Files
accounted/lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
T
Jakob Wennberg 36123cef23 feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget (#1751)
* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector'

Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted.

- lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync,
  skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a
  self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability().
  Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on
  purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant.
- lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key).
  Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins,
  else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on
  (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector
  capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the
  grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows.
  getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector
  keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the
  hosted trial copy).
- Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains
  'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline
  and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly).
  pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the
  (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows.
- Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector
  gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector
  keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests
  that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated
  to the new one.

Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green
against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint
ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector
extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can
be issued).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query

One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the
no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is
unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly

Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the
entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the
plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key.

Hosted side:
- Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix,
  org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids,
  current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count,
  last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering,
  separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted
  companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC
  validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR
  UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row)
  and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role.
  pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate
  limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade.
- lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts
  (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping),
  with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per
  request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET +
  POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report,
  never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless
  --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines).

Instance side:
- lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL
  default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count
  and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope,
  expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status
  deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone.
  /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key.
- Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json,
  with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with
  the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates),
  DECISIONS.

Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes
and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests
run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied.
no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget

Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A
self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect
a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all
transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision:
tokens on the instance, proxy stateless).

- Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger:
  sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only),
  `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global
  budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and
  `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs
  REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real
  covers all of it.
- EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core
  must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests
  unchanged.
- lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed
  connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR
  registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance
  redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch.
- app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions,
  accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST
  /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state;
  reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the
  global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted).
- issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of
  v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval.
- Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS.

Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against
supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt
relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean.
Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(connect): update ledger pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831200000

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): redact opaque path segments before usage metering; correct stale RPC-source comment

GET/DELETE /sessions/{id} and /accounts/{uid}/... carry the raw EB
session id / account uid in the pathname; metering persisted it in
cleartext next to the ledger that stores only sha256(handle). Opaque
segments (UUID, long hex, long base64url) now become ':id' before the
connector_usage_events insert. Migration comment now cites the real
prior RPC source (20260831190000).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): percent-encoded path segments count as opaque in metering redaction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): PR #1751 review batch: https-only EB URL, body-covering timeout, quota reservation, delete-after-success, doc fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

* fix(connect): bind the /sessions code exchange to its verified pending state; ceiling +1

Verified state signature, key/service match, and an existing pending
row now precede the EB exchange; a concurrently consumed state closes
the just-minted upstream session and 409s. no-phantom-columns ceiling
391 for countHeldConnections' computed .or() timestamp filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb

---------

Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
2026-08-31 21:46:50 +02:00

117 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'node:crypto'
import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
import { CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX, type ConnectorKeyStatus } from '../contract'
/**
* Hosted-side connector key primitives. Mirrors lib/auth/api-keys.ts for
* `gnubok_sk_` API keys: 32 CSPRNG bytes, SHA-256 at rest (the hash is the
* lookup; a slow KDF adds nothing on a 256-bit random secret and would sit on
* the hot path of every proxied request), atomic validate + rate-limit in a
* SECURITY DEFINER RPC that only service_role may execute.
*/
export function generateConnectorKey(): { key: string; hash: string; prefix: string } {
const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
const key = `${CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX}${random}`
return { key, hash: hashConnectorKey(key), prefix: key.slice(0, CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX.length + 8) }
}
export function hashConnectorKey(key: string): string {
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
}
export function isConnectorKeyFormat(key: string): boolean {
return key.startsWith(CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX) && key.length > CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX.length + 16
}
export interface ConnectorKeyLimits {
bank_connections_per_company: number
skv_connections_per_company: number
sync_min_interval_s: number
}
export const DEFAULT_CONNECTOR_LIMITS: ConnectorKeyLimits = {
bank_connections_per_company: 1,
skv_connections_per_company: 1,
sync_min_interval_s: 0,
}
export interface ValidatedConnectorKey {
id: string
orgNumber: string
instanceUrl: string | null
scopes: string[]
status: ConnectorKeyStatus
currentPeriodEnd: string | null
limits: ConnectorKeyLimits
}
export type ConnectorKeyValidation =
| { ok: true; key: ValidatedConnectorKey }
| { ok: false; status: 401 | 403 | 429; code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID' | 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED' | 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED'; error: string }
| { ok: false; status: 503; code: 'CONNECTOR_VALIDATION_UNAVAILABLE'; error: string }
/**
* Validate a presented key: format check, RPC lookup (atomic rate-limit
* increment), status mapping. Never throws on a bad key.
*
* A database/RPC error maps to 503, NEVER 401: the instance-side sync treats
* 401/403 as key revocation and deletes its entire connector grant cache
* (lib/connect/instance/sync.ts), so answering a hosted pooler blip with 401
* would let a transient hosted incident destroy a paying instance's 72h
* offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants branch. Only a genuine
* empty result (unknown or revoked key) is 401. This deliberately diverges
* from the api-keys precedent, where a spurious 401 costs one request.
*/
export async function validateConnectorKey(
key: string,
supabase: SupabaseClient = createServiceClientNoCookies(),
): Promise<ConnectorKeyValidation> {
if (!isConnectorKeyFormat(key)) {
return { ok: false, status: 401, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID', error: 'Invalid connector key' }
}
const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('validate_and_increment_connector_key', {
p_key_hash: hashConnectorKey(key),
})
if (error) {
return {
ok: false,
status: 503,
code: 'CONNECTOR_VALIDATION_UNAVAILABLE',
error: 'Connector key validation temporarily unavailable',
}
}
if (!data || (Array.isArray(data) && data.length === 0)) {
return { ok: false, status: 401, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID', error: 'Invalid connector key' }
}
const row = (Array.isArray(data) ? data[0] : data) as {
connector_key_id: string
org_number: string
instance_url: string | null
scopes: string[] | null
status: string
current_period_end: string | null
rate_limited: boolean
limits: Partial<ConnectorKeyLimits> | null
}
if (row.status !== 'active') {
return { ok: false, status: 403, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED', error: 'Connector key is suspended' }
}
if (row.rate_limited) {
return { ok: false, status: 429, code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED', error: 'Rate limit exceeded' }
}
return {
ok: true,
key: {
id: row.connector_key_id,
orgNumber: row.org_number,
instanceUrl: row.instance_url,
scopes: row.scopes ?? [],
status: 'active',
currentPeriodEnd: row.current_period_end,
limits: { ...DEFAULT_CONNECTOR_LIMITS, ...(row.limits ?? {}) },
},
}
}