* fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions Hotfix batch (PR1 of the assistant UI makeover, dev_docs/assistant_redesign_plan.md section 7). No visual change; each of these is wrong today regardless of which design lands, and three are unrecoverable per incident. /api/agent/invoke never checked who owns a resumed conversation_id. RLS on agent_conversations/agent_messages is company-scoped, not user-scoped (20260517204000), so a member could post a colleague's conversation id, have their history loaded into the prompt and read it back, while their own turns were appended to that thread. The conversations list route filters on user_id for exactly this reason. Also pins company and intent: resuming a thread from another company would mix ledgers, and resuming under a different intent would swap the tool whitelist under history the model has already seen. A turn persists the assistant message carrying tool_use blocks before the tools run, and their results only after the batch finishes. Dying in between (client disconnect terminating the function, a deploy, a slow tool) left history ending on an unanswered tool_use, which the Messages API rejects on replay: every later turn 400s, and agent_messages is append-only for the BFL trail, so nothing could repair it. History is now patched on read by synthesizing is_error tool_results, leaving the stored trail untouched. check_and_increment_agent_quota is SECURITY DEFINER in public with a caller-chosen p_user_id, so any authenticated user could drain a colleague's minute/day budget and lock them out of every agent endpoint. A plain REVOKE would break the limiter (all three callers use the user's RLS client) and, as it fails open, silently remove the spend cap: the function now refuses to act for anyone but the caller, while service-role connections keep passing an explicit id. The single reject route re-read status and then wrote unguarded, so losing the race with commit's atomic pending -> committing claim stamped `rejected` over an operation that had already posted a verifikat, invisible to the committing-state recovery sweep. Guarded on status like bulk-reject already is; a lost race is now a 409. The sheet's Escape handler listened on window with no defaultPrevented or target check while the sheet is deliberately non-modal, so pressing Esc to dismiss the reject-reason Select inside an approval card, the command palette or any dialog unmounted the sheet and discarded the conversation, the streaming turn and the un-actioned proposal. It now yields to open overlays and to focus outside the sheet. Verified: 9526 unit tests pass, lint clean on touched files, guards pass, and the new pg-real test proves the quota guard against real Postgres (attacker raises 42501, victim counters stay at 0). The four unrelated pg-real failures on this machine reproduce identically with these changes stashed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(assistant): close anon path on the quota RPC, order the ownership check ahead of writes Review follow-ups on the hotfix batch. The caller guard used auth.uid() alone, which is NULL for the `anon` role just as it is for backend roles, so an unauthenticated caller holding the public anon key (it ships in the browser bundle) could still pick any p_user_id and drain that user's quota. The guard now keys on the request role: anon and authenticated may only ever spend their own quota, backend roles keep passing an explicit id. The default PUBLIC execute grant is revoked as a second layer, with execute granted only to authenticated and service_role. Covered by a new pg test for the anon path. The ownership check ran after the onboarding.intake stamp, so a request that was about to be rejected could still write intake_completed_at. It now sits directly after the capability gate, ahead of every side effect and ahead of the company and profile reads, which also makes a rejected request cheaper. The tool-result repair matched ids anywhere in the history, but the API needs results in the message IMMEDIATELY after the tool_use. A result persisted after an intervening turn (two turns racing on one conversation) left a shape that still 400s. The repair is now positional, and orphaned or late-duplicate tool_results are dropped, since an unmatched tool_result is rejected just as an unanswered tool_use is. The Escape guard matched the Radix popper wrapper, which stays mounted when a popper is force-mounted; it now requires data-state="open" so a closed popper cannot block Escape for the rest of the session. Both new route errors are Swedish, per the user-facing error rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
129 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
129 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
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import type { PoolClient } from 'pg'
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import { getClient, getPool } from './setup'
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import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
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/**
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* Caller guard on check_and_increment_agent_quota (migration 20260726090000).
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*
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* The function is SECURITY DEFINER in `public`, so PostgREST exposes it to any
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* authenticated user, and p_user_id is a plain argument. Without a guard, one
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* user could spend another user's minute/day budget and lock them out of every
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* agent endpoint. This test pins the guard against a real Postgres, because a
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* mocked Supabase client cannot see a PL/pgSQL condition at all.
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*
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* Locks in:
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* - An authenticated caller may spend their OWN quota.
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* - An authenticated caller spending someone else's quota raises 42501 and
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* leaves the victim's counters untouched.
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* - A service-role/superuser connection (auth.uid() IS NULL) may still pass
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* an explicit user id: cron, tests and backend jobs rely on that.
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*/
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async function asRole<T>(
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role: 'authenticated' | 'anon',
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userId: string | null,
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fn: (client: PoolClient) => Promise<T>,
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): Promise<T> {
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const client = await getClient()
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try {
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await client.query('BEGIN')
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await client.query(`SELECT set_config('request.jwt.claims', $1, true)`, [
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JSON.stringify(userId ? { sub: userId, role } : { role }),
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])
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await client.query(`SELECT set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', $1, true)`, [userId ?? ''])
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await client.query(`SELECT set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', $1, true)`, [role])
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await client.query(`SET LOCAL ROLE ${role}`)
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const result = await fn(client)
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await client.query('COMMIT')
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return result
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} catch (error) {
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await client.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {})
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throw error
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} finally {
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client.release()
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}
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}
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function asAuthenticatedUser<T>(
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userId: string,
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fn: (client: PoolClient) => Promise<T>,
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): Promise<T> {
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return asRole('authenticated', userId, fn)
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}
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async function counterFor(userId: string): Promise<number> {
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const res = await getPool().query<{ count: number }>(
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`SELECT COALESCE(SUM(count), 0)::int AS count
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FROM public.agent_rate_counters
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WHERE user_id = $1`,
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[userId],
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)
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return res.rows[0]?.count ?? 0
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}
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describe('check_and_increment_agent_quota caller guard.pg', () => {
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it('lets an authenticated user spend their own quota', async () => {
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const userId = await insertAuthUser()
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const result = await asAuthenticatedUser(userId, async (client) => {
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const res = await client.query<{ result: { ok: boolean } }>(
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`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
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[userId],
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)
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return res.rows[0]!.result
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})
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expect(result.ok).toBe(true)
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expect(await counterFor(userId)).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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})
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it('refuses to spend another user quota and leaves their counters untouched', async () => {
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const attacker = await insertAuthUser()
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const victim = await insertAuthUser()
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await expect(
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asAuthenticatedUser(attacker, async (client) => {
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await client.query(
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`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
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[victim],
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)
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}),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: '42501' })
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expect(await counterFor(victim)).toBe(0)
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})
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it('refuses an unauthenticated anon caller entirely', async () => {
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// The anon key ships in the browser bundle, so this RPC is reachable
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// without a session. auth.uid() is NULL for anon exactly as it is for
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// backend roles, so a uid-only guard would have let this through.
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const victim = await insertAuthUser()
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await expect(
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asRole('anon', null, async (client) => {
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await client.query(
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`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
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[victim],
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)
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}),
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: expect.stringMatching(/^42501$/) })
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expect(await counterFor(victim)).toBe(0)
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})
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it('still allows a service-role connection to pass an explicit user id', async () => {
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const userId = await insertAuthUser()
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// The shared pool connects as the migration/superuser role, so auth.uid()
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// is NULL here: the same shape cron jobs and backend scripts run under.
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const res = await getPool().query<{ result: { ok: boolean } }>(
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`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
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[userId],
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)
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expect(res.rows[0]!.result.ok).toBe(true)
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expect(await counterFor(userId)).toBeGreaterThan(0)
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})
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})
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