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* feat(entitlements): partition the self-host bypass so connector capabilities fall through to grants; capability_grants.source accepts 'connector' Sovereign plan WS3 PR3: ships dark, nothing changes for hosted. - lib/entitlements/keys.ts: CONNECTOR_CAPABILITIES = bank_sync, skatteverket, org_lookup, migration (services Accounted operates that a self-hosted instance cannot provide itself) + isConnectorCapability(). Separate from PAID_CAPABILITIES and outside the trial-seed trigger on purpose: a hosted company can never hold a connector grant. - lib/entitlements/has-capability.ts: isPaywallBypassed() -> isBypassedFor(key). Hosted: byte-identical (dev / DISABLE_PAYWALL bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL wins, else the grant lookup). Self-host: local capabilities always on (FORCE_PAYWALL included, as the existing test demands); connector capabilities behave like hosted, i.e. dev bypass, FORCE_PAYWALL, else the grant lookup where the connector sync will write source='connector' rows. getCompanyEntitlements on a self-host: local paid keys + active connector keys, state 'paid' with an active connector grant else 'none' (never the hosted trial copy). - Migration 20260820122000: capability_grants.source CHECK gains 'connector', found through pg_constraint (the CHECK was declared inline and auto-named; Postgres stores IN as = ANY, matched accordingly). pg-real test: connector accepted, unknown source rejected, upsert on the (scope, key, source) identity, trial seed writes no connector rows. - Tests: self-hosted connector matrix (local all-on without DB, connector gated by grant/expiry, dev bypass all-on, FORCE_PAYWALL gates connector keys only, bulk resolution, entitlements shape); two pre-existing tests that asserted the old "self-host holds connector keys" contract updated to the new one. Verified: full unit suite green, pg-real suite for lib/entitlements green against a local supabase/postgres with every migration applied, lint ratchet, guards. Deferred to the instance-wiring PR: adding the connector extensions to the self-host Docker preset (dead-end upsells until a key can be issued). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(entitlements): fold the self-host branch into the existing grants query One .or(scopeFilter), not two: the duplicated helper pushed the no-phantom-columns unresolvable-expression count to 380/379. Behaviour is unchanged; the self-host matrix tests still pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): hosted connector-key registry + validate RPC + entitlements endpoint; instance sync writes connector grants hourly Sovereign plan WS3 PR4 ("key infra enabling manual sales"), stacked on the entitlement partition (#1747). Nothing is purchasable yet; this is the plumbing both ends need before the first manually issued key. Hosted side: - Migration 20260820123000: connector_keys (SHA-256 key_hash, prefix, org_number, pinned instance_url, scopes, status, Stripe ids, current_period_end, per-minute rate limit, active_company_count, last_seen/synced) and connector_usage_events (per-request metering, separate from metered_events whose company_id references hosted companies). RLS on, NO policies: service role only. RPC validate_and_increment_connector_key copies the api_keys pattern (FOR UPDATE, minute window, suspended reported not counted, revoked = no row) and is REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed to service_role. pg-real test covers validate/count, unknown+revoked, suspended, rate limit, execute privileges per role, RLS invisibility, usage cascade. - lib/connect/contract.ts (shared wire types), lib/connect/hosted/keys.ts (generate/hash/validate -> 401/403/429 mapping), with-connector-auth.ts (Bearer or X-Connector-Key, one usage row per request, 500 envelope on handler throw), /api/connect/entitlements GET + POST (records active_company_count, pins instance_url on first report, never moves a pinned one), scripts/issue-connector-key.ts (dry run unless --confirm, prints the key once + the .env lines). Instance side: - lib/connect/instance/config.ts (GNUBOK_CONNECTOR_KEY, GNUBOK_CONNECT_URL default https://app.gnubok.se), sync.ts: reports the active company count and writes source='connector' grants for every company x covered scope, expires_at = min(now+72h, period_end+3d); 401/403 or a non-active status deletes them (freeze-and-retain); network/5xx/429 leave them alone. /api/connector/sync/cron (hourly) runs it; not_configured without a key. - Crontab generator gains EXTRA_JOBS (variant-only jobs not in vercel.json, with reasons) + drift tests; docker/crontab.self-hosted regenerated with the hourly sync. Docs (SELF-HOSTING connector section, env templates), DECISIONS. Tests: 52 new unit tests (keys, auth wrapper, route, config, sync outcomes and grant arithmetic, cron route, crontab EXTRA_JOBS) + 7 pg-real tests run locally against supabase/postgres with every migration applied. no-phantom-columns ceiling +1 with a reason (the bulk grant upsert). