11995b1b0c
* feat(auth): make automatic logout an opt-in per-user setting Session timeouts (30 min idle / 12 h absolute on hosted) now apply only to users who enable "Automatic logout" in Settings > Security. Default is off: sessions live for the full Supabase refresh-token lifetime, the behavior from before the 2026-07 session hardening. - user_preferences.auto_logout (migration, default false), toggled via the extended /api/user/preferences route - The opt-in is snapshotted into the signed timeout cookie at mint, so enforcement stays DB-read-free per request; the preferences route clears the cookie on change so a toggle takes effect immediately - Pre-toggle cookies are authentic-but-stale: re-minted preserving their timers, never routed down the tamper path, so the rollout does not log anyone out - NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL=true enforces timeouts for every user regardless of preference (emergency lever, also plumbed through the Docker image); self-hosted stays disabled by default Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): resolve PR #1536 review findings - Replace the spread upsert in /api/user/preferences with one literal payload per field: the phantom-column schema guard cannot resolve spread payloads (Unit tests 3/4 ceiling failure) - Map the preferences 500 through getErrorMessage so the user-facing text is Swedish (CodeRabbit) - fetchAutoLogoutPreference now returns null on a FAILED read instead of a fail-open false: callers skip minting so an unknown preference is never persisted into the year-long signed cookie, and the next request retries; failures log at error level, distinct from the normal opt-out path (compliance swarm GDPR Art.32(1)(b) / ISO A.8.5) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): write multi-field preference updates as one atomic upsert A request carrying both hide_assistant_fab and auto_logout previously issued two sequential writes, so a failure of the second returned 500 after half the request had persisted (CodeRabbit, PR #1536). One literal upsert per accepted field combination keeps the write atomic and stays resolvable for the phantom-column schema guard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
405 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
405 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import {
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SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE,
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type SessionAuthMethod,
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type SessionTimeoutClientState,
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type SessionTimeoutReason,
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} from './session-timeout-shared'
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const DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000
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const DEFAULT_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS = 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000
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const DEFAULT_WARNING_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000
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const COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
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const SIGNING_CONTEXT = 'accounted-session-timeout-v1:'
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export interface SessionTimeoutConfig {
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enabled: boolean
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idleTimeoutMs: number
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absoluteTimeoutMs: number
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warningMs: number
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// Ignore the per-user auto_logout opt-in and enforce timeouts for every
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// cookie session (emergency lever / strict self-hosted deployments).
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enforceForAll: boolean
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}
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export interface SessionTimeoutState {
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version: 1
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userId: string
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sessionId: string | null
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startedAt: number
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lastActivityAt: number
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method: SessionAuthMethod
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// Snapshot of user_preferences.auto_logout taken when the state was minted.
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// Absent on cookies minted before the opt-in toggle existed: those must be
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// re-minted (reading the preference), never treated as tampered.
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autoLogout?: boolean
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}
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type Environment = Record<string, string | undefined>
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function parseDuration(value: string | undefined, fallback: number): number {
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if (value === undefined || value.trim() === '') return fallback
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const parsed = Number(value)
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if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 0) return fallback
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return parsed
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}
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export function getSessionTimeoutConfig(
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env: Environment = process.env,
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): SessionTimeoutConfig {
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const defaultTimeout = env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SELF_HOSTED === 'true' ? 0 : undefined
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const idleTimeoutMs = parseDuration(
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env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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defaultTimeout ?? DEFAULT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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)
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const absoluteTimeoutMs = parseDuration(
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env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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defaultTimeout ?? DEFAULT_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT_MS,
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)
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const configuredWarningMs = parseDuration(
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env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_WARNING_MS,
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DEFAULT_WARNING_MS,
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)
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const enabledTimeouts = [idleTimeoutMs, absoluteTimeoutMs]
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.filter((timeout) => timeout > 0)
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const warningMs = enabledTimeouts.length > 0
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? Math.min(configuredWarningMs, ...enabledTimeouts)
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: 0
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return {
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enabled: idleTimeoutMs > 0 || absoluteTimeoutMs > 0,
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idleTimeoutMs,
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absoluteTimeoutMs,
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warningMs,
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enforceForAll: env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SESSION_TIMEOUT_FORCE_ALL === 'true',
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}
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}
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export function createSessionTimeoutState(args: {
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userId: string
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sessionId: string | null
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method: SessionAuthMethod
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autoLogout: boolean
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now?: number
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}): SessionTimeoutState {
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const now = args.now ?? Date.now()
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return {
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version: 1,
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userId: args.userId,
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sessionId: args.sessionId,
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startedAt: now,
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lastActivityAt: now,
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method: args.method,
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autoLogout: args.autoLogout,
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}
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}
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/**
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* Whether timeouts actually apply to this session. Auto logout is opt-in
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* per user (founder decision 2026-08-12): without the opt-in snapshot, or
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* the global force-all override, a session lives as long as the Supabase
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* refresh token.
