Files
accounted/lib/connect/hosted/__tests__/keys.test.ts
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Jakob Wennberg f31eeaa603 feat(connect): Peppol through the connector (hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger) (#2177)
* feat(connect): peppol connector foundation: capability, ledger/budget service, quota

Adds the storage + package shape for brokering Peppol through the connector with
the same one-address + rate-budget model as bank/skatteverket: a peppol
capability (connector-gated, free on hosted), peppol as a ledger + upstream
service, a conservative rate budget, and a migration extending the ledger
service CHECK and the per-key limits (peppol_connections_per_company). Proxy
route + instance-side Qvalia reroute follow. Switch-on gated on the Qvalia
brokering-terms check.

(cherry picked from commit 3cc0da6a3, migration renumbered 20260902190000)

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat

* feat(connect): Peppol through the connector: hosted proxy, instance transport, ownership ledger

Completes the Peppol upstream for self-hosted instances on the connector
(WS3): an instance with a connector key carrying the peppol scope and no
Qvalia keys of its own sends and receives e-invoices through Arcim's
contracted access point, the same way bank and Skatteverket already route.

Hosted: app/api/connect/peppol/[...path] speaks the PeppolTransport
operations (lookup, submit, status, evidence, recipient PUT/DELETE, inbound
list/xml) rather than proxying Qvalia paths, because the Qvalia account is
shared by every hosted company and every instance: reads must be scoped to
what the caller owns, and the inbound read endpoint is destructive for the
whole account. Ownership: a receiving registration is a ledger row (service
peppol, participant id in account_uids, sha256 in handle_hash so one key
holds a participant at a time); outbound submissions land in the new
connector_peppol_submissions table and gate status/evidence; inbound
documents are served from the hosted archive filtered by the participants
the key holds. Per-company quota (peppol_connections_per_company), the
shared PEPPOL_RECEIVING_MAX_REGISTRATIONS cap, and the global peppol rate
budget apply. Provider failures cross as CONNECTOR_UPSTREAM_ERROR with the
adapter's retryable flag (422 or 502).

Instance: lib/invoices/transports/connector.ts implements PeppolTransport
over that API and registers itself in connector mode (key present, no
QVALIA_* keys); getPeppolTransportAvailability() defaults to it when no
provider is selected, so an instance needs no PEPPOL_TRANSPORT_PROVIDER.
Webhooks are not brokered; the existing outbound status poll covers it.
Hosted is byte-identical: it has its own keys, so connector mode is never on.

Docs: SELF-HOSTING.md, SOVEREIGN.md, .env.example. Switch-on for third-party
instances stays gated on the Qvalia brokering-terms check; without the scope
every operation answers 403.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): authorize Peppol participants per key, harden the proxy after review

Review follow-ups on #2177. Authorization: a key may only register (and send
as) participant identifiers Arcim recorded on the key at issuance
(connector_keys.peppol_participants, migration 20260902191000) or the
licensee's own org number, and a document may only be submitted as a sender
the key has registered; X-Connector-Company stays an opaque per-company ref.
Cap: the shared access-point cap now counts fresh pending reservations and is
re-checked after this request's own reservation, so concurrent registrations
cannot both pass. Inbound: both halves of the participant id are filtered in
the archive query (over-fetched, then exact-pair checked), so foreign rows
sharing an identifier cannot consume the limit. Delete: deregistration is a
required transport capability, checked before the ledger row is revoked, and
registration refuses an access point that cannot deregister. Instance
transport: the hosted URL must be https (loopback http only, same rule as
getConnectorConfig), and the response body is read inside the timeout window
with body-read failures mapped to retryable transport errors.
issue-connector-key.ts gains --peppol-participants and
--peppol-connections-per-company. Declined: NOT VALID on the ledger CHECK
(the table is empty until keys are issued; the validated scan is instant).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(connect): bind Peppol ownership to the instance company, query exact participant pairs