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(connect): Enable Banking proxy for self-hosted instances, with a secret-free ownership ledger and a global rate budget Sovereign plan WS3 PR5a, stacked on the connector-key infra (#1748). A self-hosted instance with a `bank_sync`-scoped connector key can now connect a bank through Arcim's PSD2 credentials; the bank session id and all transaction data stay in the instance's own database (founder decision: tokens on the instance, proxy stateless). - Migration 20260820124000: `connector_connections` (secret-free ledger: sha256 of the EB session id + account uids, service-role only), `connector_upstream_counters` + RPC `connector_reserve_upstream` (global budget under EB Annex 1 §5's 300/min, shared with hosted), and `connector_keys.limits` jsonb; validate RPC v2 returns limits. All RPCs REVOKEd from PUBLIC/anon/authenticated, GRANTed service_role. pg-real covers all of it. - EB JWT minting moved to lib/connect/upstreams/enable-banking-jwt.ts (core must not import @/extensions/); the extension re-exports it, tests unchanged. - lib/connect/hosted/{state,ledger,upstream-budget}.ts: HMAC-signed connector state (15-min TTL) so the consent redirect can use OUR registered EB callback and bounce back to the instance, no per-instance redirect URI at EB; the callback route gains that connector branch. - app/api/connect/bank/[...path]: path allowlist (aspsps, auth, sessions, accounts/{uid}/{balances,transactions}), never open passthrough. POST /auth enforces the per-company connection quota + rewrites redirect/state; reads/deletes verify ledger ownership; every upstream call takes the global budget (429 + Retry-After when exhausted). - issue-connector-key.ts: scopes default bank_sync,skatteverket (TIC out of v1), --bank/skv-connections-per-company + --sync-min-interval. - Docs (SELF-HOSTING: bank connector live), DECISIONS. Verified: 52 connect unit tests + 13 pg-real (run locally against supabase/postgres with all migrations) + EB extension suite (225, jwt relocation intact); full unit suite 15 979 green; tsc, guards, lint clean. Not in this PR: SKV broker (PR5b) and instance wiring (PR6). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(connect): update ledger pg test to re-versioned migration 20260831200000 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): redact opaque path segments before usage metering; correct stale RPC-source comment GET/DELETE /sessions/{id} and /accounts/{uid}/... carry the raw EB session id / account uid in the pathname; metering persisted it in cleartext next to the ledger that stores only sha256(handle). Opaque segments (UUID, long hex, long base64url) now become ':id' before the connector_usage_events insert. Migration comment now cites the real prior RPC source (20260831190000). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): percent-encoded path segments count as opaque in metering redaction Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): PR #1751 review batch: https-only EB URL, body-covering timeout, quota reservation, delete-after-success, doc fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb * fix(connect): bind the /sessions code exchange to its verified pending state; ceiling +1 Verified state signature, key/service match, and an existing pending row now precede the EB exchange; a concurrently consumed state closes the just-minted upstream session and 409s. no-phantom-columns ceiling 391 for countHeldConnections' computed .or() timestamp filter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzNkSsR18pLFitJdYn8QEb --------- Co-authored-by: Jakob Wennberg <311770904+jakobwennberg-oss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Emil <emilmattsson14@gmail.com>
117 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
117 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
import crypto from 'node:crypto'
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import type { SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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import { createServiceClientNoCookies } from '@/lib/auth/api-keys'
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import { CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX, type ConnectorKeyStatus } from '../contract'
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/**
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* Hosted-side connector key primitives. Mirrors lib/auth/api-keys.ts for
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* `gnubok_sk_` API keys: 32 CSPRNG bytes, SHA-256 at rest (the hash is the
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* lookup; a slow KDF adds nothing on a 256-bit random secret and would sit on
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* the hot path of every proxied request), atomic validate + rate-limit in a
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* SECURITY DEFINER RPC that only service_role may execute.