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*/
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export function sessionTimeoutEnforced(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
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): boolean {
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return config.enabled && (state.autoLogout === true || config.enforceForAll)
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}
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/**
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* Read the user's auto_logout opt-in. A missing row is a definitive false
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* (never opted in); a FAILED read returns null, deliberately distinct from
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* the opt-out path: callers must not persist a snapshot for an unknown
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* preference (which would silently disable the control for an opted-in
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* user for the cookie's lifetime) and instead skip minting so the next
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* request retries the read. Sessions that already carry a snapshot are
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* unaffected: enforcement keeps running off the signed cookie.
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*/
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export async function fetchAutoLogoutPreference(
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supabase: SupabaseClient,
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userId: string,
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): Promise<boolean | null> {
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try {
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const { data, error } = await supabase
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.from('user_preferences')
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.select('auto_logout')
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.eq('user_id', userId)
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.maybeSingle()
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if (error) {
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console.error(
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'[session-timeout] auto_logout preference read FAILED; enforcement undetermined for this request',
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error,
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)
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return null
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}
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return data?.auto_logout === true
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} catch (error) {
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console.error(
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'[session-timeout] auto_logout preference read FAILED; enforcement undetermined for this request',
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error,
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)
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return null
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}
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}
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export function evaluateSessionTimeout(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
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now = Date.now(),
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): SessionTimeoutReason | null {
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if (!sessionTimeoutEnforced(state, config)) return null
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if (
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config.absoluteTimeoutMs > 0 &&
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now - state.startedAt >= config.absoluteTimeoutMs
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) {
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return 'absolute'
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}
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if (
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config.idleTimeoutMs > 0 &&
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now - state.lastActivityAt >= config.idleTimeoutMs
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) {
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return 'idle'
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}
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return null
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}
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function getSigningSecret(env: Environment): string {
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const dedicated = env.SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET?.trim()
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if (dedicated) return dedicated
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const serviceRole = env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY?.trim()
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if (serviceRole) return serviceRole
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throw new Error(
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'Session timeout enforcement requires SESSION_TIMEOUT_SECRET or SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY',
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)
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}
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function bytesToBase64Url(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
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let binary = ''
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for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte)
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return btoa(binary)
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.replaceAll('+', '-')
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.replaceAll('/', '_')
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.replace(/=+$/u, '')
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}
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function base64UrlToBytes(value: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> | null {
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try {
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const base64 = value.replaceAll('-', '+').replaceAll('_', '/')
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const padded = base64.padEnd(Math.ceil(base64.length / 4) * 4, '=')
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const binary = atob(padded)
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const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)
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for (let index = 0; index < binary.length; index += 1) {
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bytes[index] = binary.charCodeAt(index)
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}
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return bytes
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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function encodePayload(state: SessionTimeoutState): string {
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return bytesToBase64Url(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(state)))
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}
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function decodePayload(payload: string): unknown {
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const bytes = base64UrlToBytes(payload)
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if (!bytes) return null
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try {
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return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(bytes))
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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function isValidState(value: unknown): value is SessionTimeoutState {
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if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false
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const state = value as Partial<SessionTimeoutState>
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return (
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state.version === 1 &&
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typeof state.userId === 'string' &&
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state.userId.length > 0 &&
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(state.sessionId === null || typeof state.sessionId === 'string') &&
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Number.isSafeInteger(state.startedAt) &&
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Number.isSafeInteger(state.lastActivityAt) &&
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(state.method === 'password' || state.method === 'bankid') &&
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// Absent on pre-toggle cookies: valid, but callers re-mint (see
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// sessionStateNeedsRemint) instead of treating the cookie as forged.
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(state.autoLogout === undefined || typeof state.autoLogout === 'boolean') &&
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(state.startedAt as number) > 0 &&
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(state.lastActivityAt as number) >= (state.startedAt as number)
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)
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}
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async function importSigningKey(secret: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {
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// The signing key is HKDF-derived with a purpose-bound info string, never
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// the raw secret: the SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY fallback must not use the
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// privileged credential itself as an HMAC key.
