Files
accounted/lib/bookkeeping/invoice-payment-lines.ts
T
Mattsson f24b26a139 fix: similar-sweep currency remediation, security hardening and v1 API fixes (#1215)
* fix(security): gate replace_sie_import behind owner/admin membership

The RPC was SECURITY DEFINER with EXECUTE granted to PUBLIC and anon, no
company_members lookup, no auth.uid() reference and no unauthorized raise,
while setting gnubok.allow_delete to disarm the BFL immutability and
retention triggers. Any caller holding a company_id and an import id could
hard delete another tenant's verifikationer. Confirmed live in production.

Applies the same fail closed owner/admin guard that undo_sie_import already
carries (migration 20260624120000), resolving the actor from
COALESCE(p_user_id, auth.uid()) so it denies when the role is NULL, then
revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC and anon. search_path and the raised
statement_timeout are restated, since CREATE OR REPLACE drops settings that
are not repeated.

userId is a required parameter on replaceSIEImport: the service client has a
NULL auth.uid(), so a caller without an explicit actor now fails to compile
rather than hitting the closed gate at runtime.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): validate arcim OAuth callback state server side

The callback route is skipAuth and decoded the state parameter as plain
base64url JSON, trusting consentId and provider from it. A one time code was
minted at flow start and never read. An unauthenticated attacker who learned
a consent id could run an OAuth flow on their own provider account and post
the callback with a forged state, landing their tokens on another tenant's
consent, so the victim's next migration imported the attacker's ledger.

State is now an opaque randomBytes(32) pointer to a provider_otc row,
consumed by a single atomic UPDATE guarded on used_at IS NULL and
expires_at, so a replay loses the row lock race and updates nothing.
provider is read from provider_consents rather than trusted from the client.
provider_otc already existed for exactly this purpose and was never wired up.

Also scopes getConsent to an owning company, closing a cross tenant status
oracle where the preview and migrate paths echoed a consent's status before
the scoped check ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): scope documents storage to company_id (phase A)

The documents bucket policies matched on auth.uid(), and upload keys were
documents/{userId}/..., so company membership was never consulted. Removing a
member revoked nothing: their session still authenticated and they kept
direct Storage read access to every receipt, supplier invoice and bank
statement they had uploaded. The same bug was fixed for sie-files in
20260416120000; this bucket was left behind.

Phase A is additive. Company scoped policies are added alongside the
uploader scoped ones, uploads move to documents/{companyId}/{userId}/..., and
reads accept either layout so nothing breaks mid migration. Phase C, which
drops the old policies, is gated on the backfill reporting zero remaining
legacy prefix objects.

The policy compares the company segment as text rather than casting to uuid
the way sie-files does: this bucket holds keys whose second segment is not a
uuid (MCP audit packages), and Postgres does not guarantee the bucket prefix
qual runs before the cast, so a planner reordering would raise 22P02 and fail
the whole query instead of filtering the row out.

deleteDocument now removes both candidate keys. Removing only the stored
pointer would leave a readable orphan copy of a document the user asked to
erase.

The backfill script is included but has never been run. It defaults to dry
run, refuses .env.local by name, and verifies each copy is readable and
SHA-256 identical before repointing the row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): enforce events:read scope and membership on /api/events

This was the only one of the three validateApiKey call sites with no
downstream guard: v1 and the MCP server both check scope and re-verify
company membership, this route did neither. An events:read scope existed and
was documented as gating the endpoint but was never called, so a legacy key
falling back to DEFAULT_SCOPES read the full log. The bound company id went
straight from the api_keys row into a service role query, so a key whose user
had been removed from the company kept reading.

Adds the scope check before any database access, re-verifies company_members
with archived_at IS NULL, honours test mode by stamping X-Gnubok-Mode instead
of ignoring it, applies minimisePayload so the pull surface can never return
a wider payload than the push surface, and replaces the three flat error
strings with the canonical envelope.

Test key reads are served rather than blocked: TEST_KEY_WRITE_BLOCKED is
gated on mutations in with-api-v1, so a read gets the same treatment as every
other v1 read endpoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(bookkeeping): sweep remaining journal_entries!inner embeds

A previous refactor removed this pattern from lib/reports and introduced
fetchEntryLines, but the class was never swept. Seventeen sites remained and
had become the top application consumer of production database time:
measured across the resulting query shapes, 32,694 calls and 25,848 seconds
of execution, mean 790ms, with shapes averaging 2.6s and 3.0s and maxing at
7,962ms against the 8s statement_timeout, which surfaced to users as 500s on
the booking path.