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*/
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export function generateConnectorKey(): { key: string; hash: string; prefix: string } {
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const random = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url')
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const key = `${CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX}${random}`
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return { key, hash: hashConnectorKey(key), prefix: key.slice(0, CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX.length + 8) }
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}
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export function hashConnectorKey(key: string): string {
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return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest('hex')
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}
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export function isConnectorKeyFormat(key: string): boolean {
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return key.startsWith(CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX) && key.length > CONNECTOR_KEY_PREFIX.length + 16
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}
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export interface ConnectorKeyLimits {
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bank_connections_per_company: number
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skv_connections_per_company: number
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sync_min_interval_s: number
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}
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export const DEFAULT_CONNECTOR_LIMITS: ConnectorKeyLimits = {
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bank_connections_per_company: 1,
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skv_connections_per_company: 1,
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sync_min_interval_s: 0,
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}
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export interface ValidatedConnectorKey {
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id: string
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orgNumber: string
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instanceUrl: string | null
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scopes: string[]
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status: ConnectorKeyStatus
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currentPeriodEnd: string | null
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limits: ConnectorKeyLimits
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}
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export type ConnectorKeyValidation =
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| { ok: true; key: ValidatedConnectorKey }
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| { ok: false; status: 401 | 403 | 429; code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID' | 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED' | 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED'; error: string }
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| { ok: false; status: 503; code: 'CONNECTOR_VALIDATION_UNAVAILABLE'; error: string }
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/**
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* Validate a presented key: format check, RPC lookup (atomic rate-limit
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* increment), status mapping. Never throws on a bad key.
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*
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* A database/RPC error maps to 503, NEVER 401: the instance-side sync treats
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* 401/403 as key revocation and deletes its entire connector grant cache
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* (lib/connect/instance/sync.ts), so answering a hosted pooler blip with 401
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* would let a transient hosted incident destroy a paying instance's 72h
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* offline grace. 503 lands in the sync's keep-grants branch. Only a genuine
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* empty result (unknown or revoked key) is 401. This deliberately diverges
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* from the api-keys precedent, where a spurious 401 costs one request.
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*/
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export async function validateConnectorKey(
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key: string,
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supabase: SupabaseClient = createServiceClientNoCookies(),
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): Promise<ConnectorKeyValidation> {
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if (!isConnectorKeyFormat(key)) {
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return { ok: false, status: 401, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID', error: 'Invalid connector key' }
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}
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const { data, error } = await supabase.rpc('validate_and_increment_connector_key', {
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p_key_hash: hashConnectorKey(key),
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})
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if (error) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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status: 503,
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code: 'CONNECTOR_VALIDATION_UNAVAILABLE',
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error: 'Connector key validation temporarily unavailable',
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}
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}
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if (!data || (Array.isArray(data) && data.length === 0)) {
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return { ok: false, status: 401, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_INVALID', error: 'Invalid connector key' }
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}
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const row = (Array.isArray(data) ? data[0] : data) as {
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connector_key_id: string
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org_number: string
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instance_url: string | null
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scopes: string[] | null
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status: string
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current_period_end: string | null
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rate_limited: boolean
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limits: Partial<ConnectorKeyLimits> | null
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}
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if (row.status !== 'active') {
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return { ok: false, status: 403, code: 'CONNECTOR_KEY_SUSPENDED', error: 'Connector key is suspended' }
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}
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if (row.rate_limited) {
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return { ok: false, status: 429, code: 'CONNECTOR_RATE_LIMITED', error: 'Rate limit exceeded' }
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}
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return {
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ok: true,
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key: {
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id: row.connector_key_id,
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orgNumber: row.org_number,
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instanceUrl: row.instance_url,
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scopes: row.scopes ?? [],
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status: 'active',
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currentPeriodEnd: row.current_period_end,
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limits: { ...DEFAULT_CONNECTOR_LIMITS, ...(row.limits ?? {}) },
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},
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}
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}
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