f24b26a139
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise, while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production. Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that are not repeated. userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger. State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row, consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing. provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client. provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up. Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before the scoped check ran. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A) The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in 20260416120000; this bucket was left behind. Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining legacy prefix objects. The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail the whole query instead of filtering the row out. deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to erase. The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and SHA-256 identical before repointing the row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user had been removed from the company kept reading. Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error strings with the canonical envelope. Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every other v1 read endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and had become the top application consumer of production database time: measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at 7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on the booking path. PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side instead turns that into two indexed round trips. Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling. Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead, since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows. commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column, which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped on the newest rows indefinitely. The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap; the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly. ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change sort semantics on the route that currently works. Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had them. The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters, because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a write that never happened. dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write, and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to 5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0. Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the full tree. The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the lockfile, never workflow files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily. Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which settles the intent. documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession: the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention. webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line place to change that. A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list, and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they are named rather than silently rotting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email. This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined by next.config.ts. Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry personnummer and financial data. verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible. The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md. Structural roots closed: - resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking 1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING - ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document, not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed - sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed - tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all four baselines now empty - three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import, ungated-extension-route Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap), RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/ Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites with isSwedishUserMessage extended. Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice, recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep work and are verified green together. 13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge. 20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres). Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0 errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and ~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass: - replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid() (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo - bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns - credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no cross-tenant figures in exception text - link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end - personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE - same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse - receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts - period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap - documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping - invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression), duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran - match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat) - refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window) - KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint - personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools - worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths - MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk - observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True, cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings call removed) Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests * fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215 pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() = 'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text, reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved. Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column, and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no longer renders as already filed. Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern (all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215 - restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch - replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap warning texts and update the pinned test expectations - drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment - strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
555 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
555 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Maps raw errors to user-friendly localized messages.
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*
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* Priority chain:
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* 1. Zod validation field errors
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* 2. Postgres error code map
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* 3. HTTP status code map
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* 4. Context-specific fallback
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* 5. Generic fallback
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*
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* Callers can pass an explicit `locale` ('sv' | 'en'). Default 'sv' so existing
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* server-side callers (cron, background jobs, logs) keep their current Swedish
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* output. UI callers should pass the active locale from useLocale() / getLocale().
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*
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* Specific domain phrases (locked period, unbalanced voucher, etc.) remain
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* Swedish for now: those refer to statutory accounting concepts and English
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* users will still see them on Skatteverket-bound surfaces.
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*/
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import { formatCurrency } from '@/lib/utils'
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// Pure module (no next/server): safe for the client bundles this file lives in.
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import { formatDimensionValidationIssues } from '@/lib/bookkeeping/dimension-errors'
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import { getErrorEntry, hasErrorEntry } from './structured-errors'
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type ErrorContext =
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| 'invoice'
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| 'supplier_invoice'
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| 'customer'
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| 'article'
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| 'supplier'
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| 'transaction'
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| 'journal_entry'
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| 'settings'
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| 'auth'
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| 'salary'
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export type ErrorLocale = 'sv' | 'en'
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interface GetErrorMessageOptions {
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context?: ErrorContext
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statusCode?: number
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locale?: ErrorLocale
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}
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type Bilingual = { sv: string; en: string }
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function pick(b: Bilingual, locale: ErrorLocale): string {
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return b[locale] ?? b.sv
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}
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// Postgres error codes -> localized messages