PostgREST compiles an embed with filters on the embedded side into a
correlated INNER JOIN LATERAL with a parameterized LIMIT, which stops
Postgres reordering the join, so each query walked the whole
journal_entry_lines table across all tenants. Driving from the entries side
instead turns that into two indexed round trips.

Converted sites keep their existing shape: the helper reattaches the parent
entry under the same key the embed produced. Several conversions also remove
a latent silent truncation where an unpaginated query was capped at
PostgREST's 1000 row ceiling.

Two deliberate exceptions. The free text ilike legs of the MCP display query
stay on the embed, because each is capped at legLimit and that cap drives the
truncation contract the tool reports, while the helper is unbounded. The
accounts route moves to the existing get_account_usage_counts RPC instead,
since its embed was a head count and the helper returns rows.

commitEntry's write path is untouched: the change there is confined to the
read query of the pre-commit dimension rule check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): anchor v1 list cursors on created_at

Page two returned page one, forever, while still advertising a fresh
next_cursor. The three routes sorted by and encoded a Postgres date column,
which serializes as YYYY-MM-DD, but decodeDefaultCursor validates the cursor
timestamp as full ISO-8601 and returned null, so the keyset filter was never
applied and has_more never went false. An integrator syncing verifikat looped
on the newest rows indefinitely.

The transactions route already solved this and its comment names the trap;
the fix was never ported. All three now order and encode on created_at with
an id tie break, matching the transactions keyset predicate exactly.
ISO_TIMESTAMP is deliberately left alone: relaxing it would silently change
sort semantics on the route that currently works.

Default ordering therefore moves from business date to insert order. Every
business date is still on the row, and the invoices list gains date_from and
date_to filters so a date range is still reachable; the other two already had
them.

The tests use an in-memory PostgREST that actually evaluates the filters,
because the repo's pass-through mock cannot catch this class of bug: the bug
is that the filter is never sent. They walk to exhaustion with a hard
iteration cap, so an unterminated walk fails instead of hanging.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): separate dry run from commit in the idempotency hash

The request hash was built from url.pathname, which excludes the query
string, so a dry run and its commit hashed identically. Following the flow
documented in dry-run.ts, re-issuing the request with the same
Idempotency-Key returned the cached preview with Idempotent-Replayed set and
wrote nothing, while reporting 200. An agent or integrator saw success for a
write that never happened.

dry_run is folded into the hash only when true, not as an unconditional
boolean. Including it as false would change the hash of every ordinary write,
and with a 24h idempotency TTL any key in flight across the deploy would fail
the request_hash comparison and 409 on a legitimate retry. Both hash call
sites now go through one shared helper so they cannot drift into a permanent
cache miss, and dry run responses are no longer stored at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: install the Bedrock SDK out of tree in the compliance review

The Swedish accounting compliance gate had failed ten consecutive runs and so
was posting nothing. With --no-package-lock npm discarded the lockfile and
re-resolved the whole tree from package.json, floating @hookform/resolvers to
5.4.3, whose valibot ^1 peer conflicts with the pinned valibot 0.39.0.

Installing into the parent of the checkout resolves only that one package, so
an unrelated peer conflict can never take the gate down again. Node still
finds it because ESM bare specifiers walk up parent node_modules; NODE_PATH
would not have worked, as it is CommonJS only. --legacy-peer-deps was
rejected because it masks future genuine peer conflicts and still reifies the
full tree.

The same step's SDK version is aligned from 0.31.0 back to the 0.29.1 that
package.json and check:guards enforce after the streaming outage. That drift
went unnoticed because the pin guard only inspects package.json and the
lockfile, never workflow files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* build(docker): generate crontabs from vercel.json

vercel.json defines 16 cron jobs; both Docker crontabs carried 9, and were
byte identical to each other. Self hosted deployments therefore never sent
recurring invoices, never dispatched webhooks and never cleaned up
idempotency keys. tax-deadlines also ran once a year on 2 January instead of
daily, and documents/verify weekly instead of daily.

