b68c082ef5
* fix(bank-sync): cron backfills the gap since the last successful sync The daily incremental sync always asked the bank for the last 7 days. Any pause longer than that (a lapsed subscription paid again, a consent renewed after expiry, an outage) silently lost the days in between: the connection came back, looked healthy, and the missing transactions never arrived. The lookback now widens to cover the gap since last_synced_at plus one day of overlap, capped at the 90-day PSD2 limit, and a gap of a month or more asks for strategy=longest like the manual sync route does. Dedup via external_id makes the overlap harmless. First syncs keep their 90-day path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(bank-sync): chip warns seven days before a bank consent expires The transactions-page chip only reacted once a connection was already dead (expired/error) or had gone stale. A consent that is about to end looked healthy until the morning it stopped syncing. New "expiring" state when a live connection's consent_expires is within seven days, the same threshold as the consent-expiry email in the sync cron. Precedence: attention, expiring, stale, healthy. getChipState moves to lib/transactions/bank-sync-chip-state.ts so the precedence is unit-tested; the component keeps the rendering only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(bank-sync): chip says paused when the subscription lapsed The daily cron filters connections by the bank_sync capability, so a company whose trial or subscription ended keeps status=active rows with a frozen last_synced_at. The chip read that as "stale, check the connection", which sends the user to re-authorise a connection that is perfectly alive. 56 of 191 active connections on prod were in this state on 2026-09-01. New "paused" state, ranked above everything else, when the company lacks bank_sync: hosted points at billing, self-host at the connector key, the same split BankSyncNowButton already makes. getChipState takes an options object so the clock stays out of render (react-hooks/purity). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * feat(api): agent-triggerable bank sync in v1 and MCP Closes the first wish in the F2 report: an integration could read bank data but never refresh it. New POST /api/v1/companies/{id}/bank-connections/ {connectionId}/sync and MCP gnubok_sync_bank, both on a shared runner (extensions/general/enable-banking/lib/trigger-sync.ts). Cost is bounded structurally, not by policy: the window is never caller-controlled (the cron's gap-aware 7 to 90 day lookback), a connection synced within 15 minutes answers BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN with next_allowed_at (429 + Retry-After on v1; synced=false in-band on MCP so the agent reads on instead of retrying), and a failing connection is throttled per process by attempt time. A dead session is flipped to expired with a remediation that hands the user the connect link: no API call revives a consent. Gated on bank_sync like gnubok_connect_bank; scope transactions:write. Registry, scope map, load-routes, spec snapshot and the generated accounted-api skill updated; five BANK_SYNC_* / BANK_SESSION_EXPIRED codes added to the structured-error registry. The web Synka-nu route is left as is (see DECISIONS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * test(bank-sync): use the options object in the remaining chip-state calls Four multi-line calls still passed the clock positionally after getChipState moved to an options object; tsc flagged them (vitest did not, the extra argument was ignored at runtime). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * fix(api): address skeptic findings on the agent-triggered bank sync Three refutations from the pre-publish skeptic pass: 1. Core imported the extension. The v1 sync route pulled the runner straight from @/extensions, which the core-build gate rejects and which left a live bank endpoint on zero-extension builds. The route now resolves it through the registry's services channel against a contract in lib/bank-sync/trigger-sync-contract.ts (same pattern as the Skatteverket read service) and answers EXTENSION_DISABLED when the extension is absent. 2. The idempotency cache stored the handler-level 429. A same-key retry after Retry-After, which is the documented retry, replayed the stale cooldown as a 400 for the cache's 24-hour TTL. withApiV1 no longer caches 429 responses; regression test added. The endpoint's pitfall no longer claims Idempotency-Key is mandatory (it was never enforced). 3. Two cron tests read the clock twice and failed whenever a millisecond passed between the reads. They now pin the clock with fake timers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QdcDV7CngLkWUvfKSsxFhS * fix(bank-sync): durable cooldown lease and review wording Resolves the PR #2165 review findings in one pass. Superagent P1: the attempt throttle was a process-local Map, so two agent calls on different serverless instances (or a retry after a cold start on a failing connection) could each bill an Enable Banking call, contradicting the one-sync-per-15-minutes promise. New bank_connections.sync_lease_until (migration 20260902150000), claimed with one conditional UPDATE before the bank is called; Postgres row locking makes exactly one claimer win, the rest answer BANK_SYNC_COOLDOWN. The lease stays for the full window on success and failure. Tests cover the claim order, a failed attempt seen from a second instance, a lost race, and an expired lease. CodeRabbit: the =1 plural branch now reads "in 1 day" / "om 1 dag" (daysUntilConsentExpiry rounds a partial day up, so "tomorrow" could be today); the cooldown pitfall on the v1 endpoint, the MCP description and the in-band cooldown instruction now say a cooldown can follow a failed attempt and tell the agent to compare last_synced_at before deciding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub * fix(bank-sync): lease claim as a literal filter for the schema guard CI's no-phantom-columns guard counts runtime-built query expressions and its ceiling is exact; the templated `.or('sync_lease_until.is.null,...')` claim added one. The column now defaults to epoch (NOT NULL), so "never claimed" is just "expired long ago" and the atomic claim is a single literal `.lte('sync_lease_until', now)` the guard can check. Migration is unshipped (same PR), so it is edited in place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub * fix(bank-sync): runner verifies company membership before the lease Superagent (round 3): the MCP path reached the shared runner without a membership check of its own. Both callers do enforce it upstream (withApiV1's company resolution and resolveMcpCompanyContext in the MCP dispatcher), but the runner writes transactions and bills a bank call, so it now checks company_members itself, before the cooldown and the lease claim, and answers NOT_FOUND for a non-member. The viewer check that was buried inside the sync block moves up with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0125TMQQBjBBZG9YxP7wQWub --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
103 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript
103 lines
4.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, vi } from 'vitest'
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import {
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MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP,
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PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP,
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PAID_CAPABILITIES,
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CAPABILITY,
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} from '../keys'
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/**
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* These maps are the contract that gates the paid MCP/agent path (dispatch +
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* commit). Locking the exact entries is the guard against a future paid
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* external-service tool silently bypassing the paywall: mirrors the
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* TOOL_SCOPE_MAP assertions in the mcp-server tests.