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const POSTGRES_ERROR_MAP: Record<string, Bilingual> = {
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'23505': { sv: 'En post med samma uppgifter finns redan.', en: 'A record with the same details already exists.' },
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'23503': { sv: 'Posten kan inte ändras eftersom den refereras av annan data.', en: 'This record cannot be changed because other data refers to it.' },
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'23502': { sv: 'Ett obligatoriskt fält saknas.', en: 'A required field is missing.' },
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'42501': { sv: 'Du har inte behörighet att utföra denna åtgärd.', en: 'You do not have permission to perform this action.' },
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'42P01': { sv: 'Resursen kunde inte hittas.', en: 'The resource could not be found.' },
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'23514': { sv: 'Värdet uppfyller inte de tillåtna kraven.', en: 'The value does not meet the allowed constraints.' },
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'40001': { sv: 'En annan ändring pågick samtidigt. Försök igen.', en: 'A concurrent change was in progress. Please try again.' },
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'40P01': { sv: 'En konflikt uppstod. Försök igen.', en: 'A conflict occurred. Please try again.' },
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'22P02': { sv: 'Ogiltigt värde angavs.', en: 'Invalid value supplied.' },
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'22003': { sv: 'Värdet är utanför tillåtet intervall.', en: 'Value is out of allowed range.' },
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}
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// HTTP status codes -> localized messages
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const HTTP_STATUS_MAP: Record<number, Bilingual> = {
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400: { sv: 'Förfrågan innehåller ogiltiga uppgifter.', en: 'The request contains invalid data.' },
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401: { sv: 'Din session har gått ut. Logga in igen.', en: 'Your session has expired. Please sign in again.' },
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403: { sv: 'Du har inte behörighet att utföra denna åtgärd.', en: 'You do not have permission to perform this action.' },
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404: { sv: 'Resursen kunde inte hittas.', en: 'The resource could not be found.' },
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409: { sv: 'En konflikt uppstod. Ladda om sidan och försök igen.', en: 'A conflict occurred. Reload the page and try again.' },
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422: { sv: 'Uppgifterna kunde inte bearbetas. Kontrollera fälten och försök igen.', en: 'The data could not be processed. Check the fields and try again.' },
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429: { sv: 'För många förfrågningar. Vänta en stund och försök igen.', en: 'Too many requests. Wait a moment and try again.' },
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500: { sv: 'Ett oväntat serverfel uppstod. Försök igen senare.', en: 'An unexpected server error occurred. Please try again later.' },
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502: { sv: 'Servern är tillfälligt otillgänglig. Försök igen om en stund.', en: 'The server is temporarily unavailable. Please try again shortly.' },
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503: { sv: 'Tjänsten är tillfälligt otillgänglig. Försök igen om en stund.', en: 'The service is temporarily unavailable. Please try again shortly.' },
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}
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// Context-specific fallbacks
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const CONTEXT_FALLBACKS: Record<ErrorContext, Bilingual> = {
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invoice: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera fakturan. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the invoice. Please try again.' },
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supplier_invoice: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera leverantörsfakturan. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the supplier invoice. Please try again.' },
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customer: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera kunden. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the customer. Please try again.' },
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article: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera artikeln. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the article. Please try again.' },
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supplier: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera leverantören. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the supplier. Please try again.' },
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transaction: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera transaktionen. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the transaction. Please try again.' },
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journal_entry: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera verifikationen. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the journal entry. Please try again.' },
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settings: { sv: 'Kunde inte spara inställningarna. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not save settings. Please try again.' },
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auth: { sv: 'Ett fel uppstod vid inloggningen. Försök igen.', en: 'An error occurred while signing in. Please try again.' },
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salary: { sv: 'Kunde inte hantera löneuppgifterna. Försök igen.', en: 'Could not process the payroll data. Please try again.' },
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}
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const GENERIC_FALLBACK: Bilingual = { sv: 'Något gick fel. Försök igen.', en: 'Something went wrong. Please try again.' }
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// Known error patterns → user-friendly Swedish messages
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const ERROR_PATTERN_MAP: [RegExp, string | null][] = [
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[
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/locked\/closed fiscal period/i,
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'Perioden är låst. Verifikationen kan inte skapas i en stängd eller låst period.',
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],
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[
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/Bokföringen är låst t\.o\.m\./,
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null, // null = extract the Swedish message directly from the raw error text
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],
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[
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/Cannot attach documents to entries in a locked/i,
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'Kan inte bifoga dokument till verifikationer i en låst period.',
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],
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[
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/Entry date .+ is outside fiscal period/i,
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'Datumet ligger utanför det valda räkenskapsåret.',
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],
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[
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/Only company owners and admins can delete vouchers/i,
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'Endast ägare och administratörer kan radera verifikationer.',
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],
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[
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/Journal entry not found/i,
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'Verifikationen kunde inte hittas.',
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],
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[
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/Only posted entries can be deleted/i,
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'Endast bokförda verifikationer kan raderas.',
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],
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[
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/Cannot delete voucher in a closed fiscal period/i,
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'Verifikationen kan inte raderas: räkenskapsåret är stängt.',
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],
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[
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/Cannot delete voucher in a locked fiscal period/i,
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'Verifikationen kan inte raderas: perioden är låst.',
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],
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[
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/Cannot delete: other entries reference this voucher/i,
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'Verifikationen kan inte raderas eftersom andra verifikationer (t.ex. storno eller rättelse) refererar till den.',
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],
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[
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/timed out after \d+m?s/i,
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'Anslutningen mot tjänsten tog för lång tid. Försök igen.',
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],
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[
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/already has a journal entry/i,
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'Transaktionen är redan bokförd. Ångra kategoriseringen om du vill ändra den.',
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],
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]
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/**
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* Check if a message matches a known error pattern and return the Swedish translation.