Extension crons are included rather than excluded. The Dockerfile copies the
whole tree before building, so every extension cron route is compiled into
the image regardless of the enabled preset, and each returns 200 when its
extension is unconfigured, so curl -sf logs no failure. Two such entries were
already present in the crontab for extensions absent from the preset, which
settles the intent.

documents/verify is treated as drift rather than a self hosted concession:
the weekly cadence was present in the hosted crontab too, and the run is
capped at 200 documents walking a nulls-first queue, so weekly drains the
integrity queue seven times slower on a check that exists for BFL retention.

webhooks/dispatch keeps its per minute cadence, adding 1,440 requests a day
on self hosted. A gentler tick would silently stretch the first retry, since
the retry ladder opens at 60 seconds. SCHEDULE_OVERRIDES is the one line
place to change that.

A parity test asserts the path sets match minus a documented exclusion list,
and ratchets three cron routes that are currently scheduled nowhere so they
are named rather than silently rotting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(observability): add a provider agnostic error sink

There is no error tracking in this codebase: logs go to console and Vercel
retention and nowhere else, nothing alerts on the 16 cron jobs, and seven
code comments across lib, app, components and extensions asserted that Sentry
captures errors when Sentry is not a dependency. The two most recent bug
fixes on this repo were both discovered by customer email.

This adds the sink, not a vendor. No dependency is taken: the interface has a
no-op default and a registration point, so behaviour is unchanged until an
adapter is registered. Releases are tagged from the build id already inlined
by next.config.ts.

Redaction moved out of lib/logger.ts into a leaf module that both the logger
and the sink import, so there is one denylist and no path from application
data to a third party can skip the personnummer regex, including direct sink
calls that bypass the logger. That matters here because these logs carry
personnummer and financial data.

verifyCronSecret now reports its own 401s, which covers all 16 jobs without
touching a route file and catches the case where CRON_SECRET is rotated
without updating the scheduler and every job silently 401s forever. The
threshold is one failure rather than the backup alert's three: suppressing
the first occurrence is precisely how an outage stays invisible.

The seven misleading comments are corrected to describe what the code
actually does, including the two cases that still are not covered: the client
side one, since the sink is server side, and a warn level call that is not
forwarded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remediate the 2026-07-26 similar-sweep findings across all surfaces

Resolves the ~150-finding sweep (dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26.md) with
one agent per finding; every behavioural fix carries a regression test proven
to fail at HEAD. Full status, corrections to the sweep, refusals and open
decisions in dev_docs/similar-sweep-2026-07-26-remediation-status.md.

Structural roots closed:
- resolveSekAmountOrNull(): honest SEK resolution refuses instead of booking
  1:1; four duplicated toSek closures now refuse via INVOICE_FX_RATE_MISSING
- ledger-line-amount.ts: journal_entry_lines.currency labels the document,
  not the amount; SQL pre-filter decoy proven and fixed
- sparse-patch.ts: .partial() does not strip .default() in Zod 4.4.3; the
  exploitable salary payslip-line PATCH and KPI preferences sinks fixed
- tests/schema: migration-replay phantom-column guard (13k+ refs, closed
  CHECK sets, onConflict targets); found 28 real defects, all fixed, all
  four baselines now empty
- three new ratchet guards: sek-labelled-amount, cross-extension-import,
  ungated-extension-route

Highlights: lawful VAT-rate set on all seven invoice surfaces (ML 6 kap),
RC input VAT mismatch wired on web + both MCP callers, missing-underlag
resource delegates to the shared RPC predicate, push-notifications consent
polarity fail-closed, deadlines undo honours requested state, silent-failure
and read-side-fabrication classes fixed across settings/KPI/inbox/Stripe/
Arcim/kassaflodesanalys, error-envelope stringification fixed at 10+ sites
with isSwedishUserMessage extended.

Also includes the parallel session's MCP invoice tools (update_invoice,
recurring schedules, invoice deliveries) which share files with the sweep
work and are verified green together.

13 new migrations are NOT applied anywhere; they apply via branch merge.
20260726120000 backfills 1247 supplier-invoice rows. pg tests for new
DDL are written but unrun (no local Postgres).

