Files
accounted/app/api/mcp-oauth/token/route.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg ec27228a8e style: remove em/en dashes repo-wide, add CLAUDE.md rule against them (#890)
Em dashes (—) and en dashes (–) had spread across comments, docs, tests,
and a few UI strings, reading as AI-generated boilerplate rather than
house style. Replaced each with punctuation matching its context: colon
for explanatory clauses, comma for asides, plain hyphen for numeric/legal
ranges (e.g. "21-23§"), "to"/"till" for date ranges, parentheses for
paired-dash asides. messages/en.json and messages/sv.json were fixed by
hand together to keep sv/en in sync.

Left untouched where the dash is the functional subject rather than
decorative punctuation: date-range-parser.ts's separator regex,
charset-repair.ts's CP1252 byte-mapping table (and its test), the SIE
encoding mojibake docs, generic-csv.ts's minus-sign normalizer, the
agent system-prompt files that already instruct against em dashes, and
a golden iXBRL test fixture compared byte-for-byte.

Also fixes two bugs surfaced along the way: an off-by-one in
ApiKeysPanel's scope-label split (a leftover from an earlier partial
pass), and a charset-repair test that had lost the literal en-dash it
exists to verify.

Regenerated the agent atom seed migration (skills:generate) since 27
SKILL.md files changed. Added a CLAUDE.md rule against em/en dashes,
with an explicit carve-out for the functional-dash cases above.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-04 15:58:06 +02:00

