Files
accounted/lib/providers/bjornlunden/oauth.ts
T
MattssonandClaude Opus 4.7 02f94ef631 Fix/critical issues (#351)
* fix: add 15s timeout to accounting provider HTTP clients

Node's built-in fetch has no default timeout, so a stalled provider
could hold a serverless worker open for many minutes — worse with
withRetry (6x on Fortnox, 3x on others) and getPaginated stacking
across pages.

Wrap each fetch() in the Fortnox, Visma, Bokio, Briox, and Björn
Lundén clients with signal: AbortSignal.timeout(15_000), and treat
TimeoutError/AbortError as retryable so a single stalled attempt
retries cleanly instead of hanging the request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add timeouts to OAuth token endpoints

Wrap every OAuth2 token exchange, refresh, and revoke POST in an
AbortController via a new fetchWithTimeout helper. Without this, a
hung provider endpoint holds the request thread indefinitely — worst
case being Skatteverket, where refreshAccessToken sits on the hot
path of every bookkeeping action and exchangeCodeForTokens races the
5-minute BankID auth-code TTL.

On timeout, the Skatteverket OAuth callback now redirects to
/reports?tab=vat-declaration with a Swedish retry message instead
of leaving the user stranded on the callback URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: close RLS escalation on membership and settings tables

Any authenticated user who was a member (including viewer) could issue a
direct PostgREST PATCH against company_members and promote themselves to
owner, bypassing the app-layer requireWritePermission guard entirely.
Reproduced on prod, then verified the fix on staging.

Tighten INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies on company_members, team_members,
api_keys, company_invitations, team_invitations, companies, teams, and
company_settings to require the caller to hold role IN ('owner','admin')
in the target company/team. Role check is wrapped in SECURITY DEFINER
helpers (user_is_company_admin, user_is_team_admin, user_role_in_company)
to avoid RLS recursion when a policy on company_members references
company_members in its subquery.

Add a BEFORE UPDATE trigger on company_members that rejects any role
change unless the caller already holds role='owner', so admins cannot
mint further owners even though they can otherwise write.

Legitimate write paths are unaffected: company creation goes through the
create_company_with_owner SECURITY DEFINER RPC, invite acceptance uses
the service role, and team->company membership syncs via SECURITY
DEFINER triggers. All bypass RLS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): resolve duplicate schema_migrations version 20260421160000

Two migration files shared timestamp 20260421160000 on main
(booking_template_usage.sql and opening_balances_rpc.sql), causing
supabase_migrations.schema_migrations PK collisions on any fresh CI run:

  duplicate key value violates unique constraint "schema_migrations_pkey"
  Key (version)=(20260421160000) already exists.

Bump opening_balances_rpc.sql to 20260421160500. booking_template_usage
keeps 20260421160000 because its table already exists on prod; the
renamed file has an idempotent CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION body and has
not yet been deployed to prod, so moving its version is free.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): make booking_template_usage migration idempotent

The table already exists on prod (applied out-of-band) but prod's
schema_migrations does not track version 20260421160000, so the next
PR-driven deploy would re-run this migration and fail on
`CREATE TABLE public.booking_template_usage` with a duplicate-relation
error.

Add IF NOT EXISTS to CREATE TABLE and CREATE INDEX, and DROP POLICY
IF EXISTS before each CREATE POLICY. No functional change on fresh
databases; prod just silently no-ops the table/index creates and
re-declares policies without dropping-then-missing them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: implement isTimeoutError utility and enforce role restrictions on company_members insert

* fix: implement fallback for user_id in commit_journal_entry function when auth.uid() is NULL

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 18:14:01 +02:00

53 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript

import type { TokenResponse } from '../types';
import {
fetchWithTimeout,
OAUTH_TIMEOUT_MS,
} from '@/lib/http/fetch-with-timeout';
const BL_AUTH_URL = 'https://apigateway.blinfo.se/auth/oauth/v2/token';
export async function fetchBjornLundenToken(
clientId: string,
clientSecret: string,
): Promise<TokenResponse> {
const response = await fetchWithTimeout(
BL_AUTH_URL,
{
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
},
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'client_credentials',
client_id: clientId,
client_secret: clientSecret,
}).toString(),
},
{ timeoutMs: OAUTH_TIMEOUT_MS, description: 'Björn Lundén token request' },
);
if (!response.ok) {
const body = await response.text().catch(() => '');
throw new Error(`Björn Lunden token request failed: ${response.status} ${body}`);
}
const data = await response.json() as Record<string, unknown>;
return {
access_token: data.access_token as string,
refresh_token: '',
token_type: (data.token_type as string) ?? 'Bearer',
expires_in: (data.expires_in as number) ?? 3600,
};
}
export async function refreshBjornLundenToken(): Promise<TokenResponse> {
const clientId = process.env.BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_ID ?? '';
const clientSecret = process.env.BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_SECRET ?? '';
if (!clientId || !clientSecret) {
throw new Error('BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_ID and BJORN_LUNDEN_CLIENT_SECRET must be set');
}
return fetchBjornLundenToken(clientId, clientSecret);
}
export const storeBjornLundenToken = refreshBjornLundenToken;