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* Returns null if no pattern matches.
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*/
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function tryMatchKnownError(message: string): string | null {
|
|
for (const [pattern, translation] of ERROR_PATTERN_MAP) {
|
|
if (pattern.test(message)) {
|
|
if (translation !== null) return translation
|
|
// Extract the Swedish part from the message
|
|
const match = message.match(/Bokföringen är låst t\.o\.m\. [^.]+\./)
|
|
return match ? match[0] : 'Bokföringen är låst för denna period.'
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Simple heuristic to detect already-translated Swedish messages.
|
|
* If the message contains common Swedish words/patterns, pass it through.
|
|
*/
|
|
function isSwedishUserMessage(message: string): boolean {
|
|
const swedishPatterns = [
|
|
/kunde inte/i,
|
|
/kan inte/i,
|
|
/hittades/i,
|
|
/redan/i,
|
|
/låst/i,
|
|
/försök igen/i,
|
|
/ogiltigt?/i,
|
|
/saknas/i,
|
|
/saknar/i,
|
|
/krävs/i,
|
|
/måste/i,
|
|
/redan finns/i,
|
|
/gick fel/i,
|
|
/valideringsfel/i,
|
|
/korrigera/i,
|
|
/bankuppgifter/i,
|
|
/behörighet/i,
|
|
/session/i,
|
|
/förfrågan/i,
|
|
/obligatorisk/i,
|
|
/är låst/i,
|
|
/fält/i,
|
|
/värde/i,
|
|
/felaktig/i,
|
|
/för (lång|kort|stor|liten|många|få)/i,
|
|
/bankgiro/i,
|
|
/personnummer/i,
|
|
/kontonummer/i,
|
|
/clearingnummer/i,
|
|
/nummer är/i,
|
|
/tillgängligt/i,
|
|
]
|
|
return swedishPatterns.some((p) => p.test(message))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Extract a user-friendly message from a Zod validation error shape.
|
|
* Returns null if the error is not a Zod error.
|
|
*/
|
|
function tryParseZodErrors(error: unknown): string | null {
|
|
if (typeof error !== 'object' || error === null) return null
|
|
|
|
const obj = error as Record<string, unknown>
|
|
|
|
// Check for Zod-style field errors: { fieldName: ["message"] } or { issues: [...] }
|
|
if (Array.isArray(obj.issues)) {
|
|
const issues = obj.issues as Array<{ message?: string; path?: string[] }>
|
|
const messages = issues
|
|
.slice(0, 3)
|
|
.map((issue) => {
|
|
const field = issue.path?.join('.') || ''
|
|
const msg = issue.message || 'ogiltigt värde'
|
|
return field ? `${field}: ${msg}` : msg
|
|
})
|
|
if (messages.length > 0) return messages.join('. ')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for { errors: [{ field, message, code }] } shape from validateBody
|
|
if (Array.isArray(obj.errors)) {
|
|
const items = obj.errors as Array<{ field?: string; message?: string }>
|
|
const messages = items
|
|
.slice(0, 3)
|
|
.map((it) => {
|
|
const field = it.field || ''
|
|
const msg = it.message || 'ogiltigt värde'
|
|
return field ? `${field}: ${msg}` : msg
|
|
})
|
|
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
if (messages.length > 0) return messages.join('. ')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for { errors: { field: ["msg"] } } shape (legacy)
|
|
if (typeof obj.errors === 'object' && obj.errors !== null) {
|
|
const fieldErrors = obj.errors as Record<string, string[]>
|
|
const messages: string[] = []
|
|
for (const [field, msgs] of Object.entries(fieldErrors)) {
|
|
if (Array.isArray(msgs) && msgs.length > 0) {
|
|
messages.push(`${field}: ${msgs[0]}`)
|
|
}
|
|
if (messages.length >= 3) break
|
|
}
|
|
if (messages.length > 0) return messages.join('. ')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Get a user-friendly Swedish error message from a raw error.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param error - The raw error. Can be an API response body (object), Error instance, string, or unknown.
