Files
accounted/tests/pg/agent-quota-caller-guard.pg.test.ts
T
Jakob WennbergandClaude Opus 5 ee8ddb3849 fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions (#1209)
* fix(assistant): stop cross-user conversation access, bricked threads and lost sessions

Hotfix batch (PR1 of the assistant UI makeover, dev_docs/assistant_redesign_plan.md
section 7). No visual change; each of these is wrong today regardless of which
design lands, and three are unrecoverable per incident.

/api/agent/invoke never checked who owns a resumed conversation_id. RLS on
agent_conversations/agent_messages is company-scoped, not user-scoped
(20260517204000), so a member could post a colleague's conversation id, have
their history loaded into the prompt and read it back, while their own turns
were appended to that thread. The conversations list route filters on user_id
for exactly this reason. Also pins company and intent: resuming a thread from
another company would mix ledgers, and resuming under a different intent would
swap the tool whitelist under history the model has already seen.

A turn persists the assistant message carrying tool_use blocks before the tools
run, and their results only after the batch finishes. Dying in between (client
disconnect terminating the function, a deploy, a slow tool) left history ending
on an unanswered tool_use, which the Messages API rejects on replay: every later
turn 400s, and agent_messages is append-only for the BFL trail, so nothing could
repair it. History is now patched on read by synthesizing is_error tool_results,
leaving the stored trail untouched.

check_and_increment_agent_quota is SECURITY DEFINER in public with a
caller-chosen p_user_id, so any authenticated user could drain a colleague's
minute/day budget and lock them out of every agent endpoint. A plain REVOKE
would break the limiter (all three callers use the user's RLS client) and, as it
fails open, silently remove the spend cap: the function now refuses to act for
anyone but the caller, while service-role connections keep passing an explicit
id.

The single reject route re-read status and then wrote unguarded, so losing the
race with commit's atomic pending -> committing claim stamped `rejected` over an
operation that had already posted a verifikat, invisible to the committing-state
recovery sweep. Guarded on status like bulk-reject already is; a lost race is
now a 409.

The sheet's Escape handler listened on window with no defaultPrevented or target
check while the sheet is deliberately non-modal, so pressing Esc to dismiss the
reject-reason Select inside an approval card, the command palette or any dialog
unmounted the sheet and discarded the conversation, the streaming turn and the
un-actioned proposal. It now yields to open overlays and to focus outside the
sheet.

Verified: 9526 unit tests pass, lint clean on touched files, guards pass, and
the new pg-real test proves the quota guard against real Postgres (attacker
raises 42501, victim counters stay at 0). The four unrelated pg-real failures on
this machine reproduce identically with these changes stashed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(assistant): close anon path on the quota RPC, order the ownership check ahead of writes

Review follow-ups on the hotfix batch.

The caller guard used auth.uid() alone, which is NULL for the `anon` role just
as it is for backend roles, so an unauthenticated caller holding the public anon
key (it ships in the browser bundle) could still pick any p_user_id and drain
that user's quota. The guard now keys on the request role: anon and
authenticated may only ever spend their own quota, backend roles keep passing an
explicit id. The default PUBLIC execute grant is revoked as a second layer, with
execute granted only to authenticated and service_role. Covered by a new pg test
for the anon path.

The ownership check ran after the onboarding.intake stamp, so a request that was
about to be rejected could still write intake_completed_at. It now sits directly
after the capability gate, ahead of every side effect and ahead of the company
and profile reads, which also makes a rejected request cheaper.

The tool-result repair matched ids anywhere in the history, but the API needs
results in the message IMMEDIATELY after the tool_use. A result persisted after
an intervening turn (two turns racing on one conversation) left a shape that
still 400s. The repair is now positional, and orphaned or late-duplicate
tool_results are dropped, since an unmatched tool_result is rejected just as an
unanswered tool_use is.

The Escape guard matched the Radix popper wrapper, which stays mounted when a
popper is force-mounted; it now requires data-state="open" so a closed popper
cannot block Escape for the rest of the session.