Verified: 11088 tests / 881 files green, tsc 0 non-test errors, lint 0
errors, check:guards passing, MCP payload 57475/57500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(migrations): rename replace_sie_import migration off main's 20260726090000 version

origin/main shipped 20260726090000_agent_quota_rpc_caller_guard.sql; keeping
our replace_sie_import migration on the same version would abort the Supabase
apply with a schema_migrations_pkey duplicate at merge time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): remediate pre-publish deep-review findings across all slices

A 13-agent review of the full branch diff surfaced 1 critical, 5 high and
~45 further findings; this commit resolves them in one pass:

- replace_sie_import / undo_sie_import: p_user_id honored only for
  service_role callers; any other caller is pinned to auth.uid()
  (impersonation gate bypass), authz raise errcode 42501 mapped to a
  Swedish 403 in the route, new caller-guard migration for undo
- bulk_book_transactions refuses homogeneous non-SEK batches instead of
  writing foreign magnitudes into SEK ledger columns
- credit-note cap trigger: company-match on credited_invoice_id, no
  cross-tenant figures in exception text
- link_voucher RPCs resolve NULL invoice currency as SEK end to end
- personal-number ciphertext CHECK split into NOT VALID + VALIDATE
- same-currency foreign settlements clear 1510 at booking rate and book
  realized diff to 3960/7960; rate-less foreign write paths refuse
- receivables revaluation covers partially_paid and outstanding amounts
- period lock guard paginates candidates past the PostgREST 1000 cap
- documents: service-client storage removals after authz, dual-layout
  reads in integrity cron and archive export, backfill delete-source
  sweep actually deletes with hash verification and shared-key grouping
- invoice matching normalizes NULL/lowercase currencies (regression),
  duplicate candidates stop claiming amount matches they never ran
- match-invoice aborts on any booking failure (no paid-without-verifikat)
- refresh-exchange-rate reverts on concurrent booking (TOCTOU window)
- KPI preferences upsert arbiter aligned to the company-scoped constraint
- personnummer_last4 stripped from all salary responses incl. MCP tools
- worked-hours batch restores destroyed rows on conflict and error paths
- MCP: shared duplicate-claim builder (no more 'null kr'), short-circuit
  on tag_journal_lines overflow, auto_send schedules stage as high risk
- observability sink redacts emails/IBANs/API keys and keeps redacted
  stacks in prod; assorted small guards (safe-return-to /@, dry_run=True,
  cursor helper off-by-one, OAuth state TTL 10 min, arcim saveMappings
  call removed)

Full dispositions, deferred items and hand-verified accounting numbers
are documented in the PR body and DECISIONS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(personnummer): implement masking and encryption for personal numbers with tests

* fix(review): address CI and compliance-bot findings for PR #1215

pg-real: the CI image's auth shim reads the legacy request.jwt.claim.role
GUC, so both service-role simulations (runAsServiceRole and the
invoice-delivery test's local helper) never satisfied auth.role() =
'service_role' and every legitimate p_user_id path failed closed; the
shared helper now sets both GUC shapes plus SET LOCAL ROLE with a
fail-loud sanity check, and the delivery test reuses it. The link-voucher
migration had recreated both RPCs from pre-rewrite file text,
reintroducing the NULL-unsafe membership pattern the
null-safe-tenant-guards ratchet bans; both guards now use
public.caller_is_company_member() with all currency changes preserved.

Compliance bots: the customers export now emits the standard masked form
instead of raw AES-256-GCM ciphertext in the Org-/personnummer column,
and maskCustomerRow returns a non-round-trippable placeholder on decrypt
failure instead of 500ing the list. MCP parity: gnubok_lock_period's
staging pre-check now runs the exact countUnbookedInPeriod the commit
path enforces (exported from period-service; local mirror deleted), and
gnubok_agi_status resolves AGI state run-scoped so a correction run no
longer renders as already filed.

Declined with evidence: PR-Agent's opening-balances null-zeroing concern
(all mergeable columns are NOT NULL with defaults per 20260713101000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(review): address codex review findings on PR #1215

- restore 20260726140000 to its preview-recorded content and restate the
  NULL-safe tenant guard under 20260727130000: a recorded migration version
  never re-runs, so the in-place edit could not reach the preview branch
- replace toFixed() with sv-SE two-decimal formatting in the ROT/RUT cap
  warning texts and update the pinned test expectations
- drop the em dash in the fiscal-periods route comment
- strip trailing whitespace in import-existing.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(reports): raise timeout on real PDF render tests

renderToBuffer does real @react-pdf layout work and exceeds the 5s
default when the full suite saturates the CPU; tests pass in isolation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 03:34:56 +02:00

