0040cadacc
* feat(invoicing): opt-in invoice email from the company's own sending domain Companies holding the custom_sender_domain capability grant can register their own domain (Resend sending-only profile), publish DKIM/SPF, and once verified every invoice email (send, reminders, recurring, payment confirmation, MCP/v1 sends) leaves as "<name> <faktura@their-domain>" instead of the platform sender. Reply-To is unchanged. - New table company_sending_domains (RLS: members read, owner/admin write; audit trigger), types, archive-export classification. - New capability key custom_sender_domain: manually granted per company, deliberately outside PAID_CAPABILITIES (never trial-seeded, never written by the Stripe sync). Without the grant the settings section is hidden and nothing changes. - Email extension: sending-domain routes (GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE, verify), Resend domain lifecycle without orphan adoption, domain.updated handling on the delivery webhook, explicit From support in the Resend adapter. - Core resolveInvoiceSender(): verified + enabled + entitled, else the platform sender; never throws. - Settings -> Invoicing: "Avsändare vid fakturautskick" section (sv/en). - Unit tests for the resolver, domain helpers, routes, From header; pg-real test for RLS and constraints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoicing): harden sending-domain writes, sender fallback, review findings Skeptic refutations: - Tenant JWTs could insert/update company_sending_domains with status = 'verified' and an arbitrary domain through PostgREST (RLS only checked membership), then send invoice mail as that domain. New migration 20260822130000 adds a BEFORE trigger: tenants may only open a pending claim and edit sender_local_part/sender_name/enabled; domain and verification state are service-role only. claim/verify helpers now take a service-role writer for those columns; the route's RLS client still does the insert. - A company domain Resend later rejects made every invoice send fail: the Resend adapter retries once as the platform sender when an explicit company From is rejected (nothing was sent, so no double send). Review findings: - domain.updated webhook: discriminated outcome; DB errors answer 500 so Svix retries, unknown domains are acknowledged. - Display names are RFC 5322-quoted only when they carry specials. - Sender local part is a strict dot-atom (no trailing/consecutive dots), in code and in the CHECK constraint; resend_domain_id index is UNIQUE. - IME composition guard on the claim input; event bus reset in tests; settings section skips its request for non-admins. Deferred (needs a product call): persisting the effective From address in the invoice delivery log touches the hardened evidence triggers; recorded in DECISIONS.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(invoicing): bind sending-domain verification to the claimed domain; fix pg test Skeptic re-check found a TOCTOU: during the claim's Resend round-trip a tenant could delete and re-insert its pending row under the same id with a reserved domain, and the service-role writer updated by id alone. Now: - the claim's verification-state write filters on (id, company_id, domain, resend_domain_id IS NULL) and rolls back on zero rows; - verify and the domain.updated webhook compare Resend's domain name with the row before writing verified; - resolveInvoiceSender refuses reserved platform domains and non-hostnames at send time (reserved-domain logic moved to lib/email/domain-name.ts and shared with the claim validator). pg-real: the case-insensitive uniqueness assertion now expects the domain_shape CHECK (lowercase enforced) for an uppercase variant and the unique index for a same-case duplicate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
84 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
84 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { domainToASCII } from 'node:url'
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Hostname normalization for user-entered email domains.
|
|
*
|
|
* Accepts what users actually paste ("Faktura.Hansbolag.SE.", a full URL, or
|
|
* an email address) and reduces it to a lowercased, punycoded hostname.
|
|
* Returns null when no valid hostname can be extracted. Dependency-free so
|
|
* both core and extensions can share one definition of "a valid domain".
|
|
*/
|
|
export function normalizeDomainName(raw: string): string | null {
|
|
let value = String(raw ?? '').trim().toLowerCase()
|
|
value = value.replace(/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//, '') // strip scheme
|
|
value = value.split('/')[0].split('?')[0]
|
|
const atIndex = value.lastIndexOf('@')
|
|
if (atIndex !== -1) value = value.slice(atIndex + 1)
|
|
value = value.replace(/^\.+|\.+$/g, '')
|
|
if (!value) return null
|
|
|
|
// IDN -> punycode (blåbär.se -> xn--blbr-noab.se). Returns '' when the
|
|
// input is not a valid domain.
|
|
const ascii = domainToASCII(value)
|
|
if (!ascii) return null
|
|
|
|
return isValidHostname(ascii) ? ascii : null
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function isValidHostname(domain: string): boolean {
|
|
if (domain.length < 4 || domain.length > 253) return false
|
|
const labels = domain.split('.')
|
|
if (labels.length < 2) return false
|
|
if (!labels.every((l) => /^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/.test(l))) return false
|
|
// TLD must contain a letter: rejects IP addresses and all-numeric TLDs.
|
|
return /[a-z]/.test(labels[labels.length - 1])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hostnameOf(value: string | undefined): string | null {
|
|
if (!value) return null
|
|
try {
|
|
return new URL(value).hostname.toLowerCase() || null
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return null
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Domains no tenant may ever send as: the platform's own sender domain
|
|
* (RESEND_FROM_EMAIL), the shared inbound domain, and the app host, plus
|
|
* their subdomains. Read from env on every call (cheap, and tests flip env).
|
|
*/
|
|
export function reservedSenderDomains(): string[] {
|
|
const reserved: string[] = []
|
|
const fromDomain = process.env.RESEND_FROM_EMAIL
|
|
? normalizeDomainName(process.env.RESEND_FROM_EMAIL)
|
|
: null
|
|
if (fromDomain) reserved.push(fromDomain)
|
|
const inbound = process.env.RESEND_INBOUND_DOMAIN?.toLowerCase()
|
|
if (inbound) reserved.push(inbound)
|
|
const appHost = hostnameOf(process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL)
|
|
if (appHost) reserved.push(appHost)
|
|
return reserved
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** True when `domain` is a reserved platform domain or a subdomain of one. */
|
|
export function isReservedSenderDomain(domain: string): boolean {
|
|
const d = domain.toLowerCase()
|
|
return reservedSenderDomains().some((r) => d === r || d.endsWith(`.${r}`))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Local part of a sender address: conservative dot-atom subset, lowercase.
|
|
* Dots may only separate atoms (RFC 5322 dot-atom): no leading, trailing or
|
|
* consecutive dots. Mirrored by the CHECK constraint in
|
|
* 20260822130000_company_sending_domains_tenant_guard.sql.
|
|
*/
|
|
export const SENDER_LOCAL_PART_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9_-]+(\.[a-z0-9_-]+)*$/
|
|
const SENDER_LOCAL_PART_MAX_LENGTH = 64
|
|
|
|
export function normalizeSenderLocalPart(raw: string): string | null {
|
|
const value = String(raw ?? '').trim().toLowerCase()
|
|
if (value.length === 0 || value.length > SENDER_LOCAL_PART_MAX_LENGTH) return null
|
|
return SENDER_LOCAL_PART_PATTERN.test(value) ? value : null
|
|
}
|