|
|
* @param options - Optional context and HTTP status code.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function getErrorMessage(
|
|
error: unknown,
|
|
options: GetErrorMessageOptions = {}
|
|
): string {
|
|
const { context, statusCode, locale = 'sv' } = options
|
|
|
|
// 1. If it's a string, check if it's already Swedish or matches a known pattern
|
|
if (typeof error === 'string' && error.trim()) {
|
|
if (isSwedishUserMessage(error)) return error
|
|
const knownError = tryMatchKnownError(error)
|
|
if (knownError) return knownError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 2. If it's an object, try various parsing strategies
|
|
if (typeof error === 'object' && error !== null) {
|
|
const obj = error as Record<string, unknown>
|
|
|
|
// Bare envelope inner-error shape: { code, message, message_en?, ... }.
|
|
// Happens when a caller forwards `result.error` (the inner object) instead
|
|
// of the whole `result`. Pick the English variant when the UI locale is
|
|
// English; otherwise fall back to the Swedish `message`.
|
|
if (typeof obj.code === 'string' && typeof obj.message === 'string' && obj.message.trim()) {
|
|
// Typed domain exceptions (lib/bookkeeping/errors.ts classes) also match
|
|
// this shape, but their `message` is raw English (often a DB constraint
|
|
// string) and must never reach the user verbatim. Normalize the instance
|
|
// into the structured envelope so the per-code branches below own the
|
|
// translation. Class fields are enumerable own props, so { ...obj }
|
|
// carries exactly the details those branches expect (totalDebit,
|
|
// lockDate, reason, issues, ...), while the non-enumerable Error.message
|
|
// stays out of details. Plain objects (forwarded inner envelopes,
|
|
// PostgrestError-shaped literals) keep the passthrough behavior.
|
|
if (error instanceof Error) {
|
|
// Only recurse when the registry knows the code: the structured
|
|
// branches then own the translation. An unknown code (a Node system
|
|
// error like ECONNREFUSED, a Postgres SQLSTATE on a wrapped Error, a
|
|
// stray third-party code) would fall out of the structured path with
|
|
// its raw English message, so instead fall through to the plain
|
|
// handling below: Postgres map, known patterns, Swedish check, and
|
|
// finally the status/context/generic fallbacks.
|
|
if (hasErrorEntry(obj.code)) {
|
|
return getErrorMessage(
|
|
{
|
|
error: {
|
|
code: obj.code,
|
|
message: obj.message,
|
|
account_numbers: (obj as { accountNumbers?: unknown }).accountNumbers,
|
|
details: { ...obj },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
options
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (locale === 'en' && typeof obj.message_en === 'string' && obj.message_en.trim()) {
|
|
return obj.message_en
|
|
}
|
|
return obj.message
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Structured application error: { error: { code, message, message_en?, ... } }
|
|
if (typeof obj.error === 'object' && obj.error !== null) {
|
|
const structured = obj.error as {
|
|
code?: unknown
|
|
message?: unknown
|
|
message_en?: unknown
|
|
account_numbers?: unknown
|
|
details?: unknown
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For English UI, return the registry's English message for any known
|
|
// code instead of falling through to the Swedish branches below (which
|
|
// ignored locale: English users were shown Swedish prose). The Swedish
|
|
// path is left entirely unchanged; codes absent from the registry still
|
|
// fall through. The dynamic branches (amounts / lock date / reason) keep
|
|
// owning Swedish display.
|
|
if (locale === 'en' && typeof structured.code === 'string') {
|
|
const entry = getErrorEntry(structured.code)
|
|
if (entry?.message_en) return entry.message_en
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'ACCOUNTS_NOT_IN_CHART' && Array.isArray(structured.account_numbers)) {
|
|
const numbers = structured.account_numbers as string[]
|
|
return `Följande konton behöver aktiveras: ${numbers.join(', ')}`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'JOURNAL_ENTRY_NOT_BALANCED') {
|
|
const details = structured.details as { totalDebit?: number; totalCredit?: number } | undefined
|
|
if (details && typeof details.totalDebit === 'number' && typeof details.totalCredit === 'number') {
|
|
return `Verifikationen balanserar inte (${formatCurrency(details.totalDebit)} debet vs ${formatCurrency(details.totalCredit)} kredit).`
|
|
}
|
|
return 'Verifikationen balanserar inte. Kontrollera att debet och kredit är lika stora.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'FISCAL_PERIOD_NOT_FOUND') {
|
|
return 'Räkenskapsperioden kunde inte hittas.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'ENTRY_DATE_OUTSIDE_FISCAL_PERIOD') {
|
|
return 'Datumet ligger utanför det valda räkenskapsåret.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'JOURNAL_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND') {
|
|
return 'Verifikationen kunde inte hittas.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'CANNOT_REVERSE_NON_POSTED') {
|
|
return 'Endast bokförda verifikationer kan stornas.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'CANNOT_CORRECT_NON_POSTED') {
|
|
return 'Endast bokförda verifikationer kan rättas.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'ENTRY_ALREADY_REVERSED') {
|
|
return 'Verifikationen har redan stornats av en annan användare. Ladda om sidan och försök igen.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'CURRENCY_REVALUATION_ALREADY_EXISTS') {
|
|
return 'En valutaomvärdering finns redan för denna period.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'FX_CLOSING_RATE_UNAVAILABLE') {
|
|
// Name the currency and the date: the user needs to know exactly which
|
|
// rate is missing to judge whether to wait or pick another closing
|
|
// date. Nothing was posted, so this is never a partial-state message.