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/**
* Builds the journal-entry lines for the clearing entry that closes (fully
* or partially) a customer invoice against an actual bank transaction.
*
* The lines built here are the "Inbetalning kundfaktura" path under
* faktureringsmetoden (accrual): Dr 1930 / Cr 1510, with a 3960/7960
* FX-diff line when the invoice and the bank tx are in different currencies.
*
* Shared between:
* - GET /api/transactions/[id]/match-invoice/preview (read-only, drives
* the dialog the user confirms against)
* - POST /api/transactions/[id]/match-invoice (the commit path)
*
* Single source of truth so the preview and the committed verifikat are
* byte-identical. Earlier the two diverged on the cross-currency math:
* the preview ran `resolveSekAmount(tx.amount, null, INV.currency, INV.rate)`,
* treating the SEK tx number as if it were in the invoice's currency and
* multiplying by the invoice's stored rate. That produced a fictitious
* bank-leg amount and silently dropped the FX gain/loss.
*
* # Customer-invoice only
*
* This helper is the CUSTOMER side (kundfaktura): AR account 1510, FX gain
* 3960 (valutakursvinster rörelsefordringar), FX loss 7960
* (valutakursförluster rörelsefordringar), bank-leg = Dr. Supplier-side
* settlement has the opposite DR/CR polarity (Cr 1930 / Dr 2440-series) and
* a different account taxonomy; it lives in the match_batch_allocate RPC,
* not here. Do not call this helper from supplier-invoice flows.
*
* # Currency model
*
* tx.currency : currency of the bank tx (almost always SEK)
* tx.amount : amount in tx.currency
* tx.exchange_rate : populated at ingest only when tx.currency != SEK
* tx.amount_sek : pre-computed SEK at ingest for non-SEK tx
* invoice.currency : currency the invoice was issued in
* invoice.exchange_rate: the rate at which AR was originally booked on 1510.
* REQUIRED whenever the invoice is foreign, regardless of
* the bank tx currency: without it the SEK value of the
* receivable was never established, so the kursvinst /
* kursförlust on settlement is not computable and the
* helper throws InvoiceBookingRateMissingError rather than
* inventing a number. Never needed for a SEK invoice.
*
* Bank-leg (1930) = always the actual SEK that hit the bank.
* AR-leg (1510) = the SEK value of the customer-debt reduction at the
* INVOICE's stored rate (capped to bankSek on partials
* to keep 1510 in sync with invoice.remaining_amount).
* FX diff = (AR-leg SEK Bank-leg SEK); sign drives 3960 vs 7960.
* Per BFL 5 kap 4-5§ every verifikat must balance to the
* öre; the FX diff line is what makes the cross-currency
* verifikat balance. Only emitted when the bank tx fully
* clears the invoice's remaining: partials defer the
* FX adjustment to the final settlement to avoid
* prematurely zeroing 1510 while the AR row still says
* partially_paid.
*/
import type { CreateJournalEntryLineInput } from '@/types'
import { ORE_TOLERANCE, ORE_ROUNDING_SETTLEMENT_MAX } from '@/lib/money'
import { resolveSekAmount } from './currency-utils'
const TWO_DP = (n: number): number => Math.round(n * 100) / 100
/**
* Structured code for "the foreign-currency invoice carries no usable booking
* rate". Registered in lib/errors/structured-errors.ts, so errorResponse()
* turns a throw into the canonical 400 envelope and getErrorMessage() resolves
* the Swedish sentence. Mirrors the honest BATCH_FX_RATE_MISSING guard in the
* match_batch_allocate RPC, which refuses the same situation server-side.
*/
export const MATCH_INVOICE_BOOKING_RATE_MISSING = 'MATCH_INVOICE_BOOKING_RATE_MISSING' as const
/**
* Upper bound mirrors the match_batch_allocate RPC (0 < rate < 100000): a rate
* that far out is as unusable as NULL and must not silently value the AR leg.
*/
const MAX_PLAUSIBLE_FX_RATE = 100000
/**
* Raised when a payment settles a foreign-currency invoice whose SEK value was
* never established. Booking the payment would require a kursvinst/kursförlust
* on 3960/7960, and that figure is the difference between the SEK actually
* received and the SEK the receivable was booked at. With no booking rate there