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const baseKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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new TextEncoder().encode(secret),
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'HKDF',
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false,
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['deriveKey'],
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)
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return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
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{
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name: 'HKDF',
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hash: 'SHA-256',
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salt: new Uint8Array(32),
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info: new TextEncoder().encode(SIGNING_CONTEXT),
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},
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baseKey,
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{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256', length: 256 },
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false,
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['sign', 'verify'],
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)
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}
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export async function signSessionTimeoutState(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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env: Environment = process.env,
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): Promise<string | null> {
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// A missing signing secret must degrade the timeout feature, never crash
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// authenticated requests: verifySessionTimeoutState already returns null in
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// the same misconfiguration, so returning null here keeps both halves of
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// the feature consistently disabled.
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try {
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const payload = encodePayload(state)
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const key = await importSigningKey(getSigningSecret(env))
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const signature = await crypto.subtle.sign(
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'HMAC',
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key,
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new TextEncoder().encode(`${SIGNING_CONTEXT}${payload}`),
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)
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return `${payload}.${bytesToBase64Url(new Uint8Array(signature))}`
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} catch (error) {
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console.error(
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'[session-timeout] signing failed; timeout state not persisted',
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error,
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)
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return null
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}
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}
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export async function verifySessionTimeoutState(
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value: string | undefined,
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env: Environment = process.env,
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): Promise<SessionTimeoutState | null> {
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if (!value) return null
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const [payload, signature, extra] = value.split('.')
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if (!payload || !signature || extra !== undefined) return null
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const signatureBytes = base64UrlToBytes(signature)
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if (!signatureBytes) return null
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try {
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const key = await importSigningKey(getSigningSecret(env))
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const valid = await crypto.subtle.verify(
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'HMAC',
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key,
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signatureBytes,
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new TextEncoder().encode(`${SIGNING_CONTEXT}${payload}`),
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)
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if (!valid) return null
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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const state = decodePayload(payload)
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return isValidState(state) ? state : null
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}
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interface SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
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path: '/'
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httpOnly: true
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secure: boolean
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sameSite: 'lax'
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maxAge: number
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}
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export function sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(): SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
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return {
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path: '/',
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production',
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sameSite: 'lax',
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maxAge: COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
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}
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}
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export function sessionTimeoutClearCookieOptions(): SessionTimeoutCookieOptions {
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return {
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...sessionTimeoutCookieOptions(),
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maxAge: 0,
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}
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}
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export function toSessionTimeoutClientState(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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config: SessionTimeoutConfig,
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serverNow = Date.now(),
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): SessionTimeoutClientState {
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return {
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enabled: sessionTimeoutEnforced(state, config),
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idleTimeoutMs: config.idleTimeoutMs,
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absoluteTimeoutMs: config.absoluteTimeoutMs,
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warningMs: config.warningMs,
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serverNow,
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startedAt: state.startedAt,
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lastActivityAt: state.lastActivityAt,
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method: state.method,
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}
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}
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export function sessionStateMatchesUser(
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state: SessionTimeoutState,
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userId: string,
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sessionId: string | null,
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): boolean {
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if (state.userId !== userId) return false
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if (state.sessionId === null) return true
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// The state is bound to a specific Supabase session. If the current session
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// id cannot be resolved it is unknown, not a wildcard: report a mismatch so
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// the caller mints a fresh state instead of accepting another session's.
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if (sessionId === null) return false
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return state.sessionId === sessionId
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}
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/**
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* Pre-toggle cookies carry no auto_logout snapshot. They are authentic, so
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* they must not hit the tampering path; callers re-mint them, reading the
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* preference, so every live cookie converges on the v-with-snapshot shape.
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*/
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export function sessionStateNeedsRemint(state: SessionTimeoutState): boolean {
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return state.autoLogout === undefined
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}
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export function apiRequestSkipsSessionTimeout(
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pathname: string,
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hasAuthorizationHeader: boolean,
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): boolean {
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if (
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pathname === '/api/health' ||
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pathname === '/api/log' ||
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pathname.startsWith('/api/mcp-oauth/')
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) {
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return true
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}
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return hasAuthorizationHeader && (
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pathname.startsWith('/api/v1/') ||
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pathname.startsWith('/api/extensions/ext/mcp-server/mcp')
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)
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}
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export { SESSION_TIMEOUT_COOKIE }
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