2296c0cd59
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register, where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this instance", surfaced only as a generic toast. New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in .env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST /api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage instead of a silently-successful invite. /auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password (the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the password is saved. getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed" (account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP not configured) so the 502 above is actionable. Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is gated on it. Fixes #1335 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod (verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page routes even existing-account invitees toward /register. - New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC, anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied. - New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence, case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants. - .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently falls back to SITE_URL. - Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
251 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
251 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
import { createServerClient } from '@supabase/ssr'
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import { type NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { hashInviteToken } from '@/lib/auth/invite-tokens'
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import { INVITE_COOKIE_NAME } from '@/lib/auth/consume-invite-cookie'
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export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
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const { searchParams, origin } = new URL(request.url)
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const code = searchParams.get('code')
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const token_hash = searchParams.get('token_hash')
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const type = searchParams.get('type')
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const next = searchParams.get('next') ?? '/'
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// Collect cookies that Supabase sets during auth so we can
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// explicitly forward them on the redirect response.
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const pendingCookies: { name: string; value: string; options: Record<string, unknown> }[] = []
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const supabase = createServerClient(
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY!,
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{
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cookies: {
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getAll() {
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return request.cookies.getAll()
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},
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setAll(cookiesToSet) {
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pendingCookies.length = 0
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cookiesToSet.forEach((cookie) => {
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// Mirror the cookie into request.cookies so subsequent getAll()
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// calls within this request lifecycle return the updated values
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// (matches the pattern used in proxy.ts).
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request.cookies.set(cookie.name, cookie.value)
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pendingCookies.push(cookie)
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})
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},
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},
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}
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)
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let authenticated = false
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// Handle PKCE flow (code exchange)
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if (code) {
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const { error } = await supabase.auth.exchangeCodeForSession(code)
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authenticated = !error
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}
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// Handle token hash flow (email verification / magic link)
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else if (token_hash && type) {
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const { error } = await supabase.auth.verifyOtp({
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token_hash,
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type: type as 'signup' | 'invite' | 'magiclink' | 'recovery' | 'email_change' | 'email',
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})
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authenticated = !error
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}
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if (authenticated) {
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let redirectPath = next
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// Password recovery flow: the user just exchanged a recovery token, so they
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// have a fresh session whose only purpose is to call updateUser({ password })
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// on /reset-password. Skip onboarding / team setup / dashboard redirect.
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// The token-hash flow signals this via type=recovery; PKCE has no type, so
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// also gate on next === '/reset-password' (only the reset request sets it).
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if (type === 'recovery' || next === '/reset-password') {
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/reset-password', origin))
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for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
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response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
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}
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return response
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}
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// Admin-provisioned invite (auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail, used when the
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// installation runs with signups disabled): the invited user now has a
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// verified session but no password. Reuse the recovery surface so they
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// set one before anything else. The company invite token travels in
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// `next` (/invite/<token>); persist it as the pre-auth invite cookie so
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// the reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after
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// the password is saved.
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if (type === 'invite') {
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/reset-password', origin))
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for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
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response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
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}
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const inviteTokenMatch = next.match(/^\/invite\/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$/)
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if (inviteTokenMatch) {
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// Mirrors buildInviteCookie in app/invite/[token]/page.tsx: readable
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// by the client auth surfaces (not httpOnly), lifetime matching the
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// 7-day invite TTL that the server re-checks on every acceptance.
