_STATUSES.has(status)) return 'alive'
} catch {
// Unparseable body on a 200: treat as inconclusive, not as dead.
return 'unknown'
}
return 'unknown'
} catch (error) {
console.warn('[enable-banking] probeSessionHealth failed', {
sessionId,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
})
return 'unknown'
}
}
/**
* Delete/revoke a session
*
* @param sessionId - The session ID to revoke
*/
export async function deleteSession(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
const response = await authenticatedFetch(`/sessions/${sessionId}`, {
method: 'DELETE'
})
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] deleteSession failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
sessionId,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to revoke session (${response.status}): ${body}`)
}
}
/**
* Get account balances
*
* @param accountUid - The account UID (from session.accounts[].uid)
*/
export async function getAccountBalances(accountUid: string): Promise<Balance[]> {
const response = await authenticatedFetchWithRetry(`/accounts/${accountUid}/balances`)
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] getAccountBalances failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
accountUid,
})
throw new Error(`Failed to get account balances (${response.status}): ${body}`)
}
const data: BalanceResponse = await response.json()
return data.balances || []
}
/**
* Get account balance (returns booked balance amount)
*/
export async function getAccountBalance(
accountUid: string
): Promise<{ amount: number; date: string }> {
const balances = await getAccountBalances(accountUid)
// Prefer closingBooked, then expected, then first available
const balance =
balances.find(b => b.balance_type === 'closingBooked') ||
balances.find(b => b.balance_type === 'expected') ||
balances[0]
if (!balance) {
return { amount: 0, date: new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0] }
}
return {
amount: parseFloat(balance.balance_amount.amount),
date: balance.reference_date || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]
}
}
/**
* Get account transactions
*
* @param accountUid - The account UID
* @param dateFrom - Start date (YYYY-MM-DD)
* @param dateTo - End date (YYYY-MM-DD)
* @param continuationKey - Pagination key from previous response
*/
export async function getAccountTransactions(
accountUid: string,
dateFrom?: string,
dateTo?: string,
continuationKey?: string,
strategy?: TransactionsFetchStrategy
): Promise<TransactionsResponse> {
const params = new URLSearchParams()
if (dateFrom) params.set('date_from', dateFrom)
if (dateTo) params.set('date_to', dateTo)
if (continuationKey) params.set('continuation_key', continuationKey)
if (strategy) params.set('strategy', strategy)
params.set('limit', String(DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE))
const queryString = params.toString()
const endpoint = `/accounts/${accountUid}/transactions${queryString ? `?${queryString}` : ''}`
const response = await authenticatedFetchWithRetry(endpoint)
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
console.error('[enable-banking] getAccountTransactions failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
accountUid,
dateFrom,
dateTo,
strategy,
hasContinuationKey: !!continuationKey,
})
if (isSessionExpiredResponse(response.status, body)) {
throw new SessionExpiredError(response.status, body)
}
throw new TransactionsFetchError(response.status, body)
}
return response.json()
}
/**
* Get all transactions with pagination
*/
export async function getAllTransactions(
accountUid: string,
dateFrom?: string,
dateTo?: string,
strategy?: TransactionsFetchStrategy
): Promise<Transaction[]> {
const allTransactions: Transaction[] = []
let continuationKey: string | undefined
let page = 0
let activeStrategy = strategy
// date_from is narrowed in place when the ASPSP rejects the window (below).
let activeDateFrom = dateFrom
while (true) {
let response: TransactionsResponse
try {
response = await getAccountTransactions(
accountUid,
activeDateFrom,
dateTo,
continuationKey,
activeStrategy
)
} catch (err) {
// Apply the same first-page recovery as getAllTransactionsWithRaw. Only
// TransactionsFetchError carries the status/body needed to decide;
// network errors and the like propagate untouched.
if (err instanceof TransactionsFetchError) {
const recovery = planFirstPageRecovery({
status: err.status,
body: err.body,
page,
hasContinuationKey: !!continuationKey,
activeStrategy,
activeDateFrom,
dateTo,
})
if (recovery.type === 'drop-strategy') {
console.warn('[enable-banking] strategy rejected by API, retrying without strategy', {
accountUid,
strategy: activeStrategy,
body: err.body,
})
activeStrategy = undefined
continue
}
if (recovery.type === 'narrow') {
console.warn('[enable-banking] ASPSP rejected history window, retrying with narrower date_from', {
accountUid,
previousDateFrom: activeDateFrom,
nextDateFrom: recovery.dateFrom,
dateTo,
body: err.body,
})
activeDateFrom = recovery.dateFrom
continue
}
}
throw err
}
allTransactions.push(...response.transactions)
continuationKey = response.continuation_key
page++
if (page >= MAX_PAGINATION_PAGES) {
console.warn(`[enable-banking] Pagination cap reached (${MAX_PAGINATION_PAGES} pages) for account ${accountUid}`)
break
}
if (!continuationKey) break
}
return allTransactions
}
/**
* Lookback windows (days before date_to) we step through when an ASPSP rejects
* the requested transaction history. Descending so each fallback yields a
* strictly narrower window. PSD2 obliges banks to ~90 days without fresh SCA;
* the smaller rungs cover banks that cap below that.