Second review round on #2177. Ownership is now (key, company_ref), not key
alone: a sender must be registered under the same company header, status and
evidence reads look the submission up under the header company, DELETE and
re-registration refuse a participant the key holds for another company, so
one company on a multi-company instance cannot act on another company's
registration through the shared key. The instance transport resolves the
owning company from its own peppol_deliveries / peppol_registrations rows
before status, evidence and deregistration calls (deps.companyFor,
deps.companyForParticipant, wired in transports/index.ts). Inbound listing
stays key-wide (the instance routes documents to its own companies by its
own registrations). The archive query now runs one exact-pair query per
scheme (scheme fixed, that scheme's identifiers), so neither foreign nor
cross-pair rows can consume the limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MMUUom4fUk6zi4xYZSSfat
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <jakob.wennberg@arcim.io>
Signed-off-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-02 20:57:57 +02:00

95 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest'
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { generateConnectorKey, hashConnectorKey, isConnectorKeyFormat, validateConnectorKey } from '../keys'
function supabaseWithRpc(result: { data?: unknown; error?: unknown }): { supabase: SupabaseClient; rpc: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> } {
const rpc = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: result.data ?? null, error: result.error ?? null })
return { supabase: { rpc } as unknown as SupabaseClient, rpc }
}
const ROW = {
connector_key_id: '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111',
org_number: '5561234567',
instance_url: 'https://bokforing.example.se',
scopes: ['bank_sync', 'skatteverket'],
status: 'active',
current_period_end: '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
rate_limited: false,
limits: { bank_connections_per_company: 2, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 3600 },
}
describe('connector key primitives', () => {
it('generates a gnubok_ck_ key with a display prefix and a SHA-256 hash', () => {
const { key, hash, prefix } = generateConnectorKey()
expect(key.startsWith('gnubok_ck_')).toBe(true)
expect(key.length).toBeGreaterThan(40)
expect(prefix).toBe(key.slice(0, 18))
expect(hash).toBe(hashConnectorKey(key))
expect(hash).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/)
expect(generateConnectorKey().key).not.toBe(key)
})
it('recognises the key format', () => {
expect(isConnectorKeyFormat(generateConnectorKey().key)).toBe(true)
expect(isConnectorKeyFormat('gnubok_sk_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz')).toBe(false)
expect(isConnectorKeyFormat('gnubok_ck_short')).toBe(false)
})
})
describe('validateConnectorKey', () => {
it('rejects a malformed key without touching the database', async () => {
const { supabase, rpc } = supabaseWithRpc({ data: [ROW] })
expect(await validateConnectorKey('nope', supabase)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 401, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID' })
expect(rpc).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('hashes the key and calls the atomic RPC', async () => {
const { key, hash } = generateConnectorKey()
const { supabase, rpc } = supabaseWithRpc({ data: [ROW] })
const result = await validateConnectorKey(key, supabase)
expect(rpc).toHaveBeenCalledWith('validate_and_increment_connector_key', { p_key_hash: hash })
expect(result).toEqual({
ok: true,
key: {
id: ROW.connector_key_id,
orgNumber: '5561234567',
instanceUrl: 'https://bokforing.example.se',
scopes: ['bank_sync', 'skatteverket'],
status: 'active',
currentPeriodEnd: '2027-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
limits: { bank_connections_per_company: 2, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 3600 },
},
})
})
it('fills default limits when the RPC returns null limits', async () => {
const { key } = generateConnectorKey()
const result = await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [{ ...ROW, limits: null }] }).supabase)
expect(result.ok && result.key.limits).toEqual({ bank_connections_per_company: 1, skv_connections_per_company: 1, peppol_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 0 })
})
it('maps no row (unknown/revoked) to 401, but an RPC error to 503', async () => {
const { key } = generateConnectorKey()
expect(await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [] }).supabase)).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 401 })
// NEVER 401 on a database error: the instance sync deletes its whole
// connector grant cache on 401/403, so a hosted pooler blip answered as
// 401 would destroy a paying instance's 72h offline grace. 503 lands in
// the sync's keep-grants branch.
expect(await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ error: { message: 'boom' } }).supabase)).toMatchObject({
ok: false,
status: 503,
code: 'CONNECTOR_VALIDATION_UNAVAILABLE',
})
})
it('maps a suspended key to 403 and a rate-limited one to 429', async () => {
const { key } = generateConnectorKey()
expect(
await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [{ ...ROW, status: 'suspended' }] }).supabase),
).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 403, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED' })
expect(
await validateConnectorKey(key, supabaseWithRpc({ data: [{ ...ROW, rate_limited: true }] }).supabase),
).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 429, code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED' })
})
})