b8605aabfc
The API-key settings panel carried a hand-copied list of scope groups that
had drifted to 24 of the 30 scopes in API_KEY_SCOPES: articles:read/write,
companies:write and the three reconciliation scopes were missing, so a key
minted in the dashboard could not call gnubok_create_company, the article
tools, the seven reconciliation tools or the matching v1 endpoints. The
per-scope "N verktyg" counts in the panel and in the API_KEY_SCOPES
descriptions were hand-maintained and wrong (reports:read said 18, actual
30; bookkeeping:write said 11, actual 22).
- Move the pure scope catalogue (API_KEY_SCOPES, scope lists, SCOPE_GROUPS,
TOOL_SCOPE_MAP) into lib/auth/scope-catalog.ts with no server imports, so
the client-side panel can bundle it. api-keys.ts re-exports everything,
so existing imports are unchanged.
- SCOPE_GROUPS becomes a list of { domain, label, scopes } covering every
scope (reconciliation has three), shared by the panel and the OAuth
consent page. scopeKind() replaces the ad hoc suffix checks.
- TOOL_COUNT_BY_SCOPE is derived from TOOL_SCOPE_MAP at module load; the
hand-written counts are removed from the catalogue descriptions.
- The panel renders groups and cards from the catalogue; i18n keys are
derived from domain and scope id. The "(REST API)" heading suffix is
computed from the counts instead of baked into the labels.
- New unit test asserts every scope belongs to exactly one group and that
counts equal TOOL_SCOPE_MAP occurrences.
- New sv/en strings for the articles, companies:write and reconciliation
scopes.
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
227 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
227 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'crypto'
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { createServiceRoleClient } from '@/lib/supabase/service-client'
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// Not lib/company/context: that module imports next/headers for the legacy
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// company cookie, and this file is reachable from bundles where that import
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// is a build error.
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import { getActiveCompanyId } from '@/lib/company/active-company'
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const KEY_PREFIX = 'gnubok_sk_'
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const REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX = 'gnubok_rt_'
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// ── API Key Scopes ──────────────────────────────────────────
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// The catalogue lives in scope-catalog.ts (no server imports, safe for client
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// bundles) and is re-exported here so existing imports keep working.
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export {
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API_KEY_SCOPES,
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ALL_SCOPES,
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DEFAULT_SCOPES,
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DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES,
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PUBLIC_OAUTH_METADATA_SCOPES,
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STAGING_SCOPES,
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findStageApproveConflict,
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SCOPE_GROUPS,
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scopeKind,
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TOOL_SCOPE_MAP,
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TOOL_COUNT_BY_SCOPE,
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} from './scope-catalog'
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export type { ApiKeyScope, ScopeGroup } from './scope-catalog'
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import { API_KEY_SCOPES, DEFAULT_SCOPES, type ApiKeyScope } from './scope-catalog'
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export function validateScopes(scopes: unknown): ApiKeyScope[] | null {
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if (scopes === null || scopes === undefined) return null
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if (!Array.isArray(scopes)) return null
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const valid = scopes.filter((s): s is ApiKeyScope => s in API_KEY_SCOPES)
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return valid.length > 0 ? valid : null
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}
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/**
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* Create a Supabase service client that doesn't require cookies.
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* Used for API key validation (MCP, webhooks) where there's no browser session.
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*/
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export function createServiceClientNoCookies() {
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return createServiceRoleClient(
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
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process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!
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)
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}
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export function generateApiKey(mode: ApiKeyMode = 'live'): { key: string; hash: string; prefix: string } {
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const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
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// Test keys carry an explicit `test_` infix so integrators can tell at a
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// glance which environment a key targets (matches the llms.txt contract:
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// `gnubok_sk_test_<random>`). The infix is purely cosmetic: the authoritative
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// mode is the `mode` column on api_keys, read back by hash in validateApiKey,
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// so nothing trusts the key string. Both variants keep the `gnubok_sk_`
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// prefix so the `startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)` check in validateApiKey still holds.
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const key = mode === 'test' ? `${KEY_PREFIX}test_${random}` : `${KEY_PREFIX}${random}`
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const hash = hashApiKey(key)
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// First 18 chars: 'gnubok_sk_test_xyz' for test keys, 'gnubok_sk_xxxxxxxx'
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// for live: the stored prefix is what the settings UI shows, so the test_
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// infix is visible in the key list without exposing the secret.
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const prefix = key.slice(0, KEY_PREFIX.length + 8)
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return { key, hash, prefix }
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}
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/**
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* SHA-256, deliberately, and NOT a slow KDF like bcrypt/argon2.