Both new route errors are Swedish, per the user-facing error rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-26 17:48:18 +02:00

129 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import type { PoolClient } from 'pg'
import { getClient, getPool } from './setup'
import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
/**
* Caller guard on check_and_increment_agent_quota (migration 20260726090000).
*
* The function is SECURITY DEFINER in `public`, so PostgREST exposes it to any
* authenticated user, and p_user_id is a plain argument. Without a guard, one
* user could spend another user's minute/day budget and lock them out of every
* agent endpoint. This test pins the guard against a real Postgres, because a
* mocked Supabase client cannot see a PL/pgSQL condition at all.
*
* Locks in:
* - An authenticated caller may spend their OWN quota.
* - An authenticated caller spending someone else's quota raises 42501 and
* leaves the victim's counters untouched.
* - A service-role/superuser connection (auth.uid() IS NULL) may still pass
* an explicit user id: cron, tests and backend jobs rely on that.
*/
async function asRole<T>(
role: 'authenticated' | 'anon',
userId: string | null,
fn: (client: PoolClient) => Promise<T>,
): Promise<T> {
const client = await getClient()
try {
await client.query('BEGIN')
await client.query(`SELECT set_config('request.jwt.claims', $1, true)`, [
JSON.stringify(userId ? { sub: userId, role } : { role }),
])
await client.query(`SELECT set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', $1, true)`, [userId ?? ''])
await client.query(`SELECT set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', $1, true)`, [role])
await client.query(`SET LOCAL ROLE ${role}`)
const result = await fn(client)
await client.query('COMMIT')
return result
} catch (error) {
await client.query('ROLLBACK').catch(() => {})
throw error
} finally {
client.release()
}
}
function asAuthenticatedUser<T>(
userId: string,
fn: (client: PoolClient) => Promise<T>,
): Promise<T> {
return asRole('authenticated', userId, fn)
}
async function counterFor(userId: string): Promise<number> {
const res = await getPool().query<{ count: number }>(
`SELECT COALESCE(SUM(count), 0)::int AS count
FROM public.agent_rate_counters
WHERE user_id = $1`,
[userId],
)
return res.rows[0]?.count ?? 0
}
describe('check_and_increment_agent_quota caller guard.pg', () => {
it('lets an authenticated user spend their own quota', async () => {
const userId = await insertAuthUser()
const result = await asAuthenticatedUser(userId, async (client) => {
const res = await client.query<{ result: { ok: boolean } }>(
`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
[userId],
)
return res.rows[0]!.result
})
expect(result.ok).toBe(true)
expect(await counterFor(userId)).toBeGreaterThan(0)
})
it('refuses to spend another user quota and leaves their counters untouched', async () => {
const attacker = await insertAuthUser()
const victim = await insertAuthUser()
await expect(
asAuthenticatedUser(attacker, async (client) => {
await client.query(
`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
[victim],
)
}),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: '42501' })
expect(await counterFor(victim)).toBe(0)
})
it('refuses an unauthenticated anon caller entirely', async () => {
// The anon key ships in the browser bundle, so this RPC is reachable
// without a session. auth.uid() is NULL for anon exactly as it is for
// backend roles, so a uid-only guard would have let this through.
const victim = await insertAuthUser()
await expect(
asRole('anon', null, async (client) => {
await client.query(
`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
[victim],
)
}),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: expect.stringMatching(/^42501$/) })
expect(await counterFor(victim)).toBe(0)
})
it('still allows a service-role connection to pass an explicit user id', async () => {
const userId = await insertAuthUser()
// The shared pool connects as the migration/superuser role, so auth.uid()
// is NULL here: the same shape cron jobs and backend scripts run under.
const res = await getPool().query<{ result: { ok: boolean } }>(
`SELECT public.check_and_increment_agent_quota($1::uuid, 30, 1000) AS result`,
[userId],
)
expect(res.rows[0]!.result.ok).toBe(true)
expect(await counterFor(userId)).toBeGreaterThan(0)
})
})