* is no second number: any "difference" is fabricated. Defaulting the rate to 1
* (the old `?? 1`) read the foreign amount as if it were SEK and dumped the
* entire bank receipt minus that number onto 3960 as a phantom kursvinst, with
* revenue understated by the same amount. The verifikat balanced, so no DB
* trigger fired: only refusing to post catches it.
*/
export class InvoiceBookingRateMissingError extends Error {
readonly code = MATCH_INVOICE_BOOKING_RATE_MISSING
constructor(
public readonly invoiceCurrency: string,
public readonly exchangeRate: number | null,
) {
super(
`Invoice is denominated in ${invoiceCurrency} but carries no usable booking exchange rate ` +
`(exchange_rate=${exchangeRate === null ? 'null' : String(exchangeRate)}). ` +
'The FX difference on settlement cannot be computed without the rate the receivable was booked at.',
)
this.name = 'InvoiceBookingRateMissingError'
}
}
/**
* The invoice's booking rate, or a loud failure. Only ever called when the
* INVOICE is foreign (settled cross-currency or in its own foreign currency):
* a SEK invoice never reaches it, because a SEK receivable already carries
* its own SEK value and needs no rate at all. "Currency is SEK" and "rate is
* missing" are therefore separate conditions, not one fallback.
*/
function requireInvoiceBookingRate(
exchangeRate: number | null,
invoiceCurrency: string,
): number {
if (
exchangeRate == null ||
!Number.isFinite(exchangeRate) ||
exchangeRate <= 0 ||
exchangeRate >= MAX_PLAUSIBLE_FX_RATE
) {
throw new InvoiceBookingRateMissingError(invoiceCurrency, exchangeRate)
}
return exchangeRate
}
export interface PaymentClearingTx {
amount: number
amount_sek: number | null
currency: string
exchange_rate: number | null
}
export interface PaymentClearingInvoice {
currency: string
exchange_rate: number | null
remaining_amount: number | null
total: number
paid_amount: number | null
}
export interface PaymentClearingLines {
/** Actual SEK that hit the bank. The 1930 debit. */
bankSek: number
/** SEK value of the AR reduction at the invoice's stored rate. The 1510 credit. */
arSek: number
/**
* fxDiffSek = arSek bankSek (this orientation matches what's needed to
* make the verifikat balance: positive value goes Dr 7960, negative
* value goes Cr 3960).
*
* Sign reading (note this is the OPPOSITE of an intuitive "profit"
* orientation: the value here is a balance-adjustment magnitude, not a
* P&L number, because AR is the side being cleared):
* positive → bank received FEWER SEK than AR was booked at → kursförlust → 7960 Dr
* negative → bank received MORE SEK than AR was booked at → kursvinst → 3960 Cr
* |value| ≤ 0.005 → no FX diff line emitted (floating-point tolerance,
* NOT a rounding allowance per BFL 5 kap 4-5§)
*
* If you want an intuitive "gain" number for UI display, use
* `bankSek - arSek` (negate this field). Do not consume the raw sign
* in caller logic without reading this paragraph.
*/
fxDiffSek: number
/**
* Öresavrundning residual (SEK), pure-SEK same-currency settlements only.
* remainingSek bankSek: >0 → customer paid a sub-krona short (3740 debit,
* förlust); <0 → paid a sub-krona over (3740 credit, vinst); 0 → no 3740 line.
* When non-zero the AR leg (1510) is credited the FULL remaining so the
* invoice settles, and the residual balances the verifikat via 3740.
*/
oreRoundingSek: number
lines: CreateJournalEntryLineInput[]
}
/**
* Build the verifikat lines for a customer-invoice payment matched against
* a bank tx. Pure: no DB calls. Caller decides how to persist.
*
* # Same-currency, both SEK (or SEK invoice paid from a foreign account)
* Bank-leg = AR-leg = bankSek. No FX diff line: a SEK receivable has no FX
* exposure, so the invoice's exchange_rate is never consulted.
*
* # Same-currency, foreign (EUR invoice settled by a EUR bank tx)
* The foreign units paid are known exactly (|tx.amount|), so:
* arSek = |tx.amount| × invoice.exchange_rate (booking rate)
* fxDiffSek = arSek bankSek
* 1510 is cleared at the SEK value the receivable was booked at and the
* difference against the actual SEK bank leg is the REALIZED kursvinst /