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*/
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks()
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})
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/**
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* MCP tools that invoke a paid capability directly (no stage→commit round-trip),
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* so they are gated at DISPATCH only and have no commit-time (operation-map)
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* counterpart. The document upload tools run Bedrock OCR inline via
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* extractInvoiceFields: they never stage a pending_operation.
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*/
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const DISPATCH_ONLY_MCP_TOOLS = new Set<string>([
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'gnubok_upload_document',
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'gnubok_create_document_upload',
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'gnubok_complete_document_upload',
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// Onboarding connect-link tools: read status + hand out a browser link; no commit counterpart.
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'gnubok_connect_bank',
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'gnubok_connect_skatteverket',
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// Agent-triggered PSD2 sync: inline Enable Banking call, no staged operation.
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'gnubok_sync_bank',
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])
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describe('MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP', () => {
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it('gates exactly the paid MCP tools (3 external-service staging tools + the AI OCR tools)', () => {
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expect(MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP).toEqual({
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gnubok_send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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gnubok_vat_declaration_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_agi_submit: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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gnubok_connect_bank: CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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gnubok_sync_bank: CAPABILITY.bank_sync,
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gnubok_connect_skatteverket: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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// Dispatch-only AI tools: inline Bedrock OCR, no staged operation. The
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// signed-URL pair is gated at create AND complete so a free-tier key can
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// neither reserve nor finalize a paid extraction.
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gnubok_upload_document: CAPABILITY.ai,
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gnubok_create_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
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gnubok_complete_document_upload: CAPABILITY.ai,
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})
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})
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it('only maps tools to PAID capabilities', () => {
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for (const key of Object.values(MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP)) {
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).toContain(key)
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}
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})
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})
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describe('PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP', () => {
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it('gates exactly the three paid pending-operation types', () => {
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expect(PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP).toEqual({
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send_invoice: CAPABILITY.email_send,
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submit_vat_declaration: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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submit_agi: CAPABILITY.skatteverket,
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})
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})
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it('only maps operations to PAID capabilities', () => {
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for (const key of Object.values(PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP)) {
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).toContain(key)
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}
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})
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it('covers the same capabilities as the STAGING MCP tools (dispatch ↔ commit parity)', () => {
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// Parity applies to staging tools only: an op that can be staged via MCP OR
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// approved in the UI must be gated on both transports. Dispatch-only tools
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// (inline AI OCR) have no commit counterpart and are excluded.
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const stagingMcpCaps = new Set(
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Object.entries(MCP_TOOL_CAPABILITY_MAP)
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.filter(([tool]) => !DISPATCH_ONLY_MCP_TOOLS.has(tool))
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.map(([, cap]) => cap),
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)
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expect(new Set(Object.values(PAID_OPERATION_CAPABILITY_MAP))).toEqual(stagingMcpCaps)
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})
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})
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describe('CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES', () => {
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it('names only real capability keys, with the two connector-only keys outside the paid set', async () => {
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const { CAPABILITY, CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES, PAID_CAPABILITIES, isConnectorCapability } = await import('../keys')
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const all = new Set(Object.values(CAPABILITY))
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for (const key of CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES) expect(all.has(key), key).toBe(true)
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expect(CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES).toEqual(['bank_sync', 'skatteverket', 'org_lookup', 'migration'])
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// org_lookup and migration stay free on hosted (not PAID) but still need
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// Accounted's services, hence connector-gated on a self-host.
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).not.toContain('org_lookup')
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expect(PAID_CAPABILITIES).not.toContain('migration')
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expect(isConnectorCapability('ai')).toBe(false)
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expect(isConnectorCapability('bank_sync')).toBe(true)
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})
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})
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