251 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
import { decryptAuthCode, verifyPkce, hashAuthCode } from '@/lib/auth/oauth-codes'
import {
generateApiKey,
generateRefreshToken,
hashRefreshToken,
createServiceClientNoCookies,
validateScopes,
DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES,
type ApiKeyScope,
} from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
import { requireCompanyId } from '@/lib/company/context'
const ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = 3600
// Grace window (seconds) during which a just-superseded access token and refresh
// token stay valid after a rotation. Lets a client that cannot reliably persist
// the rotated refresh token, or that fires concurrent refreshes: recover via
// idempotent replay instead of being forced into a re-auth loop (issue #710).
// Reuse of a previous refresh token AFTER this window revokes the grant.
const REFRESH_GRACE_SECONDS = 120
/**
* OAuth 2.0 Token Endpoint.
*
* Supports two grant types:
* - authorization_code: exchange a PKCE-protected auth code for a fresh
* api_key (access_token) plus a refresh_token.
* - refresh_token: rotate the refresh_token and return the same api_key
* with a fresh expires_in. The api_key itself does not expire
* server-side; expires_in is a hint so clients refresh on a cadence.
*/
export async function POST(request: Request) {
let params: URLSearchParams
const contentType = request.headers.get('content-type') || ''
if (contentType.includes('application/x-www-form-urlencoded')) {
const text = await request.text()
params = new URLSearchParams(text)
} else if (contentType.includes('application/json')) {
const json = await request.json()
params = new URLSearchParams(json as Record<string, string>)
} else {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'unsupported_content_type' }, { status: 400 })
}
const grantType = params.get('grant_type')
if (grantType === 'authorization_code') {
return handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(params)
}
if (grantType === 'refresh_token') {
return handleRefreshTokenGrant(params)
}
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: 'unsupported_grant_type',
error_description: 'Only authorization_code and refresh_token are supported',
},
{ status: 400 }
)
}
async function handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(params: URLSearchParams) {
const code = params.get('code')
const codeVerifier = params.get('code_verifier')
const redirectUri = params.get('redirect_uri')
if (!code) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'Missing code parameter' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const payload = decryptAuthCode(code)
if (!payload) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Invalid or expired authorization code' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (redirectUri && redirectUri !== payload.redirectUri) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'redirect_uri mismatch' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (!codeVerifier) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'code_verifier is required' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
if (!verifyPkce(codeVerifier, payload.codeChallenge)) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'PKCE verification failed' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const codeHash = hashAuthCode(code)
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const { error: replayError } = await supabase
.from('oauth_used_codes')
.insert({ code_hash: codeHash })
if (replayError) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Authorization code already used' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Clean up expired codes (non-blocking, best-effort)
supabase
.from('oauth_used_codes')
.delete()
.lt('created_at', new Date(Date.now() - 10 * 60 * 1000).toISOString())
.then(() => {})
const companyId = await requireCompanyId(supabase, payload.userId)
const { key, hash, prefix } = generateApiKey()
const refresh = generateRefreshToken()
// Use the scopes the user consented to during /authorize. Re-validate
// every value against API_KEY_SCOPES even though /authorize already did:
// the auth code is AEAD-encrypted but we treat the boundary as
// hostile by default (V9.2.1, defense-in-depth).
let grantedScopes: ApiKeyScope[]
if (payload.scopes && Array.isArray(payload.scopes) && payload.scopes.length > 0) {
const revalidated = validateScopes(payload.scopes)
if (!revalidated) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'Authorization code carried no valid scopes' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
grantedScopes = revalidated
} else {
// Code minted with no scope (Claude's existing flow). Fall back to the
// read-only OAuth defaults: destructive scopes must be requested
// explicitly (GDPR Art. 25(2)).
grantedScopes = DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES
}
const { error: insertError } = await supabase
.from('api_keys')
.insert({
user_id: payload.userId,
company_id: companyId,
key_hash: hash,
key_prefix: prefix,
name: 'MCP-klient (OAuth)',
scopes: grantedScopes,
refresh_token_hash: refresh.hash,
})
if (insertError) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'server_error', error_description: 'Failed to create API key' },
{ status: 500 }
)
}
return NextResponse.json({
access_token: key,
token_type: 'Bearer',
expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
refresh_token: refresh.token,
scope: grantedScopes.join(' '),
})
}
async function handleRefreshTokenGrant(params: URLSearchParams) {
const refreshToken = params.get('refresh_token')
if (!refreshToken) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'invalid_request', error_description: 'refresh_token is required' },
{ status: 400 }
)
}
const supabase = createServiceClientNoCookies()
const presentedHash = hashRefreshToken(refreshToken)
// Pre-generate the candidate credentials; the RPC decides whether to use them
// (rotate / idempotent replay) or ignore them (reuse / revoked / invalid).
// Doing lookup + rotate + demote in ONE SECURITY DEFINER RPC closes the
// TOCTOU gap the old SELECT-then-CAS had, and lets a just-superseded refresh
// token stay valid for a grace window so a client that cannot persist the
// rotated token, or fires concurrent refreshes: recovers instead of being
// forced into a re-auth loop (issue #710). Reuse AFTER the grace window
// revokes the grant (RFC 9700 §4.14.2 reuse detection).
const rotated = generateRefreshToken()
const { key: newKey, hash: newKeyHash, prefix: newKeyPrefix } = generateApiKey()
const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('rotate_mcp_refresh_token', {
p_presented_hash: presentedHash,
p_new_refresh_hash: rotated.hash,
p_new_key_hash: newKeyHash,
p_new_key_prefix: newKeyPrefix,
p_grace_seconds: REFRESH_GRACE_SECONDS,
})
if (error) {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'server_error', error_description: 'Failed to rotate refresh token' },
{ status: 500 }
)
}
const result = (Array.isArray(data) ? data[0] : data) as
| { outcome: string; scopes: string[] | null }
| undefined
const outcome = result?.outcome
// 'rotated' (normal) and 'replayed' (idempotent in-grace retry/concurrent)
// both succeed and return the freshly minted pair. Everything else maps to
// invalid_grant; for 'reuse_revoked' the grant was already revoked in the RPC.
if (outcome !== 'rotated' && outcome !== 'replayed') {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error: 'invalid_grant',
error_description:
outcome === 'revoked' ? 'Refresh token revoked' : 'Invalid or expired refresh token',
},
{ status: 400 }
)
}
// Carry the granular scopes the key was minted with (read-only OAuth defaults
// for legacy keys with null scopes) so clients don't re-authorize on refresh.
const persistedScopes = validateScopes(result?.scopes ?? null) ?? DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPES
return NextResponse.json({
access_token: newKey,
token_type: 'Bearer',
expires_in: ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS,
refresh_token: rotated.token,
scope: persistedScopes.join(' '),
})
}