*/
const ASPSP_HISTORY_FALLBACK_DAYS = [90, 60, 30] as const
/**
* Enable Banking wraps upstream-bank failures in a generic envelope, e.g.
* {"code":400,"message":"Error interacting with ASPSP","error":"ASPSP_ERROR"}.
* A too-wide history window is the most common trigger: see the date-narrowing
* fallback in getAllTransactionsWithRaw.
*/
function isAspspError(body: string): boolean {
return body.includes('ASPSP_ERROR') || body.includes('interacting with ASPSP')
}
/**
* Given the date_from we just tried, return the next strictly-narrower
* date_from from ASPSP_HISTORY_FALLBACK_DAYS, anchored to date_to. Returns
* undefined when no narrower window remains (or date_to is missing), which
* ends the retry loop. The "strictly narrower" guard keeps the loop monotonic
* and terminating even if the original window was already short.
*/
function nextNarrowerDateFrom(
currentDateFrom: string | undefined,
dateTo: string | undefined
): string | undefined {
if (!dateTo) return undefined
const anchor = new Date(`${dateTo}T00:00:00Z`)
if (!Number.isFinite(anchor.getTime())) return undefined
for (const days of ASPSP_HISTORY_FALLBACK_DAYS) {
const candidate = new Date(anchor.getTime() - days * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)
.toISOString()
.split('T')[0]
if (!currentDateFrom || candidate > currentDateFrom) {
return candidate
}
}
return undefined
}
/**
* First-page recovery policy shared by getAllTransactions and
* getAllTransactionsWithRaw, so the two pagination loops can't drift. Fallbacks
* apply only to the very first request (page 0, no continuation_key): a
* continuation_key is scoped to the window/strategy that produced it, so the
* query is never rewritten mid-pagination.
*
* - 'drop-strategy' : an unsupported strategy enum: retry the same window.
* - 'narrow' : the ASPSP rejected the history window: retry with a
* narrower date_from (the bank caps history below the ask).
* - 'give-up' : nothing left to try; the caller should rethrow.
*/
type FirstPageRecovery =
| { type: 'drop-strategy' }
| { type: 'narrow'; dateFrom: string }
| { type: 'give-up' }
function planFirstPageRecovery(args: {
status: number
body: string
page: number
hasContinuationKey: boolean
activeStrategy: TransactionsFetchStrategy | undefined
activeDateFrom: string | undefined
dateTo: string | undefined
}): FirstPageRecovery {
const { status, body, page, hasContinuationKey, activeStrategy, activeDateFrom, dateTo } = args
if (status !== 400 || page !== 0 || hasContinuationKey) return { type: 'give-up' }
// Drop an unsupported strategy first: preserves the full requested window.
if (activeStrategy) return { type: 'drop-strategy' }
// Then handle the ASPSP rejecting the window itself (e.g. Danske past ~90
// days): step date_from toward date_to so a partial sync survives.
if (isAspspError(body)) {
const dateFrom = nextNarrowerDateFrom(activeDateFrom, dateTo)
if (dateFrom) return { type: 'narrow', dateFrom }
}
return { type: 'give-up' }
}
/**
* Get all transactions with raw JSON responses for archival.
* Returns both parsed transactions and the raw response strings.
*
* If `strategy` is provided and the API rejects it with a 400 on the first
* request, retry once without `strategy` so unknown enum values can't break
* the sync. Logs a warning when the fallback fires.
*
* If the ASPSP then still rejects the first page with an ASPSP_ERROR (typically
* a history window beyond the bank's PSD2 limit, e.g. Danske past ~90 days),
* progressively narrow date_from toward date_to (90→60→30 days) so a partial
* sync of the recent window survives instead of failing outright. Logs a
* warning on each narrowing.
*/
export async function getAllTransactionsWithRaw(
accountUid: string,
dateFrom?: string,
dateTo?: string,
strategy?: TransactionsFetchStrategy
): Promise<{ transactions: Transaction[]; rawPages: string[] }> {
const allTransactions: Transaction[] = []
const rawPages: string[] = []
let continuationKey: string | undefined
let page = 0
let activeStrategy = strategy
// date_from is narrowed in place when the ASPSP rejects the window (below).