* kursförlust (3960/7960), exactly like the cross-currency path. Booking
* arSek = bankSek here (the pre-fix behaviour) over/under-credited 1510 by
* the whole rate movement and stranded the realized kursdiff on the balance
* sheet instead of the P&L.
*
* # Cross-currency with explicit paidInInvoiceCurrency (preferred path)
* The caller supplies how many units of the invoice's currency this bank
* payment satisfies (typically computed as `bankSek / today_rate` where
* `today_rate` is the Riksbanken spot rate on the payment date: see
* `app/api/transactions/[id]/match-invoice/route.ts`). The helper then:
* arSek = paidInInvoiceCurrency × invoice.exchange_rate (booking rate)
* fxDiffSek = arSek bankSek
* For a partial cross-currency payment this credits 1510 by the
* proportional foreign amount (not the full remaining) and posts the
* accurate FX-diff line. The verifikat balances per BFL 5 kap 4-5§ and
* the GL stays in sync with the AR sub-ledger because both move in step.
*
* # Cross-currency without paidInInvoiceCurrency (fallback)
* Earlier behaviour, kept for callers that haven't been updated yet:
* if `bankSek >= remaining × rate`, book the full FX diff (full clear);
* otherwise defer (book 1930 = 1510 = bankSek with no FX line). The
* deferred path leaves the GL slightly understated until the final
* settlement closes the invoice.
*
* # Foreign invoice with no booking rate
* Throws InvoiceBookingRateMissingError (code
* MATCH_INVOICE_BOOKING_RATE_MISSING). Every foreign-invoice path above
* (same-currency foreign and both cross-currency paths) values the AR leg
* at the invoice's booking rate; without it the SEK value of the receivable
* is unknown and the kursvinst/kursförlust is not a computable number. The
* caller must obtain the rate the invoice was booked at instead of posting
* a guess. Only a SEK invoice can never throw: it is settled entirely by
* the SEK branches and never consults invoice.exchange_rate.
*
* # paymentAccount
* The bank-leg account (the debit line below). Defaults to '1930': callers
* that haven't resolved the transaction's actual cash account keep booking
* there unchanged. Callers matching a real bank transaction should resolve
* it via resolveSettlementAccount (cash_account_id -> cash_accounts.ledger_
* account) and pass it here so a receipt into a non-primary bank/cash
* account (e.g. a secondary SEK account, or a EUR account on 1940) doesn't
* silently get misbooked to the primary account.
*/
export function buildInvoicePaymentClearingLines(
tx: PaymentClearingTx,
invoice: PaymentClearingInvoice,
description: string,
paidInInvoiceCurrency?: number,
/**
* BAS account for the bank leg (the 1930 debit below). Defaults to '1930'
* to preserve existing behaviour for every caller that doesn't pass one.
* Callers that know which cash account the underlying bank transaction
* actually belongs to (via cash_account_id -> cash_accounts.ledger_account,
* see lib/bookkeeping/settlement-account.ts) should resolve it and pass it
* here instead of always booking to the primary bank account.
*/
paymentAccount = '1930',
): PaymentClearingLines {
// Bank-leg: actual SEK that hit the bank. resolveSekAmount returns the
// raw amount for SEK txs and amount * exchange_rate for foreign txs
// (preferring the pre-computed amount_sek when set).
const bankSek = TWO_DP(
resolveSekAmount(
Math.abs(tx.amount),
tx.amount_sek != null ? Math.abs(tx.amount_sek) : null,
tx.currency,
tx.exchange_rate,
),
)
const sameCurrency = tx.currency === invoice.currency
const invoiceIsForeign = invoice.currency !== 'SEK'
// Pure SEK both sides: the only place whole-krona öresavrundning applies.
const pureSek = sameCurrency && invoice.currency === 'SEK'
let arSek: number
let fxDiffSek: number
let oreRoundingSek = 0
if (pureSek) {
// A whole-krona bank settlement of an öre-bearing SEK invoice leaves a
// sub-krona residual. Clear the FULL remaining off 1510 (invoice → paid)
// and let 3740 absorb the öre; a ≥1 kr short payment stays a real partial.
const remainingSek = TWO_DP(invoice.remaining_amount ?? invoice.total - (invoice.paid_amount ?? 0))
