2296c0cd59
* fix(auth): provision invitees server-side when signups are disabled Self-hosted installations with GoTrue disable_signup broke the invite flow silently: invitees without an account were routed to /register, where supabase.auth.signUp fails with "Signups not allowed for this instance", surfaced only as a generic toast. New server-only env flag AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED (documented in .env.example) mirrors the GoTrue setting. When true, POST /api/company/members/invite checks check_email_exists and, for invitees without an account, provisions one via auth.admin.inviteUserByEmail with a redirect back to /invite/<token>, before the Resend email and before the invitation row is written so a provisioning failure leaves nothing half-created and the admin can retry. The response now carries user_provisioned alongside email_sent, and a provisioning failure returns 502 with a Swedish message mapped through getErrorMessage instead of a silently-successful invite. /auth/callback now routes type=invite verifications to /reset-password (the existing set-password surface) instead of dropping the passwordless user on the dashboard, and preserves the invite token from next=/invite/<token> as the pre-auth invite cookie so the existing reset-password invite handoff accepts the membership right after the password is saved. getErrorMessage learns two GoTrue patterns: "Signups not allowed" (account creation closed on this installation, contact your inviter or administrator) so the /register dead end is explained even for flows that bypass provisioning, and "Error sending ... email" (GoTrue SMTP not configured) so the 502 above is actionable. Hosted is untouched: the flag is unset there and every new code path is gated on it. Fixes #1335 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): restore check_email_exists RPC and harden self-host invite config Adversarial review of #1404 found that the check_email_exists function the invite flow depends on does not exist anywhere: it shipped in PR #229 and was lost in the #244 migration consolidation before ever reaching prod (verified missing on the hosted production database directly). Today app/api/team/accept destructures only { data } from the RPC call, so alreadyHasAccount is silently null on every deployment and the invite page routes even existing-account invitees toward /register. - New migration 20260804140000 restores the function exactly as originally shipped: SECURITY DEFINER over auth.users, EXECUTE revoked from PUBLIC, anon and authenticated, granted to service_role only (prevents email enumeration). Fixes hosted prod behavior too once applied. - New tests/pg/check-email-exists.pg.test.ts locks in existence, case-insensitive matching, false-for-unknown, and the role grants. - .env.docker.example gains the AUTH_SIGNUPS_DISABLED block self-hosters actually use; both env templates now note that the GoTrue redirect URI allow-list must include /invite/* or the invite email redirect silently falls back to SITE_URL. - Invite route test for the existsError branch: RPC failure logs a warning and provisioning proceeds anyway (GoTrue is authoritative). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): mask invitee email in provisioning-failure log (#1335) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
126 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
126 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
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import { NextRequest } from 'next/server'
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const verifyOtp = vi.fn()
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const exchangeCodeForSession = vi.fn()
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vi.mock('@supabase/ssr', () => ({
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createServerClient: vi.fn(() => ({
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auth: {
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verifyOtp,
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exchangeCodeForSession,
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getUser: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } } }),
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mfa: {
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getAuthenticatorAssuranceLevel: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: null }),
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listFactors: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: null }),
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},
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},
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from: vi.fn(),
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rpc: vi.fn(),
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})),
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}))
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vi.mock('@/lib/auth/invite-tokens', () => ({
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hashInviteToken: vi.fn(),
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}))
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import { GET } from '../route'
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describe('GET /auth/callback: recovery flow', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks()
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})
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it('redirects to /reset-password after a successful recovery OTP (token-hash flow)', async () => {
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verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
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const request = new NextRequest(
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'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=recovery&next=/reset-password'
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)
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const response = await GET(request)
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expect(response.status).toBe(307)
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expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
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expect(verifyOtp).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ token_hash: 'abc', type: 'recovery' })
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})
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it('redirects to /reset-password after a successful PKCE exchange when next=/reset-password (no type param)', async () => {
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exchangeCodeForSession.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
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const request = new NextRequest(
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'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?code=xyz&next=/reset-password'
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)
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const response = await GET(request)
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expect(response.status).toBe(307)
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expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
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expect(exchangeCodeForSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith('xyz')
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})
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it('tags a failed recovery link with flow=recovery so the login page shows reset copy', async () => {
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verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: { message: 'Token has expired or is invalid' } })
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const request = new NextRequest(
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'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=expired&type=recovery&next=/reset-password'
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)
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const response = await GET(request)
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expect(response.status).toBe(307)
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expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe(
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'http://localhost:3000/login?error=auth_error&flow=recovery'
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)
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})
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it('tags a failed signup confirmation (PKCE code, no type/next) with flow=signup', async () => {
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exchangeCodeForSession.mockResolvedValue({
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error: { message: 'code verifier missing' },
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})
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const request = new NextRequest('http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?code=xyz')
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const response = await GET(request)
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expect(response.status).toBe(307)
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expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe(
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'http://localhost:3000/login?error=auth_error&flow=signup'
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)
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})
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})
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describe('GET /auth/callback: admin invite flow (type=invite)', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks()
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})
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it('routes a verified invite to /reset-password and preserves the invite token from next', async () => {
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verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
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const request = new NextRequest(
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'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=invite&next=/invite/gnubok_inv_tok123'
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)
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const response = await GET(request)
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expect(response.status).toBe(307)
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expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
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expect(verifyOtp).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ token_hash: 'abc', type: 'invite' })
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// The company invite token is persisted as the pre-auth invite cookie so
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// the reset-password handoff can accept the membership after the
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// password is set.
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expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie') ?? '').toContain(
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'gnubok-invite-token=gnubok_inv_tok123'
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)
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})
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it('routes a verified invite without an invite path in next to /reset-password without the cookie', async () => {
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verifyOtp.mockResolvedValue({ error: null })
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const request = new NextRequest(
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'http://localhost:3000/auth/callback?token_hash=abc&type=invite'
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)
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const response = await GET(request)
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expect(response.status).toBe(307)
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expect(response.headers.get('location')).toBe('http://localhost:3000/reset-password')
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expect(response.headers.get('set-cookie') ?? '').not.toContain('gnubok-invite-token')
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})
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})
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