Files
accounted/app/(auth)/auth/callback/__tests__/route.test.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 2296c0cd59 fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled (#1404)
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled

Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite
flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register,
where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this
instance", surfaced only as a generic toast.

New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in
.env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST
/api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees
without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail
with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and
before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves
nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries
user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure
returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage
instead of a silently-successful invite.

/auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password
(the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the
passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from
next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing
reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the
password is saved.

getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed"
(account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or
administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows
that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP
not configured) so the 502 above is actionable.

Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is
gated on it.

Fixes #1335

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config

Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the
invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and
was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod
(verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today
app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so
alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page
routes even existing-account invitees toward /register.

- New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally
  shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC,
  anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email
  enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied.
- New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence,
  case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants.
- .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters
  actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI
  allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently
  falls back to SITE_URL.
- Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning
  and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 19:34:54 +02:00

126 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
const verifyOtp = vi.fn()
const exchangeCodeForSession = vi.fn()
vi.mock('@supabase/ssr', () => ({
createServerClient: vi.fn(() => ({
auth: {
verifyOtp,
exchangeCodeForSession,
getUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } } }),
mfa: {
getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: null }),
listFactors: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: null }),
},
},
from: vi.fn(),
rpc: vi.fn(),
})),
}))
vi.mock('@/lib/auth/invite-tokens', () => ({
hashInviteToken: vi.fn(),
}))
import { GET } from '../route'
describe('GET /auth/callback: recovery flow', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
})
it('redirects to /reset-password after a successful recovery OTP (token-hash flow)', async () => {
verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
const request = new NextRequest(
'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=recovery&next=/reset-password'
)
const response = await GET(request)
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
expect(verifyOtp).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ token_hash: 'abc', type: 'recovery' })
})
it('redirects to /reset-password after a successful PKCE exchange when next=/reset-password (no type param)', async () => {
exchangeCodeForSession.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
const request = new NextRequest(
'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?code=xyz&next=/reset-password'
)
const response = await GET(request)
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
expect(exchangeCodeForSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith('xyz')
})
it('tags a failed recovery link with flow=recovery so the login page shows reset copy', async () => {
verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: { message: 'Token has expired or is invalid' } })
const request = new NextRequest(
'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=expired&type=recovery&next=/reset-password'
)
const response = await GET(request)
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe(
'http://localhost:3000/login?error=auth_error&flow=recovery'
)
})
it('tags a failed signup confirmation (PKCE code, no type/next) with flow=signup', async () => {
exchangeCodeForSession.mockResolvedValue({
error: { message: 'code verifier missing' },
})
const request = new NextRequest('http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?code=xyz')
const response = await GET(request)
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe(
'http://localhost:3000/login?error=auth_error&flow=signup'
)
})
})
describe('GET /auth/callback: admin invite flow (type=invite)', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks()
})
it('routes a verified invite to /reset-password and preserves the invite token from next', async () => {
verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
const request = new NextRequest(
'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=invite&next=/invite/gnubok_inv_tok123'
)
const response = await GET(request)
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
expect(verifyOtp).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ token_hash: 'abc', type: 'invite' })
// The company invite token is persisted as the pre-auth invite cookie so
// the reset-password handoff can accept the membership after the
// password is set.
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie') ?? '').toContain(
'gnubok-invite-token=gnubok_inv_tok123'
)
})
it('routes a verified invite without an invite path in next to /reset-password without the cookie', async () => {
verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
const request = new NextRequest(
'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=invite'
)
const response = await GET(request)
expect(response.status).toBe(307)
expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie') ?? '').not.toContain('gnubok-invite-token')
})
})