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response.cookies.set(INVITE_COOKIE_NAME, inviteTokenMatch[1], {
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path: '/',
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httpOnly: false,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'lax',
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maxAge: 7 * 24 * 60 * 60,
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})
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}
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return response
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}
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const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
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if (user) {
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// Check MFA status: redirect to verify if factor is enrolled but session is AAL1
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const { data: aal } = await supabase.auth.mfa.getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel()
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if (aal?.nextLevel === 'aal2' && aal?.currentLevel === 'aal1') {
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL('/mfa/verify', origin))
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for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
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response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
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}
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return response
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}
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// Check for pending invite token (set by invite page before redirecting to register)
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const inviteToken = request.cookies.get('gnubok-invite-token')?.value
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if (inviteToken) {
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try {
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const tokenHash = hashInviteToken(inviteToken)
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// Use the service role client to bypass RLS for invite acceptance
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const serviceClient = createServerClient(
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
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process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!,
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{ cookies: { getAll: () => [], setAll: () => {} } }
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)
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// Look up company invitation
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const { data: invite } = await serviceClient
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.from('company_invitations')
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.select('id, company_id, email, role, status, expires_at')
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.eq('token_hash', tokenHash)
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.single()
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if (
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invite &&
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invite.status === 'pending' &&
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new Date(invite.expires_at) > new Date() &&
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user.email?.toLowerCase() === invite.email.toLowerCase()
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) {
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// Add user to company
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await serviceClient.from('company_members').insert({
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company_id: invite.company_id,
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user_id: user.id,
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role: invite.role,
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source: 'direct',
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})
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// Set active company. Non-fatal on failure (middleware falls
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// back to the membership created above) but log so silent
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// persistence failures (#701) are observable.
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const { error: prefError } = await serviceClient.from('user_preferences').upsert({
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user_id: user.id,
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active_company_id: invite.company_id,
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}, { onConflict: 'user_id' })
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if (prefError) {
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console.error('[auth/callback] failed to set active company', prefError)
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}
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// Mark invite as accepted
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await serviceClient
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.from('company_invitations')
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.update({ status: 'accepted' })
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.eq('id', invite.id)
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// Invited user goes straight to dashboard: no onboarding needed
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redirectPath = '/'
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// Clear invite cookie and set company cookie on response
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL(redirectPath, origin))
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for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
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response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
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}
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response.cookies.set('gnubok-company-id', invite.company_id, {
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path: '/',
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'lax',
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maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 365,
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})
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response.cookies.delete('gnubok-invite-token')
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return response
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}
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} catch (err) {
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console.error('[auth/callback] invite acceptance failed:', err)
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// Fall through to normal onboarding check
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}
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}
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// Ensure user has a silent team (for new signups and existing users without one)
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const { data: teamMembership } = await supabase
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.from('team_members')
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.select('team_id')
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.eq('user_id', user.id)
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.limit(1)
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.maybeSingle()
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if (!teamMembership) {
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// Create team via service client (RPC requires auth.uid() which isn't available here).
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// Non-fatal: a failure here must not turn a successfully confirmed session into a
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// 500 that reads as "signup verification failed". The dashboard / onboarding path
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// recreates the silent team when it is missing, so log and continue.
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try {
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const serviceClient = createServerClient(
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL!,
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process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY!,
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{ cookies: { getAll: () => [], setAll: () => {} } }
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)
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const teamId = crypto.randomUUID()
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await serviceClient.from('teams').insert({
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id: teamId,
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name: 'Personal',
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created_by: user.id,
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})
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await serviceClient.from('team_members').insert({
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team_id: teamId,
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user_id: user.id,
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role: 'owner',
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})
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} catch (err) {
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console.error('[auth/callback] silent team creation failed:', err)
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}
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}
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// Always redirect to dashboard: it handles zero-company and incomplete states
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redirectPath = '/'
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}
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// Create redirect and explicitly set auth cookies on the response
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(new URL(redirectPath, origin))
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for (const { name, value, options } of pendingCookies) {
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response.cookies.set({ name, value, ...options })
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}
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// Keep the invite cookie alive so the /onboarding and /select-company
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// pages can retry acceptance via acceptPendingInviteByToken (only clear
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// it when successfully processed above).
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return response
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}
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// Authentication failed: redirect to login with error. Forward a coarse
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// flow hint so the login page can show the right copy: a failed signup
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// confirmation must not be framed as a failed password reset. On the PKCE
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// (?code=) path there is no `type`, so recovery is identified by the
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// next=/reset-password marker that resetPasswordForEmail sets; everything
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// else defaults to the signup/confirmation framing.
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const failedFlow =
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type === 'recovery' || next === '/reset-password' ? 'recovery' : 'signup'
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const loginUrl = new URL('/login', origin)
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loginUrl.searchParams.set('error', 'auth_error')
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loginUrl.searchParams.set('flow', failedFlow)
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return NextResponse.redirect(loginUrl)
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}
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