let activeDateFrom = dateFrom
while (true) {
const params = new URLSearchParams()
if (activeDateFrom) params.set('date_from', activeDateFrom)
if (dateTo) params.set('date_to', dateTo)
if (continuationKey) params.set('continuation_key', continuationKey)
if (activeStrategy) params.set('strategy', activeStrategy)
params.set('limit', String(DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE))
const queryString = params.toString()
const endpoint = `/accounts/${accountUid}/transactions${queryString ? `?${queryString}` : ''}`
const response = await authenticatedFetchWithRetry(endpoint)
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text()
const recovery = planFirstPageRecovery({
status: response.status,
body,
page,
hasContinuationKey: !!continuationKey,
activeStrategy,
activeDateFrom,
dateTo,
})
if (recovery.type === 'drop-strategy') {
console.warn('[enable-banking] strategy rejected by API, retrying without strategy', {
accountUid,
strategy: activeStrategy,
body,
})
activeStrategy = undefined
continue
}
if (recovery.type === 'narrow') {
console.warn('[enable-banking] ASPSP rejected history window, retrying with narrower date_from', {
accountUid,
previousDateFrom: activeDateFrom,
nextDateFrom: recovery.dateFrom,
dateTo,
body,
})
activeDateFrom = recovery.dateFrom
continue
}
console.error('[enable-banking] getAllTransactionsWithRaw failed', {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
body,
accountUid,
dateFrom: activeDateFrom,
dateTo,
strategy: activeStrategy,
page,
hasContinuationKey: !!continuationKey,
})
if (isSessionExpiredResponse(response.status, body)) {
throw new SessionExpiredError(response.status, body)
}
throw new Error(`Failed to get transactions (${response.status}): ${body}`)
}
const rawText = await response.text()
rawPages.push(rawText)
const data: TransactionsResponse = JSON.parse(rawText)
allTransactions.push(...data.transactions)
continuationKey = data.continuation_key
page++
if (page >= MAX_PAGINATION_PAGES) {
console.warn(`[enable-banking] Pagination cap reached (${MAX_PAGINATION_PAGES} pages) for account ${accountUid}`)
break
}
if (!continuationKey) break
}
return { transactions: allTransactions, rawPages }
}
/**
* Convert Enable Banking transaction to legacy format
*/
export function convertTransaction(tx: Transaction, accountCurrency: string): BankTransaction {
const rawAmount = parseFloat(tx.transaction_amount.amount)
// Use credit_debit_indicator to determine sign
// CRDT = credit (money in) = positive
// DBIT = debit (money out) = negative
const isCredit = tx.credit_debit_indicator === 'CRDT'
const amount = isCredit ? Math.abs(rawAmount) : -Math.abs(rawAmount)
// Get counterparty name from creditor/debtor objects or direct fields
const creditorName = tx.creditor?.name || tx.creditor_name
const debtorName = tx.debtor?.name || tx.debtor_name
return {
id: tx.entry_reference || tx.transaction_id || `${tx.booking_date}_${rawAmount}`,
date: tx.value_date || tx.booking_date || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0],
booking_date: tx.booking_date || tx.value_date || new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0],
amount,
currency: tx.transaction_amount.currency || accountCurrency,
// Fallback chain: bank's payment message → counterparty name → a Swedish
// label derived from the ISO 20022 / MCC codes the bank DID send (card
// purchases, ATM, fees, interest) → 'Okänd transaktion'. The final fallback
// is also normalized at the ingest boundary, so any leftover lands as the
// same Swedish neutral.
description: tx.remittance_information?.filter(r => r.trim()).join(' ') ||
(isCredit ? debtorName : creditorName) ||
deriveTransactionLabel({
bankTransactionCode: tx.bank_transaction_code,
proprietaryBankTransactionCode: tx.proprietary_bank_transaction_code,
mcc: tx.merchant_category_code,
isCredit,
}) ||
FALLBACK_DESCRIPTION,
counterparty_name: isCredit ? debtorName : creditorName,
counterparty_account: isCredit
? tx.debtor_account?.iban || tx.debtor_account?.bban
: tx.creditor_account?.iban || tx.creditor_account?.bban,
merchant_category_code: tx.merchant_category_code,
bank_transaction_code: tx.bank_transaction_code,
proprietary_bank_transaction_code: tx.proprietary_bank_transaction_code,
}
}
/**
* Get transactions in legacy format
*/
export async function getTransactions(
accountUid: string,
fromDate?: string,
toDate?: string,
accountCurrency: string = 'SEK'
): Promise<BankTransaction[]> {
const transactions = await getAllTransactions(accountUid, fromDate, toDate)
return transactions.map(tx => convertTransaction(tx, accountCurrency))
}
/**
* Whether the current configuration targets the sandbox API
*/
export function isSandboxMode(): boolean {
return ENABLE_BANKING_API_URL.includes('tilisy')
}
// Utility functions
/**
* Check if consent is expiring soon (within 7 days)
*/
export function isConsentExpiringSoon(expiresAt: string | null): boolean {
if (!expiresAt) return false
const expiryDate = new Date(expiresAt)
const warningDate = new Date()
warningDate.setDate(warningDate.getDate() + 7)
return expiryDate <= warningDate
}
/**
* Get days until consent expires
*/
export function getDaysUntilExpiry(expiresAt: string | null): number | null {
if (!expiresAt) return null
const expiryDate = new Date(expiresAt)
const now = new Date()
const diffTime = expiryDate.getTime() - now.getTime()
const diffDays = Math.ceil(diffTime / (1000 * 60 * 60 * 24))
return Math.max(0, diffDays)
}