|
|
const details = structured.details as { missingRates?: unknown } | undefined
|
|
const missing = Array.isArray(details?.missingRates)
|
|
? (details.missingRates as { currency?: unknown; date?: unknown }[])
|
|
.filter((m) => typeof m?.currency === 'string' && typeof m?.date === 'string')
|
|
.map((m) => `${m.currency as string} per ${m.date as string}`)
|
|
: []
|
|
const what = missing.length > 0 ? missing.join(', ') : 'balansdagen'
|
|
return `Ingen valutakurs från Riksbanken finns för ${what}. Valutaomvärderingen har inte bokförts: en uppskattad kurs får inte bokföras mot 3960/7960. Försök igen när kursen är publicerad.`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'INVALID_MAPPING_RESULT') {
|
|
return 'Kontering saknas för transaktionen. Kontrollera bokföringsreglerna.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'DIMENSION_VALIDATION_FAILED') {
|
|
// Prefer reconstructing the per-code Swedish sentences from the
|
|
// machine-readable issue list (present on both the dashboard and the
|
|
// v1/registry error envelopes); fall back to the message, which the
|
|
// engine already emits in Swedish naming the offending codes.
|
|
const details = structured.details as { issues?: unknown } | undefined
|
|
const formatted = formatDimensionValidationIssues(details?.issues)
|
|
if (formatted) return formatted
|
|
if (typeof structured.message === 'string' && structured.message.trim()) {
|
|
return structured.message
|
|
}
|
|
return 'Ett angivet kostnadsställe/projekt finns inte i dimensionsregistret eller är arkiverat. Skapa värdet i registret först.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'NO_OPEN_PERIOD_FOR_DATE') {
|
|
return 'Det finns ingen räkenskapsperiod som täcker det valda datumet. Skapa eller öppna räkenskapsåret först.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'TARGET_PERIOD_CLOSED') {
|
|
return 'Räkenskapsåret för det valda datumet är stängt (bokslut) och kan inte återöppnas. Bokför rättelsen i innevarande period istället.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'TARGET_PERIOD_LOCKED') {
|
|
const details = structured.details as { lockDate?: string } | undefined
|
|
return details?.lockDate
|
|
? `Räkenskapsperioden för det valda datumet är låst (t.o.m. ${details.lockDate}). Lås upp perioden för att flytta verifikationen dit.`
|
|
: 'Räkenskapsperioden för det valda datumet är låst. Lås upp perioden för att flytta verifikationen dit.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'OB_COMPANY_LOCK_DATE') {
|
|
const details = structured.details as { lockDate?: string } | undefined
|
|
return details?.lockDate
|
|
? `Bokföringen är låst t.o.m. ${details.lockDate} och ingående balanser kan inte korrigeras. Ta bort eller flytta låsdatumet under Inställningar → Bokföring och försök igen.`
|
|
: 'Bokföringen är låst av företagets låsdatum och ingående balanser kan inte korrigeras. Ta bort eller flytta låsdatumet under Inställningar → Bokföring och försök igen.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'MEANINGLESS_CORRECTION') {
|
|
const details = structured.details as { reason?: string } | undefined
|
|
if (details?.reason === 'no_date_change') {
|
|
return 'Det nya datumet är samma som det nuvarande: det finns inget att flytta.'
|
|
}
|
|
if (details?.reason === 'identical_to_original') {
|
|
return 'Rättelsen är identisk med originalverifikationen: inget har ändrats.'
|
|
}
|
|
return 'Rättelsen saknar ekonomisk innebörd: varje konto netto till noll. En rättelse måste beskriva en faktisk affärshändelse (BFL 5 kap. 5 §).'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (structured.code === 'BOOKKEEPING_DATABASE_ERROR') {
|
|
// A DB-layer error may carry a user-relevant cause (e.g. period lock
|
|
// trigger). Try the known-pattern map before falling back to the
|
|
// generic "kunde inte sparas" message.
|
|
if (typeof structured.message === 'string') {
|
|
const matched = tryMatchKnownError(structured.message)
|
|
if (matched) return matched
|
|
}
|
|
return 'Verifikationen kunde inte sparas. Försök igen.'
