0ff1b05553
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(connect): update pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831190000 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): RPC errors answer 503 not 401; X-Connector-Key wins over Authorization A hosted DB error mapped to 401 made the instance sync treat a pooler blip as key revocation and delete its entire connector grant cache, zeroing the 72h offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants branch (already test-pinned). Bearer-first extraction hashed the upstream token on dual-header proxied calls, 401ing the exact shape X-Connector-Key exists for. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): sync deletes grants only on a body-proven connector rejection, never bare 401/403 A WAF challenge page, edge deployment protection, or an egress proxy answers 401/403 without the hosted app ever running; trusting status alone wiped the instance's 72h offline grant cache within the hour. Deletion now requires the hosted route's own rejection code in the JSON body; codeless 401/403 keeps grants (server_error branch). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1748 review batch: https-only connect URL, atomic pin, prefix-gated Bearer, deferred metering, entitlements validation, integer months - GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL must be https (http only for loopback); invalid or plaintext URLs disable the connector instead of sending the key. - instance_url pin update filters on IS NULL; a lost race re-reads and reports the winner's pin. - extractConnectorKey: a Bearer is the connector credential only with the gnubok_ck_ prefix; upstream Bearer falls through to X-Connector-Key. - Usage metering runs via after() off the response path (inline outside a request scope). - Sync validates entitlements shape: unknown status or malformed current_period_end keeps grants (server_error), never deletes. - issue-connector-key rejects fractional --months. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
143 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
143 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
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import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
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import { getPool, withUserContext } from './setup'
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import { insertAuthUser } from './fixtures'
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// pg-real coverage for migration 20260831190000 (connector_keys,
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// connector_usage_events, validate_and_increment_connector_key): the atomic
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// validate + rate-limit path, the suspended/revoked answers, and the
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// service-role-only exposure (no RLS policy, RPC not executable by anon or
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// authenticated). Required by .claude/rules/database.md for RPC/RLS changes.
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function hashOf(key: string): string {
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return createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
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}
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async function insertKey(p: {
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status?: string
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rpm?: number
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revoked?: boolean
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scopes?: string[]
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periodEnd?: string | null
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}): Promise<{ id: string; key: string; hash: string }> {
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const key = `gnubok_ck_${randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')}`
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const hash = hashOf(key)
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const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ id: string }>(
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`INSERT INTO public.connector_keys
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(key_hash, key_prefix, org_number, licensee_name, instance_url, scopes, status, rate_limit_rpm, current_period_end, revoked_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, '5561234567', 'Byrå AB', 'https://bokforing.example.se', $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
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RETURNING id`,
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[
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hash,
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key.slice(0, 18),
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p.scopes ?? ['bank_sync', 'skatteverket', 'org_lookup', 'migration'],
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p.status ?? 'active',
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p.rpm ?? 600,
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p.periodEnd === undefined ? null : p.periodEnd,
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p.revoked ? new Date().toISOString() : null,
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],
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)
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return { id: rows[0].id, key, hash }
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}
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type RpcRow = {
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connector_key_id: string
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org_number: string
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instance_url: string | null
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scopes: string[]
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status: string
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current_period_end: Date | null
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rate_limited: boolean
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}
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async function rpc(hash: string): Promise<RpcRow[]> {
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const { rows } = await getPool().query<RpcRow>(
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`SELECT * FROM public.validate_and_increment_connector_key($1)`,
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[hash],
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)
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return rows
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}
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describe('validate_and_increment_connector_key', () => {
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it('returns the key row and counts the request', async () => {
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const { id, hash } = await insertKey({ periodEnd: '2027-01-01T00:00:00Z' })
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const rows = await rpc(hash)
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expect(rows).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({
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connector_key_id: id,
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org_number: '5561234567',
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instance_url: 'https://bokforing.example.se',
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status: 'active',
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rate_limited: false,
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})
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expect(rows[0].scopes).toEqual(['bank_sync', 'skatteverket', 'org_lookup', 'migration'])
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const { rows: after } = await getPool().query<{ request_count: number; last_seen_at: Date | null }>(
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`SELECT request_count, last_seen_at FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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)
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expect(after[0].request_count).toBe(1)
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expect(after[0].last_seen_at).not.toBeNull()
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})
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it('returns nothing for an unknown hash and for a revoked key', async () => {
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expect(await rpc(hashOf('gnubok_ck_nope'))).toEqual([])
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const revoked = await insertKey({ revoked: true, status: 'revoked' })
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expect(await rpc(revoked.hash)).toEqual([])
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})
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it('reports a suspended key without counting it', async () => {
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const { id, hash } = await insertKey({ status: 'suspended' })
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const rows = await rpc(hash)
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expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({ status: 'suspended', rate_limited: false })
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const { rows: after } = await getPool().query<{ request_count: number }>(
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`SELECT request_count FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`,
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[id],
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)
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expect(after[0].request_count).toBe(0)
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})
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it('rate-limits inside the minute window', async () => {
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const { hash } = await insertKey({ rpm: 2 })
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expect((await rpc(hash))[0].rate_limited).toBe(false)
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expect((await rpc(hash))[0].rate_limited).toBe(false)
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expect((await rpc(hash))[0].rate_limited).toBe(true)
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})
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it('is executable by service_role only', async () => {
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const { rows } = await getPool().query<{ role: string; ok: boolean }>(
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`SELECT r.role, has_function_privilege(r.role, 'public.validate_and_increment_connector_key(text)', 'execute') AS ok
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FROM (VALUES ('anon'), ('authenticated'), ('service_role')) AS r(role)`,
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)
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const byRole = Object.fromEntries(rows.map((r) => [r.role, r.ok]))
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expect(byRole).toEqual({ anon: false, authenticated: false, service_role: true })
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})
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})
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describe('connector tables are service-role only', () => {
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it('an authenticated user sees no connector keys or usage rows', async () => {
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await insertKey({})
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const userId = await insertAuthUser()
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await withUserContext(userId, async (client) => {
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const keys = await client.query(`SELECT id FROM public.connector_keys`)
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expect(keys.rowCount).toBe(0)
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const usage = await client.query(`SELECT id FROM public.connector_usage_events`)
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expect(usage.rowCount).toBe(0)
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})
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})
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it('usage rows cascade with their key', async () => {
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const { id } = await insertKey({})
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await getPool().query(
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`INSERT INTO public.connector_usage_events (connector_key_id, service, endpoint, status_code)
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VALUES ($1, 'entitlements', '/api/connect/entitlements', 200)`,
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[id],
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)
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await getPool().query(`DELETE FROM public.connector_keys WHERE id = $1`, [id])
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const { rows } = await getPool().query(
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`SELECT count(*)::int AS n FROM public.connector_usage_events WHERE connector_key_id = $1`,
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[id],
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)
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expect(rows[0].n).toBe(0)
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})
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})
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