36123cef23
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision: tokens on the instance, proxy stateless). - Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger: sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only), `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real covers all of it. - EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests unchanged. - lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch. - app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions, accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state; reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted). - issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval. - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS. Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(connect): update ledger pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831200000 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): redact opaque path segments before usage metering; correct stale RPC-source comment GET/DELETE /sessions/{id} and /accounts/{uid}/... carry the raw EB session id / account uid in the pathname; metering persisted it in cleartext next to the ledger that stores only sha256(handle). Opaque segments (UUID, long hex, long base64url) now become ':id' before the connector_usage_events insert. Migration comment now cites the real prior RPC source (20260831190000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): percent-encoded path segments count as opaque in metering redaction Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1751 review batch: https-only EB URL, body-covering timeout, quota reservation, delete-after-success, doc fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): bind the /sessions code exchange to its verified pending state; ceiling +1 Verified state signature, key/service match, and an existing pending row now precede the EB exchange; a concurrently consumed state closes the just-minted upstream session and 409s. no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 for countHeldConnections' computed .or() timestamp filter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
99 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
99 lines
4.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
|
|
import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
|
|
import { getPool, withUserContext } from './setup'
|
|
import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
|
|
|
|
// pg-real for migration 20260831200000: the connection ledger, the global
|
|
// upstream budget RPC, and validate v2 returning limits. Service-role-only
|
|
// exposure is asserted the same way as the base connector-keys test.
|
|
|
|
function hash(s: string): string {
|
|
return createHash('sha256').update(s).digest('hex')
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function insertKey(limits?: Record<string, number>): Promise<{ id: string; hash: string }> {
|
|
const key = `gnubok_ck_${randomBytes(16).toString('base64url')}`
|
|
const h = hash(key)
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ id: string }>(
|
|
`INSERT INTO public.connector_keys (key_hash, key_prefix, org_number, scopes, status${limits ? ', limits' : ''})
|
|
VALUES ($1, $2, '5561234567', ARRAY['bank_sync','skatteverket'], 'active'${limits ? ', $3' : ''})
|
|
RETURNING id`,
|
|
limits ? [h, key.slice(0, 18), JSON.stringify(limits)] : [h, key.slice(0, 18)],
|
|
)
|
|
return { id: rows[0].id, hash: h }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describe('validate_and_increment_connector_key v2', () => {
|
|
it('returns the key limits (default when unset)', async () => {
|
|
const { hash: h } = await insertKey()
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT * FROM public.validate_and_increment_connector_key($1)`, [h])
|
|
expect(rows[0].limits).toEqual({ bank_connections_per_company: 1, skv_connections_per_company: 1, sync_min_interval_s: 0 })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('returns custom limits verbatim', async () => {
|
|
const { hash: h } = await insertKey({ bank_connections_per_company: 3, skv_connections_per_company: 2, sync_min_interval_s: 1800 })
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT * FROM public.validate_and_increment_connector_key($1)`, [h])
|
|
expect(rows[0].limits).toEqual({ bank_connections_per_company: 3, skv_connections_per_company: 2, sync_min_interval_s: 1800 })
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
describe('connector_reserve_upstream', () => {
|
|
it('reserves under the ceiling and rejects over it, service-scoped', async () => {
|
|
const svc = `bank-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`
|
|
const call = async () => {
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT public.connector_reserve_upstream($1, 2, 100) AS r`, [svc])
|
|
return rows[0].r as { ok: boolean; scope?: string }
|
|
}
|
|
expect((await call()).ok).toBe(true)
|
|
expect((await call()).ok).toBe(true)
|
|
const third = await call()
|
|
expect(third.ok).toBe(false)
|
|
expect(third.scope).toBe('minute')
|
|
// A different service has its own budget.
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT public.connector_reserve_upstream($1, 2, 100) AS r`, [`skv-${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`])
|
|
expect((rows[0].r as { ok: boolean }).ok).toBe(true)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('is executable by service_role only', async () => {
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ role: string; ok: boolean }>(
|
|
`SELECT r.role, has_function_privilege(r.role, 'public.connector_reserve_upstream(text,integer,integer)', 'execute') AS ok
|
|
FROM (VALUES ('anon'), ('authenticated'), ('service_role')) AS r(role)`,
|
|
)
|
|
expect(Object.fromEntries(rows.map((r) => [r.role, r.ok]))).toEqual({ anon: false, authenticated: false, service_role: true })
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
describe('connector_connections ledger', () => {
|
|
it('enforces the handle uniqueness per service and cascades with the key', async () => {
|
|
const { id: keyId } = await insertKey()
|
|
await getPool().query(
|
|
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, handle_hash, status)
|
|
VALUES ($1, 'bank', 'c1', $2, 'active')`,
|
|
[keyId, hash('sess-1')],
|
|
)
|
|
await expect(
|
|
getPool().query(
|
|
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, handle_hash, status)
|
|
VALUES ($1, 'bank', 'c2', $2, 'active')`,
|
|
[keyId, hash('sess-1')],
|
|
),
|
|
).rejects.toThrow(/idx_connector_connections_handle|duplicate key/)
|
|
await getPool().query(`DELETE FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`, [keyId])
|
|
const { rows } = await getPool().query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM public.connector_connections WHERE connector_key_id = $1`, [keyId])
|
|
expect(rows[0].n).toBe(0)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('is invisible to an authenticated user (service-role only)', async () => {
|
|
const { id: keyId } = await insertKey()
|
|
await getPool().query(
|
|
`INSERT INTO public.connector_connections (connector_key_id, service, company_ref, status) VALUES ($1, 'bank', 'c1', 'pending')`,
|
|
[keyId],
|
|
)
|
|
const userId = await insertAuthUser()
|
|
await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
|
|
const r = await client.query(`SELECT id FROM public.connector_connections`)
|
|
expect(r.rowCount).toBe(0)
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
})
|