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (locale === 'en' && typeof structured.message_en === 'string' && structured.message_en.trim()) {
|
|
return structured.message_en
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof structured.message === 'string' && structured.message.trim()) {
|
|
// Known codes without a dynamic branch above (e.g. CANNOT_REVERSE_STORNO)
|
|
// carry raw English engine messages: prefer the registry's Swedish
|
|
// message so no typed code surfaces English in a Swedish UI.
|
|
if (locale === 'sv' && typeof structured.code === 'string' && !isSwedishUserMessage(structured.message)) {
|
|
const entry = getErrorEntry(structured.code)
|
|
if (entry?.message_sv) return entry.message_sv
|
|
}
|
|
return structured.message
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Accumulated per-item validation list from routes that collect several
|
|
// problems before responding, e.g. the salary approve route:
|
|
// { error: 'Valideringsfel …', details: ['Tomas Tysén: Bankuppgifter saknas …', …] }
|
|
// Surface the specific reasons: otherwise this shape falls all the way
|
|
// through to the generic HTTP-400 message and the user learns nothing.
|
|
if (
|
|
Array.isArray(obj.details) &&
|
|
obj.details.length > 0 &&
|
|
obj.details.every((d) => typeof d === 'string' && d.trim() !== '')
|
|
) {
|
|
const items = (obj.details as string[]).map((d) => d.trim())
|
|
const shown = items.slice(0, 5).join(' • ')
|
|
const more = items.length > 5 ? ` (+${items.length - 5} till)` : ''
|
|
const lead = typeof obj.error === 'string' && obj.error.trim() ? `${obj.error.trim()}: ` : ''
|
|
return `${lead}${shown}${more}`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try Zod validation errors
|
|
const zodMessage = tryParseZodErrors(obj)
|
|
if (zodMessage) return zodMessage
|
|
|
|
// Try Postgres error code
|
|
if (typeof obj.code === 'string' && POSTGRES_ERROR_MAP[obj.code]) {
|
|
return pick(POSTGRES_ERROR_MAP[obj.code], locale)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try known error patterns (e.g. locked period triggers)
|
|
for (const field of ['error', 'message'] as const) {
|
|
if (typeof obj[field] === 'string' && obj[field].trim()) {
|
|
const knownError = tryMatchKnownError(obj[field])
|
|
if (knownError) return knownError
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try error.message if it's already a good Swedish message
|
|
if (typeof obj.error === 'string' && obj.error.trim()) {
|
|
if (isSwedishUserMessage(obj.error)) return obj.error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (typeof obj.message === 'string' && obj.message.trim()) {
|
|
if (isSwedishUserMessage(obj.message)) return obj.message
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 3. Error instance
|
|
if (error instanceof Error && error.message.trim()) {
|
|
const knownError = tryMatchKnownError(error.message)
|
|
if (knownError) return knownError
|
|
if (isSwedishUserMessage(error.message)) return error.message
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 4. HTTP status code map
|
|
if (statusCode && HTTP_STATUS_MAP[statusCode]) {
|
|
return pick(HTTP_STATUS_MAP[statusCode], locale)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 5. Context-specific fallback
|
|
if (context && CONTEXT_FALLBACKS[context]) {
|
|
return pick(CONTEXT_FALLBACKS[context], locale)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 6. Generic fallback
|
|
return pick(GENERIC_FALLBACK, locale)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Helper that parses a Response body and returns a user-friendly error message.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function getResponseErrorMessage(
|
|
response: Response,
|
|
context?: ErrorContext,
|
|
locale?: ErrorLocale,
|
|
): Promise<string> {
|
|
try {
|
|
const body = await response.json()
|
|
return getErrorMessage(body, { context, statusCode: response.status, locale })
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return getErrorMessage(null, { context, statusCode: response.status, locale })
|
|
}
|
|
}
|