const oreDiff = TWO_DP(remainingSek - bankSek)
if (oreDiff !== 0 && Math.abs(oreDiff) < ORE_ROUNDING_SETTLEMENT_MAX) {
arSek = remainingSek
oreRoundingSek = oreDiff
} else {
arSek = bankSek
}
fxDiffSek = 0
} else if (!invoiceIsForeign) {
// SEK invoice settled from a non-SEK bank account: the receivable is a
// kronor claim, so the customer-debt reduction equals the SEK that hit
// the bank. The invoice's exchange_rate is never consulted.
arSek = bankSek
fxDiffSek = 0
} else if (sameCurrency) {
// Foreign invoice settled in its own currency (EUR invoice, EUR tx). The
// foreign units paid are known exactly, so clear 1510 at the invoice's
// BOOKING rate for those units and book the difference against the actual
// SEK bank leg as the realized kursdiff, exactly like the cross-currency
// path below. Setting arSek = bankSek here (the old behaviour) credited
// 1510 at the settlement-date value: a 1 000 EUR invoice booked at 11,30
// (11 300,00 on 1510) settled by a tx worth 11 496,70 kr over-credited
// 1510 by 196,70 and the realized kursvinst never reached 3960.
const invRate = requireInvoiceBookingRate(invoice.exchange_rate, invoice.currency)
const paidForeign = Math.abs(tx.amount)
arSek = TWO_DP(paidForeign * invRate)
fxDiffSek = TWO_DP(arSek - bankSek)
} else if (paidInInvoiceCurrency != null && paidInInvoiceCurrency > 0) {
// Proper FX path: caller computed the invoice-currency equivalent
// using today's spot rate. AR-leg comes off 1510 at the invoice's
// BOOKING rate (so the GL credit matches what was originally posted
// for those units of foreign currency). FX diff balances the verifikat.
const invRate = requireInvoiceBookingRate(invoice.exchange_rate, invoice.currency)
arSek = TWO_DP(paidInInvoiceCurrency * invRate)
fxDiffSek = TWO_DP(arSek - bankSek)
} else {
// Fallback when no paidInInvoiceCurrency is supplied (e.g. legacy
// callers, Riksbanken lookup failed with no manual override). Same
// pre-FX-rewrite behaviour: full-clear gets FX diff, partial defers.
const invRemainingForeign = invoice.remaining_amount ?? invoice.total - (invoice.paid_amount ?? 0)
const invRate = requireInvoiceBookingRate(invoice.exchange_rate, invoice.currency)
const arSekFullRemaining = TWO_DP(invRemainingForeign * invRate)
if (bankSek >= arSekFullRemaining - 0.005) {
arSek = arSekFullRemaining
fxDiffSek = TWO_DP(arSek - bankSek)
} else {
arSek = bankSek
fxDiffSek = 0
}
}
const lines: CreateJournalEntryLineInput[] = [
{
account_number: paymentAccount,
debit_amount: bankSek,
credit_amount: 0,
line_description: description,
},
{
account_number: '1510',
debit_amount: 0,
credit_amount: arSek,
line_description: description,
},
]
// Tolerance of 0.005 SEK is for floating-point equalisation only, not a
// rounding allowance per BFL 5 kap 4-5§. Same rationale as the balance
// pre-check in gnubok_bulk_book_transactions.
if (Math.abs(fxDiffSek) > 0.005) {
if (fxDiffSek > 0) {
// arSek > bankSek → bank received fewer SEK than booked. Loss → 7960 debit.
lines.push({
account_number: '7960',
debit_amount: Math.abs(fxDiffSek),
credit_amount: 0,
line_description: 'Valutakursförlust',
})
} else {
// bankSek > arSek → bank received more SEK than booked. Gain → 3960 credit.
lines.push({
account_number: '3960',
debit_amount: 0,
credit_amount: Math.abs(fxDiffSek),
line_description: 'Valutakursvinst',
})
}
}
// Öresavrundning (3740): pure-SEK only, mutually exclusive with an FX diff.
// The AR leg above is already the full remaining, so 3740 balances the
// verifikat: customer paid a sub-krona short → 3740 debit (förlust); over →
// credit (vinst). Opposite polarity to the supplier side (AP cleared by a Dr).
if (Math.abs(oreRoundingSek) >= ORE_TOLERANCE) {
if (oreRoundingSek > 0) {
lines.push({
account_number: '3740',
debit_amount: Math.abs(oreRoundingSek),
credit_amount: 0,
line_description: 'Öresavrundning',
})
} else {
lines.push({
account_number: '3740',
debit_amount: 0,
credit_amount: Math.abs(oreRoundingSek),
line_description: 'Öresavrundning',
})
}
}
return { bankSek, arSek, fxDiffSek, oreRoundingSek, lines }
}