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*
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* CodeQL flags this as js/insufficient-password-hash. That rule exists for
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* user-chosen passwords, which are low-entropy and brute-forceable, so the
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* defence is to make each guess expensive. This input is not a password: keys
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* come from generateApiKey as 32 CSPRNG bytes (`gnubok_sk_<base64url>`), and no
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* work factor moves the needle on a 256-bit random secret.
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*
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* A slow KDF would also be actively worse here: this runs on the hot path of
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* every MCP request, where the hash is the primary-key lookup used to find the
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* row, so per-request cost is real latency for zero security gain.
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*
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* Do NOT "fix" this by changing the algorithm. The hash IS the stored
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* credential, so a different function invalidates every live `gnubok_sk_` key,
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* breaking existing MCP connections with no migration path.
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*/
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export function hashApiKey(key: string): string {
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
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}
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export function generateRefreshToken(): { token: string; hash: string } {
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const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
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const token = `${REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX}${random}`
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const hash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
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return { token, hash }
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}
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export function hashRefreshToken(token: string): string {
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex')
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}
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export function isRefreshToken(token: string): boolean {
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return token.startsWith(REFRESH_TOKEN_PREFIX)
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}
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export function extractBearerToken(request: Request): string | null {
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const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization')
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if (!authHeader?.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null
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return authHeader.slice(7)
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}
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/**
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* Validate an API key and enforce rate limiting.
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* Uses the DB RPC for atomic check + increment.
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* Returns the user_id, company_id, api_key_id, name, and effective scopes on
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* success, or an error with HTTP status.
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* null scopes in DB → DEFAULT_SCOPES (read-only).
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*
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* api_key_id and api_key_name are returned so callers (e.g. the MCP server)
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* can record actor attribution on pending_operations and audit_log.
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* They may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the migration
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* that adds them to the RPC return shape.
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*/
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/**
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* Operating mode of the API key. 'live' keys see real company data; 'test' keys
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* are bound to deterministic sandbox companies. Keys created before the Phase 1
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* migration default to 'live' for backwards compatibility.
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*/
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export type ApiKeyMode = 'live' | 'test'
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export async function validateApiKey(
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key: string
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): Promise<
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| {
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userId: string
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/**
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* The key's default company. null only while the key's user has no
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* company at all (minted from the OAuth popup before onboarding, issue
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* #1814): the first validation after a company exists binds the key.
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*/
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companyId: string | null
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apiKeyId?: string
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apiKeyName?: string
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scopes: ApiKeyScope[]
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mode: ApiKeyMode
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}
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| { error: string; status: number }
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> {
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if (isRefreshToken(key)) {
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return {
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error: 'Refresh token cannot be used as access token; exchange it at /api/mcp-oauth/token',
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status: 401,
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}
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}
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if (!key.startsWith(KEY_PREFIX)) {
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return { error: 'Invalid API key format', status: 401 }
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}
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const hash = hashApiKey(key)
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const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
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const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('validate_and_increment_api_key', {
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p_key_hash: hash,
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})
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if (error || !data || data.length === 0) {
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return { error: 'Invalid API key', status: 401 }
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}
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const row = data[0]
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if (row.rate_limited) {
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return { error: 'Rate limit exceeded', status: 429 }
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}
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const companyId: string | null =
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row.company_id ?? (await bindUnboundKey(supabase, row.user_id, row.api_key_id))
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return {
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userId: row.user_id,
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companyId,
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apiKeyId: row.api_key_id,
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apiKeyName: row.api_key_name,
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scopes: validateScopes(row.scopes) ?? DEFAULT_SCOPES,
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// `mode` may be undefined when the deployed DB hasn't yet run the Phase 1
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// migration that adds it to the RPC return. Default to 'live' so existing
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// keys behave unchanged.
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mode: (row.mode === 'test' ? 'test' : 'live') as ApiKeyMode,
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}
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}
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/**
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* Late binding for keys minted before the user's first company existed.
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*
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* The OAuth token endpoint stores company_id NULL for such keys. Company
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* creation happens in the web app (a Server Action) which knows nothing about
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* the user's keys, so the binding is healed here, on the first validation after
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* a company exists: one place, regardless of how the company was created.
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* Returns null while the user still has no company. The UPDATE is best-effort:
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* a failed write only means the next call resolves again.
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*/
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async function bindUnboundKey(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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userId: string,
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apiKeyId: string | undefined
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): Promise<string | null> {
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let companyId: string | null
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try {
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companyId = await getActiveCompanyId(supabase, userId)
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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if (!companyId) return null
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if (apiKeyId) {
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await supabase
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.from('api_keys')
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.update({ company_id: companyId })
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.eq('id', apiKeyId)
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.is('company_id', null)
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}
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return companyId
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}
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/**
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* Check if a given scope is allowed by the key's scopes.
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*/
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export function hasScope(keyScopes: ApiKeyScope[], required: ApiKeyScope): boolean {
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return keyScopes.includes(required)
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}
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